| Author | Title | Year | Journal/Proceedings | Reftype | DOI/URL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Schaffer, J. | On What Grounds What [BibTeX] |
2009 | Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology, pp. 347 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{schaffer-what-2009,
author = {Schaffer, Jonathan},
title = {On What Grounds What},
booktitle = {Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {2009},
pages = {347}
}
|
|||||
| Quine, W.V. | On What There Is [BibTeX] |
1948 | The Review of Metaphysics Vol. 2(5), pp. 21-38 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{quine-what-1948,
author = {Quine, Willard V.},
title = {On What There Is},
journal = {The Review of Metaphysics},
year = {1948},
volume = {2},
number = {5},
pages = {21--38}
}
|
|||||
| Sommaruga, G. | One or many concepts of information [BibTeX] |
2009 | Vol. 5363Formal theories of information: from shannon to semantic information theory and general concepts of information, pp. 253-267 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{sommaruga-one-2009,
author = {Sommaruga, Giovanni},
title = {One or many concepts of information},
booktitle = {Formal theories of information: from shannon to semantic information theory and general concepts of information},
year = {2009},
volume = {5363},
pages = {253--267}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics [BibTeX] |
2013 | Vol. 3(1), pp. 19-32 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-ontic-2013,
author = {Esfeld, Michael},
title = {Ontic structural realism and the interpretation of quantum mechanics},
year = {2013},
volume = {3},
number = {1},
pages = {19--32}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. and Lam, V. | Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects | 2010 | article | URL | |
| Abstract: The paper spells out five different accounts of the relationship between objects and relations three of which are versions of ontic structural realism (OSR). We argue that the distinction between objects and properties, including relations, is merely a conceptual one by contrast to an ontological one: properties, including relations, are modes, that is the concrete, particular ways in which objects exist. We then set out moderate OSR as the view according to which irreducible relations are central ways in which the fundamental physical objects exist. Physical structures thus consist in objects for whom it is essential that they are related in certain ways. There hence are objects, but they do not possess an intrinsic identity. This view can also admit intrinsic properties as ways in which objects exist provided that these do not amount to identity conditions for the objects. Finally, we indicate how this view can take objective modality into account. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-ontic-2010,
author = {Esfeld, Michael and Lam, Vincent},
title = {Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects},
year = {2010},
url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5531/}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. and Lam, V. | Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects [BibTeX] |
2011 | Vol. 281Scientific Structuralism, pp. 143-159 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{esfeld-ontic-2011,
author = {Esfeld, Michael and Lam, Vincent},
title = {Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects},
booktitle = {Scientific Structuralism},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2011},
volume = {281},
pages = {143--159}
}
|
|||||
| Kantorovich, A. | Ontic Structuralism and the Symmetries of Particle Physics | 2009 | Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie Vol. 40(1), pp. 73-84 |
article | |
| Abstract: According to structural realism, in mature science there is structural continuity along theoretical change. A major counterexample to this thesis is the transition from the Eightfold Way to the Standard Model in particle physics. Nevertheless, the notion of structure is significantly important in comprehending the theoretical picture of particle physics, where particles change and undergo transmutations, while the only thing which remains unchanged is the basic structure, i.e. the symmetry group which controls the transmutations. This kind of view agrees with the paradigmatic case where the structure is an internal symmetry and the instantiations are the elementary particles. The metaphysical view which reflects this situation is a version of ontic structuralism.; According to structural realism, in mature science there is structural continuity along theoretical change. A major counterexample to this thesis is the transition from the Eightfold Way to the Standard Model in particle physics. Nevertheless, the notion of structure is significantly important in comprehending the theoretical picture of particle physics, where particles change and undergo transmutations, while the only thing which remains unchanged is the basic structure, i.e. the symmetry group which controls the transmutations. This kind of view agrees with the paradigmatic case where the structure is an internal symmetry and the instantiations are the elementary particles. The metaphysical view which reflects this situation is a version of ontic structuralism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{kantorovich-ontic-2009,
author = {Kantorovich, Aharon},
title = {Ontic Structuralism and the Symmetries of Particle Physics},
journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie},
year = {2009},
volume = {40},
number = {1},
pages = {73--84}
}
|
|||||
| Fraser, D. | Ontological aspects of quantum field theory [BibTeX] |
2004 | Vol. 35B(4) |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{fraser-ontological-2004,
author = {Fraser, D.},
title = {Ontological aspects of quantum field theory},
year = {2004},
volume = {35B},
number = {4}
}
|
|||||
| Ney, A. | Ontological Reduction and the Wave Function Ontology | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: This chapter discusses the project of reducing the objects of our manifest image to a wave function ontology. Although there are prima facie difficulties about viewing ourselves and objects like tables and chairs as somehow being constituted out of an object like the wave function, several philosophers have appealed to functionalism to argue that there is no special issue for reduction to this sort of ontology. I argue that even assuming functionalism, substantial difficulties remain, and I consider what is needed to accomplish a successful reduction. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{ney-ontological-2013,
author = {Ney, Alyssa},
title = {Ontological Reduction and the Wave Function Ontology},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Quine, W.V. | Ontological relativity: and other essays [BibTeX] |
1969 | Vol. no. 1 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{quine-ontological-1969,
author = {Quine, W. V.},
title = {Ontological relativity: and other essays},
publisher = {Columbia University Press},
year = {1969},
volume = {no. 1}
}
|
|||||
| J. Schroeder, M. | Ontological study of information: identity and state | 2014 | Kybernetes Vol. 43(6), pp. 882-894 |
article | |
| Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that sufficiently general concept of information encompassing multi-disciplinary scientific conceptualizations of this term can be useful for a discussion of the long standing philosophical problems. Design/methodology/approach - The author is using his concepts of information and its integration along with their mathematical formalization introduced in earlier publications to describe what constitutes an object, its identity and state. The concept of information used here is defined in terms of the categorical opposition of the one-and-many which plays a central role in philosophical tradition. Its formalization is closely related to formalisms of many theories involved in scientific disciplines. These features produce a common stage for philosophical discourse and scientific analysis. Findings - The formalism based on author's concept of information opens philosophical concepts such as object, identity and state to analysis consistent with scientific methodology. The analysis, consistent with modern physical theories, such as quantum mechanics, permits resolution paradoxal aspects of object's identity for long time puzzling philosophers. Originality/value - The approach to information applied here was introduced in earlier publications, but the analysis of the problems of identity in this context is novel and unprecedented. The author hopes, that even those who prefer different conceptualizations of information can benefit from the present exposition of author's analysis by considering it an example of bridging philosophical and scientific discourse.;Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that sufficiently general concept of information encompassing multi-disciplinary scientific conceptualizations of this term can be useful for a discussion of the long standing philosophical problems. Design/methodology/approach – The author is using his concepts of information and its integration along with their mathematical formalization introduced in earlier publications to describe what constitutes an object, its identity and state. The concept of information used here is defined in terms of the categorical opposition of the one-and-many which plays a central role in philosophical tradition. Its formalization is closely related to formalisms of many theories involved in scientific disciplines. These features produce a common stage for philosophical discourse and scientific analysis. Findings – The formalism based on author's concept of information opens philosophical concepts such as object, identity and state to analysis consistent with scientific methodology. The analysis, consistent with modern physical theories, such as quantum mechanics, permits resolution paradoxal aspects of object's identity for long time puzzling philosophers. Originality/value – The approach to information applied here was introduced in earlier publications, but the analysis of the problems of identity in this context is novel and unprecedented. The author hopes, that even those who prefer different conceptualizations of information can benefit from the present exposition of author's analysis by considering it an example of bridging philosophical and scientific discourse.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{j.-schroeder-ontological-2014,
author = {J. Schroeder, Marcin},
title = {Ontological study of information: identity and state},
journal = {Kybernetes},
year = {2014},
volume = {43},
number = {6},
pages = {882--894}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information | 2004 | Metaphilosophy Vol. 35(4), pp. 554-582 |
article | |
| Abstract: The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis of the central problems in mathematics. The rest of the article is devoted to the eighteen problems. These are organized into five sections: problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the investigation of values.; The philosophy of information (PI) is a new area of research with its own field of investigation and methodology. This article, based on the Herbert A. Simon Lecture of Computing and Philosophy I gave at Carnegie Mellon University in 2001, analyses the eighteen principal open problems in PI. Section 1 introduces the analysis by outlining Herbert Simon's approach to PI. Section 2 discusses some methodological considerations about what counts as a good philosophical problem. The discussion centers on Hilbert's famous analysis of the central problems in mathematics. The rest of the article is devoted to the eighteen problems. These are organized into five sections: problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the investigation of values. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-open-2004,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2004},
volume = {35},
number = {4},
pages = {554--582}
}
|
|||||
| Frieden, B.R. and Gatenby, R.A. | Order in a multidimensional system [BibTeX] |
2011 | Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics Vol. 84(1), pp. 011128 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{frieden-order-2011,
author = {Frieden, B. R. and Gatenby, Robert A.},
title = {Order in a multidimensional system},
journal = {Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics},
year = {2011},
volume = {84},
number = {1},
pages = {011128}
}
|
|||||
| Yaffe, M.P. | Organelle inheritance in the yeast cell cycle | 1991 | Vol. 1(6) |
book | |
| Abstract: Cell proliferation requires the inheritance of subcellular organelles, yet little is known of the molecular basis of this essential process. Recent microscopy studies of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae have characterized the cellular distribution of mitochondria, vacuoles and elements of the endoplasmic reticulum and Golgi complex. In addition, genetic and microscopical approaches have allowed the isolation and analysis of mutants defective in the inheritance of mitochondria and vacuoles. These investigations are leading to the identification of molecular components mediating the movement of organelles into daughter cells and have revealed that the inheritance of organelles is coordinated with other events of the cell division cycle. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{yaffe-organelle-1991,
author = {Yaffe, Michael P.},
title = {Organelle inheritance in the yeast cell cycle},
year = {1991},
volume = {1},
number = {6}
}
|
|||||
| Weisman, L.S. | Organelles on the move: insights from yeast vacuole inheritance [BibTeX] |
2006 | Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology Vol. 7(4), pp. 243-252 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{weisman-organelles-2006,
author = {Weisman, Lois S.},
title = {Organelles on the move: insights from yeast vacuole inheritance},
journal = {Nature Reviews Molecular Cell Biology},
year = {2006},
volume = {7},
number = {4},
pages = {243--252}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information | 2004 | Minds and Machines Vol. 14(2), pp. 197-221 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper outlines a quantitative theory of strongly semantic information (TSSI) based on truth-values rather than probability distributions. The main hypothesis supported in the paper is that the classic quantitative theory of weakly semantic information (TWSI), based on probability distributions, assumes that truth-values supervene on factual semantic information, yet this principle is too weak and generates a well-known semantic paradox, whereas TSSI, according to which factual semantic information encapsulates truth, can avoid the paradox and is more in line with the standard conception of what generally counts as semantic information. After a brief introduction, section two outlines the semantic paradox implied by TWSI, analysing it in terms of an initial conflict between two requisites of a quantitative theory of semantic information. In section three, three criteria of semantic information equivalence are used to provide a taxonomy of quantitative approaches to semantic information and introduce TSSI. In section four, some further desiderata that should be fulfilled by a quantitative TSSI are explained. From section five to section seven, TSSI is developed on the basis of a calculus of truth-values and semantic discrepancy with respect to a given situation. In section eight, it is shown how TSSI succeeds in solving the paradox. Section nine summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some future developments.; This paper outlines a quantitative theory of strongly semantic information (TSSI) based on truth-values rather than probability distributions. The main hypothesis supported in the paper is that the classic quantitative theory of weakly semantic information (TWSI), based on probability distributions, assumes that truth-values supervene on factual semantic information, yet this principle is too weak and generates a well-known semantic paradox, whereas TSSI, according to which factual semantic information encapsulates truth, can avoid the paradox and is more in line with the standard conception of what generally counts as semantic information. After a brief introduction, section two outlines the semantic paradox implied by TWSI, analysing it in terms of an initial conflict between two requisites of a quantitative theory of semantic information. In section three, three criteria of semantic information equivalence are used to provide a taxonomy of quantitative approaches to semantic information and introduce TSSI. In section four, some further desiderata that should be fulfilled by a quantitative TSSI are explained. From section five to section seven, TSSI is developed on the basis of a calculus of truth-values and semantic discrepancy with respect to a given situation. In section eight, it is shown how TSSI succeeds in solving the paradox. Section nine summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some future developments. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-outline-2004,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2004},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {197--221}
}
|
|||||
| Kutach, D. | Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science: Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{kutach-oxford-2013,
author = {Kutach, Douglas},
title = {Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science: Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press, USA},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Gray, R.M. | Pair Processes: Channels, Codes, and Couplings [BibTeX] |
2011 | Entropy and Information Theory, pp. 21-60 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{gray-pair-2011,
author = {Gray, Robert M.},
title = {Pair Processes: Channels, Codes, and Couplings},
booktitle = {Entropy and Information Theory},
publisher = {Springer US},
year = {2011},
pages = {21--60}
}
|
|||||
| Lewis, D.K. | Papers in metaphysics and epistemology [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{lewis-papers-1999,
author = {Lewis, David K.},
title = {Papers in metaphysics and epistemology},
publisher = {New York},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. | Particle creation by black holes [BibTeX] |
1975 | Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 43(3), pp. 199-220 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-particle-1975,
author = {Hawking, S.W.},
title = {Particle creation by black holes},
journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics},
year = {1975},
volume = {43},
number = {3},
pages = {199--220},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02345020},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02345020}
}
|
|||||
| Alesci, E. and Modesto, L. | Particle creation by loop black holes | 2014 | General Relativity and Gravitation Vol. 46(2), pp. 1-28 |
article | |
| Abstract: We study the black hole particle production in a regular spacetime metric obtained in a minisuperspace approach to loop quantum gravity. In different previous papers the static solution was obtained and shown to be singularity-free and self-dual. In this paper expanding a previous study of the black hole dynamics we repeat the Hawking analysis which leads to a thermal flux of particles at the future infinity. The evaporation time is infinite and the unitarity is recovered due to the regularity of the spacetime and to the characteristic behavior of the surface gravity.; We study the black hole particle production in a regular spacetime metric obtained in a minisuperspace approach to loop quantum gravity. In different previous papers the static solution was obtained and shown to be singularity-free and self-dual. In this paper expanding a previous study of the black hole dynamics we repeat the Hawking analysis which leads to a thermal flux of particles at the future infinity. The evaporation time is infinite and the unitarity is recovered due to the regularity of the spacetime and to the characteristic behavior of the surface gravity.; We study the black hole particle production in a regular spacetime metric obtained in a minisuperspace approach to loop quantum gravity. In different previous papers the static solution was obtained and shown to be singularity-free and self-dual. In this paper expanding a previous study of the black hole dynamics we repeat the Hawking analysis which leads to a thermal flux of particles at the future infinity. The evaporation time is infinite and the unitarity is recovered due to the regularity of the spacetime and to the characteristic behavior of the surface gravity. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{alesci-particle-2014,
author = {Alesci, Emanuele and Modesto, Leonardo},
title = {Particle creation by loop black holes},
journal = {General Relativity and Gravitation},
year = {2014},
volume = {46},
number = {2},
pages = {1--28}
}
|
|||||
| Falkenburg, B. | Particle metaphysics: a critical account of subatomic reality [BibTeX] |
2007 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{falkenburg-particle-2007,
author = {Falkenburg, Brigitte},
title = {Particle metaphysics: a critical account of subatomic reality},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2007}
}
|
|||||
| Goris, R.L.T., Movshon, J.A. and Simoncelli, E.P. | Partitioning neuronal variability | 2014 | Nature neuroscience Vol. 17(6), pp. 858-865 |
article | |
| Abstract: Responses of sensory neurons differ across repeated measurements. This variability is usually treated as stochasticity arising within neurons or neural circuits. However, some portion of the variability arises from fluctuations in excitability due to factors that are not purely sensory, such as arousal, attention, and adaptation. To isolate these fluctuations, we developed a model in which spikes are generated by a Poisson process whose rate is the product of a drive that is sensory in origin, and a gain summarizing stimulus-independent modulatory influences on excitability. This model provides an accurate account of response distributions of visual neurons in macaque LGN, V1, V2, and MT, revealing that variability originates in large part from excitability fluctuations which are correlated over time and between neurons, and which increase in strength along the visual pathway. The model provides a parsimonious explanation for observed systematic dependencies of response variability and covariability on firing rate.;Responses of sensory neurons differ across repeated measurements. This variability is usually treated as stochasticity arising within neurons or neural circuits. However, some portion of the variability arises from fluctuations in excitability due to factors that are not purely sensory, such as arousal, attention and adaptation. To isolate these fluctuations, we developed a model in which spikes are generated by a Poisson process whose rate is the product of a drive that is sensory in origin and a gain summarizing stimulus-independent modulatory influences on excitability. This model provides an accurate account of response distributions of visual neurons in macaque lateral geniculate nucleus and cortical areas V1, V2 and MT, revealing that variability originates in large part from excitability fluctuations that are correlated over time and between neurons, and that increase in strength along the visual pathway. The model provides a parsimonious explanation for observed systematic dependencies of response variability and covariability on firing rate.; Responses of sensory neurons differ across repeated measurements. This variability is usually treated as stochasticity arising within neurons or neural circuits. However, some portion of the variability arises from fluctuations in excitability due to factors that are not purely sensory, such as arousal, attention and adaptation. To isolate these fluctuations, we developed a model in which spikes are generated by a Poisson process whose rate is the product of a drive that is sensory in origin and a gain summarizing stimulus-independent modulatory influences on excitability. This model provides an accurate account of response distributions of visual neurons in macaque lateral geniculate nucleus and cortical areas V1, V2 and MT, revealing that variability originates in large part from excitability fluctuations that are correlated over time and between neurons, and that increase in strength along the visual pathway. The model provides a parsimonious explanation for observed systematic dependencies of response variability and covariability on firing rate.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{goris-partitioning-2014,
author = {Goris, Robbe L. T. and Movshon, J. A. and Simoncelli, Eero P.},
title = {Partitioning neuronal variability},
journal = {Nature neuroscience},
year = {2014},
volume = {17},
number = {6},
pages = {858--865}
}
|
|||||
| Cohen, D. and Yarom, Y. | Patches of synchronized activity in the cerebellar cortex evoked by mossy-fiber stimulation: questioning the role of parallel fibers [BibTeX] |
1998 | Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Vol. 95 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{cohen-patches-1998,
author = {Cohen, D. and Yarom, Y.},
title = {Patches of synchronized activity in the cerebellar cortex evoked by mossy-fiber stimulation: questioning the role of parallel fibers},
journal = {Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A},
year = {1998},
volume = {95},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.25.15032},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.25.15032}
}
|
|||||
| Smith, M.U. | Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz: Genetics and Philosophy: An Introduction: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, ISBN: 9780521173902, 278 pp, price: $ 29.99 (Paperback), $ 90.00 (Hardcover), $ 24.00 (eBook) [BibTeX] |
2014 | Vol. 23(9) |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{smith-paul-2014,
author = {Smith, Mike U.},
title = {Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz: Genetics and Philosophy: An Introduction: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, ISBN: 9780521173902, 278 pp, price: $ 29.99 (Paperback), $ 90.00 (Hardcover), $ 24.00 (eBook)},
year = {2014},
volume = {23},
number = {9}
}
|
|||||
| Romanini, V., Fernández, E. and service) , S.(O. | Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life [BibTeX] |
2014 | Vol. 11 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{romanini-peirce-2014,
author = {Romanini, Vinicius and Fernández, Eliseo and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life},
publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
year = {2014},
volume = {11}
}
|
|||||
| Forster, P. | Peirce and the threat of nominalism [BibTeX] |
2011 | Vol. 9780521118996 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{forster-peirce-2011,
author = {Forster, Paul},
title = {Peirce and the threat of nominalism},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2011},
volume = {9780521118996}
}
|
|||||
| Bergman, M. | Peirce's philosophy of communication: the rhetorical underpinnings of the theory of signs [BibTeX] |
2009 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{bergman-peirces-2009,
author = {Bergman, Mats},
title = {Peirce's philosophy of communication: the rhetorical underpinnings of the theory of signs},
publisher = {Continuum},
year = {2009}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | Perception and observation unladened | 2015 | Philosophical Studies Vol. 172(3), pp. 563-585 |
article | |
| Abstract: Let us call 'veridicalism' the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view's greatest threat, the so-called 'theory-ladenness' of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically not detrimental to their veridicality or at least not irreversibly so. Central to the defence of veridicalism are two principles: that of internal similarities and that of internal dissimilarities.;Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically not detrimental to their veridicality or at least not irreversibly so. Central to the defence of veridicalism are two principles: that of internal similarities and that of internal dissimilarities.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{votsis-perception-2015,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {Perception and observation unladened},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
year = {2015},
volume = {172},
number = {3},
pages = {563--585}
}
|
|||||
| Schulte, P. | Perceptual representations: a teleosemantic answer to the breadth-of-application problem | 2015 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 30(1), pp. 119-136 |
article | |
| Abstract: Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being "too liberal", i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge's insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge's own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination–or so I will argue.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being "too liberal", i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge's insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge's own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination-or so I will argue.; Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge’s insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge’s own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination—or so I will argue. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{schulte-perceptual-2015,
author = {Schulte, Peter},
title = {Perceptual representations: a teleosemantic answer to the breadth-of-application problem},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2015},
volume = {30},
number = {1},
pages = {119--136}
}
|
|||||
| Orlitsky, A. and Santhanam, N.P. | Performance of universal codes over infinite alphabets | 2003 | , pp. 402-410 | inproceedings | |
| Abstract: It was known that universal compression of strings generated by independent and identically distributed sources over infinite alphabets entails infinite per-symbol redundancy. Alternative compression schemes, which decompose the description of such strings into a description of the symbols appearing in the string, and a description of the arrangement of the symbols form were presented. Two descriptions of the symbol arrangement were considered: shapes and patterns. Roughly speaking, shapes describe the relative magnitude of the symbols while patterns describe only the order in which they appear. The per-symbol worst-case redundancy of compressing shapes is a positive constant less than one, and the per-symbol redundancy of compressing patterns diminishes to zero as the block-length increases were proven. Some results on sequential pattern compression were also mentioned. | |||||
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{orlitsky-performance-2003,
author = {Orlitsky, A. and Santhanam, N. P.},
title = {Performance of universal codes over infinite alphabets},
publisher = {IEEE},
year = {2003},
pages = {402--410}
}
|
|||||
| Chalmers, D.J. | Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap | 2010 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. This chapter explores another reaction to the explanatory gap. Those who react in this way agree that there is an explanatory gap, but they hold that it stems from the way we think about consciousness. In particular, this view locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness themselves. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{chalmers-phenomenal-2010,
author = {Chalmers, David J.},
title = {Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Carruthers, P. | Phenomenal consciousness: a naturalistic theory [BibTeX] |
2000 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{carruthers-phenomenal-2000,
author = {Carruthers, Peter},
title = {Phenomenal consciousness: a naturalistic theory},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2000}
}
|
|||||
| Delancey, C. | Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information | 2007 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 66(3), pp. 329-352 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, and Thomas Nagel's Bat Argument) can be interpreted to show that phenomenal information is not different in kind from physical information, but rather is just more information than we typically attribute to our understanding of a physical theory. I clarify how this hypothesis is distinct from Nagel's claim that the theory of consciousness may be inconceivable, and then in conclusion briefly describe how these results might suggest a positive and conservative physicalist account of phenomenal experience.;This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, and Thomas Nagel's Bat Argument) can be interpreted to show that phenomenal information is not different in kind from physical information, but rather is just more information than we typically attribute to our understanding of a physical theory. I clarify how this hypothesis is distinct from Nagel's claim that the theory of consciousness may be inconceivable, and then in conclusion briefly describe how these results might suggest a positive and conservative physicalist account of phenomenal experience.;This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, and Thomas Nagel’s Bat Argument) can be interpreted to show that phenomenal information is not different in kind from physical information, but rather is just more information than we typically attribute to our understanding of a physical theory. I clarify how this hypothesis is distinct from Nagel’s claim that the theory of consciousness may be inconceivable, and then in conclusion briefly describe how these results might suggest a positive and conservative physicalist account of phenomenal experience.;This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, and Thomas Nagel's Bat Argument) can be interpreted to show that phenomenal information is not different in kind from physical information, but rather is just more information than we typically attribute to our understanding of a physical theory. I clarify how this hypothesis is distinct from Nagel's claim that the theory of consciousness may be inconceivable, and then in conclusion briefly describe how these results might suggest a positive and conservative physicalist account of phenomenal experience.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{delancey-phenomenal-2007,
author = {Delancey, Craig},
title = {Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {2007},
volume = {66},
number = {3},
pages = {329--352}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Philosophical conceptions of information [BibTeX] |
2009 | Vol. 5363Formal theories of information: from shannon to semantic information theory and general concepts of information, pp. 13-53 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{floridi-philosophical-2009,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Philosophical conceptions of information},
booktitle = {Formal theories of information: from shannon to semantic information theory and general concepts of information},
year = {2009},
volume = {5363},
pages = {13--53}
}
|
|||||
| Brown, H.R. and Harré, R. | Philosophical foundations of quantum field theory [BibTeX] |
1988 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{brown-philosophical-1988,
author = {Brown, Harvey R. and Harré, Rom},
title = {Philosophical foundations of quantum field theory},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {1988}
}
|
|||||
| Friedman, M. | Philosophical Naturalism [BibTeX] |
1997 | Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association Vol. 71(2), pp. 5-21 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{friedman-philosophical-1997,
author = {Friedman, Michael},
title = {Philosophical Naturalism},
journal = {Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association},
year = {1997},
volume = {71},
number = {2},
pages = {5--21}
}
|
|||||
| Papineau, D. | Philosophical naturalism [BibTeX] |
1993 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{papineau-philosophical-1993,
author = {Papineau, David},
title = {Philosophical naturalism},
publisher = {B. Blackwell},
year = {1993}
}
|
|||||
| Lewis, D.K. | Philosophical papers [BibTeX] |
1986 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{lewis-philosophical-1986,
author = {Lewis, David K.},
title = {Philosophical papers},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {1986}
}
|
|||||
| Mogilner, C. and Norton, M. | Philosophies of Happiness: Preferences For Experienced and Remembered Happiness | 2013 | Advances in Consumer Research Vol. 41, pp. 1 |
article | |
| Abstract: Do people prefer a life they would experience as happy or a life they would remember as happy? We document a mismatch: People exhibit a long-term preference for experienced happiness – yet in the moment, consistently choose remembered happiness. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mogilner-philosophies-2013,
author = {Mogilner, Cassie and Norton, Michael},
title = {Philosophies of Happiness: Preferences For Experienced and Remembered Happiness},
journal = {Advances in Consumer Research},
year = {2013},
volume = {41},
pages = {1}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Philosophy and computing: an introduction [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{floridi-philosophy-1999,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Philosophy and computing: an introduction},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| Rorty, R. | Philosophy and the mirror of nature [BibTeX] |
2009 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{rorty-philosophy-2009,
author = {Rorty, Richard},
title = {Philosophy and the mirror of nature},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2009},
edition = {30th anniversary}
}
|
|||||
| Godfrey-Smith, P. | Philosophy of biology [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{godfrey-smith-philosophy-2013,
author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
title = {Philosophy of biology},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Adriaans, P. and Benthem, J.v. | Philosophy of information [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 8. |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{adriaans-philosophy-2008,
author = {Adriaans, Pieter and Benthem, Johan v.},
title = {Philosophy of information},
publisher = {North-Holland},
year = {2008},
volume = {8.}
}
|
|||||
| Shapiro, S. | Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology [BibTeX] |
2000 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{shapiro-philosophy-2000,
author = {Shapiro, Stewart},
title = {Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology},
publisher = {Oxford University Press, Incorporated},
year = {2000}
}
|
|||||
| Bokulich, A. and Jaeger, G. | Philosophy of quantum information and entanglement [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{bokulich-philosophy-2010,
author = {Bokulich, Alisa and Jaeger, Gregg},
title = {Philosophy of quantum information and entanglement},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Peters, M.A. | Philosophy of the City: Hymn to the Polis. On the Right to the City [BibTeX] |
2014 | Policy Futures in Education Vol. 12(4), pp. 455-462 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{peters-philosophy-2014,
author = {Peters, Michael A.},
title = {Philosophy of the City: Hymn to the Polis. On the Right to the City},
journal = {Policy Futures in Education},
year = {2014},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {455--462}
}
|
|||||
| Dowe, P. | Physical causation [BibTeX] |
2000 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dowe-physical-2000,
author = {Dowe, Phil},
title = {Physical causation},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2000}
}
|
|||||
| Ney, A. | Physical Causation and Difference-Making | 2009 | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 60(4), pp. 737-764 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation. Two Pursuits in the Philosophy of Causation Causal Foundationalism and its Rivals Anti-foundationalism: Russell and Field Against the Russell Field Arguments The Case for Foundationalism Causing and 'Causing' An Application: Mental Causation; This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{ney-physical-2009,
author = {Ney, Alyssa},
title = {Physical Causation and Difference-Making},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2009},
volume = {60},
number = {4},
pages = {737--764}
}
|
|||||
| Jackson, F. and Pargetter, R. | Physical Probability as a Propensity [BibTeX] |
1982 | Noûs Vol. 16(4), pp. 567-583 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{jackson-physical-1982,
author = {Jackson, Frank and Pargetter, Robert},
title = {Physical Probability as a Propensity},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {1982},
volume = {16},
number = {4},
pages = {567--583}
}
|
|||||
| Gillett, C. and Loewer, B. | Physicalism and its discontents [BibTeX] |
2001 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{gillett-physicalism-2001,
author = {Gillett, Carl and Loewer, Barry},
title = {Physicalism and its discontents},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2001}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | Physicalism and Ontological Holism | 1999 | Metaphilosophy Vol. 30(4), pp. 319-337 |
article | |
| Abstract: The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, realization of higher‐order properties by basic physical properties, and reduction. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-physicalism-1999,
