Consciousness, that elusive and deeply personal experience of being, has puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries. What is it? How does it arise?
A compelling new perspective comes from philosopher Bruce R. Long, who proposes an informational identity theory of consciousness. This theory posits that consciousness is not some mysterious substance or epiphenomenon, but rather identical to certain kinds of information processing.
Identity theory is not new, so what's the new proposal? It's about emphasising complexly processed cognitive and perceptual information, rather than brain processes.
Long argues that specific types of information, when structured and processed in particular ways, constitute conscious experience. It's not just any information, though. It's information that is intrinsically semantic – meaning it carries inherent meaning – and is organized in a way that allows for complex representations and self-awareness. Think of it like this: a digital image is just a collection of data, but when that data is processed and interpreted by a computer, it forms a meaningful image that a human can perceive. Similarly, certain kinds of organized, meaningful information, when processed by a suitable system (like a brain), are consciousness.
This informational identity theory stands in contrast to more traditional, process-focused identity theories. Those theories often identify consciousness with specific brain processes. Long's theory, however, focuses on the information being processed, not just the physical processes themselves. Consciousness, in this view, is identical to adequately complexly processed information within perceptual and cognitive information processes. It's not simply caused by these processes; it is these processes at the informational level of description. This distinction is crucial. It means that consciousness could potentially arise in any system capable of processing the right kind of semantic information in the right way, not just biological brains.
This informational identity theory offers several intriguing possibilities. It suggests that consciousness isn't limited to biological brains. If we can create artificial systems that process the right kind of semantic information in the right way, they too could potentially be conscious. It also provides a framework for understanding different levels of consciousness, from the simplest awareness to complex self-reflection, as variations in the complexity and organization of the underlying information.
Long's theory is still being developed and debated, but it offers a fresh and potentially groundbreaking approach to understanding consciousness. By focusing on information as the fundamental building block, it provides a bridge between the physical world and the subjective experience of being, opening up new avenues for both scientific investigation and philosophical inquiry. It challenges us to rethink what it means to be conscious and suggests that the key might lie in understanding the intricate dance of information that makes up our inner lives.
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