author = {Esfeld, Michael},
title = {Physicalism and Ontological Holism},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {1999},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {319--337}
}
|
|||||
| Stoljar, D. | Physicalism and the Necessary a Posteriori [BibTeX] |
2000 | The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 97(1), pp. 33-54 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{stoljar-physicalism-2000,
author = {Stoljar, Daniel},
title = {Physicalism and the Necessary a Posteriori},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2000},
volume = {97},
number = {1},
pages = {33--54}
}
|
|||||
| Hüttemann, A. and Papineau, D. | Physicalism Decomposed [BibTeX] |
2005 | Analysis Vol. 65(1), pp. 33-39 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{huttemann-physicalism-2005,
author = {Hüttemann, Andreas and Papineau, David},
title = {Physicalism Decomposed},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2005},
volume = {65},
number = {1},
pages = {33--39}
}
|
|||||
| Pettit, P. | Physicalism Without Popout [BibTeX] |
2009 | Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{pettit-physicalism-2009,
author = {Pettit, Philip},
title = {Physicalism Without Popout},
booktitle = {Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {2009}
}
|
|||||
| Kim, J. | Physicalism, or something near enough [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{kim-physicalism-2005,
author = {Kim, Jaegwon},
title = {Physicalism, or something near enough},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Brown, R. and Ladyman, J. | Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level | 2009 | The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59(234), pp. 20-38 |
article | |
| Abstract: We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its hey elements are, fast, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositioned attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience.; We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its key elements are, first, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositional attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{brown-physicalism-2009,
author = {Brown, Robin and Ladyman, James},
title = {Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2009},
volume = {59},
number = {234},
pages = {20--38}
}
|
|||||
| Poland, J.S. | Physicalism, the philosophical foundations [BibTeX] |
1994 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{poland-physicalism-1994,
author = {Poland, Jeffrey S.},
title = {Physicalism, the philosophical foundations},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {1994}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | Physics and Causation | 2010 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 40(9), pp. 1597-1610 |
article | |
| Abstract: The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal properties or causal structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is built in the first place on an interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state reductions so that there really are both entangled states and classical properties, GRW being the most elaborate physical proposal for such an interpretation. I then argue that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be read in a causal manner, the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally, I mention that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well.; The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal properties or causal structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is built in the first place on an interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state reductions so that there really are both entangled states and classical properties, GRW being the most elaborate physical proposal for such an interpretation. I then argue that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be read in a causal manner, the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally, I mention that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well.; The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal properties or causal structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is built in the first place on an interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state reductions so that there really are both entangled states and classical properties, GRW being the most elaborate physical proposal for such an interpretation. I then argue that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be read in a causal manner, the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally, I mention that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-physics-2010,
author = {Esfeld, Michael},
title = {Physics and Causation},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {2010},
volume = {40},
number = {9},
pages = {1597--1610}
}
|
|||||
| Callender, C. and Huggett, N. | Physics meets philosophy at the Planck scale: contemporary theories in quantum gravity [BibTeX] |
2001 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{callender-physics-2001,
author = {Callender, Craig and Huggett, Nick},
title = {Physics meets philosophy at the Planck scale: contemporary theories in quantum gravity},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2001}
}
|
|||||
| Papantonopoulos, E. | Physics of black holes: a guided tour [BibTeX] |
2009 | Vol. 769 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{papantonopoulos-physics-2009,
author = {Papantonopoulos, E.},
title = {Physics of black holes: a guided tour},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2009},
volume = {769}
}
|
|||||
| Balaguer, M. | Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics [BibTeX] |
1998 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{balaguer-platonism-1998,
author = {Balaguer, Mark},
title = {Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {1998}
}
|
|||||
| Pooley, O. | Points, Particles, and Structural Realism [BibTeX] |
2011 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{pooley-points-2011,
author = {Pooley, Oliver},
title = {Points, Particles, and Structural Realism},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Aylesworth, G. | Postmodernism [BibTeX] |
2015 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{aylesworth-postmodernism-2015,
author = {Aylesworth, Gary},
title = {Postmodernism},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2015},
edition = {Spring 2015},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/postmodernism/}
}
|
|||||
| Frieden, B.R. and Gatenby, R.A. | Power laws of complex systems from extreme physical information | 2005 | Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics Vol. 72(3), pp. 036101 |
article | |
| Abstract: Many complex systems obey allometric, or power, laws y=Y x(a) . Here y textgreater or = 0 is the measured value of some system attribute a , Ytextgreater or =0 is a constant, and x is a stochastic variable. Remarkably, for many living systems the exponent a is limited to values n/4 , n=0, +/-1, +/-2... Here x is the mass of a randomly selected creature in the population. These quarter-power laws hold for many attributes, such as pulse rate (n=-1) . Allometry has, in the past, been theoretically justified on a case-by-case basis. An ultimate goal is to find a common cause for allometry of all types and for both living and nonliving systems. The principle I-J=extremum of extreme physical information is found to provide such a cause. It describes the flow of Fisher information J–textgreaterI from an attribute value a on the cell level to its exterior observation y . Data y are formed via a system channel function y identical to f (x,a) , with f (x,a) to be found. Extremizing the difference I-J through variation of f (x,a) results in a general allometric law f (x,a) identical to y=Y x(a) . Darwinian evolution is presumed to cause a second extremization of I-J , now with respect to the choice of a . The solution is a=n/4 , n=0,+/-1,+/-2..., defining the particular powers of biological allometry. Under special circumstances, the model predicts that such biological systems are controlled by only two distinct intracellular information sources. These sources are conjectured to be cellular DNA and cellular transmembrane ion gradients.; Many complex systems obey allometric, or power, laws y=Yx(a). Here y textgreater= 0 is the measured value of some system attribute a, Y textgreater= 0 is a constant, and x is a stochastic variable. Remarkably, for many living systems the exponent a is limited to values n/4, n=0,+/- 1,+/- 2,... Here x is the mass of a randomly selected creature in the population. These quarter-power laws hold for many attributes, such as pulse rate (n=-1). Allometry has, in the past, been theoretically justified on a case-by-case basis. An ultimate goal is to find a common cause for allometry of all types and for both living and nonliving systems. The principle I-J=extremum of extreme physical information is found to provide such a cause. It describes the flow of Fisher information J -textgreater I from an attribute value a on the cell level to its exterior observation y. Data y are formed via a system channel function y equivalent to f(x,a), with f(x,a) to be found. Extremizing the difference I-J through variation of f(x,a) results in a general allometric law f(x,a)equivalent to y=Yx(a). Darwinian evolution is presumed to cause a second extremization of I-J, now with respect to the choice of a. The solution is a=n/4, n=0,+/- 1,+/- 2..., defining the particular powers of biological allometry. Under special circumstances, the model predicts that such biological systems are controlled by only two distinct intracellular information sources. These sources are conjectured to be cellular DNA and cellular transmembrane ion gradients. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{frieden-power-2005,
author = {Frieden, B. R. and Gatenby, Robert A.},
title = {Power laws of complex systems from extreme physical information},
journal = {Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics},
year = {2005},
volume = {72},
number = {3},
pages = {036101}
}
|
|||||
| Hookway, C. | Pragmatism [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{hookway-pragmatism-2016,
author = {Hookway, Christopher},
title = {Pragmatism},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Summer 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/pragmatism/}
}
|
|||||
| Reynolds, A. | Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism [BibTeX] |
1999 | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 13(2), pp. 201 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{reynolds-pragmatism-1999,
author = {Reynolds, Andrew},
title = {Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism},
journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
year = {1999},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {201}
}
|
|||||
| Dretske, F.I. | Précis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information [BibTeX] |
1983 | Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 6(1), pp. 55-63 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{dretske-precis-1983,
author = {Dretske, Fred I.},
title = {Précis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information},
journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
year = {1983},
volume = {6},
number = {1},
pages = {55--63}
}
|
|||||
| Bywater, R.P. | Prediction of protein structural features from sequence data based on Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov complexity | 2015 | PloS one Vol. 10(4), pp. e0119306 |
article | |
| Abstract: While the genome for a given organism stores the information necessary for the organism to function and flourish it is the proteins that are encoded by the genome that perhaps more than anything else characterize the phenotype for that organism. It is therefore not surprising that one of the many approaches to understanding and predicting protein folding and properties has come from genomics and more specifically from multiple sequence alignments. In this work I explore ways in which data derived from sequence alignment data can be used to investigate in a predictive way three different aspects of protein structure: secondary structures, inter-residue contacts and the dynamics of switching between different states of the protein. In particular the use of Kolmogorov complexity has identified a novel pathway towards achieving these goals. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bywater-prediction-2015,
author = {Bywater, Robert P.},
title = {Prediction of protein structural features from sequence data based on Shannon entropy and Kolmogorov complexity},
journal = {PloS one},
year = {2015},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
pages = {e0119306}
}
|
|||||
| D.P.R | Preface [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. v - viii |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{d.p.r-preface-2008,
author = {D.P.R},
title = {Preface},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {v -- viii},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030131}
}
|
|||||
| Christoff, K., Keramatian, K., Gordon, A.M., Smith, R. and Mädler, B. | Prefrontal organization of cognitive control according to levels of abstraction | 2009 | Brain Research Vol. 1286, pp. 94-105 |
article | |
| Abstract: The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a crucial role in cognitive control and higher mental functions by maintaining working memory representations of currently relevant information, thereby inducing a mindset that facilitates the processing of such information. Using fMRI, we examined how the human PFC implements mindsets for information at varying levels of abstraction. Subjects solved anagrams grouped into three kinds of blocks (concrete, moderately abstract, and highly abstract) according to the degree of abstraction of their solutions. Mindsets were induced by cuing subjects at the beginning of every block as to the degree of abstraction of solutions they should look for. Different levels of abstraction were matched for accuracy and reaction time, allowing us to examine the effects of varying abstraction in the absence of variations in cognitive complexity. Mindsets for concrete, moderately abstract, and highly abstract information were associated with stronger relative recruitment of ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and rostrolateral PFC regions, respectively, suggesting a functional topography whereby increasingly anterior regions are preferentially associated with representations of increasing abstraction. Rather than being a structural property of the neurons in different prefrontal subregions, this relative specialization may reflect one of the principles according to which lateral PFC adaptively codes and organizes task-relevant information. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{christoff-prefrontal-2009,
author = {Christoff, Kalina and Keramatian, Kamyar and Gordon, Alan M. and Smith, Rachelle and Mädler, Burkhard},
title = {Prefrontal organization of cognitive control according to levels of abstraction},
journal = {Brain Research},
year = {2009},
volume = {1286},
pages = {94--105}
}
|
|||||
| Egg, M. and Esfeld, M. | Primitive ontology and quantum state in the GRW matter density theory [BibTeX] |
2014 | Synthese | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{egg-primitive-2014,
author = {Egg, Matthias and Esfeld, Michael},
title = {Primitive ontology and quantum state in the GRW matter density theory},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Allori, V. | Primitive Ontology and the Structure of Fundamental Physical Theories | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: In contrast to what is commonly believed, fundamental physical theories (like classical and quantum mechanics) have a common structure: the (microscopic) constituents of material objects are mathematically represented by a primitive ontology, an entity in space-time. Because the wave function lives in configuration space, the problem for the metaphysician is to establish what the wave function is. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{allori-primitive-2013,
author = {Allori, Valia},
title = {Primitive Ontology and the Structure of Fundamental Physical Theories},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Bousso, R. and Hawking, S.W. | Primordial Black Holes: Pair Creation, Lorentzian Condition, and Evaporation | 1999 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 38(4), pp. 1227-1252 |
article | |
| Abstract: The wave function of the universe is usually taken to be a functional of the three-metric on a spacelike section, Sigma, which is measured. It is sometimes better, however, to work in the conjugate representation, where the wave function depends on a quantity related to the second fundamental form of Sigma. This makes it possible to ensure that Sigma is part of a Lorentzian universe by requiring that the argument of the wave function be purely imaginary. We demonstrate the advantages of this formalism first in the well-known examples of the nucleation of a de Sitter or a Nariai universe. We then use it to calculate the pair creation rate for submaximal black holes in de Sitter space, which had been thought to vanish semiclassically. We also study the quantum evolution of asymptotically de Sitter black holes. For black holes whose size is comparable to that of the cosmological horizon, this process differs significantly from the evaporation of asymptotically flat black holes. Our model includes the one-loop effective action in the s-wave and large-N approximation. Black holes of the maximal mass are in equilibrium. Unexpectedly, we find that nearly maximal quantum Schwarzschild-de Sitter black holes antievaporate. However, there is a different perturbative mode that leads to evaporation. We show that this mode will always be excited when a pair of maximal cosmological black holes nucleates.;The wave function of the universe is usuallytaken to be a functional of the threemetric on aspacelike section, Σ, which is measured. It issometimes better, however, to work in the conjugaterepresentation, where the wave function depends on a quantityrelated to the second fundamental form of Σ. Thismakes it possible to ensure that Σ is part of aLorentzian universe by requiring that the argument of the wave function be purely imaginary. Wedemonstrate the advantages of this formalism first inthe well-known examples of the nucleation of a de Sitteror a Nariai universe. We then use it to calculate the pair creation rate for submaximal blackholes in de Sitter space, which had been thought tovanish semiclassically. We also study the quantumevolution of asymptotically de Sitter black holes. Forblack holes whose size is comparable to that of thecosmological horizon, this process differs significantlyfrom the evaporation of asymptotically flat black holes.Our model includes the one-loop effective action in the s-wave and large-N approximation.Black holes of the maximal mass are in equilibrium.Unexpectedly, we find that nearly maximal quantumSchwarzschild–de Sitter black holes antievaporate.However, there is a different perturbative mode thatleads to evaporation. We show that this mode will alwaysbe excited when a pair of maximal cosmological blackholes nucleates.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bousso-primordial-1999,
author = {Bousso, Raphael and Hawking, Stephen W.},
title = {Primordial Black Holes: Pair Creation, Lorentzian Condition, and Evaporation},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {1999},
volume = {38},
number = {4},
pages = {1227--1252}
}
|
|||||
| Frieden, B. and Gatenby, R. | Principle of maximum Fisher information from Hardy's axioms applied to statistical systems | 2013 | PHYSICAL REVIEW E Vol. 88(4), pp. 042144 |
article | |
| Abstract: Consider a finite-sized, multidimensional system in parameter state a. The system is either at statistical equilibrium or general nonequilibrium, and may obey either classical or quantum physics. L. Hardy's mathematical axioms provide a basis for the physics obeyed by any such system. One axiom is that the number N of distinguishable states a in the system obeys N = max. This assumes that N is known as deterministic prior knowledge. However, most observed systems suffer statistical fluctuations, for which N is therefore only known approximately. Then what happens if the scope of the axiom N = max is extended to include such observed systems? It is found that the state a of the system must obey a principle of maximum Fisher information, I = I-max. This is important because many physical laws have been derived, assuming as a working hypothesis that I = I-max. These derivations include uses of the principle of extreme physical information (EPI). Examples of such derivations were of the De Broglie wave hypothesis, quantum wave equations, Maxwell's equations, new laws of biology (e. g., of Coulomb force-directed cell development and of in situ cancer growth), and new laws of economic fluctuation and investment. That the principle I = I-max itself derives from suitably extended Hardy axioms thereby eliminates its need to be assumed in these derivations. Thus, uses of I = I-max and EPI express physics at its most fundamental level, its axiomatic basis in math.; Consider a finite-sized, multidimensional system in parameter state a. The system is either at statistical equilibrium or general nonequilibrium, and may obey either classical or quantum physics. L. Hardy's mathematical axioms provide a basis for the physics obeyed by any such system. One axiom is that the number N of distinguishable states a in the system obeys N=max. This assumes that N is known as deterministic prior knowledge. However, most observed systems suffer statistical fluctuations, for which N is therefore only known approximately. Then what happens if the scope of the axiom N=max is extended to include such observed systems? It is found that the state a of the system must obey a principle of maximum Fisher information, I=I(max). This is important because many physical laws have been derived, assuming as a working hypothesis that I=I(max). These derivations include uses of the principle of extreme physical information (EPI). Examples of such derivations were of the De Broglie wave hypothesis, quantum wave equations, Maxwell's equations, new laws of biology (e.g., of Coulomb force-directed cell development and of in situ cancer growth), and new laws of economic fluctuation and investment. That the principle I=I(max) itself derives from suitably extended Hardy axioms thereby eliminates its need to be assumed in these derivations. Thus, uses of I=I(max) and EPI express physics at its most fundamental level, its axiomatic basis in math. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{frieden-principle-2013,
author = {Frieden, BR and Gatenby, RA},
title = {Principle of maximum Fisher information from Hardy's axioms applied to statistical systems},
journal = {PHYSICAL REVIEW E},
year = {2013},
volume = {88},
number = {4},
pages = {042144}
}
|
|||||
| Gallager, R.G. | Principles of digital communication [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | URL | |
BibTeX:
@book{gallager-principles-2008,
author = {Gallager, Robert G.},
title = {Principles of digital communication},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2008},
url = {http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science/6-450-principles-of-digital-communications-i-fall-2006/lecture-notes/}
}
|
|||||
| Kirpatovskii, S.I. | Principles of the information theory of measurements [BibTeX] |
1974 | Measurement Techniques Vol. 17(5), pp. 655-659 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{kirpatovskii-principles-1974,
author = {Kirpatovskii, S. I.},
title = {Principles of the information theory of measurements},
journal = {Measurement Techniques},
year = {1974},
volume = {17},
number = {5},
pages = {655--659}
}
|
|||||
| McKenzie, K. | Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis | 2014 | BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Vol. 65(2), pp. 353-380 |
article | |
| Abstract: In this article, I address concerns that the ontological priority claims definitive of ontic structural realism are as they stand unclear, and I do so by placing these claims on a more rigorous formal footing than they typically have been hitherto. I first of all argue that Kit Fine's analysis of ontological dependence furnishes us with an ontological priority relation that is particularly apt for structuralism. With that in place, and with reference to two case studies prominent within the structuralist literature, I consider whether any of structuralism's distinctive priority claims may be regarded as warranted. The discussion as a whole has largely negative implications for the radical structuralism of French and Ladyman (including their 'eliminativist' interpretation of it), largely positive implications for the moderate structuralism primarily advocated by Esfeld and Lam, and some broad lessons for contemporary fundamentalist metaphysics as a whole.; In this article, I address concerns that the ontological priority claims definitive of ontic structural realism are as they stand unclear, and I do so by placing these claims on a more rigorous formal footing than they typically have been hitherto. I first of all argue that Kit Fine's analysis of ontological dependence furnishes us with an ontological priority relation that is particularly apt for structuralism. With that in place, and with reference to two case studies prominent within the structuralist literature, I consider whether any of structuralism's distinctive priority claims may be regarded as warranted. The discussion as a whole has largely negative implications for the radical structuralism of French and Ladyman (including their 'eliminativist' interpretation of it), largely positive implications for the moderate structuralism primarily advocated by Esfeld and Lam, and some broad lessons for contemporary fundamentalist metaphysics as a whole.;In this article, I address concerns that the ontological priority claims definitive of ontic structural realism are as they stand unclear, and I do so by placing these claims on a more rigorous formal footing than they typically have been hitherto. I first of all argue that Kit Fine's analysis of ontological dependence furnishes us with an ontological priority relation that is particularly apt for structuralism. With that in place, and with reference to two case studies prominent within the structuralist literature, I consider whether any of structuralism's distinctive priority claims may be regarded as warranted. The discussion as a whole has largely negative implications for the radical structuralism of French and Ladyman (including their 'eliminativist' interpretation of it), largely positive implications for the moderate structuralism primarily advocated by Esfeld and Lam, and some broad lessons for contemporary fundamentalist metaphysics as a whole.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mckenzie-priority-2014,
author = {McKenzie, K.},
title = {Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis},
journal = {BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE},
year = {2014},
volume = {65},
number = {2},
pages = {353--380}
}
|
|||||
| Greaves, H. | Probability in the Everett Interpretation | 2007 | Philosophy Compass Vol. 2(1), pp. 109-128 |
article | |
| Abstract: The Everett (many‐worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics faces a prima facie problem concerning quantum probabilities. Research in this area has been fast‐paced over the last few years, following a controversial suggestion by David Deutsch that decision theory can solve the problem. This article provides a non‐technical introduction to the decision‐theoretic program, and a sketch of the current state of the debate. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{greaves-probability-2007,
author = {Greaves, Hilary},
title = {Probability in the Everett Interpretation},
journal = {Philosophy Compass},
year = {2007},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {109--128}
}
|
|||||
| Gray, R.M. | Probability, random processes, and ergodic properties [BibTeX] |
2009 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{gray-probability-2009,
author = {Gray, Robert M.},
title = {Probability, random processes, and ergodic properties},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2009},
edition = {2nd}
}
|
|||||
| Dittrich, W. and Gies, H. | Probing the quantum vacuum: pertubative effective action approach in quantum electrodynamics and its application [BibTeX] |
2000 | Vol. 166 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{dittrich-probing-2000,
author = {Dittrich, Walter and Gies, Holger},
title = {Probing the quantum vacuum: pertubative effective action approach in quantum electrodynamics and its application},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2000},
volume = {166}
}
|
|||||
| Perry, D.H. | Process reliabilism: Experimental cognitive psychology and neuroscience | 2013 | book | ||
| Abstract: Since the time of Plato's Theatetus, philosophers such as Plato's Socrates have asked the question: what is propositional knowledge? Merely believing something is insufficient for knowledge because anyone can believe anything without any further stipulations than that the subject accepts the belief. Even if the beliefs in question are true, knowledge still seems to require more than a simple approximation to truth by an accepted belief. Plato's solution to this problem was to develop three conditions for the transmission of belief into knowledge: justification, truth, and belief. Since Plato, a number of thinkers have developed critiques of this paradigm that account for different criticisms of it. I build on the work of a contemporary epistemologist named Alvin Goldman who in his seminal work Epistemology and Cognition developed a radical new concept of justification called process reliabilism. Process reliabilism claims that S knows that p only if S's belief in p results from a reliable belief-forming cognitive process. As a result of this work, a debate sparked in contemporary analytic epistemology between what are traditionally called the internalists and the externalists. Internalists claim that the determiners of justification must be internal to the epistemic agent, whereas externalists claim that external reliability is the sole determiner of justification. In the second chapter of this work, I provide an analysis of this debate and subsequently argue for the externalist position against a number of contemporary thinkers who seek to collapse the distinction. In the final section of this thesis, I incorporate research from experimental cognitive psychology and neuroscience to update the research cited by Goldman in Epistemology and Cognition. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{perry-process-2013,
author = {Perry, David H.},
title = {Process reliabilism: Experimental cognitive psychology and neuroscience},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Dupré, J. | Processes of life: essays in the philosophy of biology [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dupre-processes-2012,
author = {Dupré, John},
title = {Processes of life: essays in the philosophy of biology},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Ascoli, G.A. | Progress and perspectives in computational neuroanatomy [BibTeX] |
1999 | Anat Rec Vol. 257 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{ascoli-progress-1999,
author = {Ascoli, G. A.},
title = {Progress and perspectives in computational neuroanatomy},
journal = {Anat Rec},
year = {1999},
volume = {257},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/3.0.CO;2-H},
doi = {3.0.CO;2-H}
}
|
|||||
| Suppes, P. | Propensity Representations of Probability [BibTeX] |
1987 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 26(3), pp. 335-358 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{suppes-propensity-1987,
author = {Suppes, Patrick},
title = {Propensity Representations of Probability},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {1987},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
pages = {335--358}
}
|
|||||
| Clauser, J.F., Horne, M.A., Shimony, A. and Holt, R.A. | Proposed Experiment to Test Local Hidden-Variable Theories [BibTeX] |
1969 | Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 23(15), pp. 880-884 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{clauser-proposed-1969,
author = {Clauser, John F. and Horne, Michael A. and Shimony, Abner and Holt, Richard A.},
title = {Proposed Experiment to Test Local Hidden-Variable Theories},
journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.},
year = {1969},
volume = {23},
number = {15},
pages = {880--884},
url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.23.880},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.23.880}
}
|
|||||
| Kyle Stanford, P., Humphreys, P., Hawley, K., Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. | Protecting rainforest realism: James Ladyman, Don Ross: Everything must go: metaphysics naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 368 £49.00 HB [BibTeX] |
2010 | Vol. 19(2) |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{kyle-stanford-protecting-2010,
author = {Kyle Stanford, P. and Humphreys, Paul and Hawley, Katherine and Ladyman, James and Ross, Don},
title = {Protecting rainforest realism: James Ladyman, Don Ross: Everything must go: metaphysics naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 368 £49.00 HB},
year = {2010},
volume = {19},
number = {2}
}
|
|||||
| Eidhammer, I., Taylor, W.R. and Jonassen, I. | Protein bioinformatics: an algorithmic approach to sequence and structure analysis [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{eidhammer-protein-2004,
author = {Eidhammer, Ingvar and Taylor, W. R. and Jonassen, Inge},
title = {Protein bioinformatics: an algorithmic approach to sequence and structure analysis},
publisher = {Wiley},
year = {2004}
}
|
|||||
| Horwich, A.L. | Protein folding in the cell: An inside story | 2011 | Nature medicine Vol. 17(10), pp. 1211-1216 |
article | |
| Abstract: The final step of information transfer from DNA to effector protein involves the folding of newly translated polypeptide chains into characteristic three-dimensional active structures. The discovery of chaperonins and their role in assisting protein folding in the cell has led to the recognition that folding is a closely monitored and regulated process that is central to cellular homeostasis. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{horwich-protein-2011,
author = {Horwich, Arthur L.},
title = {Protein folding in the cell: An inside story},
journal = {Nature medicine},
year = {2011},
volume = {17},
number = {10},
pages = {1211--1216}
}
|
|||||
| Gershenson, A. and Gierasch, L.M. | Protein folding in the cell: challenges and progress | 2011 | Current opinion in structural biology Vol. 21(1), pp. 32-41 |
article | |
| Abstract: It is hard to imagine a more extreme contrast than that between the dilute solutions used for in vitro studies of protein folding and the crowded, compartmentalized, sticky, spatially inhomogeneous interior of a cell. This review highlights recent research exploring protein folding in the cell with a focus on issues that are generally not relevant to in vitro studies of protein folding, such as macromolecular crowding, hindered diffusion, cotranslational folding, molecular chaperones, and evolutionary pressures. The technical obstacles that must be overcome to characterize protein folding in the cell are driving methodological advances, and we draw attention to several examples, such as fluorescence imaging of folding in cells and genetic screens for in-cell stability.; It is hard to imagine a more extreme contrast than that between the dilute solutions used for in vitro studies of protein folding and the crowded, compartmentalized, sticky, spatially inhomogeneous interior of a cell. This review highlights recent research exploring protein folding in the cell with a focus on issues that are generally not relevant to in vitro studies of protein folding, such as macromolecular crowding, hindered diffusion, cotranslational folding, molecular chaperones, and evolutionary pressures. The technical obstacles that must be overcome to characterize protein folding in the cell are driving methodological advances, and we draw attention to several examples, such as fluorescence imaging of folding in cells and genetic screens for in-cell stability.; It is hard to imagine a more extreme contrast than that between the dilute solutions used for in vitro studies of protein folding and the crowded, compartmentalized, sticky, spatially inhomogeneous interior of a cell. This review highlights recent research exploring protein folding in the cell with a focus on issues that are generally not relevant to in vitro studies of protein folding, such as macromolecular crowding, hindered diffusion, cotranslational folding, molecular chaperones, and evolutionary pressures. The technical obstacles that must be overcome to characterize protein folding in the cell are driving methodological advances, and we draw attention to several examples, such as fluorescence imaging of folding in cells and genetic screens for in-cell stability.; It is hard to imagine a more extreme contrast than that between the dilute solutions used for in vitro studies of protein folding and the crowded, compartmentalized, sticky, spatially inhomogeneous interior of a cell. This review highlights recent research exploring protein folding in the cell with a focus on issues that are generally not relevant to in vitro studies of protein folding, such as macromolecular crowding, hindered diffusion, co-translational folding, molecular chaperones, and evolutionary pressures. The technical obstacles that must be overcome to characterize protein folding in the cell are driving methodological advances, and we draw attention to several examples, such as fluorescence imaging of folding in cells and genetic screens for in-cell stability.; It is hard to imagine a more extreme contrast than that between the dilute solutions used for in vitro studies of protein folding and the crowded, compartmentalized, sticky, spatially inhomogeneous interior of a cell. This review highlights recent research exploring protein folding in the cell with a focus on issues that are generally not relevant to in vitro studies of protein folding, such as macromolecular crowding, hindered diffusion, cotranslational folding, molecular chaperones, and evolutionary pressures. The technical obstacles that must be overcome to characterize protein folding in the cell are driving methodological advances, and we draw attention to several examples, such as fluorescence imaging of folding in cells and genetic screens for in-cell stability. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{gershenson-protein-2011,
author = {Gershenson, Anne and Gierasch, Lila M.},
title = {Protein folding in the cell: challenges and progress},
journal = {Current opinion in structural biology},
year = {2011},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {32--41}
}
|
|||||
| Altschul, S.F., Gertz, E.M., Agarwala, R., Schäffer, A.A. and Yu, Y.-K. | PSI-BLAST pseudocounts and the minimum description length principle | 2009 | Nucleic acids research Vol. 37(3), pp. 815-824 |
article | |
| Abstract: Position specific score matrices (PSSMs) are derived from multiple sequence alignments to aid in the recognition of distant protein sequence relationships. The PSI-BLAST protein database search program derives the column scores of its PSSMs with the aid of pseudocounts, added to the observed amino acid counts in a multiple alignment column. In the absence of theory, the number of pseudocounts used has been a completely empirical parameter. This article argues that the minimum description length principle can motivate the choice of this parameter. Specifically, for realistic alignments, the principle supports the practice of using a number of pseudocounts essentially independent of alignment size. However, it also implies that more highly conserved columns should use fewer pseudocounts, increasing the inter-column contrast of the implied PSSMs. A new method for calculating pseudocounts that significantly improves PSI-BLAST's; retrieval accuracy is now employed by default.; Position specific score matrices (PSSMs) are derived from multiple sequence alignments to aid in the recognition of distant protein sequence relationships. The PSI-BLAST protein database search program derives the column scores of its PSSMs with the aid of pseudocounts, added to the observed amino acid counts in a multiple alignment column. In the absence of theory, the number of pseudocounts used has been a completely empirical parameter. This article argues that the minimum description length principle can motivate the choice of this parameter. Specifically, for realistic alignments, the principle supports the practice of using a number of pseudocounts essentially independent of alignment size. However, it also implies that more highly conserved columns should use fewer pseudocounts, increasing the inter-column contrast of the implied PSSMs. A new method for calculating pseudocounts that significantly improves PSI-BLAST's retrieval accuracy is now employed by default.; Position specific score matrices (PSSMs) are derived from multiple sequence alignments to aid in the recognition of distant protein sequence relationships. The PSI-BLAST protein database search program derives the column scores of its PSSMs with the aid of pseudocounts, added to the observed amino acid counts in a multiple alignment column. In the absence of theory, the number of pseudocounts used has been a completely empirical parameter. This article argues that the minimum description length principle can motivate the choice of this parameter. Specifically, for realistic alignments, the principle supports the practice of using a number of pseudocounts essentially independent of alignment size. However, it also implies that more highly conserved columns should use fewer pseudocounts, increasing the inter-column contrast of the implied PSSMs. A new method for calculating pseudocounts that significantly improves PSI-BLAST's; retrieval accuracy is now employed by default.; Position specific score matrices (PSSMs) are derived from multiple sequence alignments to aid in the recognition of distant protein sequence relationships. The PSI-BLAST protein database search program derives the column scores of its PSSMs with the aid of pseudocounts, added to the observed amino acid counts in a multiple alignment column. In the absence of theory, the number of pseudocounts used has been a completely empirical parameter. This article argues that the minimum description length principle can motivate the choice of this parameter. Specifically, for realistic alignments, the principle supports the practice of using a number of pseudocounts essentially independent of alignment size. However, it also implies that more highly conserved columns should use fewer pseudocounts, increasing the inter-column contrast of the implied PSSMs. A new method for calculating pseudocounts that significantly improves PSI-BLAST's; retrieval accuracy is now employed by default.; Position specific score matrices (PSSMs) are derived from multiple sequence alignments to aid in the recognition of distant protein sequence relationships. The PSI-BLAST protein database search program derives the column scores of its PSSMs with the aid of pseudocounts, added to the observed amino acid counts in a multiple alignment column. In the absence of theory, the number of pseudocounts used has been a completely empirical parameter. This article argues that the minimum description length principle can motivate the choice of this parameter. Specifically, for realistic alignments, the principle supports the practice of using a number of pseudocounts essentially independent of alignment size. However, it also implies that more highly conserved columns should use fewer pseudocounts, increasing the inter-column contrast of the implied PSSMs. A new method for calculating pseudocounts that significantly improves PSI-BLAST's; retrieval accuracy is now employed by default. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{altschul-psi-blast-2009,
author = {Altschul, Stephen F. and Gertz, E. M. and Agarwala, Richa and Schäffer, Alejandro A. and Yu, Yi-Kuo},
title = {PSI-BLAST pseudocounts and the minimum description length principle},
journal = {Nucleic acids research},
year = {2009},
volume = {37},
number = {3},
pages = {815--824}
}
|
|||||
| Altschul, S.F., Gertz, E.M., Agarwala, R., Schäffer, A.A. and Yu, Y.-K. | PSI-BLAST pseudocounts and the minimum length principle [BibTeX] |
2009 | Nucleic acids research Vol. 37(3), pp. 815-824 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{altschul-psi-blast-2009-1,
author = {Altschul, Stephen F. and Gertz, E. M. and Agarwala, Richa and Schäffer, Alejandro A. and Yu, Yi-Kuo},
title = {PSI-BLAST pseudocounts and the minimum length principle},
journal = {Nucleic acids research},
year = {2009},
volume = {37},
number = {3},
pages = {815--824}
}
|
|||||
| Fodor, J.A. and Society, B.P. | Psychosemantics: the problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind [BibTeX] |
1987 | Vol. 2 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{fodor-psychosemantics:-1987,
author = {Fodor, Jerry A. and Society, British Psychological},
title = {Psychosemantics: the problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {1987},
volume = {2}
}
|
|||||
| Millikan, R.G. | Pushmi-Pullyu Representations [BibTeX] |
1995 | Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 9, pp. 185-200 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{millikan-pushmi-pullyu-1995,
author = {Millikan, Ruth G.},
title = {Pushmi-Pullyu Representations},
journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
year = {1995},
volume = {9},
pages = {185--200}
}
|
|||||
| Allo, P. | Putting information first: Luciano Floridi and the philosophy of information [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{allo-putting-2010,
author = {Allo, Patrick},
title = {Putting information first: Luciano Floridi and the philosophy of information},
publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Devitt, M. | Putting metaphysics first: essays on metaphysics and epistemology [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{devitt-putting-2010,
author = {Devitt, Michael},
title = {Putting metaphysics first: essays on metaphysics and epistemology},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | Putting realism in perspectivism [BibTeX] |
2012 | Philosophica Vol. 84(1), pp. 85-122 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{votsis-putting-2012,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {Putting realism in perspectivism},
journal = {Philosophica},
year = {2012},
volume = {84},
number = {1},
pages = {85--122}
}
|
|||||
| Frieden, B.R. and Hawkins, R.J. | Quantifying system order for full and partial coarse graining | 2010 | Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics Vol. 82(6), pp. 066117 |
article | |
| Abstract: We show that Fisher information I and its weighted versions effectively measure the order R of a large class of shift-invariant physical systems. This result follows from the assumption that R decreases under small perturbations caused by a coarse graining of the system. The form found for R is generally unitless, which allows the order for different phenomena to be compared objectively. The monotonic contraction properties of R and I in time imply that they are entropies, in addition to their usual status as information. This removes the need for data, and therefore an observer, in physical derivations based upon their use. Thus, this recognizes complementary scenarios to the participatory observer of Wheeler, where (now) physical phenomena can occur in the absence of an observer. Simple applications of the new order measure R are discussed.; We show that Fisher information I and its weighted versions effectively measure the order R of a large class of shift-invariant physical systems. This result follows from the assumption that R decreases under small perturbations caused by a coarse graining of the system. The form found for R is generally unitless, which allows the order for different phenomena to be compared objectively. The monotonic contraction properties of R and I in time imply that they are entropies, in addition to their usual status as information. This removes the need for data, and therefore an observer, in physical derivations based upon their use. Thus, this recognizes complementary scenarios to the participatory observer of Wheeler, where (now) physical phenomena can occur in the absence of an observer. Simple applications of the new order measure R are discussed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{frieden-quantifying-2010,
author = {Frieden, B. R. and Hawkins, Raymond J.},
title = {Quantifying system order for full and partial coarse graining},
journal = {Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics},
year = {2010},
volume = {82},
number = {6},
pages = {066117}
}
|
|||||
| Nielsen, M.A. and Chuang, I.L. | Quantum computation and quantum information [BibTeX] |
2000 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{nielsen-quantum-2000,
author = {Nielsen, Michael A. and Chuang, Isaac L.},
title = {Quantum computation and quantum information},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2000}
}
|
|||||
| Yanofsky, N.S. and Mannucci, M.A. | Quantum computing for computer scientists [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{yanofsky-quantum-2008,
author = {Yanofsky, Noson S. and Mannucci, Mirco A.},
title = {Quantum computing for computer scientists},
publisher = {New York},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Ollivier, H. and Zurek, W.H. | Quantum Discord: A Measure of the Quantumness of Correlations [BibTeX] |
2001 | Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 88(1), pp. 017901 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{ollivier-quantum-2001,
author = {Ollivier, Harold and Zurek, Wojciech H.},
title = {Quantum Discord: A Measure of the Quantumness of Correlations},
journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.},
year = {2001},
volume = {88},
number = {1},
pages = {017901},
url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.88.017901},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.88.017901}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations [BibTeX] |
2004 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 601-617 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-quantum-2004,
author = {Esfeld, Michael},
title = {Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2004},
volume = {35},
number = {4},
pages = {601--617}
}
|
|||||
| Kuhlmann, M. | Quantum Field Theory [BibTeX] |
2015 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{kuhlmann-quantum-2015,
author = {Kuhlmann, Meinard},
title = {Quantum Field Theory},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2015},
edition = {Summer 2015},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/quantum-field-theory/}
}
|
|||||
| Mandl, F. and Shaw, G. | Quantum field theory [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{mandl-quantum-2013,
author = {Mandl, F. and Shaw, Graham},
title = {Quantum field theory},
publisher = {Wiley},
year = {2013},
edition = {2nd}
}
|
|||||
| Tong, D. | Quantum Field Theory [BibTeX] |
2007 | Part III Mathematical Tripos. | inproceedings | URL |
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{tong-quantum-2007,
author = {Tong, David},
title = {Quantum Field Theory},
booktitle = {Part III Mathematical Tripos.},
publisher = {University of Cambridge},
year = {2007},
url = {http://www.downsky.org/e-books-list/quantum-field-theory-by-dr-david-tong-1a73p.html}
}
|
|||||
| Redhead, M.L.G. | Quantum Field Theory for Philosophers | 1982 | PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Vol. 1982(2), pp. 57-99 |
article | |
| Abstract: The metaphysical commitments of quantum field theory are examined. A thesis of underdetermination as between field and particle approaches to the "elementary particles" is argued for but only if a disputed notion of transcendental individuality is admitted. The superiority of the field approach is further emphasized in the context of heuristics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{redhead-quantum-1982,
author = {Redhead, Michael L. G.},
title = {Quantum Field Theory for Philosophers},
journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association},
year = {1982},
volume = {1982},
number = {2},
pages = {57--99}
}
|
|||||
| Lancaster, T. and Blundell, S. | Quantum field theory for the gifted amateur [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{lancaster-quantum-2014,
author = {Lancaster, Tom and Blundell, Stephen},
title = {Quantum field theory for the gifted amateur},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Zeidler, E. | Quantum field theory II: quantum electrodynamics : a bridge between mathematicians and physicists | 2009 | book | ||
| Abstract: This is the second volume of a modern introduction to quantum field theory which addresses both mathematicians and physicists ranging from advanced undergraduate students to professional scientists. This book seeks to bridge the existing gap between the different languages used by mathematicians and physicists. For students of mathematics it is shown that detailed knowledge of the physical background helps to discover interesting interrelationships between quite diverse mathematical topics. For students of physics fairly advanced mathematics, beyond that included in the usual curriculum in physics, is presented. The present volume concerns a detailed study of the mathematical and physical aspects of the quantum theory of light.;This is the second volume of a modern introduction to quantum field theory which addresses both mathematicians and physicists ranging from advanced undergraduate students to professional scientists. This book seeks to bridge the existing gap between the different languages used by mathematicians and physicists. For students of mathematics it is shown that detailed knowledge of the physical background helps to discover interesting interrelationships between quite diverse mathematical topics. For students of physics fairly advanced mathematics, beyond that included in the usual curriculum in physics, is presented. The present volume concerns a detailed study of the mathematical and physical aspects of the quantum theory of light.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{zeidler-quantum-2009,
author = {Zeidler, Eberhard},
title = {Quantum field theory II: quantum electrodynamics : a bridge between mathematicians and physicists},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2009},
edition = {1. Aufl.}
}
|
|||||
| Zeidler, E. and service) , S.(O. | Quantum Field Theory II: Quantum Electrodynamics: A Bridge between Mathematicians and Physicists [BibTeX] |
2009 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{zeidler-quantum-2009-1,
author = {Zeidler, Eberhard and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {Quantum Field Theory II: Quantum Electrodynamics: A Bridge between Mathematicians and Physicists},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
year = {2009}
}
|
|||||
| Zee, A. | Quantum field theory in a nutshell [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{zee-quantum-2010,
author = {Zee, A.},
title = {Quantum field theory in a nutshell},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2010},
edition = {2nd}
}
|
|||||
| Dosch, H.G., Müller, V.F. and Sieroka, N. | Quantum field theory in a semiotic perspective [BibTeX] |
2005 | Vol. Nr. 17 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{dosch-quantum-2005,
author = {Dosch, Hans G. and Müller, Volkhard F. and Sieroka, Norman},
title = {Quantum field theory in a semiotic perspective},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2005},
volume = {Nr. 17}
}
|
|||||
| Hollands, S. and Wald, R.M. | Quantum fields in curved spacetime [BibTeX] |
2015 | Physics Reports Vol. 574, pp. 1-35 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{hollands-quantum-2015,
author = {Hollands, Stefan and Wald, Robert M.},
title = {Quantum fields in curved spacetime},
journal = {Physics Reports},
year = {2015},
volume = {574},
pages = {1--35}
}
|
|||||
| Cirel'son, B.S. | Quantum generalizations of Bell's inequality | 1980 | Letters in Mathematical Physics Vol. 4(2), pp. 93-100 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: Even though quantum correlations violate Bell's inequality, they satisfy weaker inequalities of a similar type. Some particular inequalities of this kind are proved here. The more general case of instruments located in different space-time regions is also discussed in some detail. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{cirelson-quantum-1980,
author = {Cirel'son, B. S.},
title = {Quantum generalizations of Bell's inequality},
journal = {Letters in Mathematical Physics},
year = {1980},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
pages = {93--100},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00417500},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00417500}
}
|
|||||
| Rovelli, C. | Quantum gravity [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{rovelli-quantum-2004,
author = {Rovelli, Carlo},
title = {Quantum gravity},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2004}
}
|
|||||
| Bennett, C.H. and DiVincenzo, D.P. | Quantum information and computation | 2000 | Nature Vol. 404(6775), pp. 247-255 |
article | |
| Abstract: In information processing, as in physics, our classical world view provides an incomplete approximation to an underlying quantum reality. Quantum effects like interference and entanglement play no direct role in conventional information processing, but they can be harnessed to break codes, create unbreakable codes, and speed up otherwise intractable computations.; In information processing, as in physics, our classical world view provides an incomplete approximation to an underlying quantum reality. Quantum effects like interference and entanglement play no direct role in conventional information processing, but they can be harnessed to break codes, create unbreakable codes, and speed up otherwise intractable computations.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bennett-quantum-2000,
author = {Bennett, Charles H. and DiVincenzo, David P.},
title = {Quantum information and computation},
journal = {Nature},
year = {2000},
volume = {404},
number = {6775},
pages = {247--255}
}
|
|||||
| Peres, A. | Quantum information and general relativity | 2004 | Fortschritte der Physik Vol. 52(11-12), pp. 1052-1055 |
article | |
| Abstract: The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (1935) is reexamined in the light of Shannon's information theory (1948). The EPR argument did not take into account that the observers' information was localized, like any other physical object. General relativity introduces new problems: there are horizons which act as one-way membranes for the propagation of quantum information, in particular black holes which act like sinks.;The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (1935) is reexamined in the light of Shannon's information theory (1948). The EPR argument did not take into account that the observers' information was localized, like any other physical object. General relativity introduces new problems: there are horizons which act as on-way membranes for the propagation of quantum information, in particular black holes which act like sinks. (C) 2004 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{peres-quantum-2004-1,
author = {Peres, Asher},
title = {Quantum information and general relativity},
journal = {Fortschritte der Physik},
year = {2004},
volume = {52},
number = {11-12},
pages = {1052--1055}
}
|
|||||
| Peres, A. and Terno, D.R. | Quantum information and relativity theory | 2004 | Reviews of Modern Physics Vol. 76(1), pp. 93-123 |
article | |
| Abstract: This article discusses the intimate relationship between quantum mechanics, information theory, and relativity theory. Taken together these are the foundations of present-day theoretical physics, and their interrelationship is an essential part of the theory. The acquisition of information from a quantum system by an observer occurs at the interface of classical and quantum physics. The authors review the essential tools needed to describe this interface, i.e., Kraus matrices and positive-operator-valued measures. They then discuss how special relativity imposes severe restrictions on the transfer of information between distant systems and the implications of the fact that quantum entropy is not a Lorentz-covariant concept. This leads to a discussion of how it comes about that Lorentz transformations of reduced density matrices for entangled systems may not be completely positive maps. Quantum field theory is, of course, necessary for a consistent description of interactions. Its structure implies a fundamental tradeoff between detector reliability and localizability. Moreover, general relativity produces new and counterintuitive effects, particularly when black holes (or, more generally, event horizons) are involved. In this more general context the authors discuss how most of the current concepts in quantum information theory may require a reassessment.;Quantum mechanics, information theory, and relativity theory are the basic foundations of theoretical physics. The acquisition of information from a quantum system is the interface of classical and quantum physics. Essential tools for its description are Kraus matrices and positive operator valued measures (POVMs). Special relativity imposes severe restrictions on the transfer of information between distant systems. Quantum entropy is not a Lorentz covariant concept. Lorentz transformations of reduced density matrices for entangled systems may not be completely positive maps. Quantum field theory, which is necessary for a consistent description of interactions, implies a fundamental trade-off between detector reliability and localizability. General relativity produces new, counterintuitive effects, in particular when black holes (or more generally, event horizons) are involved. Most of the current concepts in quantum information theory may then require a reassessment.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{peres-quantum-2004,
author = {Peres, Asher and Terno, Daniel R.},
title = {Quantum information and relativity theory},
journal = {Reviews of Modern Physics},
year = {2004},
volume = {76},
number = {1},
pages = {93--123}
}
|
|||||
| Melkikh, A.V. | Quantum information and the problem of mechanisms of biological evolution | 2014 | Bio Systems Vol. 115, pp. 33 |
article | |
| Abstract: One of the most important conditions for replication in early evolution is the de facto elimination of the conformational degrees of freedom of the replicators, the mechanisms of which remain unclear. In addition, realistic evolutionary timescales can be established based only on partially directed evolution, further complicating this issue. A division of the various evolutionary theories into two classes has been proposed based on the presence or absence of a priori information about the evolving system. A priori information plays a key role in solving problems in evolution. Here, a model of partially directed evolution, based on the learning automata theory, which includes a priori information about the fitness space, is proposed. A potential repository of such prior information is the states of biologically important molecules. Thus, the need for extended evolutionary synthesis is discussed. Experiments to test the hypothesis of partially directed evolution are proposed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{melkikh-quantum-2014,
author = {Melkikh, Alexey V.},
title = {Quantum information and the problem of mechanisms of biological evolution},
journal = {Bio Systems},
year = {2014},
volume = {115},
pages = {33}
}
|
|||||
| Pitalúa-García, D. | Quantum Information Causality [BibTeX] |
2013 | Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 110(21), pp. 210402 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{pitalua-garcia-quantum-2013,
author = {Pitalúa-García, Damián},
title = {Quantum Information Causality},
journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.},
year = {2013},
volume = {110},
number = {21},
pages = {210402},
url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.210402},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.210402}
}
|
|||||
| DiVincenzo, D.P. and Loss, D. | Quantum information is physical | 1998 | Superlattices and Microstructures Vol. 23(3), pp. 419-432 |
article | |
| Abstract: We discuss a few current developments in the use of quantum mechanically coherent systems for information processing. In each of these developments, Rolf Landauer has played a crucial role in nudging us, and other workers in the field, into asking the right questions, some of which we have been lucky enough to answer. A general overview of the key ideas of quantum error correction is given. We discuss how quantum entanglement is the key to protecting quantum states from decoherence in a manner which, in a theoretical sense, is as effective as the protection of digital data from bit noise. We also discuss five general criteria which must be satisfied to implement a quantum computer in the laboratory, and we illustrate the application of these criteria by discussing our ideas for creating a quantum computer out of the spin states of coupled quantum dots. (C) 1998 Academic Press Limited.; We discuss a few current developments in the use of quantum mechanically coherent systems for information processing. In each of these developments, Rolf Landauer has played a crucial role in nudging us, and other workers in the field, into asking the right questions, some of which we have been lucky enough to answer. A general overview of the key ideas of quantum error correction is given. We discuss how quantum entanglement is the key to protecting quantum states from decoherence in a manner which, in a theoretical sense, is as effective as the protection of digital data from bit noise. We also discuss five general criteria which must be satisfied to implement a quantum computer in the laboratory, and we illustrate the application of these criteria by discussing our ideas for creating a quantum computer out of the spin states of coupled quantum dots. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{divincenzo-quantum-1998,
author = {DiVincenzo, D. P. and Loss, D.},
title = {Quantum information is physical},
journal = {Superlattices and Microstructures},
year = {1998},
volume = {23},
number = {3},
pages = {419--432}
}
|
|||||
| Tomamichel, M. and EBSCOhost | Quantum information processing with finite resources: mathematical foundations [BibTeX] |
2016 | Vol. 5 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{tomamichel-quantum-2016,
author = {Tomamichel, Marco and EBSCOhost},
title = {Quantum information processing with finite resources: mathematical foundations},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2016},
volume = {5}
}
|
|||||
| Wilde, M. | Quantum information theory [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{wilde-quantum-2013,
author = {Wilde, Mark},
title = {Quantum information theory},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Hayashi, M. | Quantum Information Theory: Mathematical Foundation [BibTeX] |
2017 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hayashi-quantum-2017,
author = {Hayashi, Masahito},
title = {Quantum Information Theory: Mathematical Foundation},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
year = {2017},
edition = {2nd 2017.}
}
|
|||||
| Fayngold, M. and Fayngold, V. | Quantum mechanics and quantum information [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{fayngold-quantum-2013,
author = {Fayngold, Moses and Fayngold, Vadim},
title = {Quantum mechanics and quantum information},
publisher = {Wiley},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Fuchs, C.A. | Quantum mechanics as quantum information, mostly [BibTeX] |
2003 | Journal of Modern Optics Vol. 50(6-7), pp. 987-1023 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{fuchs-quantum-2003,
author = {Fuchs, Christopher A.},
title = {Quantum mechanics as quantum information, mostly},
journal = {Journal of Modern Optics},
year = {2003},
volume = {50},
number = {6-7},
pages = {987--1023}
}
|
|||||
| Bub, J. | Quantum Mechanics is About Quantum Information | 2005 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 541-560 |
article | |
| Abstract: I argue that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a theory about the representation and manipulation of information, not a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles. The notion of quantum information is to be understood as a new physical primitive—just as, following Einsteins special theory of relativity, a field is no longer regarded as the physical manifestation of vibrations in a mechanical medium, but recognized as a new physical entity in its own right.; I argue that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a theory about the representation and manipulation of information, not a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles. The notion of quantum information is to be understood as a new physical primitive—just as, following Einstein’s special theory of relativity, a field is no longer regarded as the physical manifestation of vibrations in a mechanical medium, but recognized as a new physical entity in its own right. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bub-quantum-2005,
author = {Bub, Jeffrey},
title = {Quantum Mechanics is About Quantum Information},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {2005},
volume = {35},
number = {4},
pages = {541--560}
}
|
|||||
| Wallace, D. and Timpson, C.G. | Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism | 2010 | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 61(4), pp. 697-727 |
article | |
| Abstract: What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call space time state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call space time state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wallace-quantum-2010,
author = {Wallace, David and Timpson, Christopher G.},
title = {Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2010},
volume = {61},
number = {4},
pages = {697--727}
}
|
|||||
| Fraassen, V. and Bas, C. | Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view [BibTeX] |
1991 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{van-fraassen-quantum-1991,
author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.},
title = {Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {1991}
}
|
|||||
| Maudlin, T. | Quantum non-locality and relativity: metaphysical intimations of modern physics [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{maudlin-quantum-2011,
author = {Maudlin, Tim},
title = {Quantum non-locality and relativity: metaphysical intimations of modern physics},
publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
year = {2011},
edition = {3rd}
}
|
|||||
| Popescu, S. and Rohrlich, D. | Quantum nonlocality as an axiom | 1994 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 24(3), pp. 379-385 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: In the conventional approach to quantum mechanics, indeterminism is an axiom and nonlocality is a theorem. We consider inverting the logical order, making nonlocality an axiom and indeterminism a theorem. Nonlocal “superquantum” correlations, preserving relativistic causality, can violate the CHSH inequality more strongly than any quantum correlations. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{popescu-quantum-1994,
author = {Popescu, Sandu and Rohrlich, Daniel},
title = {Quantum nonlocality as an axiom},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {1994},
volume = {24},
number = {3},
pages = {379--385},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02058098},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02058098}
}
|
|||||
| Hardy, L. | Quantum ontological excess baggage [BibTeX] |
2004 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(2), pp. 267-276 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{hardy-quantum-2004,
author = {Hardy, Lucien},
title = {Quantum ontological excess baggage},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2004},
volume = {35},
number = {2},
pages = {267--276}
}
|
|||||
| Holevo, A.S. | Quantum Systems, Channels, Information: A Mathematical Introduction [BibTeX] |
2012 | Vol. 16 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{holevo-quantum-2012,
author = {Holevo, Alexander S.},
title = {Quantum Systems, Channels, Information: A Mathematical Introduction},
publisher = {De Gruyter},
year = {2012},
volume = {16}
}
|
|||||
| Norris, C. | Quantum theory and the flight from realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics [BibTeX] |
2000 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{norris-quantum-2000,
author = {Norris, Christopher},
title = {Quantum theory and the flight from realism: philosophical responses to quantum mechanics},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2000}
}
|
|||||
| Deutsch, D. | Quantum theory as a universal physical theory [BibTeX] |
1985 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 24(1), pp. 1-41 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{deutsch-quantum-1985-1,
author = {Deutsch, David},
title = {Quantum theory as a universal physical theory},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {1985},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {1--41}
}
|
|||||
| Keller, O. | Quantum theory of near-field electrodynamics [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{keller-quantum-2011,
author = {Keller, Ole},
title = {Quantum theory of near-field electrodynamics},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Deutsch, D. | Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer | 1985 | Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences Vol. 400(1818), pp. 97-117 |
article | DOI |
| Abstract: It is argued that underlying the Church-Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the ‘universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{deutsch-quantum-1985,
author = {Deutsch, D.},
title = {Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer},
journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences},
year = {1985},
volume = {400},
number = {1818},
pages = {97--117},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1985.0070}
}
|
|||||
| Van der Klis, M. | Quasi-periodic oscillations in celestial x-ray sources | 1988 | , pp. 50-58 | techreport | |
| Abstract: TRN: 90-014580: Much of what we know about x-ray sources in our galaxy derives from regularities in the way the intensity of their radiation varies with time. Cyclic increases and decreases in intensity can indicate that a star is orbiting the x-ray source, eclipsing it periodically. X-ray pulses uniformly spaced less than a few seconds apart, on the other hand, imply that the source is a high-density object, know as a neutron star, that happens to be strongly magnetized and spinning rapidly as well. Intermittent bursts of x rays also indicated the presence of a neutron star, but one on whose surface enormous thermonuclear explosions are taking place. In late 1984 and early 1985, the author and his colleagues realized that their observations of one of the brightest galactic-bulge sources, GX5-1, had revealed a peculiar type of regular variation in its x-ray intensity. The observations were made with a satellite of the European Space Agency, the x-ray observatory, EXOSAT. The variations observed in the intensity of GX5-1's x-ray emissions were particularly surprising because they were not strictly periodic: in any given observation the interval between x-ray intensity peaks was likely to be close to .03 second, but often it was a bit longer or shorter. Such not quite periodic fluctuations are generally called quasi-periodic oscillations (QPO's). 6 figs. | |||||
BibTeX:
@techreport{van-der-klis-quasi-periodic-1988,
author = {Van der Klis, M.},
title = {Quasi-periodic oscillations in celestial x-ray sources},
year = {1988},
pages = {50--58}
}
|
|||||
| Aguirre, A., Foster, B. and Merali, Z. | Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions Are Wrong? [BibTeX] |
2015 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{aguirre-questioning-2015,
author = {Aguirre, Anthony and Foster, Brendan and Merali, Zeeya},
title = {Questioning the Foundations of Physics: Which of Our Fundamental Assumptions Are Wrong?},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Aguirre, A., Foster, B. and Merali, Z. | Questioning the foundations of physics: which of our fundamental assumptions are wrong? [BibTeX] |
2015 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{aguirre-questioning-2015-1,
author = {Aguirre, Anthony and Foster, Brendan and Merali, Zeeya},
title = {Questioning the foundations of physics: which of our fundamental assumptions are wrong?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Redhead, M., Lipton, P., Douven, I. and Bueno, O. | Quests of a realist [BibTeX] |
2001 | Vol. 10(3) |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{redhead-quests-2001,
author = {Redhead, Michael and Lipton, Peter and Douven, Igor and Bueno, Otávio},
title = {Quests of a realist},
year = {2001},
volume = {10},
number = {3}
}
|
|||||
| Liggins, D. | Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument | 2008 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 68(1), pp. 113-127 |
article | |
| Abstract: Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.;Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument–an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam's writings reveals some neglected arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.;Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument–an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam's writings reveals some neglected arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam's writings reveals some neglected arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.;Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument-an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam's writings reveals some neglected arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{liggins-quine-2008,
author = {Liggins, David},
title = {Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {2008},
volume = {68},
number = {1},
pages = {113--127}
}
|
|||||
| Chua, W.F. | Radical Developments in Accounting Thought | 1986 | The Accounting Review Vol. 61(4), pp. 601-632 |
article | |
| Abstract: Mainstream accounting is grounded in a common set of philosophical assumptions about knowledge, the empirical world, and the relationship between theory and practice. This particular world-view, with its emphasis on hypothetico-deductivism and technical control, possesses certain strengths but has restricted the range of problems studied and the use of research methods. By changing this set of assumptions, fundamentally different and potentially rich research insights are obtained. Two alternative world-views and their underlying assumptions are elucidated-the interpretive and the critical. The consequences of conducting research within these philosophical traditions are discussed via a comparison between accounting research that is conducted on the "same" problem but from two different perspectives. In addition, some of the difficulties associated with these alternative perspectives are briefly dealt with. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{chua-radical-1986,
author = {Chua, Wai F.},
title = {Radical Developments in Accounting Thought},
journal = {The Accounting Review},
year = {1986},
volume = {61},
number = {4},
pages = {601--632}
}
|
|||||
| Pargetter, R. and Bigelow, J. | Re-acquaintance with qualia | 2006 | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 84(3), pp. 353-378 |
article | |
| Abstract: Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia'[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the reasons why, he now thinks, his knowledge argument against materialism fails to prove the falsity of materialism [Jackson 2005. He argues that you can block the knowledge argument against materialism-but only if you tie yourself to a dubious doctrine called representationalism. We argue that the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of either representational or nonrepresentational materialism. It does, however, furnish both materialists and dualists with a successful argument for the existence of distinctively first-person modes of acquaintance with mental states. Jackson's argument does not refute materialism: but it does bring to the surface significant features of thought and experience, which many dualists have sensed, and most materialists have missed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{pargetter-re-acquaintance-2006,
author = {Pargetter, Robert and Bigelow, John},
title = {Re-acquaintance with qualia},
journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2006},
volume = {84},
number = {3},
pages = {353--378}
}
|
|||||
| Ehrenfeucht, A., Kleijn, J., Koutny, M. and Rozenberg, G. | Reaction systems: A natural computing approach to the functioning of living cells [BibTeX] |
2012 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{ehrenfeucht-reaction-2012,
author = {Ehrenfeucht, Andrzej and Kleijn, Jetty and Koutny, Maciej and Rozenberg, Grzegorz},
title = {Reaction systems: A natural computing approach to the functioning of living cells},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Kim, S.-B., Lasserre, T. and Wang, Y. | Reactor neutrinos [BibTeX] |
2013 | Advances in High Energy Physics Vol. 2013, pp. 1-34 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{kim-reactor-2013,
author = {Kim, Soo-Bong and Lasserre, Thierry and Wang, Yifang},
title = {Reactor neutrinos},
journal = {Advances in High Energy Physics},
year = {2013},
volume = {2013},
pages = {1--34}
}
|
|||||
| Block, N.J. | Readings in philosophy of psychology [BibTeX] |
1980 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{block-readings-1980,
author = {Block, Ned J.},
title = {Readings in philosophy of psychology},
publisher = {Methuen},
year = {1980}
}
|
|||||
| Dennett, D.C. | Real Patterns [BibTeX] |
1991 | The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88(1), pp. 27-51 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{dennett-real-1991,
author = {Dennett, Daniel C.},
title = {Real Patterns},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {1991},
volume = {88},
number = {1},
pages = {27--51}
}
|
|||||
| Maddy, P. | Realism in Mathematics [BibTeX] |
1992 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{maddy-realism-1992,
author = {Maddy, Penelope},
title = {Realism in Mathematics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press, Incorporated},
year = {1992}
}
|
|||||
| Field, H.H. | Realism, mathematics, and modality [BibTeX] |
1989 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{field-realism-1989,
author = {Field, Hartry H.},
title = {Realism, mathematics, and modality},
publisher = {Blackwell},
year = {1989}
}
|
|||||
| Salmon, W.C., Salmon, M.H. and Dowe, P. | Reality and rationality [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{salmon-reality-2005,
author = {Salmon, Wesley C. and Salmon, Merrilee H. and Dowe, Phil},
title = {Reality and rationality},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Papineau, D. | Reality and representation [BibTeX] |
1987 | article | ||
BibTeX:
@article{papineau-reality-1987,
author = {Papineau, David},
title = {Reality and representation},
year = {1987}
}
|
|||||
| Wharton, K. | Reality, no matter how you slice it [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 181-196 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{wharton-reality-2015,
author = {Wharton, Ken},
title = {Reality, no matter how you slice it},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {181--196}
}
|
|||||
| Brooks, M. | Reality: It's nothing but information | 2012 | New Scientist Vol. 215(2884), pp. 41 - |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: What we call reality might actually be the output of a program running on a cosmos-sized quantum computer | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{brooks-reality:-2012,
author = {Brooks, Michael},
title = {Reality: It's nothing but information},
journal = {New Scientist},
year = {2012},
volume = {215},
number = {2884},
pages = {41 --},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0262407912625196},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(12)62519-6}
}
|
|||||
| Saravani, M., Afshordi, N. and Mann, R.B. | Recent Findings in Physics Research Described by Researchers from University of Waterloo (Empty black holes, firewalls, and the origin of Bekenstein-Hawking entropy) [BibTeX] |
2015 | Journal of Technology & Science, pp. 476 | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{saravani-recent-2015,
author = {Saravani, Mehdi and Afshordi, Niayesh and Mann, Robert B.},
title = {Recent Findings in Physics Research Described by Researchers from University of Waterloo (Empty black holes, firewalls, and the origin of Bekenstein-Hawking entropy)},
journal = {Journal of Technology & Science},
year = {2015},
pages = {476}
}
|
|||||
| McArthur, D. | Reconsidering Structural Realism: 1 | 2003 | Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 33(4), pp. 517 |
article | |
| Abstract: McArthur examines arguments for and against structural realism. He agrees that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be 'all or nothing,' that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content. However, he contends that this view is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the realism question and that such a view leaves a large role for structural realism as a fruitful way to interpret theories. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mcarthur-reconsidering-2003,
author = {McArthur, Dan},
title = {Reconsidering Structural Realism: 1},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2003},
volume = {33},
number = {4},
pages = {517}
}
|
|||||
| Wimsatt, W.C. | Reductionism and Its Heuristics: Making Methodological Reductionism Honest | 2006 | Synthese Vol. 151(3), pp. 445-475 |
article | |
| Abstract: Methodological reductionists practice ‘wannabe reductionism’. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as “reductionist”. “Successional reduction” and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism.;Methodological reductionists practice 'wannabe reductionism'. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as "reductionist". "Successional reduction" and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism.;Methodological reductionists practice 'wannabe reductionism'. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as "reductionist". "Successional reduction" and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism.;Issue Title: New Perspectives on Reduction and Emergence in Physics, Biology and Psychology Methodological reductionists practice 'wannabe reductionism'. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as "reductionist". "Successional reduction" and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wimsatt-reductionism-2006,
author = {Wimsatt, William C.},
title = {Reductionism and Its Heuristics: Making Methodological Reductionism Honest},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2006},
volume = {151},
number = {3},
pages = {445--475}
}
|
|||||
| Wimsatt, W.C. | Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality [BibTeX] |
2007 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{wimsatt-re-engineering-2007,
author = {Wimsatt, William C.},
title = {Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
year = {2007}
}
|
|||||
| Tononi, G., Sporns, O. and Edelman, G.M. | Reentry and the problem of integrating multiple cortical areas: simulation of dynamic integration in the visual system [BibTeX] |
1992 | Cerebral Cortex Vol. 2 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{tononi-reentry-1992,
author = {Tononi, G. and Sporns, O. and Edelman, G. M.},
title = {Reentry and the problem of integrating multiple cortical areas: simulation of dynamic integration in the visual system},
journal = {Cerebral Cortex},
year = {1992},
volume = {2},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/2.4.310},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/2.4.310}
}
|
|||||
| Carver, T. | Reflections on Hobbes, Nature and Artifice [BibTeX] |
2015 | Hobbes Studies Vol. 28(1), pp. 64-73 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{carver-reflections-2015,
author = {Carver, Terrell},
title = {Reflections on Hobbes, Nature and Artifice},
journal = {Hobbes Studies},
year = {2015},
volume = {28},
number = {1},
pages = {64--73}
}
|
|||||
| Kruse, H.W. | Reines-Cowan team discovery of the electron neutrino | 2011 | Nuclear Physics B (Proceedings Supplements) Vol. 221, pp. 142-148 |
article | |
| Abstract: Personal perspective and recollections by the author discuss the Reines-Cowan team discovery of the electron neutrino at a Savannah River reactor in 1956. First presented at the Neutrino Santa Fe 2006 Conference. © 2011.; Personal perspective and recollections by the author discuss the Reines-Cowan team discovery of the electron neutrino at a Savannah River reactor in 1956. First presented at the Neutrino Santa Fe 2006 Conference. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{kruse-reines-cowan-2011,
author = {Kruse, Herald W.},
title = {Reines-Cowan team discovery of the electron neutrino},
journal = {Nuclear Physics B (Proceedings Supplements)},
year = {2011},
volume = {221},
pages = {142--148}
}
|
|||||
| Simons, P. | Relations and Idealism: On Some Arguments of Hochberg against Trope Nominalism | 2014 | Dialectica Vol. 68(2), pp. 305-315 |
article | |
| Abstract: In a recent article, H erbert H ochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalist who is sceptical about relational tropes, as deviating into idealism. Since there are few philosophical views I find more repugnant than idealism, I must either resist the accusation or recant. I choose to resist, by showing how relational tropes are not needed as truth‐makers for a wide range of truths, and raising the real possibility that they may not be needed at all, without lapsing into either monism or idealism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{simons-relations-2014,
author = {Simons, Peter},
title = {Relations and Idealism: On Some Arguments of Hochberg against Trope Nominalism},
journal = {Dialectica},
year = {2014},
volume = {68},
number = {2},
pages = {305--315}
}
|
|||||
| Gray, R.M. | Relative Entropy [BibTeX] |
2011 | Entropy and Information Theory, pp. 173-218 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{gray-relative-2011,
author = {Gray, Robert M.},
title = {Relative Entropy},
booktitle = {Entropy and Information Theory},
publisher = {Springer US},
year = {2011},
pages = {173--218}
}
|
|||||
| Rovelli, C. | Relative information at the foundation of physics [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 79-86 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rovelli-relative-2015,
author = {Rovelli, Carlo},
title = {Relative information at the foundation of physics},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {79--86}
}
|
|||||
| Kaniadakis, G. | Relativistic entropy and related Boltzmann kinetics | 2009 | The European Physical Journal A Vol. 40(3), pp. 275-287 |
article | |
| Abstract: It is well known that the particular form of the two-particle correlation function, in the collisional integral of the classical Boltzmman equation, fixes univocally the entropy of the system, which turns out to be the Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy. In the ordinary relativistic Boltzmann equation, some standard generalizations, with respect to its classical version, imposed by the special relativity, are customarily performed. The only ingredient of the equation, which tacitly remains in its original classical form, is the two-particle correlation function, and this fact imposes that also the relativistic kinetics is governed by the Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy. Indeed the ordinary relativistic Boltzmann equation admits as stationary stable distribution, the exponential Juttner distribution. Here, we show that the special relativity laws and the maximum entropy principle suggest a relativistic generalization also of the two-particle correlation function and then of the entropy. The so obtained, fully relativistic Boltzmann equation, obeys the H-theorem and predicts a stationary stable distribution, presenting power law tails in the high-energy region. The ensued relativistic kinetic theory preserves the main features of the classical kinetics, which recovers in the c [right arrow] [infinity] limit.;It is well known that the particular form of the two-particle correlation function, in the collisional integral of the classical Boltzmman equation, fixes univocally the entropy of the system, which turns out to be the Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy. In the ordinary relativistic Boltzmann equation, some standard generalizations, with respect to its classical version, imposed by the special relativity, are customarily performed. The only ingredient of the equation, which tacitly remains in its original classical form, is the two-particle correlation function, and this fact imposes that also the relativistic kinetics is governed by the Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy. Indeed the ordinary relativistic Boltzmann equation admits as stationary stable distribution, the exponential Juttner distribution. Here, we show that the special relativity laws and the maximum entropy principle suggest a relativistic generalization also of the two-particle correlation function and then of the entropy. The so obtained, fully relativistic Boltzmann equation, obeys the H-theorem and predicts a stationary stable distribution, presenting power law tails in the high-energy region. The ensued relativistic kinetic theory preserves the main features of the classical kinetics, which recovers in the c $ \rightarrow$ ∞ limit.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{kaniadakis-relativistic-2009,
author = {Kaniadakis, G.},
title = {Relativistic entropy and related Boltzmann kinetics},
journal = {The European Physical Journal A},
year = {2009},
volume = {40},
number = {3},
pages = {275--287}
}
|
|||||
| Tang, W.H. | Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief | 2016 | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 94(2), pp. 362-377 |
article | |
| Abstract: What are the conditions under which suspension of belief-or suspension, for short-is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In this paper, I consider some proposals as to how process reliabilists might seek to account for justified suspension. Although several of these proposals do not work, two are promising. The first such proposal appeals to the notion of propositional justification; the second involves weaving evidentialist elements into reliabilism. I'll argue that the second proposal is better than the first.;What are the conditions under which suspension of belief-or suspension, for short-is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In this paper, I consider some proposals as to how process reliabilists might seek to account for justified suspension. Although several of these proposals do not work, two are promising. The first such proposal appeals to the notion of propositional justification; the second involves weaving evidentialist elements into reliabilism. I'll argue that the second proposal is better than the first.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{tang-reliabilism-2016,
author = {Tang, Weng H.},
title = {Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief},
journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2016},
volume = {94},
number = {2},
pages = {362--377}
}
|
|||||
| Goldman, A. and Beddor, B. | Reliabilist Epistemology [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{goldman-reliabilist-2016,
author = {Goldman, Alvin and Beddor, Bob},
title = {Reliabilist Epistemology},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Winter 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/reliabilism/}
}
|
|||||
| French, S. and Ladyman, J. | Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure | 2003 | Synthese Vol. 136(1), pp. 31-56 |
article | |
| Abstract: We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structural realism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned the view of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualising objects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in the context of modern physics.; We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structuralrealism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned theview of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualisingobjects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in thecontext of modern physics.; We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structural realism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned the view of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualising objects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in the context of modern physics.; We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structuralrealism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned theview of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualisingobjects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in thecontext of modern physics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{french-remodelling-2003,
author = {French, Steven and Ladyman, James},
title = {Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2003},
volume = {136},
number = {1},
pages = {31--56}
}
|
|||||
| Griffiths, P.E. and Gray, R.D. | Replicator II – Judgement Day | 1997 | Biology and Philosophy Vol. 12(4), pp. 471-492 |
article | |
| Abstract: The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative ’extended replicator‘ approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). A precise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the ’life-cycle‘ that DST claims is the unit of evolution. Pacé Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an ’extended replicator‘ on Sterelny et al.‘s definition. Reasons are given for scepticism about the heuristic value claimed for the extended replicator concept. For every competitive, individualistic insight the replicator theorist has a cooperative, systematic blindspot.; The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative 'extended replicator' approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). Aprecise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the 'life-cycle' that DST claims is the unit of evolution. PacB Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an 'extended replicator' on Sterelny et al.'s definition. Reasons are given for scepticism about the heuristic value claimed for the extended replicator concept. For every competitive, individualistic insight the replicator theorist has a cooperative, systematic blindspot.; The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative 'extended replicator' approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). A precise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the 'life-cycle' that DST claims is the unit of evolution. Pacé Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an 'extended replicator' on Sterelny et al.'s definition. Reasons are given for scepticism about the heuristic value claimed for the extended replicator concept. For every competitive, individualistic insight the replicator theorist has a cooperative, systematic blindspot.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{griffiths-replicator-1997,
author = {Griffiths, Paul E. and Gray, Russell D.},
title = {Replicator II – Judgement Day},
journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
year = {1997},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {471--492}
}
|
|||||
| Sober, E. | Reply to Godfrey-Smith [BibTeX] |
1999 | Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 95(1/2), pp. 183-186 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{sober-reply-1999,
author = {Sober, Elliott},
title = {Reply to Godfrey-Smith},
journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
year = {1999},
volume = {95},
number = {1/2},
pages = {183--186}
}
|
|||||
| Jablonka, E. and Lamb, M.J. | Reply to Wilkins on review of evolution in four dimensions [1] [BibTeX] |
2007 | BioEssays Vol. 29(3), pp. 308-308 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{jablonka-reply-2007,
author = {Jablonka, Eva and Lamb, Marion J.},
title = {Reply to Wilkins on review of evolution in four dimensions [1]},
journal = {BioEssays},
year = {2007},
volume = {29},
number = {3},
pages = {308--308}
}
|
|||||
| Finkelstein, L. | Representation By Symbol Systems As An Extension Of The Concept Of Measurement | 1975 | Kybernetes Vol. 4(4), pp. 215-223 |
article | |
| Abstract: The study of information is central to the science of Cybernetics. The communication and processing of information takes place, in general, by means of signals, which represent or describe (in other words symbolize) the entities to which the information relates. The present paper examines one of the foundation problems of Cybernetics: the principles of representing entities and the relations between them by systems of symbols. It treats these principles as extensions and generalizations of the fundamental concepts of measurement. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{finkelstein-representation-1975,
author = {Finkelstein, L.},
title = {Representation By Symbol Systems As An Extension Of The Concept Of Measurement},
journal = {Kybernetes},
year = {1975},
volume = {4},
number = {4},
pages = {215--223}
}
|
|||||
| Shea, N. | Representation in the genome and in other inheritance systems | 2007 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 22(3), pp. 313 |
article | |
| Abstract: There is ongoing controversy as to whether the genome is a representing system (Sterelny K., Smith K.C. and Dickson M. 1996. Biol. Philos. 11: 377-403; Griffiths P.E. 2001. Philos. Sci. 68: 394-412). Although it is widely recognised that DNA carries information, both correlating with and coding for various outcomes, neither of these implies that the genome has semantic properties like correctness or satisfaction conditions (Godfrey-Smith P. 2002. In: Wolenski J. and Kajania-Placek K. (eds), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Sciences, Vol. II. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 387-400). Here a modified version of teleosemantics is applied to the genome to show that it does indeed have semantic properties - there is representation in the genome. The account differs in three respects from previous attempts to apply teleosemantics to genes. It emphasises the role of the consumer of representations (in addition to their mode of production). It rejects the standard assumption that genetic representation can be used to explain the course of an organism's development. And it identifies the explanatory role played by representational properties of the genome. A striking consequence of this account is that other inheritance systems could also be representational. Thus, a version of the parity thesis is accepted (Griffiths P.E. 2001. Philos. Sci. 68: 394-412). However, the criteria for being an inheritance system are demanding, so semantic properties are not ubiquitous.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{shea-representation-2007,
author = {Shea, Nicholas},
title = {Representation in the genome and in other inheritance systems},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2007},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {313}
}
|
|||||
| Maze, J.R. | Representationism, Realism and the Redundancy of `Mentalese | 1991 | Theory & Psychology Vol. 1(2), pp. 163-185 |
article | |
| Abstract: Representationism as a theory of knowledge cannot avoid collapsing into solipsism, cannot distinguish between true and false beliefs without contradicting its own basic premise and cannot give any objective ground for inference. Fodor's postulated `mentalese' is shown to suffer these defects; further, its nativism cannot bridge the supposed gap between sensory particulars and cognitive universals. His arguments for its necessity for natural language learning are problematic. Direct realism avoids these unnecessary difficulties by postulating a native perceptual ability to identify kinds of complex object, and finds the grounds of inference in the perceived structure of the world. Cognitive science can have useful applications if freed of representationism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{maze-representationism-1991,
author = {Maze, J. R.},
title = {Representationism, Realism and the Redundancy of `Mentalese},
journal = {Theory & Psychology},
year = {1991},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
pages = {163--185}
}
|
|||||
| Hacking, I. | Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science [BibTeX] |
1983 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hacking-representing-1983,
author = {Hacking, Ian},
title = {Representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1983}
}
|
|||||
| Arabatzis, T. | Representing electrons: a biographical approach to theoretical entities [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{arabatzis-representing-2006,
author = {Arabatzis, Theodore},
title = {Representing electrons: a biographical approach to theoretical entities},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Schiff, N.D., Ribary, U., Moreno, D.R., Beattie, B., Kronberg, E., Blasberg, R., Giacino, J., McCagg, C., Fins, J.J., Llinas, R. and Plum, F. | Residual cerebral activity and behavioural fragments can remain in the persistently vegetative brain [BibTeX] |
2002 | Brain Vol. 125 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{schiff-residual-2002,
author = {Schiff, N. D. and Ribary, U. and Moreno, D. R. and Beattie, B. and Kronberg, E. and Blasberg, R. and Giacino, J. and McCagg, C. and Fins, J. J. and Llinas, R. and Plum, F.},
title = {Residual cerebral activity and behavioural fragments can remain in the persistently vegetative brain},
journal = {Brain},
year = {2002},
volume = {125},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/awf131},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awf131}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | Responding to the Hole Problem [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 89 - 125 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-responding-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {Responding to the Hole Problem},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {89 -- 125},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030052}
}
|
|||||
| Bergstrom, C.T. and Rosvall, M. | Response to commentaries on “The Transmission Sense of Information” [BibTeX] |
2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 195-200 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{bergstrom-response-2011,
author = {Bergstrom, Carl T. and Rosvall, Martin},
title = {Response to commentaries on “The Transmission Sense of Information”},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {195--200}
}
|
|||||
| Rosvall, M., Bergstrom, C.T., fysik , I.f., fakulteten , T.-n. and universitet , U. | Response to commentaries on “The transmission sense of information”: discussion note [BibTeX] |
2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 195 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{rosvall-response-2011,
author = {Rosvall, Martin and Bergstrom, Carl T. and fysik, Institutionen för and fakulteten, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga and universitet, Umeå},
title = {Response to commentaries on “The transmission sense of information”: discussion note},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {195}
}
|
|||||
| Sdrolia, C. and Bishop, J.M. | Rethinking Construction: On Luciano Floridi's 'Against Digital Ontology' | 2014 | Minds and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science Vol. 24(1), pp. 89 |
article | |
| Abstract: In the fourteenth chapter of The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi puts forth a criticism of 'digital ontology' as a step toward the articulation of an 'informational structural realism'. Based on the claims made in the chapter, the present paper seeks to evaluate the distinctly Kantian scope of the chapter from a rather unconventional viewpoint: while in sympathy with the author's doubts 'against' digital philosophy, we follow a different route. We turn our attention to the concept of construction as used in the book with the hope of raising some additional questions that might contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake in Floridi's experimental epistemological response to digital ontology. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{sdrolia-rethinking-2014,
author = {Sdrolia, Chryssa and Bishop, J. M.},
title = {Rethinking Construction: On Luciano Floridi's 'Against Digital Ontology'},
journal = {Minds and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science},
year = {2014},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {89}
}
|
|||||
| Glennan, S. | Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation | 2002 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 69(S3), pp. S342-S353 |
article | |
| Abstract: Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.;Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper Glennan argues that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. Glennan contrasts Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with his own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, Glennan shows how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. Glennan concludes by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.;Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.;Philosophers of science typically associate the causal‐mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon’s account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex‐systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon’s account of causal‐mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{glennan-rethinking-2002,
author = {Glennan, Stuart},
title = {Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2002},
volume = {69},
number = {S3},
pages = {S342--S353}
}
|
|||||
| Broadbent, A. | Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation | 2007 | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 15(2), pp. 169-189 |
article | |
| Abstract: The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting-point the suggestion that C causes E iff (∼C □→ ∼E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (∼E □→ ∼C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre-emption. It is found that the 'reversed' counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre-emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{broadbent-reversing-2007,
author = {Broadbent, Alex},
title = {Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
year = {2007},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {169--189}
}
|
|||||
| Menzies, P. | Review: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation | 2006 | Mind Vol. 115(459), pp. 821-826 |
article | |
| Abstract: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation by James Woodward is reviewed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{menzies-review:-2006,
author = {Menzies, P.},
title = {Review: Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2006},
volume = {115},
number = {459},
pages = {821--826}
}
|
|||||
| Uspensky, V.A. and Shen, A. | Review: Ming Li, Paul Vitanyi, An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications [BibTeX] |
1995 | J.Symbolic Logic Vol. 60(iss. 3), pp. 1017-1020 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{uspensky-review:-1995,
author = {Uspensky, V. A. and Shen, A.},
title = {Review: Ming Li, Paul Vitanyi, An introduction to Kolmogorov complexity and its applications},
journal = {J.Symbolic Logic},
year = {1995},
volume = {60},
number = {iss. 3},
pages = {1017--1020}
}
|
|||||
| Elias, P. | Review: Rudolf Carnap, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information [BibTeX] |
1954 | J. Symbolic Logic Vol. 19(iss. 3), pp. 230-232 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{elias-review:-1954,
author = {Elias, Peter},
title = {Review: Rudolf Carnap, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information},
journal = {J. Symbolic Logic},
year = {1954},
volume = {19},
number = {iss. 3},
pages = {230--232}
}
|
|||||
| Wibral, M., Wollstadt, P., Meyer, U., Pampu, N., Priesemann, V. and Vicente, R. | Revisiting Wiener's principle of causality - interaction-delay reconstruction using transfer entropy and multivariate analysis on delay-weighted graphs | 2012 | Vol. 2012, pp. 3676-3679 |
inproceedings | |
| Abstract: To understand the function of networks we have to identify the structure of their interactions, but also interaction timing, as compromised timing of interactions may disrupt network function. We demonstrate how both questions can be addressed using a modified estimator of transfer entropy. Transfer entropy is an implementation of Wiener's principle of observational causality based on information theory, and detects arbitrary linear and non-linear interactions. Using a modified estimator that uses delayed states of the driving system and independently optimized delayed states of the receiving system, we show that transfer entropy values peak if the delay of the state of the driving system equals the true interaction delay. In addition, we show how reconstructed delays from a bivariate transfer entropy analysis of a network can be used to label spurious interactions arising from cascade effects and apply this approach to local field potential (LFP) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) data.; To understand the function of networks we have to identify the structure of their interactions, but also interaction timing, as compromised timing of interactions may disrupt network function. We demonstrate how both questions can be addressed using a modified estimator of transfer entropy. Transfer entropy is an implementation of Wiener's principle of observational causality based on information theory, and detects arbitrary linear and non-linear interactions. Using a modified estimator that uses delayed states of the driving system and independently optimized delayed states of the receiving system, we show that transfer entropy values peak if the delay of the state of the driving system equals the true interaction delay. In addition, we show how reconstructed delays from a bivariate transfer entropy analysis of a network can be used to label spurious interactions arising from cascade effects and apply this approach to local field potential (LFP) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) data. | |||||
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{wibral-revisiting-2012,
author = {Wibral, M. and Wollstadt, P. and Meyer, U. and Pampu, N. and Priesemann, V. and Vicente, R.},
title = {Revisiting Wiener's principle of causality - interaction-delay reconstruction using transfer entropy and multivariate analysis on delay-weighted graphs},
publisher = {IEEE},
year = {2012},
volume = {2012},
pages = {3676--3679}
}
|
|||||
| Ramberg, B. | Richard Rorty [BibTeX] |
2009 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{ramberg-richard-2009,
author = {Ramberg, Bjørn},
title = {Richard Rorty},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2009},
edition = {Spring 2009},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/rorty/}
}
|
|||||
| Colyvan, M. | Road Work Ahead: Heavy Machinery on the Easy Road | 2012 | Mind Vol. 121(484), pp. 1031 |
article | |
| Abstract: Colyvan replies to Jody Azzouni, Otavio Bueno, Mary Leng, David Liggins, and Stephen Yablo, who offer defenses of so-called 'easy road' nominalist strategies in the philosophy of mathematics. He reveals that he was not convinced that these attempts are successful, but they are pushing in fruitful directions. In any case, these five papers really do help to bring the key issues into focus. There are many good points made in the papers in question. Here, he highlights some of the most interesting issues and notes some of the points of residual disagreement in his 'There is No Easy Road to Nominalism' article. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{colyvan-road-2012,
author = {Colyvan, Mark},
title = {Road Work Ahead: Heavy Machinery on the Easy Road},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2012},
volume = {121},
number = {484},
pages = {1031}
}
|
|||||
| Ricketts, T. | ROOTS OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY [BibTeX] |
2011 | American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 48(3), pp. 287-300 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{ricketts-roots-2011,
author = {Ricketts, Thomas},
title = {ROOTS OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY},
journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2011},
volume = {48},
number = {3},
pages = {287--300}
}
|
|||||
| Douglass, R. and Press, O.U. | Rousseau and Hobbes: Nature, free will, and the passions [BibTeX] |
2015 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{douglass-rousseau-2015,
author = {Douglass, Robin and Press, Oxford University},
title = {Rousseau and Hobbes: Nature, free will, and the passions},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2015},
edition = {First, impression 1.}
}
|
|||||
| LaFreniere, G.F. | Rousseau and the European Roots of Environmentalism [BibTeX] |
1990 | Environmental History Review Vol. 14(4), pp. 41-72 |
article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{lafreniere-rousseau-1990,
author = {LaFreniere, Gilbert F.},
title = {Rousseau and the European Roots of Environmentalism},
journal = {Environmental History Review},
year = {1990},
volume = {14},
number = {4},
pages = {41--72},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984813}
}
|
|||||
| Ellison, C.E. | Rousseau and the Modern City: The Politics of Speech and Dress [BibTeX] |
1985 | Political Theory Vol. 13(4), pp. 497-533 |
article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{ellison-rousseau-1985,
author = {Ellison, Charles E.},
title = {Rousseau and the Modern City: The Politics of Speech and Dress},
journal = {Political Theory},
year = {1985},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
pages = {497--533},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/191609}
}
|
|||||
| Temmer, M.J. | Rousseau and Thoreau [BibTeX] |
1961 | Yale French Studies(28), pp. 112-121 | article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{temmer-rousseau-1961,
author = {Temmer, Mark J.},
title = {Rousseau and Thoreau},
journal = {Yale French Studies},
year = {1961},
number = {28},
pages = {112--121},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928950}
}
|
|||||
| Craig, E. and (Firm), R. | Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy [BibTeX] |
1998 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{craig-routledge-1998,
author = {Craig, Edward and (Firm), Routledge},
title = {Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {1998}
}
|
|||||
| Hintikka, J. | Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist: materials and perspectives [BibTeX] |
1975 | Vol. 73 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{hintikka-rudolf-1975,
author = {Hintikka, Jaakko},
title = {Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist: materials and perspectives},
publisher = {D. Reidel Pub. Co},
year = {1975},
volume = {73}
}
|
|||||
| Brillouin Léon, 1889.-1969. | Science and information theory [BibTeX] |
1962 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{brillouin-science-1962,
author = {Brillouin, Léon, 1889-1969},
title = {Science and information theory},
year = {1962}
}
|
|||||
| Frieden, B.R. | Science from Fisher information: a unification [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{frieden-science-2004,
author = {Frieden, B. R.},
title = {Science from Fisher information: a unification},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2004},
edition = {2nd}
}
|
|||||
| Field, H. | Science without numbers [BibTeX] |
1980 | article | ||
BibTeX:
@article{field-science-1980-1,
author = {Field, Hartry},
title = {Science without numbers},
year = {1980}
}
|
|||||
| Field, H.H. | Science without numbers: a defence of nominalism [BibTeX] |
1980 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{field-science-1980,
author = {Field, Hartry H.},
title = {Science without numbers: a defence of nominalism},
publisher = {Blackwell},
year = {1980}
}
|
|||||
| Malament, D. | Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. by Hartry H. Field [BibTeX] |
1982 | The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 79(9), pp. pp. 523-534 |
article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{malament-science-1982,
author = {Malament, David},
title = {Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. by Hartry H. Field},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {1982},
volume = {79},
number = {9},
pages = {pp. 523--534},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026384}
}
|
|||||
| Salmon, W. | Scientific Explanation and Causal Structure of the World [BibTeX] |
1984 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{salmon-scientific-1984,
author = {Salmon, WC},
title = {Scientific Explanation and Causal Structure of the World},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1984}
}
|
|||||
| Salmon, W.C. | Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification [BibTeX] |
1990 | Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía Vol. 22(66), pp. 3-23 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{salmon-scientific-1990,
author = {Salmon, Wesley C.},
title = {Scientific Explanation: Causation and Unification},
journal = {Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía},
year = {1990},
volume = {22},
number = {66},
pages = {3--23}
}
|
|||||
| Ross, D., Ladyman, J. and Kincaid, H. | Scientific metaphysics [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{ross-scientific-2013,
author = {Ross, Don and Ladyman, James and Kincaid, Harold},
title = {Scientific metaphysics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Andersen, H. and Hepburn, B. | Scientific Method [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{andersen-scientific-2016,
author = {Andersen, Hanne and Hepburn, Brian},
title = {Scientific Method},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Summer 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/scientific-method/}
}
|
|||||
| Humphreys, P. | Scientific Ontology and Speculative Ontology [BibTeX] |
2013 | Scientific Metaphysics | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{humphreys-scientific-2013,
author = {Humphreys, Paul},
title = {Scientific Ontology and Speculative Ontology},
booktitle = {Scientific Metaphysics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Chakravartty, A. | Scientific Realism [BibTeX] |
2015 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{chakravartty-scientific-2015,
author = {Chakravartty, Anjan},
title = {Scientific Realism},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
year = {2015},
edition = {Fall 2015},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/scientific-realism/}
}
|
|||||
| Sankey, H. | Scientific realism and the rationality of science [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{sankey-scientific-2008,
author = {Sankey, Howard},
title = {Scientific realism and the rationality of science},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Fraassen, V. and Bas, C. | Scientific representation: paradoxes of perspective [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{van-fraassen-scientific-2008,
author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.},
title = {Scientific representation: paradoxes of perspective},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Bokulich, A., Bokulich, P. and service) , S.(O. | Scientific Structuralism [BibTeX] |
2011 | Vol. 281 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{bokulich-scientific-2011,
author = {Bokulich, Alisa and Bokulich, Peter and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {Scientific Structuralism},
publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
year = {2011},
volume = {281}
}
|
|||||
| French, S. | Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington's structuralist conception of objects [BibTeX] |
2003 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 34(2), pp. 227-259 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{french-scribbling-2003,
author = {French, Steven},
title = {Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington's structuralist conception of objects},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2003},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
pages = {227--259}
}
|
|||||
| Locke, J. and Macpherson, C.B. | Second treatise of government [BibTeX] |
1980 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{locke-second-1980,
author = {Locke, John and Macpherson, C. B.},
title = {Second treatise of government},
publisher = {Hackett Pub. Co},
year = {1980},
edition = {1st}
}
|
|||||
| Mao, Z. | Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung [BibTeX] |
1961 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{mao-selected-1961,
author = {Mao, Zedong},
title = {Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung},
publisher = {Distributed throughout the world by Pergamon Press},
year = {1961},
edition = {1st}
}
|
|||||
| Wray, K.B. | Selection and Predictive Success | 2010 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 72(3), pp. 365-377 |
article | |
| Abstract: Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen's selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists' explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success. The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success.;Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen's selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists' explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success. The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success.;Van Fraassen believes our current best theories enable us to make accurate predictions because they have been subjected to a selection process similar to natural selection. His explanation for the predictive success of our best theories has been subjected to extensive criticism from realists. I aim to clarify the nature of van Fraassen's selectionist explanation for the success of science. Contrary to what the critics claim, the selectionist can explain why it is that we have successful theories, as well as why it is reasonable to expect past successful theories to be successful in the future. I also argue that the plausibility of the realists' explanation rests on an inaccurate understanding of the nature of predictive success. The predictive success of our best theories is a relative success.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wray-selection-2010,
author = {Wray, K. B.},
title = {Selection and Predictive Success},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {2010},
volume = {72},
number = {3},
pages = {365--377}
}
|
|||||
| Singleton, D., Vagenas, E.C. and Zhu, T. | Self-similarity, conservation of entropy/bits and the black hole information puzzle [BibTeX] |
2014 | Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2014(5), pp. 1-9 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{singleton-self-similarity-2014,
author = {Singleton, Douglas and Vagenas, Elias C. and Zhu, Tao},
title = {Self-similarity, conservation of entropy/bits and the black hole information puzzle},
journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics},
year = {2014},
volume = {2014},
number = {5},
pages = {1--9}
}
|
|||||
| Singleton, D., Vagenas, E.C. and Zhu, T. | Self-similarity, conservation of entropy/bits and the black hole information puzzle [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 119-127 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{singleton-self-similarity-2015,
author = {Singleton, Douglas and Vagenas, Elias C and Zhu, Tao},
title = {Self-similarity, conservation of entropy/bits and the black hole information puzzle},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {119--127}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Semantic Conceptions of Information [BibTeX] |
2005 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | misc | URL |
BibTeX:
@misc{floridi-semantic-2005,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Semantic Conceptions of Information},
journal = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Stanfrod Univeristy CSLI},
year = {2005},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic}
}
|
|||||
| Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R. | Semantic Information [BibTeX] |
1953 | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 4(14), pp. 147-157 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{bar-hillel-semantic-1953,
author = {Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua and Carnap, Rudolf},
title = {Semantic Information},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {1953},
volume = {4},
number = {14},
pages = {147--157}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth | 2011 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 74(2), pp. 147-175 |
article | |
| Abstract: Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science's sense of "verification" and "validation") that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science's sense of "proxy") and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory's sense of "commutation") and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science's technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.; Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science's sense of "verification" and "validation"); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science's sense of "proxy") and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory's sense of "commutation"); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science's technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.; Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science's sense of "verification" and "validation"); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science's sense of "proxy") and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory's sense of "commutation"); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science's technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science's sense of "verification" and "validation"); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science's sense of "proxy") and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory's sense of "commutation"); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science's technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained.; Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. However, what it means for semantic information to be true is often left implicit, with correspondentist interpretations representing the most popular, default option. The article develops an alternative approach, namely a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. This is meant as a contribution not only to the philosophy of information but also to the philosophical debate on the nature of truth. After the introduction, in Sect. 2, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In Sect. 3, i is polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This polarization is normalised in Sect. 4, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In Sects. 5 and 6, it is argued that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates Q by verifying and validating it (in the computer science’s sense of “verification” and “validation”); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in the computer science’s sense of “proxy”) and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category theory’s sense of “commutation”); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer science’s technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. Sect. 7 provides some further clarifications about CTT, in the light of semantic paradoxes. Section 8 draws a general conclusion about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users. In the course of the article all technical expressions from computer science are explained. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-semantic-2011,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {2011},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {147--175}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Semantic information and the network theory of account | 2012 | Synthese Vol. 184(3), pp. 431-454 |
article | |
| Abstract: The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the target semantic information t by default, is correctly satisfied by the information flow of correct answers provided by an informational source s. Section 4 illustrates some of the major advantages of such a Network Theory of Account (NTA) and clears the ground of a few potential difficulties. Section 5 clarifies why NTA and an informational analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is accounted semantic information, is not subject to Gettier-type counterexamples. A concluding section briefly summarises the results obtained.; The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the target semantic information t by default, is correctly satisfied by the information flow of correct answers provided by an informational source s. Section 4 illustrates some of the major advantages of such a Network Theory of Account (NTA) and clears the ground of a few potential difficulties. Section 5 clarifies why NTA and an informational analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is accounted semantic information, is not subject to Gettier-type counterexamples. A concluding section briefly summarises the results obtained.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the target semantic information t by default, is correctly satisfied by the information flow of correct answers provided by an informational source s. Section 4 illustrates some of the major advantages of such a Network Theory of Account (NTA) and clears the ground of a few potential difficulties. Section 5 clarifies why NTA and an informational analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is accounted semantic information, is not subject to Gettier-type counterexamples. A concluding section briefly summarises the results obtained.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-semantic-2012,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Semantic information and the network theory of account},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2012},
volume = {184},
number = {3},
pages = {431--454}
}
|
|||||
| Davies, J., Studer, R. and Warren, P. | Semantic Web technologies: trends and research in ontology-based systems [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{davies-semantic-2006,
author = {Davies, J. and Studer, Rudi and Warren, Paul},
title = {Semantic Web technologies: trends and research in ontology-based systems},
publisher = {John Wiley & Sons},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Lyons, J. and Societies, A.C.o.L. | Semantics [BibTeX] |
1977 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{lyons-semantics-1977,
author = {Lyons, John and Societies, American Council of Learned},
title = {Semantics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1977}
}
|
|||||
| Fodor, J.A. | Semantics, Wisconsin Style [BibTeX] |
1984 | Synthese Vol. 59(3), pp. 231-250 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{fodor-semantics-1984,
author = {Fodor, J. A.},
title = {Semantics, Wisconsin Style},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {1984},
volume = {59},
number = {3},
pages = {231--250}
}
|
|||||
| Peirce, C.S. and Welby Victoria, L. | Semiotic and significs: the correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby [BibTeX] |
1977 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{peirce-semiotic-1977,
author = {Peirce, Charles S. and Welby, Victoria, Lady},
title = {Semiotic and significs: the correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby},
publisher = {Indiana University Press},
year = {1977}
}
|
|||||
| Hoffmeyer, J. | Semiotic freedom: an emerging force [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 185-204 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{hoffmeyer-semiotic-2010,
author = {Hoffmeyer, Jesper},
title = {Semiotic freedom: an emerging force},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {185--204},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.010}
}
|
|||||
| Godfrey-Smith, P. | Sender-Receiver Systems within and between Organisms | 2014 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 81(5), pp. 866-878 |
article | |
| Abstract: Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about "genetic information" can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender.; Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender.; Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender.; Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about "genetic information" can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{godfrey-smith-sender-receiver-2014,
author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
title = {Sender-Receiver Systems within and between Organisms},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2014},
volume = {81},
number = {5},
pages = {866--878}
}
|
|||||
| Godfrey-Smith, P. | Senders, receivers, and genetic information: comments on Bergstrom and Rosvall [BibTeX] |
2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 177-181 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{godfrey-smith-senders-2011,
author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
title = {Senders, receivers, and genetic information: comments on Bergstrom and Rosvall},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {177--181}
}
|
|||||
| Fu, T., Abbasi, A., Zeng, D. and Chen, H. | Sentimental Spidering: Leveraging Opinion Information in Focused Crawlers | 2012 | ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS) Vol. 30(4), pp. 1-30 |
article | |
| Abstract: Despite the increased prevalence of sentiment-related information on the Web, there has been limited work on focused crawlers capable of effectively collecting not only topic-relevant but also sentiment-relevant content. In this article, we propose a novel focused crawler that incorporates topic and sentiment information as well as a graph-based tunneling mechanism for enhanced collection of opinion-rich Web content regarding a particular topic. The graph-based sentiment (GBS) crawler uses a text classifier that employs both topic and sentiment categorization modules to assess the relevance of candidate pages. This information is also used to label nodes in web graphs that are employed by the tunneling mechanism to improve collection recall. Experimental results on two test beds revealed that GBS was able to provide better precision and recall than seven comparison crawlers. Moreover, GBS was able to collect a large proportion of the relevant content after traversing far fewer pages than comparison methods. GBS outperformed comparison methods on various categories of Web pages in the test beds, including collection of blogs, Web forums, and social networking Web site content. Further analysis revealed that both the sentiment classification module and graph-based tunneling mechanism played an integral role in the overall effectiveness of the GBS crawler.;Despite the increased prevalence of sentiment-related information on the Web, there has been limited work on focused crawlers capable of effectively collecting not only topic-relevant but also sentiment-relevant content. In this article, we propose a novel focused crawler that incorporates topic and sentiment information as well as a graph-based tunneling mechanism for enhanced collection of opinion-rich Web content regarding a particular topic. The graph-based sentiment (GBS) crawler uses a text classifier that employs both topic and sentiment categorization modules to assess the relevance of candidate pages. This information is also used to label nodes in web graphs that are employed by the tunneling mechanism to improve collection recall. Experimental results on two test beds revealed that GBS was able to provide better precision and recall than seven comparison crawlers. Moreover, GBS was able to collect a large proportion of the relevant content after traversing far fewer pages than comparison methods. GBS outperformed comparison methods on various categories of Web pages in the test beds, including collection of blogs, Web forums, and social networking Web site content. Further analysis revealed that both the sentiment classification module and graph-based tunneling mechanism played an integral role in the overall effectiveness of the GBS crawler.;Despite the increased prevalence of sentiment-related information on the Web, there has been limited work on focused crawlers capable of effectively collecting not only topic-relevant but also sentiment-relevant content. In this article, we propose a novel focused crawler that incorporates topic and sentiment information as well as a graph-based tunneling mechanism for enhanced collection of opinion-rich Web content regarding a particular topic. The graph-based sentiment (GBS) crawler uses a text classifier that employs both topic and sentiment categorization modules to assess the relevance of candidate pages. This information is also used to label nodes in web graphs that are employed by the tunneling mechanism to improve collection recall. Experimental results on two test beds revealed that GBS was able to provide better precision and recall than seven comparison crawlers. Moreover, GBS was able to collect a large proportion of the relevant content after traversing far fewer pages than comparison methods. GBS outperformed comparison methods on various categories of Web pages in the test beds, including collection of blogs, Web forums, and social networking Web site content. Further analysis revealed that both the sentiment classification module and graph-based tunneling mechanism played an integral role in the overall effectiveness of the GBS crawler.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{fu-sentimental-2012,
author = {Fu, Tianjun and Abbasi, Ahmed and Zeng, Daniel and Chen, Hsinchun},
title = {Sentimental Spidering: Leveraging Opinion Information in Focused Crawlers},
journal = {ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)},
year = {2012},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {1--30}
}
|
|||||
| Łukaszewski, T. and Wilk, S. | Sequential Classification by Exploring Levels of Abstraction [BibTeX] |
2014 | Procedia Computer Science Vol. 35, pp. 309-317 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{lukaszewski-sequential-2014,
author = {Łukaszewski, Tomasz and Wilk, Szymon},
title = {Sequential Classification by Exploring Levels of Abstraction},
journal = {Procedia Computer Science},
year = {2014},
volume = {35},
pages = {309--317}
}
|
|||||
| Anand, K., Bianconi, G. and Severini, S. | Shannon and von Neumann entropy of random networks with heterogeneous expected degree | 2011 | Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics Vol. 83(3), pp. 036109 |
article | |
| Abstract: Entropic measures of complexity are able to quantify the information encoded in complex network structures. Several entropic measures have been proposed in this respect. Here we study the relation between the Shannon entropy and the von Neumann entropy of networks with given expected degree sequence. We find in different examples of network topologies that when the degree distribution contains some heterogeneity, an intriguing correlation emerges between the two entropic quantities. This results seems to suggest that heterogeneity in the expected degree distribution is implying an equivalence between a quantum and a classical description of networks, which respectively corresponds to the von Neumann and the Shannon entropy.; Entropic measures of complexity are able to quantify the information encoded in complex network structures. Several entropic measures have been proposed in this respect. Here we study the relation between the Shannon entropy and the von Neumann entropy of networks with given expected degree sequence. We find in different examples of network topologies that when the degree distribution contains some heterogeneity, an intriguing correlation emerges between the two entropic quantities. This results seems to suggest that heterogeneity in the expected degree distribution is implying an equivalence between a quantum and a classical description of networks, which respectively corresponds to the von Neumann and the Shannon entropy. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{anand-shannon-2011,
author = {Anand, Kartik and Bianconi, Ginestra and Severini, Simone},
title = {Shannon and von Neumann entropy of random networks with heterogeneous expected degree},
journal = {Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics},
year = {2011},
volume = {83},
number = {3},
pages = {036109}
}
|
|||||
| Hamdan, D., Parry, W. and Thouvenot, J... | Shannon entropy for stationary processes and dynamical systems | 2008 | Ergodic Theory and Dynamical Systems Vol. 28(2), pp. 447-480 |
article | |
| Abstract: Abstract We consider stationary ergodic processes indexed by $\mathbb Z$ or $\mathbb Ztextasciicircumn$ whose finite-dimensional marginals have laws which are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. We define an entropy theory for these continuous processes, prove an analogue of the Shannon-MacMillan-Breiman theorem and study more precisely the particular example of Gaussian processes. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Abstract We consider stationary ergodic processes indexed by $\mathbb Z$ or $\mathbb Ztextasciicircumn$ whose finite-dimensional marginals have laws which are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. We define an entropy theory for these continuous processes, prove an analogue of the Shannon-MacMillan-Breiman theorem and study more precisely the particular example of Gaussian processes. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; We consider stationary ergodic processes indexed by Z or Z(n) whose finite-dimensional marginals have laws which are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. We define an entropy theory for these continuous processes, prove an analogue of the Shannon - MacMillan - Breiman theorem and study more precisely the particular example of Gaussian processes. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hamdan-shannon-2008,
author = {Hamdan, D. and Parry, W. and Thouvenot, J. -.},
title = {Shannon entropy for stationary processes and dynamical systems},
journal = {Ergodic Theory and Dynamical Systems},
year = {2008},
volume = {28},
number = {2},
pages = {447--480}
}
|
|||||
| Cole, C. | Shannon revisited: Information in terms of uncertainty | 1993 | Journal of the American Society for Information Science Vol. 44(4), pp. 204-211 |
article | |
| Abstract: Shannon's theory of communication is discussed from the point of view of his concept of uncertainty. It is suggested that there are two information concepts in Shannon, two different uncertainties, and at least two different entropy concepts. Information science focuses on the uncertainty associated with the transmission of the signal rather than the uncertainty associated with the selection of a message from a set of possible messages. The author believes the latter information concept, which is from the sender's point of view, has more to say to information science about what information is than the former, which is from the receiver's point of view and is mainly concerned with “noise” reduction. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{cole-shannon-1993,
author = {Cole, Charles},
title = {Shannon revisited: Information in terms of uncertainty},
journal = {Journal of the American Society for Information Science},
year = {1993},
volume = {44},
number = {4},
pages = {204--211}
}
|
|||||
| Busch, J. and Morrison, J. | Should scientific realists be platonists? | 2016 | Synthese Vol. 193(2), pp. 435-449 |
article | |
| Abstract: Enhanced indispensability arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5).; Issue Title: Special issue on Indispensability and Explanation (first 13 articles appearing in issue) Enhanced indispensability arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (§2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes (§3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods (§4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (§5).;Enhanced indispensability arguments (EIA) claim that Scientific Realists are committed to the existence of mathematical entities due to their reliance on Inference to the best explanation (IBE). Our central question concerns this purported parity of reasoning: do people who defend the EIA make an appropriate use of the resources of Scientific Realism (in particular, IBE) to achieve platonism? (A 2) We argue that just because a variety of different inferential strategies can be employed by Scientific Realists does not mean that ontological conclusions concerning which things we should be Scientific Realists about are arrived at by any inferential route which eschews causes (A 3), and nor is there any direct pressure for Scientific Realists to change their inferential methods (A 4). We suggest that in order to maintain inferential parity with Scientific Realism, proponents of EIA need to give details about how and in what way the presence of mathematical entities directly contribute to explanations (A 5).; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{busch-should-2016,
author = {Busch, Jacob and Morrison, Joe},
title = {Should scientific realists be platonists?},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2016},
volume = {193},
number = {2},
pages = {435--449}
}
|
|||||
| Skyrms, B. | Signals: evolution, learning, & information [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{skyrms-signals:-2010-1,
author = {Skyrms, Brian},
title = {Signals: evolution, learning, & information},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Skyrms, B. | Signals: evolution, learning, and information [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{skyrms-signals:-2010,
author = {Skyrms, Brian},
title = {Signals: evolution, learning, and information},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Pande, V.S. | Simple theory of protein folding kinetics | 2010 | Physical Review Letters Vol. 105(19), pp. 198101 |
article | |
| Abstract: We present a simple model of protein folding dynamics that captures key qualitative elements recently seen in all-atom simulations. The goals of this theory are to serve as a simple formalism for gaining deeper insight into the physical properties seen in detailed simulations as well as to serve as a model to easily compare why these simulations suggest a different kinetic mechanism than previous simple models. Specifically, we find that non-native contacts play a key role in determining the mechanism, which can shift dramatically as the energetic strength of non-native interactions is changed. For proteinlike non-native interactions, our model finds that the native state is a kinetic hub, connecting the strength of relevant interactions directly to the nature of folding kinetics.; We present a simple model of protein folding dynamics that captures key qualitative elements recently seen in all-atom simulations. The goals of this theory are to serve as a simple formalism for gaining deeper insight into the physical properties seen in detailed simulations as well as to serve as a model to easily compare why these simulations suggest a different kinetic mechanism than previous simple models. Specifically, we find that non-native contacts play a key role in determining the mechanism, which can shift dramatically as the energetic strength of non-native interactions is changed. For proteinlike non-native interactions, our model finds that the native state is a kinetic hub, connecting the strength of relevant interactions directly to the nature of folding kinetics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{pande-simple-2010,
author = {Pande, Vijay S.},
title = {Simple theory of protein folding kinetics},
journal = {Physical Review Letters},
year = {2010},
volume = {105},
number = {19},
pages = {198101}
}
|
|||||
| Baudrillard, J. | Simulacra and simulation [BibTeX] |
1994 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{baudrillard-simulacra-1994,
author = {Baudrillard, Jean},
title = {Simulacra and simulation},
publisher = {University of Michigan Press},
year = {1994}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. | Singularities and the geometry of spacetime | 2014 | The European Physical Journal H Vol. 39(4), pp. 413-503 |
article | |
| Abstract: The aim of this essay is to investigate certain aspects of the geometry of the spacetime manifold in the General Theory of Relativity with particular reference to the occurrence of singularities in cosmological solutions and their relation with other global properties. Section 2 gives a brief outline of Riemannian geometry. In Section 3, the General Theory of Relativity is presented in the form of two postulates and two requirements which are common to it and to the Special Theory of Relativity, and a third requirement, the Einstein field equations, which distinguish it from the Special Theory. There does not seem to be any alternative set of field equations which would not have some undeseriable features. Some exact solutions are described. In Section 4, the physical significance of curvature is investigated using the deviation equation for timelike and null curves. The Riemann tensor is decomposed into the Ricci tensor which represents the gravitational effect at a point of matter at that point and the Welyl tensor which represents the effect at a point of gravitational radiation and matter at other points. The two tensors are related by the Bianchi identities which are presented in a form analogous to the Maxwell equations. Some lemmas are given for the occurrence of conjugate points on timelike and null geodesics and their relation with the variation of timelike and null curves is established. Section 5 is concerned with properties of causal relations between points of spacetime. It is shown that these could be used to determine physically the manifold structure of spacetime if the strong causality assumption held. The concepts of a null horizon and a partial Cauchy surface are introduced and are used to prove a number of lemmas relating to the existence of a timelike curve of maximum length between two sets. In Section 6, the definition of a singularity of spacetime is given in terms of geodesic incompleteness. The various energy assumptions needed to prove the occurrence of singularities are discussed and then a number of theorems are presented which prove the occurrence of singularities in most cosmological solutions. A procedure is given which could be used to describe and classify the singularites and their expected nature is discussed. Sections 2 and 3 are reviews of standard work. In Section 4, the deviation equation is standard but the matrix method used to analyse it is the author's own as is the decomposition given of the Bianchi identities (this was also obtained independently by Trumper). Variation of curves and conjugate points are standard in a positive-definite metric but this seems to be the first full account for timelike and null curves in a Lorentz metric. Except where otherwise indicated in the text, Sections 5 and 6 are the work of the author who, however, apologises if through ignorance or inadvertance he has failed to make acknowledgements where due. Some of this work has been described in [Hawking S.W. 1965b. Occurrence of singularities in open universes. Phys. Rev. Lett. 15: 689-690; Hawking S.W. and G.F.R. Ellis. 1965c. Singularities in homogeneous world models. Phys. Rev. Lett. 17: 246-247; Hawking S.W. 1966a. Singularities in the universe. Phys. Rev. Lett. 17: 444-445; Hawking S.W. 1966c. The occurrence of singularities in cosmology. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A 294: 511-521]. Undoubtedly, the most important results are the theorems in Section 6 on the occurrence of singularities. These seem to imply either that the General Theory of Relativity breaks down or that there could be particles whose histories did not exist before (or after) a certain time. The author's own opinion is that the theory probably does break down, but only when quantum gravitational effects become important. This would not be expected to happen until the radius of curvature of spacetime became about 10(-14) cm.;The aim of this essay is to investigate certain aspects of the geometry of the spacetime manifold in the General Theory of Relativity with particular reference to the occurrence of singularities in cosmological solutions and their relation with other global properties. Section 2 gives a brief outline of Riemannian geometry. In Section 3, the General Theory of Relativity is presented in the form of two postulates and two requirements which are common to it and to the Special Theory of Relativity, and a third requirement, the Einstein field equations, which distinguish it from the Special Theory. There does not seem to be any alternative set of field equations which would not have some undeseriable features. Some exact solutions are described. In Section 4, the physical significance of curvature is investigated using the deviation equation for timelike and null curves. The Riemann tensor is decomposed into the Ricci tensor which represents the gravitational effect at a point of matter at that point and the Welyl tensor which represents the effect at a point of gravitational radiation and matter at other points. The two tensors are related by the Bianchi identities which are presented in a form analogous to the Maxwell equations. Some lemmas are given for the occurrence of conjugate points on timelike and null geodesics and their relation with the variation of timelike and null curves is established. Section 5 is concerned with properties of causal relations between points of spacetime. It is shown that these could be used to determine physically the manifold structure of spacetime if the strong causality assumption held. The concepts of a null horizon and a partial Cauchy surface are introduced and are used to prove a number of lemmas relating to the existence of a timelike curve of maximum length between two sets. In Section 6, the definition of a singularity of spacetime is given in terms of geodesic incompleteness. The various energy assumptions needed to prove the occurrence of singularities are discussed and then a number of theorems are presented which prove the occurrence of singularities in most cosmological solutions. A procedure is given which could be used to describe and classify the singularites and their expected nature is discussed. Sections 2 and 3 are reviews of standard work. In Section 4, the deviation equation is standard but the matrix method used to analyse it is the author’s own as is the decomposition given of the Bianchi identities (this was also obtained independently by Trümper). Variation of curves and conjugate points are standard in a positive-definite metric but this seems to be the first full account for timelike and null curves in a Lorentz metric. Except where otherwise indicated in the text, Sections 5 and 6 are the work of the author who, however, apologises if through ignorance or inadvertance he has failed to make acknowledgements where due. Some of this work has been described in [Hawking S.W. 1965b. Occurrence of singularities in open universes. Phys. Rev. Lett. 15: 689–690; Hawking S.W. and G.F.R. Ellis. 1965c. Singularities in homogeneous world models. Phys. Rev. Lett. 17: 246–247; Hawking S.W. 1966a. Singularities in the universe. Phys. Rev. Lett. 17: 444–445; Hawking S.W. 1966c. The occurrence of singularities in cosmology. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A 294: 511–521]. Undoubtedly, the most important results are the theorems in Section 6 on the occurrence of singularities. These seem to imply either that the General Theory of Relativity breaks down or that there could be particles whose histories did not exist before (or after) a certain time. The author’s own opinion is that the theory probably does break down, but only when quantum gravitational effects become important. This would not be expected to happen until the radius of curvature of spacetime became about 10-14 cm.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-singularities-2014,
author = {Hawking, Stephen},
title = {Singularities and the geometry of spacetime},
journal = {The European Physical Journal H},
year = {2014},
volume = {39},
number = {4},
pages = {413--503}
}
|
|||||
| Sartenaer, O. | Sixteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again) [BibTeX] |
2015 | Journal for General Philosophy of Science | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{sartenaer-sixteen-2015,
author = {Sartenaer, Olivier},
title = {Sixteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again)},
journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Armstrong, D.M. | Sketch for a systematic metaphysics [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{armstrong-sketch-2010,
author = {Armstrong, D. M.},
title = {Sketch for a systematic metaphysics},
publisher = {Clarendon},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Doniach, S. and Lipfert, J. | Small and Wide Angle X-ray Scattering from Biological Macromolecules and their Complexes in Solution | 2012 | Comprehensive Biophysics, pp. 376 - 397 | incollection | URL |
| Abstract: The use of X-ray scattering to study the structure of biomolecules in solution dates back to the first half of the twentieth century. In recent years, however, the advent of high-flux synchrotron radiation sources, improved detector technology, and novel data analysis algorithms have dramatically improved the signal-to-noise ratio, experimental throughput, and information content of X-ray scattering measurements. The chapter reviews the basic principles and recent developments and applications of small- and wide-angle X-ray scattering experiments. Starting from the physical principles of X-ray scattering, the importance of hydration effects, the use of SAXS\ data for low-resolution structure determination and applications of X-ray scattering to unfolded proteins, membrane protein-detergent systems, and functional RNAs\ are discussed. In addition to surveying recent literature, the article emphasizes open questions, such as the treatment of hydration for unfolded protein ensembles, and suggests promising future directions, such as the use of nano-gold labels in X-ray scattering experiments. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{doniach-small-2012,
author = {Doniach, S. and Lipfert, J.},
title = {Small and Wide Angle X-ray Scattering from Biological Macromolecules and their Complexes in Solution},
booktitle = {Comprehensive Biophysics},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2012},
pages = {376 -- 397},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123749208001223}
}
|
|||||
| SARKAR, S. | Sober on Intelligent Design | 2011 | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 83(3), pp. 683-691 |
article | |
| Abstract: This response to Sober's (2008) Evidence and Evolution draws out and criticizes some consequences of his analysis because of its reliance on a likelihood framework for adjucating the dispute between (Intelligent Design) creationism and evolution. In particular, Sober's analysis does not allow it to be formally claimed that evolutionary theory better explains living phenomena than Intelligent Design and makes irrelevant the contribution of the theory of evolution by natural selection to assessments of the status of the argument from design. Finally, a rudimentary alternative framework for theory confirmation is presented here which avoids these conclusions by rejecting likelihoodism and deploying multiple criteria to the problem of scientific theory choice.; This response to Sober's (2008) Evidence and Evolution draws out and criticizes some consequences of his analysis because of its reliance on a likelihood framework for adjucating the dispute between (Intelligent Design) creationism and evolution. In particular, Sober's analysis does not allow it to be formally claimed that evolutionary theory better explains living phenomena than Intelligent Design and makes irrelevant the contribution of the theory of evolution by natural selection to assessments of the status of the argument from design. Finally, a rudimentary alternative framework for theory confirmation is presented here which avoids these conclusions by rejecting likelihoodism and deploying multiple criteria to the problem of scientific theory choice. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{sarkar-sober-2011,
author = {SARKAR, SAHOTRA},
title = {Sober on Intelligent Design},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2011},
volume = {83},
number = {3},
pages = {683--691}
}
|
|||||
| Goldman, A. and Blanchard, T. | Social Epistemology [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{goldman-social-2016,
author = {Goldman, Alvin and Blanchard, Thomas},
title = {Social Epistemology},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Winter 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-social/}
}
|
|||||
| Goldman, A.I. and Whitcomb, D. | Social epistemology: essential readings [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{goldman-social-2011,
author = {Goldman, Alvin I. and Whitcomb, Dennis},
title = {Social epistemology: essential readings},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Heinaman, R. | Social Justice in Plato's Republic [BibTeX] |
1998 | Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought Vol. 15(1-2), pp. 23-43 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{heinaman-social-1998,
author = {Heinaman, Robert},
title = {Social Justice in Plato's Republic},
journal = {Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought},
year = {1998},
volume = {15},
number = {1-2},
pages = {23--43}
}
|
|||||
| Goldman, A.I. | Social Process Reliabilism | 2014 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: This chapter focuses on the justificational status of collective beliefs. When the Bush Administration believed (assuming its belief was genuine) that Saddam Hussein had WMDs, was it justified in so believing? It raises and explores problems about the relations between the justificational status of a group’s beliefs and those of its members. To what extent (if any) is this analogous to the relations within an individual between the justificational statuses of its own beliefs? Specifically, does “transmission” occur between the J-status of a group belief and the J-statuses of its members’ beliefs? The second half of the chapter advances a specific theory of justifiedness for collective belief, one borrowed and adapted from individual epistemology. This is the theory of process reliabilism. The chapter defends the thesis that the principal elements of process reliabilism, including its causal and historical features, apply (with suitable modifications) to the case of collective belief. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{goldman-social-2014,
author = {Goldman, Alvin I.},
title = {Social Process Reliabilism},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S., Perry, M. and Strominger, A. | Soft Hair on Black Holes | 2016 | PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS Vol. 116(23), pp. 231301 |
article | |
| Abstract: It has recently been shown that Bondi-van der Burg-Metzner-Sachs supertranslation symmetries imply an infinite number of conservation laws for all gravitational theories in asymptotically Minkowskian spacetimes. These laws require black holes to carry a large amount of soft (i.e., zero-energy) supertranslation hair. The presence of a Maxwell field similarly implies soft electric hair. This Letter gives an explicit description of soft hair in terms of soft gravitons or photons on the black hole horizon, and shows that complete information about their quantum state is stored on a holographic plate at the future boundary of the horizon. Charge conservation is used to give an infinite number of exact relations between the evaporation products of black holes which have different soft hair but are otherwise identical. It is further argued that soft hair which is spatially localized to much less than a Planck length cannot be excited in a physically realizable process, giving an effective number of soft degrees of freedom proportional to the horizon area in Planck units.;It has recently been shown that BMS supertranslation symmetries imply an infinite number of conservation laws for all gravitational theories in asymptotically Minkowskian spacetimes. These laws require black holes to carry a large amount of soft (i.e. zero-energy) supertranslation hair. The presence of a Maxwell field similarly implies soft electric hair. This paper gives an explicit description of soft hair in terms of soft gravitons or photons on the black hole horizon, and shows that complete information about their quantum state is stored on a holographic plate at the future boundary of the horizon. Charge conservation is used to give an infinite number of exact relations between the evaporation products of black holes which have different soft hair but are otherwise identical. It is further argued that soft hair which is spatially localized to much less than a Planck length cannot be excited in a physically realizable process, giving an effective number of soft degrees of freedom proportional to the horizon area in Planck units.;It has recently been shown that Bondi-van der Burg-Metzner-Sachs supertranslation symmetries imply an infinite number of conservation laws for all gravitational theories in asymptotically Minkowskian spacetimes. These laws require black holes to carry a large amount of soft (i.e., zero-energy) supertranslation hair. The presence of a Maxwell field similarly implies soft electric hair. This Letter gives an explicit description of soft hair in terms of soft gravitons or photons on the black hole horizon, and shows that complete information about their quantum state is stored on a holographic plate at the future boundary of the horizon. Charge conservation is used to give an infinite number of exact relations between the evaporation products of black holes which have different soft hair but are otherwise identical. It is further argued that soft hair which is spatially localized to much less than a Planck length cannot be excited in a physically realizable process, giving an effective number of soft degrees of freedom proportional to the horizon area in Planck units.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-soft-2016,
author = {Hawking, SW and Perry, MJ and Strominger, A.},
title = {Soft Hair on Black Holes},
journal = {PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS},
year = {2016},
volume = {116},
number = {23},
pages = {231301}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. and Taddeo, M. | Solving the symbol grounding problem: a critical review of fifteen years of research | 2005 | Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence Vol. 17(4), pp. 419-445 |
article | |
| Abstract: This article reviews eight proposed strategies for solving the symbol grounding problem (SGP), which was given its classic formulation in Harnad (1990). After a concise introduction, the paper provides an analysis of the requirement that must be satisfied by any hypothesis seeking to solve the SGP, the zero semantical commitment condition. It is then used to assess the eight strategies, which are organized into three main approaches: representationalism, semi-representationalism and non-representationalism. The conclusion is that all the strategies are semantically committed and hence that none of them provides a valid solution to the SGP, which remains an open problem. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-solving-2005,
author = {Floridi, Luciano and Taddeo, Mariarosaria},
title = {Solving the symbol grounding problem: a critical review of fifteen years of research},
journal = {Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2005},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
pages = {419--445}
}
|
|||||
| Montanaro, A. | Some applications of hypercontractive inequalities in quantum information theory | 2012 | Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 53(12), pp. 122206 |
article | |
| Abstract: Hypercontractive inequalities have become important tools in theoretical computer science and have recently found applications in quantum computation. In this note we discuss how hypercontractive inequalities, in various settings, can be used to obtain (fairly) concise proofs of several results in quantum information theory: a recent lower bound of Lancien and Winter on the bias achievable by local measurements which are 4-designs; spectral concentration bounds for k-local Hamiltonians; and a recent result of Pellegrino and Seoane-Sepúlveda giving general lower bounds on the classical bias obtainable in multiplayer XOR games.;Hypercontractive inequalities have become important tools in theoretical computer science and have recently found applications in quantum computation. In this note we discuss how hypercontractive inequalities, in various settings, can be used to obtain (fairly) concise proofs of several results in quantum information theory: a recent lower bound of Lancien and Winter on the bias achievable by local measurements which are 4-designs; spectral concentration bounds for k-local Hamiltonians; and a recent result of Pellegrino and Seoane-Sepulveda giving general lower bounds on the classical bias obtainable in multiplayer XOR games. (C) 2012 American Institute of Physics. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4769269];Hypercontractive inequalities have become important tools in theoretical computer science and have recently found applications in quantum computation. In this note we discuss how hypercontractive inequalities, in various settings, can be used to obtain (fairly) concise proofs of several results in quantum information theory: a recent lower bound of Lancien and Winter on the bias achievable by local measurements which are 4-designs; spectral concentration bounds for k-local Hamiltonians; and a recent result of Pellegrino and Seoane-Sepulveda giving general lower bounds on the classical bias obtainable in multiplayer XOR games.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{montanaro-applications-2012,
author = {Montanaro, Ashley},
title = {Some applications of hypercontractive inequalities in quantum information theory},
journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics},
year = {2012},
volume = {53},
number = {12},
pages = {122206}
}
|
|||||
| Pincock, C. | Sorin Bangu. The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. ISBN 978-0-230-28520-0 (hbk). Pp. xiii + 252 [BibTeX] |
2014 | Philosophia Mathematica Vol. 22(3), pp. 401-412 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{pincock-sorin-2014,
author = {Pincock, C.},
title = {Sorin Bangu. The Applicability of Mathematics in Science: Indispensability and Ontology. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. ISBN 978-0-230-28520-0 (hbk). Pp. xiii + 252},
journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
year = {2014},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {401--412}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | Space and Time in the Leibniz–Clarke Debate [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 23 - 43 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-space-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {Space and Time in the Leibniz–Clarke Debate},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {23 -- 43},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030027}
}
|
|||||
| Hestenes, D. and service) , S.(O. | Space-Time Algebra [BibTeX] |
2015 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hestenes-space-time-2015,
author = {Hestenes, David and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {Space-Time Algebra},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2015},
edition = {2nd 2015.}
}
|
|||||
| Jafarkhani, H. | Space-time coding: theory and practice [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{jafarkhani-space-time-2005,
author = {Jafarkhani, Hamid},
title = {Space-time coding: theory and practice},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Siva, V. | Spacetime in General Relativity [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 73 - 87 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{siva-spacetime-2008,
author = {Siva, V.},
title = {Spacetime in General Relativity},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {73 -- 87},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030040}
}
|
|||||
| Asselmeyer-Maluga, T. | Spacetime Weave—Bit as the Connection Between Its or the Informational Content of Spacetime [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 129-142 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{asselmeyer-maluga-spacetime-2015,
author = {Asselmeyer-Maluga, Torsten},
title = {Spacetime Weave—Bit as the Connection Between Its or the Informational Content of Spacetime},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {129--142}
}
|
|||||
| Slowik, E. | Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism | 2005 | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 19(2), pp. 147-166 |
article | |
| Abstract: This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{slowik-spacetime-2005,
author = {Slowik, Edward},
title = {Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism},
journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2005},
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {147--166}
}
|
|||||
| Bell, J.S. | Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy | 2004 | book | ||
| Abstract: John Bell, FRS was one of the leading expositors and interpreters of modern quantum theory. He is particularly famous for his discovery of the crucial difference between the predictions of conventional quantum mechanics and the implications of local causality, a concept insisted on by Einstein. John Bell's work played a major role in the development of our current understanding of the profound nature of quantum concepts and of the fundamental limitations they impose on the applicability of the classical ideas of space, time and locality. This book includes all of John Bell's published and unpublished papers on the conceptual and philosophical problems of quantum mechanics, including two papers that appeared after the first edition was published. The book includes a short Preface written by the author for the first edition, and also an introduction by Alain Aspect that puts into context John Bell's enormous contribution to the quantum philosophy debate. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{bell-speakable-2004,
author = {Bell, J. S.},
title = {Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: collected papers on quantum philosophy},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2004},
edition = {Revis;2;2nd;}
}
|
|||||
| Förster, F., Villa, E., Thomas, D., Korinek, A. and Baumeister, W. | Sructure Determination of Macromolecular Complexes by Cryo-Electron Microscopy in vitro and in situ | 2012 | Comprehensive Biophysics, pp. 245 - 276 | incollection | URL |
| Abstract: Three-dimensional (3-D) cryo-electron microscopy (EM) comprises three different branches: single particle analysis (SPA), cryo-electron tomography (CET), and electron crystallography. In this introduction into 3-D cryo-EM we first summarize the principle of imaging frozen-hydrated specimens by a transmission electron microscope (TEM) three-dimensionally before giving an insight into state-of-the-art strategies for automated data acquisition. For SPA\ and CET, we then review the respective methodologies and some selected applications highlighting the potential of both techniques, and in less detail we summarize electron crystallography. Finally, we give an account of the rapidly developing methods for model building using cryo-EM maps. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{forster-sructure-2012,
author = {Förster, F. and Villa, E. and Thomas, D. and Korinek, A. and Baumeister, W.},
title = {Sructure Determination of Macromolecular Complexes by Cryo-Electron Microscopy in vitro and in situ},
booktitle = {Comprehensive Biophysics},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2012},
pages = {245 -- 276},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123749208001181}
}
|
|||||
| Clark, P.J. | Statistical mechanics and the propensity interpretation of probability [BibTeX] |
2001 | Chance in Physics, pp. 271-281 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{clark-statistical-2001,
author = {Clark, Peter J},
title = {Statistical mechanics and the propensity interpretation of probability},
booktitle = {Chance in Physics},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2001},
pages = {271--281}
}
|
|||||
| Narasimhan, R. | Steven Pinker on 'Mentalese' [BibTeX] |
1997 | World Englishes Vol. 16(1), pp. 147-152 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{narasimhan-steven-1997,
author = {Narasimhan, R.},
title = {Steven Pinker on 'Mentalese'},
journal = {World Englishes},
year = {1997},
volume = {16},
number = {1},
pages = {147--152}
}
|
|||||
| Cavedon-Taylor, D. | Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller | 2009 | Philosophia Vol. 37(1), pp. 105-107 |
article | |
| Abstract: Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through. (PUBLICATION ABSTRACT);Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.;Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{cavedon-taylor-still-2009,
author = {Cavedon-Taylor, Dan},
title = {Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller},
journal = {Philosophia},
year = {2009},
volume = {37},
number = {1},
pages = {105--107}
}
|
|||||
| Easther, R., Greene, B.R., Jackson, M.G. and Kabat, D. | String windings in the early universe [BibTeX] |
2005 | Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics Vol. 2005(2), pp. 009-9 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{easther-string-2005,
author = {Easther, Richard and Greene, Brian R. and Jackson, Mark G. and Kabat, Daniel},
title = {String windings in the early universe},
journal = {Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics},
year = {2005},
volume = {2005},
number = {2},
pages = {009--9}
}
|
|||||
| Pandini, A., Fornili, A. and Kleinjung, J. | Structural alphabets derived from attractors in conformational space | 2010 | BMC Bioinformatics Vol. 11(1), pp. 97-97 |
article | |
| Abstract: Background: The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. Results: A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. Conclusions: The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; Abstract Background: The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. Results: A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. Conclusions: The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; BACKGROUND: The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. RESULTS: A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. CONCLUSIONS: The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; Abstract Background: The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. Results: A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. Conclusions: The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics.; Abstract Background The hierarchical and partially redundant nature of protein structures justifies the definition of frequently occurring conformations of short fragments as 'states'. Collections of selected representatives for these states define Structural Alphabets, describing the most typical local conformations within protein structures. These alphabets form a bridge between the string-oriented methods of sequence analysis and the coordinate-oriented methods of protein structure analysis. Results A Structural Alphabet has been derived by clustering all four-residue fragments of a high-resolution subset of the protein data bank and extracting the high-density states as representative conformational states. Each fragment is uniquely defined by a set of three independent angles corresponding to its degrees of freedom, capturing in simple and intuitive terms the properties of the conformational space. The fragments of the Structural Alphabet are equivalent to the conformational attractors and therefore yield a most informative encoding of proteins. Proteins can be reconstructed within the experimental uncertainty in structure determination and ensembles of structures can be encoded with accuracy and robustness. Conclusions The density-based Structural Alphabet provides a novel tool to describe local conformations and it is specifically suitable for application in studies of protein dynamics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{pandini-structural-2010,
author = {Pandini, Alessandro and Fornili, Arianna and Kleinjung, Jens},
title = {Structural alphabets derived from attractors in conformational space},
journal = {BMC Bioinformatics},
year = {2010},
volume = {11},
number = {1},
pages = {97--97}
}
|
|||||
| Lam, V. | Structural Aspects of Space-Time Singularities | 2008 | Vol. 4The Ontology of Spacetime II, pp. 111 - 131 |
incollection | URL |
| Abstract: We investigate the possible relevance of space-time singularities (within the theory of general relativity) for the debate about the nature of space-time. Standard attempts to describe space-time singularities in terms of local entities and local properties are discussed. It seems that space-time singularities possess some non-local or global aspects in the sense that they violate some basic aspects of (pre-)locality, which are inherent in the standard differential geometric representation of space-time. These possible non-local or global aspects of space-time underline the fact that the debate about the nature of space-time should not focus only on local aspects of space-time (such as space-time points) and should not be too dependent on one specific mathematical representation. In particular, we briefly discuss the possible relevance of the algebraic formulation of the theory of general relativity for the ‘problem’ of space-time singularities. Based on these considerations, a structural realist interpretation of space-time is proposed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{lam-structural-2008,
author = {Lam, Vincent},
title = {Structural Aspects of Space-Time Singularities},
booktitle = {The Ontology of Spacetime II},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {4},
pages = {111 -- 131},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408000065}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J. | Structural Realism [BibTeX] |
2014 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | misc | |
BibTeX:
@misc{ladyman-structural-2014,
author = {Ladyman, James},
title = {Structural Realism},
journal = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Stanford University CLSI},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Cao, T.Y. | Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory [BibTeX] |
2003 | Synthese Vol. 136(1), pp. 3-24 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{cao-structural-2003,
author = {Cao, Tian Y.},
title = {Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2003},
volume = {136},
number = {1},
pages = {3--24}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J. | Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air | 2011 | Synthese Vol. 180(2), pp. 87-101 |
article | |
| Abstract: The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.;The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.;The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.; Issue Title: SCIENTIFIC REALISM QUO VADIS? THEORIES, STRUCTURES, UNDERDETERMINATION AND REFERENCE The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{ladyman-structural-2011,
author = {Ladyman, James},
title = {Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2011},
volume = {180},
number = {2},
pages = {87--101}
}
|
|||||
| Saunders, S. | Structural Realism, Again [BibTeX] |
2003 | Vol. 136(1), pp. 127-133 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{saunders-structural-2003,
author = {Saunders, Simon},
title = {Structural Realism, Again},
year = {2003},
volume = {136},
number = {1},
pages = {127--133}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits [BibTeX] |
2011 | Vol. 281Scientific Structuralism, pp. 105-117 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{votsis-structural-2011,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits},
booktitle = {Scientific Structuralism},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2011},
volume = {281},
pages = {105--117}
}
|
|||||
| Worrall, J. | Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? | 1989 | Dialectica Vol. 43(1/2), pp. 99-124 |
article | |
| Abstract: The main argument for scientific realism is that our present theories in science are so successful empirically that they can't have got that way by chance — instead they must somehow have latched onto the blueprint of the universe. The main argument against scientific realism is that there have been enormously successful theories which were once accepted but are now regarded as false. The central question addressed in this paper is whether there is some reasonable way to have the best of both worlds: to give the argument from scientific revolutions its full weight and yet still adopt some sort of realist attitude towards presently accepted theories in physics and elsewhere. I argue that there is such a way — through structural realism, a position adopted by Poincaré, and here elaborated and defended. L'argument principal en faveur du réalisme scientifique, c'est que nos théories scientifiques actuelles sont empiriquement si efficaces que cela ne peut pas être dû au hasard — on doit en quelque sorte avoir découvert les plans de l'univers. L'argument principal contre le réalisme scientifique, c'est qu'il y a eu des théories scientifiques massivement efficaces qui ont été autrefois tenues pour vraies mais sont considérées aujourd'hui comme fausses. La principale question traitée dans ce papier, c'est s'il y a un moyen raisonnable de prendre le meilleur des deux mondes: de donner tout son poids à l'argument tiré des révolutions scientifiques et d'adopter pourtant une sorte d'attitude réaliste à l'égard des théories actuellement acceptées en physique ou ailleurs. Je montre qu'une telle voie existe: le réalisme structurel, une position adoptée par Poincaré, que je défends et développe ici. Das Hauptargument für wissenschaftlichen Realismus ist, dass unsere gegenwärtigen Theorien in der Wissenschaft empirisch so erfolgreich sind, dass sie nicht zufälligerweise so geworden sein können — statt dessen müssen sie irgendwie mit dem Plan des Universums übereinstimmen. Das Hauptargument gegen den wissenschaftlichen Realismus ist, dass es ausgesprochen erfolgreiche Theorien gegeben hat, die einmal akzeptiert gewesen waren, aber jetzt als falsch betrachtet werden. Die in diesem Papier behandelte Kernfrage lautet, ob es einen vernünftigen Weg gibt, aus beiden Welten das Beste zu haben: dem Argument vom Vorhandensein wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen sein volles Gewicht zu geben und dennoch eine Art von realistischer Einstellung gegenüber den heute in der Physik und anderswo akzeptierten Theorien einzunehmen. Ich argumentiere, dass es einen solchen Weg gibt — durch den von Poincaré übernommenen strukturellen Realismus, der hier ausgearbeitet und verteidigt wird. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{worrall-structural-1989,
author = {Worrall, John},
title = {Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?},
journal = {Dialectica},
year = {1989},
volume = {43},
number = {1/2},
pages = {99--124}
}
|
|||||
| Steiner, M., Rayo, A., Shapiro, S. and Hellman, G. | Structuralism [BibTeX] |
2007 | Vol. 1, pp. 536-563 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{steiner-structuralism-2007,
author = {Steiner, Mark and Rayo, Agustín and Shapiro, Stewart and Hellman, Geoffrey},
title = {Structuralism},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2007},
volume = {1},
pages = {536--563}
}
|
|||||
| Bueno, O. | Structuralism and Information | 2010 | Metaphilosophy Vol. 41(3), pp. 365-379 |
article | |
| Abstract: According to Luciano Floridi (2008), informational structural realism provides a framework to reconcile the two main versions of realism about structure: the epistemic formulation (according to which all we can know is structure) and the ontic version (according to which structure is all there is). The reconciliation is achieved by introducing suitable levels of abstraction and by articulating a conception of structural objects in information-theoretic terms. In this essay, I argue that the proposed reconciliation works at the expense of realism. I then propose an alternative framework, in terms of partial structures, that offers a way of combining information and structure in a realist setting while still preserving the distinctive features of the two formulations of structural realism. Suitably interpreted, the proposed framework also makes room for an empiricist form of informational structuralism (structural empiricism). Pluralism then emerges. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bueno-structuralism-2010,
author = {Bueno, Otávio},
title = {Structuralism and Information},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
year = {2010},
volume = {41},
number = {3},
pages = {365--379}
}
|
|||||
| Chakravartty, A. | Structuralism as a form of scientific realism | 2004 | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 18(2), pp. 151-171 |
article | |
| Abstract: Structural realism has recently re-entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti-realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{chakravartty-structuralism-2004,
author = {Chakravartty, Anjan},
title = {Structuralism as a form of scientific realism},
journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2004},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {151--171}
}
|
|||||
| Brading, K. | Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality [BibTeX] |
2011 | Vol. 281Scientific Structuralism, pp. 43-65 |
incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{brading-structuralist-2011,
author = {Brading, Katherine},
title = {Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality},
booktitle = {Scientific Structuralism},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2011},
volume = {281},
pages = {43--65}
}
|
|||||
| French, S. | Structure as a Weapon of the Realist | 2006 | Vol. 106(1), pp. 169-187 |
article | |
| Abstract: Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist 'tendency' has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's 'epistemic' structural realism; the latter with Ladyman's 'ontic' form. And both raise important issues of general interest within the philosophy of science and metaphysics, respectively. The former invites questions regarding the identification and appropriate representation of these commonalities; the latter touches on different views regarding the nature of objects, the constitutive role of properties and the seat of causal powers. Both strands have recently come under critical fire. It is my intention to present a unified account of the 'structuralist tendency' which emphasizes the dual roles of structure as representational and constitutive, and to indicate how the more acute critical remarks can be dealt with. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{french-structure-2006,
author = {French, Steven},
title = {Structure as a Weapon of the Realist},
year = {2006},
volume = {106},
number = {1},
pages = {169--187}
}
|
|||||
| Kling, J. | Structure, Agency, and Marxist Understanding of the City - KatznelsonIra: Marxism and the City. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. xii, 320. $49.95.) [BibTeX] |
001 | The Review of Politics Vol. 57(1), pp. 143-147 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{kling-structure-001,
author = {Kling, Joseph},
title = {Structure, Agency, and Marxist Understanding of the City - KatznelsonIra: Marxism and the City. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. xii, 320. $49.95.)},
journal = {The Review of Politics},
year = {001},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
pages = {143--147},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/div-class-title-structure-agency-and-marxist-understanding-of-the-city-katznelsonira-marxism-and-the-city-oxford-clarendon-press-1992-pp-xii-320-49-95-div/F90C36D8ED0DC4BAF20385D19A5F8F1F},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500019999}
}
|
|||||
| Fraassen, V. and Bas, C. | Structure: Its Shadow and Substance | 2006 | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 57(2), pp. 275-307 |
article | |
| Abstract: Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{van-fraassen-structure:-2006,
author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.},
title = {Structure: Its Shadow and Substance},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2006},
volume = {57},
number = {2},
pages = {275--307}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. and Lam, V. | Structures as the objects of fundamental physics [BibTeX] |
2009 | Epistemic objects : [research colloquium: "Epistemic objects", May 16 - 17th 2008, Technische Universität Berlin], pp. 3-16 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{esfeld-structures-2009,
author = {Esfeld, Michael and Lam, Vincent},
title = {Structures as the objects of fundamental physics},
booktitle = {Epistemic objects : [research colloquium: "Epistemic objects", May 16 - 17th 2008, Technische Universität Berlin]},
publisher = {Max Planck Institute for the History of Science},
year = {2009},
pages = {3--16}
}
|
|||||
| Takahashi, M. | Studies in relativity and quantum information theory | 2013 | phdthesis | ||
| Abstract: This thesis explores a broad range of topics in the foundations of relativity and quantum information theory. The first and main topic of this thesis is on relativistic quantum information theory. Here we construct a reformulation of quantum information, which is consistent with relativity theory. We will see that by providing a rigorous formulation starting with the field equations for a massive fermion and a photon we can construct a theory for relativistic quantum information. In particular we provide a measurement formalism, a transport equation which describes the unitary evolution of a state through spacetime as well as how to extend this to multipartite systems. The second topic concerns the nature of time, duration and clocks in current physical theories and in particular for Newtonian mechanics. We analyse the relationship between the readings of clocks in Newtonian mechanics with absolute time. We will see that in order to answer this question we must provide not only a model for a clock but also solve what is referred to as Newton’s Scholium problem. We then compare this with other dynamical theories in particular quantum mechanics and general relativity where the treatment of time is quite different from Newtonian mechanics. The final topic is rather different from the first two. In this chapter we investigate a range of methods to perform tomography in a solid-state qubit device, for which a priori initialization and measurement of the qubit is restricted to a single basis of the Bloch sphere. We explore and compare several methods to acquire precise descriptions of additional states and measurements, quantifying both stochastic and systematic errors, ultimately leading to a tomographically-complete set that can be subsequently used in process tomography. We focus in detail on the example of a spin qubit formed by the singlet-triplet subspace of two electron spins in a GaAs double quantum dot, although our approach is quite general. | |||||
BibTeX:
@phdthesis{takahashi-studies-2013,
author = {Takahashi, Maki},
title = {Studies in relativity and quantum information theory},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Dorato, M. | Substantivalism, Relationism, and Structural Spacetime Realism | 2000 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 30(10), pp. 1605-1628 |
article | |
| Abstract: Debates about the ontological implications of the general theory of relativity have long oscillated between spacetime substantivalism and relationism. I evaluate such debates by claiming that we need a third option, which I refer to as "structural spacetime realism." Such a tertium quid sides with the relationists in defending the relational nature of the spacetime structure, but joins the substantivalists in arguing that spacetime exists, at least in part, independently of particular physical objects and events, the degree of "independence" being given by the extent to which geometrical laws exist "over and above" physical events exemplifying them. By showing that structural spacetime realism is the natural outcome of a semantic, model-theoretic approach to the nature of scientific theories, I conclude by arguing that the notion of partial isomorphic representation is the most plausible candidate to connect spacetime models with reality.;Debates about the ontological implications of the general theory of relativity have long oscillated between spacetime substantivalism and relationism. I evaluate such debates by claiming that we need a third option, which I refer to as “structural spacetime realism.” Such a tertium quid sides with the relationists in defending the relational nature of the spacetime structure, but joins the substantivalists in arguing that spacetime exists, at least in part, independently of particular physical objects and events, the degree of “independence” being given by the extent to which geometrical laws exist “over and above” physical events exemplifying them. By showing that structural spacetime realism is the natural outcome of a semantic, model-theoretic approach to the nature of scientific theories, I conclude by arguing that the notion of partial isomorphic representation is the most plausible candidate to connect spacetime models with reality.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dorato-substantivalism-2000,
author = {Dorato, Mauro},
title = {Substantivalism, Relationism, and Structural Spacetime Realism},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {2000},
volume = {30},
number = {10},
pages = {1605--1628}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S.W., Perry, M.J. and Strominger, A. | Superrotation Charge and Supertranslation Hair on Black Holes | 2016 | article | ||
| Abstract: It is shown that black hole spacetimes in classical Einstein gravity are characterized by, in addition to their ADM mass M, momentum \vec P, angular momentum \vec J and boost charge \vec K, an infinite head of supertranslation hair. The distinct black holes are distinguished by classical superrotation charges measured at infinity. Solutions with supertranslation hair are diffeomorphic to the Schwarzschild spacetime, but the diffeomorphisms are part of the BMS subgroup and act nontrivially on the physical phase space. It is shown that a black hole can be supertranslated by throwing in an asymmetric shock wave. A leading-order Bondi-gauge expression is derived for the linearized horizon supertranslation charge and shown to generate, via the Dirac bracket, supertranslations on the linearized phase space of gravitational excitations of the horizon. The considerations of this paper are largely classical augmented by comments on their implications for the quantum theory. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-superrotation-2016,
author = {Hawking, Stephen W. and Perry, Malcolm J. and Strominger, Andrew},
title = {Superrotation Charge and Supertranslation Hair on Black Holes},
year = {2016}
}
|
|||||
| Dretske, F. | Supervenience and the causal explanation of behavior [BibTeX] |
2015 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{dretske-supervenience-2015,
author = {Dretske, Fred},
title = {Supervenience and the causal explanation of behavior},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Kim, J. | Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction | 2005 | Vol. 1, pp. 556-585 |
incollection | |
| Abstract: Introduction – Supervenience – Emergence and Models of Reduction – Realization and Supervenience; Supervenience, emergence, realization, and reduction are among the concepts that have played—and continue to play—prominent roles in metaphysics during the last few decades and at the present time, in particular in the debates over the mind-body problem and the status of the special sciences. One of their principal applications has been in characterizing the ways in which mental properties or phenomena are related to physical properties and processes. Thus, it has been claimed, and widely accepted, that the mentality of a creature is ‘supervenient’ on its physical nature in the sense that once a creature's physical nature is fixed, its mental nature is thereby fixed. It has also been suggested that consciousness and rationality are among the ‘emergent’ characteristics of complex organisms and systems in that these are ‘novel’ systemic properties that in some sense transcend the simpler properties of their constituent parts. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{kim-supervenience-2005,
author = {Kim, Jaegwon},
title = {Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2005},
volume = {1},
pages = {556--585}
}
|
|||||
| Nemeslaki, A. and Pocsarovszky, K. | Supporting e-business research with web crawler methodology | 2012 | Society and Economy Vol. 34(1), pp. 13-28 |
article | |
| Abstract: In economic and social sciences it is crucial to test theoretical models against large and reliable databases. The general research challenge is to build up a well-structured database that suits the given research question well and that is cost efficient at the same time. In this paper we focus on crawler programs that proved to be an effective tool for data base building in very different problem settings. We present three structurally different research models where crawler programs can be applied successfully: exploration, classification and time series analysis. In the case of exploration we present findings about the Hungarian web agency industry where no previous statistical data was available about their operations. For classification we show how the top visited Hungarian web domains can be divided into predefined categories of e-business models. In the third research we used a crawler to gather the values of specific pre-defined records containing ticket prices of low cost airlines from one single site. Based on the experiences we highlight some conceptual conclusions and opportunities for crawler based research in e-business. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{nemeslaki-supporting-2012,
author = {Nemeslaki, András and Pocsarovszky, Károly},
title = {Supporting e-business research with web crawler methodology},
journal = {Society and Economy},
year = {2012},
volume = {34},
number = {1},
pages = {13--28}
}
|
|||||
| Page, D. | Susskind's challenge to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal and possible resolutions | 2007 | JOURNAL OF COSMOLOGY AND ASTROPARTICLE PHYSICS(1) | article | |
| Abstract: Given the observed cosmic acceleration, Leonard Susskind has presented the following argument against the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal for the quantum state of the universe: it should most likely lead to a nearly empty large de Sitter universe, rather than to early rapid inflation. Even if one adds the condition of observers, they are most likely to form by quantum fluctuations in de Sitter and therefore not see the structure that we observe. Here I present my own amplified version of this argument and consider possible resolutions, one of which seems to imply that inflation expands the universe to be larger than 10(1010122) Mpc. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{page-susskinds-2007,
author = {Page, DN},
title = {Susskind's challenge to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal and possible resolutions},
journal = {JOURNAL OF COSMOLOGY AND ASTROPARTICLE PHYSICS},
year = {2007},
number = {1}
}
|
|||||
| Dennett, D.C. | Sweet dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dennett-sweet-2005,
author = {Dennett, D. C.},
title = {Sweet dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Castellani, E. and Brading, K. | Symmetries in physics: philosophical reflections [BibTeX] |
2003 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{castellani-symmetries-2003,
author = {Castellani, Elena and Brading, Katherine},
title = {Symmetries in physics: philosophical reflections},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2003}
}
|
|||||
| Belot, G. | Symmetry and gauge freedom | 2003 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 34(2), pp. 189 - 225 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: The classical field theories that underlie the quantum treatments of the electromagnetic, weak, and strong forces share a peculiar feature: specifying the initial state of the field determines the evolution of some degrees of freedom of the theory while leaving the evolution of some others wholly arbitrary. This strongly suggests that some of the variables of the standard state space lack physical content—intuitively, the space of states of such a theory is of higher dimension than the corresponding space of genuine physical possibilities. The structure of such theories can helpfully be characterized in terms of the action of symmetry groups on their space of states; and the conceptual problems surrounding their strange behavior can be sharpened in light of the observation that it is usually possible to eliminate the redundant variables associated with these symmetries—which turn out to be precisely those variables whose evolution is unconstrained by the dynamical laws of the theory. This paper discusses this approach, uses it to frame questions about the interpretation of classical gauge theories, and to reflect (pessimistically) on our prospects of reaching satisfactory answers to these questions. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{belot-symmetry-2003,
author = {Belot, Gordon},
title = {Symmetry and gauge freedom},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2003},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
pages = {189 -- 225},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219803000042},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S1355-2198(03)00004-2}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | Symmetry and Ontology [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 173 - 188 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-symmetry-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {Symmetry and Ontology},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {173 -- 188},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030088}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | Symmetry, structure, and spacetime | 2008 | Vol. 3 |
book | |
| Abstract: In this book Rickles considers several interpretative difficulties raised by gauge-type symmetries (those that correspond to no change in physical state). The ubiquity of such symmetries in modern physics renders them an urgent topic in philosophy of physics. Rickles focuses on spacetime physics, and in particular classical and quantum general relativity. Here the problems posed are at their most pathological, involving the apparent disappearance of spacetime! Rickles argues that both traditional ontological positions should be replaced by a structuralist account according to which relational structure is what the physics is about. À Unified treatment of gauge symmetries and their relationship to ontology in physicsÀ Brings philosophy of space and time into step with developments in modern physicsÀ Argues against the received view on the implications of symmetries in physicsÀ Provides elementary treatments of technical issuesÀ Illustrates a novel defense of structuralism | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{rickles-symmetry-2008-1,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {Symmetry, structure, and spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
edition = {1st}
}
|
|||||
| Steriade, M. | Synchronized activities of coupled oscillators in the cerebral cortex and thalamus at different levels of vigilance [BibTeX] |
1997 | Cerebral Cortex Vol. 7 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{steriade-synchronized-1997,
author = {Steriade, M.},
title = {Synchronized activities of coupled oscillators in the cerebral cortex and thalamus at different levels of vigilance},
journal = {Cerebral Cortex},
year = {1997},
volume = {7},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.6.583},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.6.583}
}
|
|||||
| Bermudez, J.L. | Syntax, Semantics and Levels of Explanation [BibTeX] |
1995 | The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 45(180), pp. 361-367 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{bermudez-syntax-1995,
author = {Bermudez, Jose L.},
title = {Syntax, Semantics and Levels of Explanation},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {1995},
volume = {45},
number = {180},
pages = {361--367}
}
|
|||||
| Wilden, A. | System and structure: essays in communication and exchange [BibTeX] |
1972 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{wilden-system-1972,
author = {Wilden, Anthony},
title = {System and structure: essays in communication and exchange},
publisher = {Tavistock Publications},
year = {1972}
}
|
|||||
| Wimsatt, W.C. | Taming the Dimensions - Visualizations in Science [BibTeX] |
1990 | PSA; Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association Vol. 2, pp. 111 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{wimsatt-taming-1990,
author = {Wimsatt, William C.},
title = {Taming the Dimensions - Visualizations in Science},
journal = {PSA; Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association},
year = {1990},
volume = {2},
pages = {111}
}
|
|||||
| Neander, K. | Teleological Theories of Mental Content [BibTeX] |
2012 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{neander-teleological-2012,
author = {Neander, Karen},
title = {Teleological Theories of Mental Content},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2012},
edition = {Spring 2012},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-teleological/#3.1}
}
|
|||||
| Artiga, M. | Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations | 2014 | Erkenntnis Vol. 79(S3), pp. 545-566 |
article | |
| Abstract: One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.; Issue Title: The first six articles belong to the Special Issue CAUSES AND (IN)DETERMINISM One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.; One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{artiga-teleosemantics-2014,
author = {Artiga, Marc},
title = {Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
year = {2014},
volume = {79},
number = {S3},
pages = {545--566}
}
|
|||||
| Nanay, B. | Teleosemantics without Etiology | 2014 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 81(5), pp. 798-810 |
article | |
| Abstract: The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable or 'naturalistic' theory of mental content. This paper focuses on one of the key concepts of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out teleosemantics is that of etiological function. My claim is that if we replace this concept of function with an alternative one and if we also restrict the scope of teleosemantics, we can arrive at an account of biologizing mental content that is much less problematic than the previous attempts.;The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable or ‘naturalistic’ theory of mental content. This paper focuses on one of the key concepts of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out teleosemantics is that of etiological function. My claim is that if we replace this concept of function with an alternative one and if we also restrict the scope of teleosemantics, we can arrive at an account of biologizing mental content that is much less problematic than the previous attempts.;The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable or 'naturalistic' theory of mental content. This paper focuses on one of the key concepts of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out teleosemantics is that of etiological function. My claim is that if we replace this concept of function with an alternative one and if we also restrict the scope of teleosemantics, we can arrive at an account of biologizing mental content that is much less problematic than the previous attempts.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{nanay-teleosemantics-2014,
author = {Nanay, Bence},
title = {Teleosemantics without Etiology},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2014},
volume = {81},
number = {5},
pages = {798--810}
}
|
|||||
| Artiga, M. | Teleosemantics, Infotel-semantics and Circularity | 2014 | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 22(4), pp. 583-603 |
article | |
| Abstract: Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls 'Infotel-semantics'), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard teleosemantics.; Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls 'Infotel-semantics'), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard teleosemantics.; Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls 'Infotel-semantics'), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off than standard teleosemantics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{artiga-teleosemantics-2014-1,
author = {Artiga, Marc},
title = {Teleosemantics, Infotel-semantics and Circularity},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
year = {2014},
volume = {22},
number = {4},
pages = {583--603}
}
|
|||||
| Macdonald, G. and Papineau, D. | Teleosemantics: new philosophical essays [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{macdonald-teleosemantics:-2006,
author = {Macdonald, Graham and Papineau, David},
title = {Teleosemantics: new philosophical essays},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Plenio, M.B. and Vedral, V. | Teleportation, entanglement and thermodynamics in the quantum world | 1998 | Contemporary Physics Vol. 39(6), pp. 431-446 |
article | |
| Abstract: Quantum merchanics has many counter-intuitive consequences which contradict our intuition which is based on classical physics. Here we discuss a special aspect of quantum mechanics, namely the possibility of entanglement between two or more particles.;Quantum mechanics has many counter-intuitive consequences which contradict our intuition which is based on classical physics. Here we discuss a special aspect of quantum mechanics, namely the possibility of entanglement between two or more particles. We will establish the basic properties of entanglement using quantum state teleportation. These principles will then allow us to formulate quantitative measures of entanglement. Finally we will show that the same general principles can also be used to prove seemingly difficult questions regarding entanglement dynamics very easily. This will be used to motivate the hope that we can construct a thermodynamics of entanglement.;Quantum mechanics has many counter-intuitive consequences which contradict our intuition which is based on classical physics. Here we discuss a special aspect of quantum mechanics, namely the possibility of entanglement between two or more particles. We will establish the basic properties of entanglement using quantum state teleportation. These principles will then allow us to formulate quantitative measures of entanglement. Finally we will show that the same general principles can also be used to prove seemingly difficult questions regarding entanglement dynamics very easily. This will be used to motivate the hope that we can construct a thermodynamics of entanglement.;Quantum merchanics has many counter-intuitive consequences which contradict our intuition which is based on classical physics. Here we discuss a special aspect of quantum mechanics, namely the possibility of entanglement between two or more particles.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{plenio-teleportation-1998,
author = {Plenio, Martin B. and Vedral, Vlatko},
title = {Teleportation, entanglement and thermodynamics in the quantum world},
journal = {Contemporary Physics},
year = {1998},
volume = {39},
number = {6},
pages = {431--446}
}
|
|||||
| Bennett, C.H., Brassard, G., Crépeau, C., Jozsa, R., Peres, A. and Wootters, W.K. | Teleporting an unknown quantum state via dual classical and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen channels | 1993 | Physical Review Letters Vol. 70(13), pp. 1895-1899 |
article | |
| Abstract: An unknown quantum state \phi] can be disassembled into, then later reconstructed from, purely classical information and purely nonclassical Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations. To do so the sender, ”Alice,” and the receiver, ”Bob,” must prearrange the sharing of an EPR-correlated pair of particles. Alice makes a joint measurement on her EPR particle and the unknown quantum system, and sends Bob the classical result of this measurement. Knowing this, Bob can convert the state of his EPR particle into an exact replica of the unknown state \phi]) which Alice destroyed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bennett-teleporting-1993,
author = {Bennett, Charles H. and Brassard, Gilles and Crépeau, Claude and Jozsa, Richard and Peres, Asher and Wootters, William K.},
title = {Teleporting an unknown quantum state via dual classical and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen channels},
journal = {Physical Review Letters},
year = {1993},
volume = {70},
number = {13},
pages = {1895--1899}
}
|
|||||
| Wilce, A. | Tensor product of frame manuals | 1990 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 29(8), pp. 805-814 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: Since its first use, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the Hilbert-space tensor product as a device for coupling the Hilbert-space models of two separated quantum mechanical systems. The Hilbert-space model is paraphrased manual-theoretically by the assertion that quantum mechanical entities are represented by frame manuals. There is a natural, heuristically straightforward tensor product for (unital) manuals, and it is natural therefore to ask whether the tensor product of frame manuals might serve as an alternative model of separated quantum mechanical systems. It is shown that the states on a tensor product of complex frame manuals give rise uniquely to sesquilinear forms on the tensor product of the underlying Hibert spaces. In certain cases, these in turn give rise to operators, which, however, are not generally positive, and which, even if compact, need not be trace-class. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wilce-tensor-1990,
author = {Wilce, Alexander},
title = {Tensor product of frame manuals},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {1990},
volume = {29},
number = {8},
pages = {805--814},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00675098},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00675098}
}
|
|||||
| Kläy, M., Randall, C. and Foulis, D. | Tensor products and probability weights | 1987 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 26(3), pp. 199-219 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: We study a general tensor product for two collections of related physical operations or observations. This is a free product, subject only to the condition that the operations in the first collection fail to have any influence on the statistics of operations in the second collection and vice versa. In the finite-dimensional case, it is shown that the vector space generated by the probability weights on the general tensor product is the algebraic tensor product of the vector spaces generated by the probability weights on the components. The relationship between the general tensor product and the tensor product of Hilbert spaces is examined in the light of this result. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{klay-tensor-1987,
author = {Kläy, M. and Randall, C. and Foulis, D.},
title = {Tensor products and probability weights},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {1987},
volume = {26},
number = {3},
pages = {199--219},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00668911},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00668911}
}
|
|||||
| Carnap, R. | Testability and Meaning [BibTeX] |
1936 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 3(4), pp. 419-471 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{carnap-testability-1936,
author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
title = {Testability and Meaning},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {1936},
volume = {3},
number = {4},
pages = {419--471}
}
|
|||||
| Greco, J. | Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information | 2015 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: This chapter reviews a number of related problems in the epistemology of testimony, and suggests some dilemmas for any theory of knowledge that tries to solve them. Here a common theme emerges: It can seem that any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or too easy, and that therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible. The chapter then puts forward a proposal for making progress. Specifically, an important function of the concept of knowledge is to govern the acquisition and distribution of quality information within an epistemic community. Testimonial exchanges paradigmatically serve in the distribution role, but sometimes serve in the acquisition role. The resulting position, it is argued, explains why testimonial knowledge is sometimes easy to get, and sometimes much harder. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{greco-testimonial-2015,
author = {Greco, John},
title = {Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Branciard, C., Salart, D., Zbinden, H., Baas, A. and Gisin, N. | Testing the speed of 'spooky action at a distance' | 2008 | Nature Vol. 454(7206), pp. 861-864 |
article | |
| Abstract: Correlations are generally described by one of two mechanisms: either a first event influences a second one by sending information encoded in bosons or other physical carriers, or the correlated events have some common causes in their shared history. Quantum physics predicts an entirely different kind of cause for some correlations, named entanglement. This reveals itself in correlations that violate Bell inequalities (implying that they cannot be described by common causes) between space-like separated events (implying that they cannot be described by classical communication). Many Bell tests have been performed, and loopholes related to locality and detection have been closed in several independent experiments. It is still possible that a first event could influence a second, but the speed of this hypothetical influence (Einstein's 'spooky action at a distance') would need to be defined in some universal privileged reference frame and be greater than the speed of light. Here we put stringent experimental bounds on the speed of all such hypothetical influences. We performed a Bell test over more than 24 hours between two villages separated by 18km and approximately east-west oriented, with the source located precisely in the middle. We continuously observed two-photon interferences well above the Bell inequality threshold. Taking advantage of the Earth's rotation, the configuration of our experiment allowed us to determine, for any hypothetically privileged frame, a lower bound for the speed of the influence. For example, if such a privileged reference frame exists and is such that the Earth's speed in this frame is less than 10textasciicircumsup -3textasciicircum times that of the speed of light, then the speed of the influence would have to exceed that of light by at least four orders of magnitude. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Correlations are generally described by one of two mechanisms: either a first event influences a second one by sending information encoded in bosons or other physical carriers, or the correlated events have some common causes in their shared history. Quantum physics predicts an entirely different kind of cause for some correlations, named entanglement. This reveals itself in correlations that violate Bell inequalities (implying that they cannot be described by common causes) between space-like separated events (implying that they cannot be described by classical communication). Many Bell tests have been performed, and loopholes related to locality and detection have been closed in several independent experiments. It is still possible that a first event could influence a second, but the speed of this hypothetical influence (Einstein's 'spooky action at a distance') would need to be defined in some universal privileged reference frame and be greater than the speed of light. Here we put stringent experimental bounds on the speed of all such hypothetical influences. We performed a Bell test over more than 24 hours between two villages separated by 18km and approximately east-west oriented, with the source located precisely in the middle. We continuously observed two-photon interferences well above the Bell inequality threshold. Taking advantage of the Earth's rotation, the configuration of our experiment allowed us to determine, for any hypothetically privileged frame, a lower bound for the speed of the influence. For example, if such a privileged reference frame exists and is such that the Earth's speed in this frame is less than 10textasciicircumsup -3textasciicircum times that of the speed of light, then the speed of the influence would have to exceed that of light by at least four orders of magnitude. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Correlations are generally described by one of two mechanisms: either a first event influences a second one by sending information encoded in bosons or other physical carriers, or the correlated events have some common causes in their shared history. Quantum physics predicts an entirely different kind of cause for some correlations, named entanglement. This reveals itself in correlations that violate Bell inequalities (implying that they cannot be described by common causes) between space-like separated events (implying that they cannot be described by classical communication). Many Bell tests have been performed, and loopholes related to locality and detection have been closed in several independent experiments. It is still possible that a first event could influence a second, but the speed of this hypothetical influence (Einstein's 'spooky action at a distance') would need to be defined in some universal privileged reference frame and be greater than the speed of light. Here we put stringent experimental bounds on the speed of all such hypothetical influences. We performed a Bell test over more than 24 hours between two villages separated by 18 km and approximately east-west oriented, with the source located precisely in the middle. We continuously observed two-photon interferences well above the Bell inequality threshold. Taking advantage of the Earth's rotation, the configuration of our experiment allowed us to determine, for any hypothetically privileged frame, a lower bound for the speed of the influence. For example, if such a privileged reference frame exists and is such that the Earth's speed in this frame is less than 10-3 times that of the speed of light, then the speed of the influence would have to exceed that of light by at least four orders of magnitude.;Correlations are generally described by one of two mechanisms: either a first event influences a second one by sending information encoded in bosons or other physical carriers, or the correlated events have some common causes in their shared history. Quantum physics predicts an entirely different kind of cause for some correlations, named entanglement. This reveals itself in correlations that violate Bell inequalities (implying that they cannot be described by common causes) between space-like separated events (implying that they cannot be described by classical communication). Many Bell tests have been performed, and loopholes related to locality and detection have been closed in several independent experiments. It is still possible that a first event could influence a second, but the speed of this hypothetical influence (Einstein's 'spooky action at a distance') would need to be defined in some universal privileged reference frame and be greater than the speed of light. Here we put stringent experimental bounds on the speed of all such hypothetical influences. We performed a Bell test over more than 24 hours between two villages separated by 18 km and approximately east-west oriented, with the source located precisely in the middle. We continuously observed two-photon interferences well above the Bell inequality threshold. Taking advantage of the Earth's rotation, the configuration of our experiment allowed us to determine, for any hypothetically privileged frame, a lower bound for the speed of the influence. For example, if such a privileged reference frame exists and is such that the Earth's speed in this frame is less than 10(-3) times that of the speed of light, then the speed of the influence would have to exceed that of light by at least four orders of magnitude.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{branciard-testing-2008,
author = {Branciard, Cyril and Salart, Daniel and Zbinden, Hugo and Baas, Augustin and Gisin, Nicolas},
title = {Testing the speed of 'spooky action at a distance'},
journal = {Nature},
year = {2008},
volume = {454},
number = {7206},
pages = {861--864}
}
|
|||||
| Berleant, A. | The aesthetics of environment [BibTeX] |
1992 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{berleant-aesthetics-1992,
author = {Berleant, Arnold},
title = {The aesthetics of environment},
publisher = {Temple University Press},
year = {1992}
}
|
|||||
| Ichikawa, J.J. and Steup, M. | The Analysis of Knowledge [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{ichikawa-analysis-2016,
author = {Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Steup, Matthias},
title = {The Analysis of Knowledge},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Winter 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/knowledge-analysis/}
}
|
|||||
| Passingham, R.E., Stephan, K.E. and Kotter, R. | The anatomical basis of functional localization in the cortex [BibTeX] |
2002 | Nat Rev Neurosci Vol. 3 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{passingham-anatomical-2002,
author = {Passingham, R. E. and Stephan, K. E. and Kotter, R.},
title = {The anatomical basis of functional localization in the cortex},
journal = {Nat Rev Neurosci},
year = {2002},
volume = {3},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn893},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn893}
}
|
|||||
| Dade-Robertson, M. | The architecture of information: architecture, interaction design and the patterning of digital information [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dade-robertson-architecture-2011,
author = {Dade-Robertson, Martyn},
title = {The architecture of information: architecture, interaction design and the patterning of digital information},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Peirce, C.S. and Institute, T.H. | The Architecture of Theories [BibTeX] |
1891 | Monist Vol. 1(2), pp. 161-176 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{peirce-architecture-1891,
author = {Peirce, Charles S. and Institute, The Hegeler},
title = {The Architecture of Theories},
journal = {Monist},
year = {1891},
volume = {1},
number = {2},
pages = {161--176}
}
|
|||||
| Shannon, C. | The bandwagon (Edtl.) [BibTeX] |
1956 | IRE Transactions on Information Theory Vol. 2(1), pp. 3-3 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{shannon-bandwagon-1956,
author = {Shannon, C.},
title = {The bandwagon (Edtl.)},
journal = {IRE Transactions on Information Theory},
year = {1956},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {3--3}
}
|
|||||
| Abel, D.L. | The biosemiosis of prescriptive information | 2009 | Semiotica Vol. 2009(174), pp. 1-19 |
article | |
| Abstract: Exactly how do the sign/symbol/token systems of endo- and exo-biosemiosis differ from those of cognitive semiosis? Do the biological messages that integrate metabolism have conceptual meaning? Semantic information has two subsets: Descriptive and Prescriptive. Prescriptive information instructs or directly produces nontrivial function. In cognitive semiosis, prescriptive information requires anticipation and "choice with intent" at bona fide decision nodes. Prescriptive information either tells us what choices to make, or it is a recordation of wise choices already made. Symbol systems allow recordation of deliberate choices and the transmission of linear digital prescriptive information. Formal symbol selection can be instantiated into physicality using physical symbol vehicles (tokens). Material symbol systems (MSS) formally assign representational meaning to physical objects. Even verbal semiosis instantiates meaning into physical sound waves using an MSS. Formal function can also be incorporated into physicality through the use of dynamically-inert (dynamically-incoherent or -decoupled) configurable switch-settings in conceptual circuits. This article examines the degree to which biosemiosis conforms to the essential formal criteria of prescriptive semiosis and cybernetic management. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{abel-biosemiosis-2009,
author = {Abel, David L.},
title = {The biosemiosis of prescriptive information},
journal = {Semiotica},
year = {2009},
volume = {2009},
number = {174},
pages = {1--19}
}
|
|||||
| Müller, M.P., Oppenheim, J. and Dahlsten, O.C.O. | The black hole information problem beyond quantum theory | 2012 | Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2012(9), pp. 1-32 |
article | |
| Abstract: The origin of black hole entropy and the black hole information problem provide important clues for trying to piece together a quantum theory of gravity. Thus far, discussions on this topic have mostly assumed that in a consistent theory of gravity and quantum mechanics, quantum theory will be unmodified. Here, we examine the black hole information problem in the context of generalisations of quantum theory. In particular, we examine black holes in the setting of generalised probabilistic theories, in which quantum theory and classical probability theory are special cases. We compute the time it takes information to escape a black hole, assuming that information is preserved. We find that under some very general assumptions, the arguments of Page (that information should escape the black hole after half the Hawking photons have been emitted), and the black-hole mirror result of Hayden and Preskill (that information can escape quickly) need to be modified. The modification is determined entirely by what we call the Wootters-Hardy parameter associated with a theory. We find that although the information leaves the black hole after enough photons have been emitted, it is fairly generic that it fails to appear outside the black hole at this point — something impossible in quantum theory due to the no-hiding theorem. The information is neither inside the black hole, nor outside it, but is delocalised. Our central technical result is an information decoupling theorem which holds in the generalised probabilistic framework.;The origin of black hole entropy and the black hole information problem provide important clues for trying to piece together a quantum theory of gravity. Thus far, discussions on this topic have mostly assumed that in a consistent theory of gravity and quantum mechanics, quantum theory will be unmodified. Here, we examine the black hole information problem in the context of generalisations of quantum theory. In particular, we examine black holes in the setting of generalised probabilistic theories, in which quantum theory and classical probability theory are special cases. We compute the time it takes information to escape a black hole, assuming that information is preserved. We find that under some very general assumptions, the arguments of Page (that information should escape the black hole after half the Hawking photons have been emitted), and the black-hole mirror result of Hayden and Preskill (that information can escape quickly) need to be modified. The modification is determined entirely by what we call the Wootters-Hardy parameter associated with a theory. We find that although the information leaves the black hole after enough photons have been emitted, it is fairly generic that it fails to appear outside the black hole at this point something impossible in quantum theory due to the no-hiding theorem. The information is neither inside the black hole, nor outside it, but is delocalised. Our central technical result is an information decoupling theorem which holds in the generalised probabilistic framework.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{muller-black-2012,
author = {Müller, Markus P. and Oppenheim, Jonathan and Dahlsten, Oscar C. O.},
title = {The black hole information problem beyond quantum theory},
journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics},
year = {2012},
volume = {2012},
number = {9},
pages = {1--32}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{floridi-blackwell-2004,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information},
publisher = {Blackwell Pub},
year = {2004}
}
|
|||||
| Hénaff, M. and Lapidus, R. | The Cannibalistic City: Rousseau, Large Numbers, and the Abuse of the Social Bond [BibTeX] |
1992 | SubStance Vol. 21(1), pp. 3-23 |
article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{henaff-cannibalistic-1992,
author = {Hénaff, Marcel and Lapidus, Roxanne},
title = {The Cannibalistic City: Rousseau, Large Numbers, and the Abuse of the Social Bond},
journal = {SubStance},
year = {1992},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {3--23},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3685344}
}
|
|||||
| Brádler, K. and Adami, C. | The capacity of black holes to transmit quantum information [BibTeX] |
2014 | Vol. 2014(5), pp. 1-26 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{bradler-capacity-2014,
author = {Brádler, Kamil and Adami, Christoph},
title = {The capacity of black holes to transmit quantum information},
year = {2014},
volume = {2014},
number = {5},
pages = {1--26}
}
|
|||||
| Wright, E.L. | The case for qualia [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{wright-case-2008,
author = {Wright, Edmond L.},
title = {The case for qualia},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Rovelli, C. | The century of the incomplete revolution: Searching for general relativistic quantum field theory | 2000 | Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 41(6), pp. 3776-3800 |
article | |
| Abstract: In fundamental physics, this has been the century of quantum mechanics and general relativity. It has also been the century of the long search for a conceptual framework capable of embracing the astonishing features of the world that have been revealed by these two “first pieces of a conceptual revolution.” The general requirements on the mathematics and some specific developments toward the construction of such a framework are discussed. Examples of covariant constructions of (simple) generally relativistic quantum field theories have been obtained as topological quantum field theories, in nonperturbative zero-dimensional string theory and its higher-dimensional generalizations, and as spin foam models. A canonical construction of a general relativistic quantum field theory is provided by loop quantum gravity. Remarkably, all these diverse approaches have turned out to be related, suggesting an intriguing general picture of general relativistic quantum physics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{rovelli-century-2000,
author = {Rovelli, Carlo},
title = {The century of the incomplete revolution: Searching for general relativistic quantum field theory},
journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics},
year = {2000},
volume = {41},
number = {6},
pages = {3776--3800}
}
|
|||||
| Wakakuwa, E. and Murao, M. | The chain rule implies Tsirelson's bound: an approach from generalized mutual information | 2012 | New Journal of Physics Vol. 14(11), pp. 113037 |
article | URL |
| Abstract: In order to analyze an information theoretical derivation of Tsirelson's bound based on information causality, we introduce a generalized mutual information (GMI), defined as the optimal coding rate of a channel with classical inputs and general probabilistic outputs. In the case where the outputs are quantum, the GMI coincides with the quantum mutual information. In general, the GMI does not necessarily satisfy the chain rule. We prove that Tsirelson's bound can be derived by imposing the chain rule on the GMI. We formulate a principle, which we call the no-supersignaling condition , which states that the assistance of nonlocal correlations does not increase the capability of classical communication. We prove that this condition is equivalent to the no-signaling condition. As a result, we show that Tsirelson's bound is implied by the nonpositivity of the quantitative difference between information causality and no-supersignaling. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wakakuwa-chain-2012,
author = {Wakakuwa, Eyuri and Murao, Mio},
title = {The chain rule implies Tsirelson's bound: an approach from generalized mutual information},
journal = {New Journal of Physics},
year = {2012},
volume = {14},
number = {11},
pages = {113037},
url = {http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/14/i=11/a=113037}
}
|
|||||
| Beni, M.D. | The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation [BibTeX] |
2016 | Biosemiotics | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{beni-code-2016,
author = {Beni, Majid D.},
title = {The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation},
journal = {Biosemiotics},
year = {2016}
}
|
|||||
| Sella, G. and Ardell, D.H. | The Coevolution of Genes and Genetic Codes: Crick’s Frozen Accident Revisited [BibTeX] |
2006 | Journal of Molecular Evolution Vol. 63(3), pp. 297-313 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{sella-coevolution-2006,
author = {Sella, Guy and Ardell, David H.},
title = {The Coevolution of Genes and Genetic Codes: Crick’s Frozen Accident Revisited},
journal = {Journal of Molecular Evolution},
year = {2006},
volume = {63},
number = {3},
pages = {297--313}
}
|
|||||
| Wang, Y. | The cognitive informatics theory and mathematical models of visual information processing in the brain [BibTeX] |
2009 | International Journal of Cognitive Informatics and Natural Intelligence Vol. 3(3), pp. 1-11 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{wang-cognitive-2009,
author = {Wang, Yingxu},
title = {The cognitive informatics theory and mathematical models of visual information processing in the brain},
journal = {International Journal of Cognitive Informatics and Natural Intelligence},
year = {2009},
volume = {3},
number = {3},
pages = {1--11}
}
|
|||||
| Szudzik, M.P. | The Computable Universe Hypothesis | 2010 | article | ||
| Abstract: When can a model of a physical system be regarded as computable? We provide the definition of a computable physical model to answer this question. The connection between our definition and Kreisel's notion of a mechanistic theory is discussed, and several examples of computable physical models are given, including models which feature discrete motion, a model which features non-discrete continuous motion, and probabilistic models such as radioactive decay. We show how computable physical models on effective topological spaces can be formulated using the theory of type-two effectivity (TTE). Various common operations on computable physical models are described, such as the operation of coarse-graining and the formation of statistical ensembles. The definition of a computable physical model also allows for a precise formalization of the computable universe hypothesis–the claim that all the laws of physics are computable. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{szudzik-computable-2010,
author = {Szudzik, Matthew P.},
title = {The Computable Universe Hypothesis},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Lloyd, S. | The computational universe [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 92-103 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{lloyd-computational-2010,
author = {Lloyd, Seth},
title = {The computational universe},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {92--103},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.005}
}
|
|||||
| Smith, J.M. | The Concept of Information in Biology | 2000 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 67(2), pp. 177-194 |
article | |
| Abstract: The use of informational terms is widespread in molecular and developmental biology. In biology, the use of informational terms implies intentionality, in that both the form of the signal, and the response to it, have evolved by selection.;The use of informational terms is widespread in molecular and developmental biology. The usage dates back to Weismann. In both protein synthesis and in later development, genes are symbols, in that there is no necessary connection between their form (sequence) and their effects. The sequence of a gene has been determined, by past natural selection, because of the effects it produces. In biology, the use of informational terms implies intentionality, in that both the form of the signal, and the response to it, have evolved by selection. Where an engineer sees design, a biologist sees natural selection.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{smith-concept-2000,
author = {Smith, John M.},
title = {The Concept of Information in Biology},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2000},
volume = {67},
number = {2},
pages = {177--194}
}
|
|||||
| Smith, J.M. | The concept of information in biology [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 123-145 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{smith-concept-2010,
author = {Smith, John Maynard},
title = {The concept of information in biology},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {123--145},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.007}
}
|
|||||
| Duncan, A. | The conceptual framework of quantum field theory [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{duncan-conceptual-2012,
author = {Duncan, Anthony},
title = {The conceptual framework of quantum field theory},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Rousseau, J.-J. and Mallory, W.C. | The confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau complete [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{rousseau-confessions-2012,
author = {Rousseau, Jean-Jacques and Mallory, W. C.},
title = {The confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau complete},
publisher = {The Floating Press},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Haco, S.J., Hawking, S.W., Perry, M.J. and Bourjaily, J.L. | The Conformal BMS Group | 2017 | article | ||
| Abstract: We describe the conformal symmetries of asymptotically flat spacetime. These represent an extension of the BMS group that we call the conformal BMS group. Its general features are discussed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{haco-conformal-2017,
author = {Haco, Sasha J. and Hawking, Stephen W. and Perry, Malcolm J. and Bourjaily, Jacob L.},
title = {The Conformal BMS Group},
year = {2017}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J., Presnell, S., Short, A.J. and Groisman, B. | The connection between logical and thermodynamic irreversibility [BibTeX] |
2007 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 38(1), pp. 58-79 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{ladyman-connection-2007,
author = {Ladyman, James and Presnell, Stuart and Short, Anthony J. and Groisman, Berry},
title = {The connection between logical and thermodynamic irreversibility},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2007},
volume = {38},
number = {1},
pages = {58--79}
}
|
|||||
| Chalmers, D.J. | The Conscious Mind [BibTeX] |
1996 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{chalmers-conscious-1996-1,
author = {Chalmers, David J.},
title = {The Conscious Mind},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1996}
}
|
|||||
| Chalmers, D.J. | The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory [BibTeX] |
1996 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{chalmers-conscious-1996,
author = {Chalmers, David J.},
title = {The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {1996}
}
|
|||||
| Millhouse, T., Bush, L.S. and Moss, D. | The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Evolution of Morality, pp. 113-135 | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{millhouse-containment-2016,
author = {Millhouse, Tyler and Bush, Lance S. and Moss, David},
title = {The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality},
booktitle = {The Evolution of Morality},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2016},
pages = {113--135},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19671-8-5}
}
|
|||||
| Fredkin, E. | The Digital Perspective [BibTeX] |
2003 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 42(2), pp. 145-145 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{fredkin-digital-2003,
author = {Fredkin, Ed},
title = {The Digital Perspective},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {2003},
volume = {42},
number = {2},
pages = {145--145}
}
|
|||||
| Lamme, V.A. and Roelfsema, P.R. | The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing [BibTeX] |
2000 | Trends Neurosci Vol. 23 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{lamme-distinct-2000,
author = {Lamme, V. A. and Roelfsema, P. R.},
title = {The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing},
journal = {Trends Neurosci},
year = {2000},
volume = {23},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-2236(00)01657-X},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-2236(00)01657-X}
}
|
|||||
| Kun, Á., Szilágyi, A., Könnyű, B., Boza, G., Zachar, I. and Szathmáry, E. | The dynamics of the RNA world: insights and challenges [BibTeX] |
2015 | Vol. 1341(1), pp. 75-95 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{kun-dynamics-2015,
author = {Kun, Ádám and Szilágyi, András and Könnyű, Balázs and Boza, Gergely and Zachar, István and Szathmáry, Eörs},
title = {The dynamics of the RNA world: insights and challenges},
year = {2015},
volume = {1341},
number = {1},
pages = {75--95}
}
|
|||||
| Di Giulio, M. | The Early Phases of Genetic Code Origin: Conjectures on the Evolution of Coded Catalysis | 2003 | Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere Vol. 33(4), pp. 479-489 |
article | |
| Abstract: A review of the most significant contributions on the early phases of genetic code origin is presented. After stressing the importance of the key intermediary role played in protein synthesis, by peptidyl-tRNA, which is attributed with a primary function in ancestral catalysis, the general lines leading to the codification of the first amino acids in the genetic code are discussed. This is achieved by means of a model of protoribosome evolution which sees protoribosome as the central organiser of ancestral biosynthesis and the mediator of the encounter between compounds (metabolite-pre-tRNAs) and catalysts (peptidyl-pre-tRNAs). The encounter between peptidyl-pre-tRNA catalysts in protoribosome is favoured by metabolic pre-mRNAs and later resulted (given the high temperature at which this evolution is supposed to have taken place) in the evolution of mRNAs with codons of the type GNS. These mRNAs codified only for those amino acids that the coevolution theory of genetic code origin sees as the precursors of all other amino acids. Some aspects of the model here discussed might be rendered real by the transfer-messenger RNA molecule (tmRNA) which is here considered a molecular fossil of ancestral protein synthesis.; A review of the most significant contributions on the early phases of genetic code origin is presented. After stressing the importance of the key intermediary role played in protein synthesis, by peptidyl-tRNA, which is attributed with a primary function in ancestral catalysis, the general lines leading to the codification of the first amino acids in the genetic code are discussed. This is achieved by means of a model of protoribosome evolution which sees protoribosome as the central organiser of ancestral biosynthesis and the mediator of the encounter between compounds (metabolite-pre-tRNAs) and catalysts (peptidyl-pre-tRNAs). The encounter between peptidyl-pre-tRNA catalysts in protoribosome is favoured by metabolic pre-mRNAs and later resulted ( given the high temperature at which this evolution is supposed to have taken place) in the evolution of mRNAs with codons of the type GNS. These mRNAs codified only for those amino acids that the coevolution theory of genetic code origin sees as the precursors of all other amino acids. Some aspects of the model here discussed might be rendered real by the transfer-messenger RNA molecule ( tmRNA) which is here considered a molecular fossil of ancestral protein synthesis.; A review of the most significant contributions on the early phases of genetic code origin is presented. After stressing the importance of the key intermediary role played in protein synthesis, by peptidyl-tRNA, which is attributed with a primary function in ancestral catalysis, the general lines leading to the codification of the first amino acids in the genetic code are discussed. This is achieved by means of a model of protoribosome evolution which sees protoribosome as the central organiser of ancestral biosynthesis and the mediator of the encounter between compounds (metabolite-pre-tRNAs) and catalysts (peptidyl-pre-tRNAs). The encounter between peptidyl-pre-tRNA catalysts in protoribosome is favoured by metabolic pre-mRNAs and later resulted (given the high temperature at which this evolution is supposed to have taken place) in the evolution of mRNAs with codons of the type GNS. These mRNAs codified only for those amino acids that the coevolution theory of genetic code origin sees as the precursors of all other amino acids. Some aspects of the model here discussed might be rendered real by the transfer-messenger RNA molecule (tmRNA) which is here considered a molecular fossil of ancestral protein synthesis.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; A review of the most significant contributions on the early phases of genetic code origin is presented. After stressing the importance of the key intermediary role played in protein synthesis, by peptidyl-tRNA, which is attributed with a primary function in ancestral catalysis, the general lines leading to the codification of the first amino acids in the genetic code are discussed. This is achieved by means of a model of protoribosome evolution which sees protoribosome as the central organiser of ancestral biosynthesis and the mediator of the encounter between compounds (metabolite-pre-tRNAs) and catalysts (peptidyl-pre-tRNAs). The encounter between peptidyl-pre-tRNA catalysts in protoribosome is favoured by metabolic pre-mRNAs and later resulted (given the high temperature at which this evolution is supposed to have taken place) in the evolution of mRNAs with codons of the type GNS. These mRNAs codified only for those amino acids that the coevolution theory of genetic code origin sees as the precursors of all other amino acids. Some aspects of the model here discussed might be rendered real by the transfer-messenger RNA molecule (tmRNA) which is here considered a molecular fossil of ancestral protein synthesis. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{di-giulio-early-2003,
author = {Di Giulio, Massimo},
title = {The Early Phases of Genetic Code Origin: Conjectures on the Evolution of Coded Catalysis},
journal = {Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere},
year = {2003},
volume = {33},
number = {4},
pages = {479--489}
}
|
|||||
| Cooper, R., Boyko, C. and Codinhoto, R. | The effect of the physical environment on mental wellbeing. [References] [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{cooper-effect-2010,
author = {Cooper, R. and Boyko, C. and Codinhoto, R.},
title = {The effect of the physical environment on mental wellbeing. [References]},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Woodward, P. | The emergence of mental content: An essay in the metaphysics of mind | 2015 | phdthesis | ||
| Abstract: Intentionality is the aboutness or directedness of mental states. According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a mental state’s intentional content is constituted by its causal embeddedness in an organism, vis-à-vis that organism’s environment. I argue that theories of this sort fail to explain how we could know the intentional contents of our mental states. As an alternative to causation-based theories of intentionality, I develop a consciousness-based theory of intentionality, as follows. Phenomenal properties are experiential aspects of consciousness. Among the various types of phenomenal property (sensory, somatic, conative, and so on) are phenomenal-intentional properties , or P-I properties. P-I properties are experiential aspects of consciousness whose natures consist in the presentation to the subject of an intentional content. In perception, imagination and cognition, P-I properties bind together to form modes of presentation of all of the intentional contents we can entertain. Along with the rest of the phenomenal domain, P-I properties emerge from the physical systems on which they depend, but are not reducible to, constituted by or realized in the states of those systems. | |||||
BibTeX:
@phdthesis{woodward-emergence-2015,
author = {Woodward, Philip},
title = {The emergence of mental content: An essay in the metaphysics of mind},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Wallace, D. | The emergent multiverse: quantum theory according to the Everett interpretation [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{wallace-emergent-2012,
author = {Wallace, David},
title = {The emergent multiverse: quantum theory according to the Everett interpretation},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Barbour, J.B. | The end of time : the next revolution in our understanding of the universe / by Julian Barbour [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{barbour-end-1999,
author = {Barbour, Julian B.},
title = {The end of time : the next revolution in our understanding of the universe / by Julian Barbour},
publisher = {Weidenfeld and Nicolson London},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| D'Agostino, M. and Floridi, L. | The Enduring Scandal of Deduction: Is Propositional Logic Really Uninformative? | 2009 | Vol. 167(2), pp. 271-315 |
article | |
| Abstract: Deductive inference is usually regarded as being “tautological” or “analytical”: the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing computational resources, and converge towards classical propositional logic. The underlying claim is that this hierarchy can be used to represent increasing levels of “depth” or “informativeness” of Boolean reasoning. Special attention is paid to the most basic logic in this hierarchy, the pure “intelim logic”, which satisfies all the requirements of a natural deduction system (allowing both introduction and elimination rules for each logical operator) while admitting of a feasible (quadratic) decision procedure. We argue that this logic is “analytic” in a particularly strict sense, in that it rules out any use of “virtual information”, which is chiefly responsible for the combinatorial explosion of standard classical systems. As a result, analyticity and tractability are reconciled and growing degrees of computational complexity are associated with the depth at which the use of virtual information is allowed.; Deductive inference is usually regarded as being "tautological" or "analytical": the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing computational resources, and converge towards classical propositional logic. The underlying claim is that this hierarchy can be used to represent increasing levels of "depth" or "informativeness" of Boolean reasoning. Special attention is paid to the most basic logic in this hierarchy, the pure "intelim logic", which satisfies all the requirements of a natural deduction system (allowing both introduction and elimination rules for each logical operator) while admitting of a feasible (quadratic) decision procedure. We argue that this logic is "analytic" in a particularly strict sense, in that it rules out any use of "virtual information", which is chiefly responsible for the combinatorial explosion of standard classical systems. As a result, analyticity and tractability are reconciled and growing degrees of computational complexity are associated with the depth at which the use of virtual information is allowed.; Deductive inference is usually regarded as being "tautological" or "analytical": the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing computational resources, and converge towards classical propositional logic. The underlying claim is that this hierarchy can be used to represent increasing levels of "depth" or "informativeness" of Boolean reasoning. Special attention is paid to the most basic logic in this hierarchy, the pure "intelim logic", which satisfies all the requirements of a natural deduction system (allowing both introduction and elimination rules for each logical operator) while admitting of a feasible (quadratic) decision procedure. We argue that this logic is "analytic" in a particularly strict sense, in that it rules out any use of "virtual information", which is chiefly responsible for the combinatorial explosion of standard classical systems. As a result, analyticity and tractability are reconciled and growing degrees of computational complexity are associated with the depth at which the use of virtual information is allowed.; Deductive inference is usually regarded as being "tautological" or "analytical": the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing computational resources, and converge towards classical propositional logic. The underlying claim is that this hierarchy can be used to represent increasing levels of "depth" or "informativeness" of Boolean reasoning. Special attention is paid to the most basic logic in this hierarchy, the pure "intelim logic", which satisfies all the requirements of a natural deduction system (allowing both introduction and elimination rules for each logical operator) while admitting of a feasible (quadratic) decision procedure. We argue that this logic is "analytic" in a particularly strict sense, in that it rules out any use of "virtual information", which is chiefly responsible for the combinatorial explosion of standard classical systems. As a result, analyticity and tractability are reconciled and growing degrees of computational complexity are associated with the depth at which the use of virtual information is allowed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dagostino-enduring-2009,
author = {D'Agostino, Marcello and Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Enduring Scandal of Deduction: Is Propositional Logic Really Uninformative?},
year = {2009},
volume = {167},
number = {2},
pages = {271--315}
}
|
|||||
| Wolynes, P. | The Energy Landscape Theory of Protein Folding [BibTeX] |
2008 | inproceedings | ||
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{wolynes-energy-2008,
author = {Wolynes, Peter},
title = {The Energy Landscape Theory of Protein Folding},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Gray, R.M. | The Entropy Ergodic Theorem [BibTeX] |
2011 | Entropy and Information Theory, pp. 97-115 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{gray-entropy-2011-2,
author = {Gray, Robert M.},
title = {The Entropy Ergodic Theorem},
booktitle = {Entropy and Information Theory},
publisher = {Springer US},
year = {2011},
pages = {97--115}
}
|
|||||
| Lerner, V.S. | The entropy functional, the information path functional's essentials and their connections to Kolmogorov's entropy, complexity and physics | 2011 | article | ||
| Abstract: The paper introduces the recent results related to an entropy functional on trajectories of a controlled diffusion process, and the information path functional (IPF), analyzing their connections to the Kolmogorov's entropy, complexity and the Lyapunov's characteristics. Considering the IPF's essentials and specifics, the paper studies the singularities of the IPF extremal equations and the created invariant relations, which both are useful for the solution of important mathematical and applied problems. Keywords: Additive functional; Entropy; Singularities, Natural Border Problem; Invariant | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lerner-entropy-2011,
author = {Lerner, Vladimir S.},
title = {The entropy functional, the information path functional's essentials and their connections to Kolmogorov's entropy, complexity and physics},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The ethics of information [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{floridi-ethics-2014,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The ethics of information},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Everett, H., Barrett, J.A. and Byrne, P. | The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics: collected works 1955-1980 with commentary [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | URL | |
BibTeX:
@book{everett-everett-2012,
author = {Everett, Hugh and Barrett, Jeffrey A. and Byrne, Peter},
title = {The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics: collected works 1955-1980 with commentary},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2012},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t2jf}
}
|
|||||
| Sudbery, A. | The Everett-Wheeler interpretation and the open future | 2011 | AIP Conference Proceedings | article | |
| Abstract: I discuss the meaning of probability in the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, together with the problem of defining histories. To resolve these, I propose an understanding of probability arising from a form of temporal logic: the probability of a future-tense proposition is identified with its truth value in a many-valued and context-dependent logic. In short, probability is degree of truth. These ideas relate to traditional naive ideas of time and chance. Indeed, I argue that Everettian quantum mechanics is the only form of scientific theory that truly incorporates the perception that the future is open. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{sudbery-everett-wheeler-2011,
author = {Sudbery, Anthony},
title = {The Everett-Wheeler interpretation and the open future},
journal = {AIP Conference Proceedings},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Shackelford, T.K., Hansen, R.D. and service) , S.(O. | The Evolution of Morality | 2016 | book | ||
| Abstract: This interdisciplinary collection presents novel theories, includes provocative re-workings of longstanding arguments, and offers a healthy cross-pollination of ideas to the morality literature. Structures, functions, and content of morality are reconsidered as cultural, religious, and political components are added to the standard biological/environmental mix. Innovative concepts such as the Periodic Table of Ethics and evidence for morality in non-human species illuminate areas for further discussion and research. And some of the book's contributors question premises we hold dear, such as morality as a product of reason, the existence of moral truths, and the motto "life is good." Highlights of the coverage: The tripartite theory of Machiavellian morality: judgment, influence, and conscience as distinct moral adaptations.Prosocial morality from a biological, cultural, and developmental perspective.The containment problem and the evolutionary debunking of morality.A comparative perspective on the evolution of moral behavior.A moral guide to depravity: religiously-motivated violence and sexual selection.Game theory and the strategic logic of moral intuitions.The Evolution of Morality makes a stimulating supplementary text for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in the evolutionary sciences, particularly in psychology, biology, anthropology, sociology, political science, religious studies, and philosophy;This interdisciplinary collection presents novel theories, includes provocative re-workings of longstanding arguments, and offers a healthy cross-pollination of ideas to the morality literature. Structures, functions, and content of morality are reconsidered as cultural, religious, and political components are added to the standard biological/environmental mix. Innovative concepts such as the Periodic Table of Ethics and evidence for morality in non-human species illuminate areas for further discussion and research. And some of the book's contributors question premises we hold dear, such as morality as a product of reason, the existence of moral truths, and the motto "life is good." Highlights of the coverage: * The tripartite theory of Machiavellian morality: judgment, influence, and conscience as distinct moral adaptations.* Prosocial morality from a biological, cultural, and developmental perspective.* The containment problem and the evolutionary debunking of morality.* A comparative perspective on the evolution of moral behavior.* A moral guide to depravity: religiously-motivated violence and sexual selection.* Game theory and the strategic logic of moral intuitions. The Evolution of Morality makes a stimulating supplementary text for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in the evolutionary sciences, particularly in psychology, biology, anthropology, sociology, political science, religious studies, and philosophy; | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{shackelford-evolution-2016,
author = {Shackelford, Todd K. and Hansen, Ranald D. and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {The Evolution of Morality},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2016},
edition = {1st 2015.;1st 2015;}
}
|
|||||
| Jablonka, E. and Lamb, M.J. | The expanded evolutionary synthesis–a response to Godfrey-Smith, Haig, and West-Eberhard | 2007 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 22(3), pp. 453 |
article | |
| Abstract: In responding to three reviews of Evolution in Four Dimensions (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005, MIT Press), we briefly consider the historical background to the present genecentred view of evolution, especially the way in which Weismann's theories have influenced it, and discuss the origins of the notion of epigenetic inheritance. We reaffirm our belief that all types of hereditary information–genetic, epigenetic, behavioural and cultural–have contributed to evolutionary change, and outline recent evidence, mainly from epigenetic studies, that suggests that non-DNA heritable variations are not rare and can be quite stable. We describe ways in which such variations may have influenced evolution. The approach we take leads to broader definitions of terms such as 'units of heredity', 'units of evolution', and 'units of selection', and we maintain that 'information' can be a useful concept if it is defined in terms of its effects on the receiver. Although we agree that evolutionary theory is not undergoing a Kuhnian revolution, the incorporation of new data and ideas about hereditary variation, and about the role of development in generating it, is leading to a version of Darwinism that is very different from the gene-centred one that dominated evolutionary thinking in the second half of the twentieth century.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{jablonka-expanded-2007,
author = {Jablonka, Eva and Lamb, Marion J.},
title = {The expanded evolutionary synthesis–a response to Godfrey-Smith, Haig, and West-Eberhard},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2007},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {453}
}
|
|||||
| Lyon, A. and Colyvan, M. | The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces | 2008 | Philosophia Mathematica Vol. 16(2), pp. 227-243 |
article | |
| Abstract: David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise problems for nominalists that go beyond Malament's initial concerns.;David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise problems for nominalists that go beyond Malament's initial concerns.;David Malament argued that Hartry Field's nominalisation program is unlikely to be able to deal with non-space-time theories such as phase-space theories. We give a specific example of such a phase-space theory and argue that this presentation of the theory delivers explanations that are not available in the classical presentation of the theory. This suggests that even if phase-space theories can be nominalised, the resulting theory will not have the explanatory power of the original. Phase-space theories thus raise problems for nominalists that go beyond Malament's initial concerns.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lyon-explanatory-2008,
author = {Lyon, Aidan and Colyvan, Mark},
title = {The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces},
journal = {Philosophia Mathematica},
year = {2008},
volume = {16},
number = {2},
pages = {227--243}
}
|
|||||
| Sterelny, K., Smith, K.C. and Dickison, M. | The extended replicator [BibTeX] |
1996 | Biology and Philosophy Vol. 11(3), pp. 377-403 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{sterelny-extended-1996,
author = {Sterelny, Kim and Smith, Kelly C. and Dickison, Michael},
title = {The extended replicator},
journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
year = {1996},
volume = {11},
number = {3},
pages = {377--403}
}
|
|||||
| Deutsch, D. | The fabric of reality [BibTeX] |
1998 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{deutsch-fabric-1998,
author = {Deutsch, David},
title = {The fabric of reality},
publisher = {Penguin Books},
year = {1998}
}
|
|||||
| Damasio, A.R. | The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{damasio-feeling-1999,
author = {Damasio, A. R.},
title = {The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness},
publisher = {Harcourt Brace},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| Donaldson-Matasci, M.C., Bergstrom, C.T. and Lachmann, M. | The fitness value of information [BibTeX] |
2010 | Oikos Vol. 119(2), pp. 219-230 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{donaldson-matasci-fitness-2010,
author = {Donaldson-Matasci, Matina C. and Bergstrom, Carl T. and Lachmann, Michael},
title = {The fitness value of information},
journal = {Oikos},
year = {2010},
volume = {119},
number = {2},
pages = {219--230}
}
|
|||||
| Mathur, S. and Turton, D. | The flaw in the firewall argument [BibTeX] |
2014 | NUCLEAR PHYSICS B Vol. 884(1), pp. 566-611 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{mathur-flaw-2014,
author = {Mathur, SD and Turton, D.},
title = {The flaw in the firewall argument},
journal = {NUCLEAR PHYSICS B},
year = {2014},
volume = {884},
number = {1},
pages = {566--611}
}
|
|||||
| Bennett, C.H. and Landauer, R. | The Fundamental Physical Limits of Computation | 1985 | Scientific American Vol. 253(1), pp. 48 |
article | |
| Abstract: Examines what constraints govern the physical process of computation, considering such areas as whether a minimum amount of energy is required per logic step. Indicates that although there seems to be no minimum, answers to other questions are unresolved. Examples used include DNA/RNA, a Brownian clockwork turning machine, and others. (JN) | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bennett-fundamental-1985,
author = {Bennett, Charles H. and Landauer, Rolf},
title = {The Fundamental Physical Limits of Computation},
journal = {Scientific American},
year = {1985},
volume = {253},
number = {1},
pages = {48}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S.W. and Horowitz, G.T. | The gravitational Hamiltonian, action, entropy and surface terms | 1996 | Classical and Quantum Gravity Vol. 13(6), pp. 1487-1498 |
article | |
| Abstract: We give a general derivation of the gravitational hamiltonian starting from the Einstein-Hilbert action, keeping track of all surface terms. The surface term that arises in the hamiltonian can be taken as the definition of the `total energy', even for spacetimes that are not asymptotically flat. (In the asymptotically flat case, it agrees with the usual ADM energy.) We also discuss the relation between the euclidean action and the hamiltonian when there are horizons of infinite area (e.g. acceleration horizons) as well as the usual finite area black hole horizons. Acceleration horizons seem to be more analogous to extreme than nonextreme black holes, since we find evidence that their horizon area is not related to the total entropy.;We give a derivation of the gravitational Hamiltonian starting from the Einstein-Hilbert action, keeping track of all surface terms. This derivation can be applied to any spacetime that asymptotically approaches a static background solution. The surface term that arises in the Hamiltonian can be taken as the definition of the 'total energy', even for spacetimes that are not asymptotically flat. (In the asymptotically flat case, it agrees with the usual ADM energy.) We also discuss the relation between the Euclidean action and the Hamiltonian when there are horizons of infinite area (e.g. acceleration horizons) as well as the usual finite area black hole horizons. Acceleration horizons seem to be more analogous to extreme than nonextreme black holes, since we find evidence that their horizon area is not related to the total entropy.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-gravitational-1996,
author = {Hawking, S. W. and Horowitz, Gary T.},
title = {The gravitational Hamiltonian, action, entropy and surface terms},
journal = {Classical and Quantum Gravity},
year = {1996},
volume = {13},
number = {6},
pages = {1487--1498}
}
|
|||||
| Smith, J.M. | The Idea of Information in Biology | 1999 | The Quarterly Review of Biology Vol. 74(4), pp. 395-400 |
article | |
| Abstract: The idea of information in biology is discussed. There has been, in the course of evolution, a series of changes in the way in which information is stored and transmitted. However, philosophers of biology have either ignored the concept of information or have argued that it is irrelevant or misleading. The manner in which the concept has been applied in genetics, evolution, and developmental biology is considered.;Smith discusses how the idea of Information Theory has been applied in genetics, evolution and developmental biology. He is not, he concedes, competent to discuss Information Theory in neurobiology.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{smith-idea-1999,
author = {Smith, John M.},
title = {The Idea of Information in Biology},
journal = {The Quarterly Review of Biology},
year = {1999},
volume = {74},
number = {4},
pages = {395--400}
}
|
|||||
| Iser, W. | The implied reader: patterns of communication in prose fiction from Bunyan to Beckett [BibTeX] |
1974 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{iser-implied-1974,
author = {Iser, Wolfgang},
title = {The implied reader: patterns of communication in prose fiction from Bunyan to Beckett},
publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
year = {1974}
}
|
|||||
| Baker, A. | The Indispensability Argument and Multiple Foundations for Mathematics | 2003 | The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 53(210), pp. 49-67 |
article | |
| Abstract: One recent trend in the philosophy of mathematics has been to approach the central epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning mathematics from the perspective of the applications of mathematics to describing the world, especially within the context of empirical science. A second area of activity is where philosophy of mathematics intersects with foundational issues in mathematics, including debates over the choice of set-theoretic axioms, and over whether category theory, for example, may provide an alternative foundation for mathematics. My central claim is that these latter issues are of direct relevance to philosophical arguments connected to the applicability of mathematics. In particular, the possibility of there being distinct alternative foundations for mathematics blocks the standard argument from the indispensable role of mathematics in science to the existence of specific mathematical objects.;One recent trend in the philosophy of mathematics has been to approach the central epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning mathematics from the perspective of the applications of mathematics to describing the world, especially within the context of empirical science. A second area of activity is where philosophy of mathematics intersects with foundational issues in mathematics, including debates over the choice of set-theoretic axioms, and over whether category theory, for example, may provide an alternative foundation for mathematics. My central claim is that these latter issues are of direct relevance to philosophical arguments connected to the applicability of mathematics. In particular, the possibility of there being distinct alternative foundations for mathematics blocks the standard argument from the indispensable role of mathematics in science to the existence of specific mathematical objects.;One recent trend in the philosophy of mathematics has been to approach the central epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning mathematics from the perspective of the applications of mathematics to describing the world, especially within the context of empirical science. A second area of activity is where philosophy of mathematics intersects with foundational issues in mathematics, including debates over the choice of set–theoretic axioms, and over whether category theory, for example, may provide an alternative foundation for mathematics. My central claim is that these latter issues are of direct relevance to philosophical arguments connected to the applicability of mathematics. In particular, the possibility of there being distinct alternative foundations for mathematics blocks the standard argument from the indispensable role of mathematics in science to the existence of specific mathematical objects.; One recent trend in the philosophy of mathematics has been to approach the central epistemological and metaphysical issues concerning mathematics from the perspective of the applications of mathematics to describing the world, especially within the context of empirical science. A second area of activity is where philosophy of mathematics intersects with foundational issues in mathematics, including debates over the choice of set-theoretic axioms, and over whether category theory, for example, may provide an alternative foundation for mathematics. My central claim is that these latter issues are of direct relevance to philosophical arguments connected to the applicability of mathematics. In particular, the possibility of there being distinct alternative foundations for mathematics blocks the standard argument from the indispensable role of mathematics in science to the existence of specific mathematical objects.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{baker-indispensability-2003,
author = {Baker, Alan},
title = {The Indispensability Argument and Multiple Foundations for Mathematics},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2003},
volume = {53},
number = {210},
pages = {49--67}
}
|
|||||
| Cole, J. and Shapiro, S. | The Indispensability of Mathematics | 2003 | Vol. 112(446) |
book | |
| Abstract: Mark Colyvan's "The Indispensability of Mathematics" is reviewed. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{cole-indispensability-2003,
author = {Cole, Julian and Shapiro, Stewart},
title = {The Indispensability of Mathematics},
year = {2003},
volume = {112},
number = {446}
}
|
|||||
| Colyvan, M. | The indispensability of mathematics [BibTeX] |
2001 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{colyvan-indispensability-2001,
author = {Colyvan, Mark},
title = {The indispensability of mathematics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2001}
}
|
|||||
| Leng, M. | The Indispensability of Mathematics | 2010 | , pp. 45-76 | incollection | |
| Abstract: This chapter discusses Hartry Field's attempt to respond to the indispensability argument by showing how to dispense with mathematics in formulating our best scientific theories. It is pointed out that Field does not want to stop us from using mathematics in our scientific theorizing, but rather, that he wishes to explain the use of mathematics as a ‘theoretical juice extractor’, which allows us to draw out the consequences of our non-mathematical assumptions. Objections to Field's programme are considered, including objections to the logical assumptions made by his account of applications, and objections to his claim that mathematics can always be dispensed with. While these objections are not conclusive, it is noted that mathematical assumptions may be valuable enough to remain present in even our best formulations of our scientific theories. Hence the book's project, to consider the case for anti-platonism on the assumption that mathematics is indispensable to empirical science. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{leng-indispensability-2010,
author = {Leng, Mary},
title = {The Indispensability of Mathematics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {45--76}
}
|
|||||
| Denning, P.J. and Bell, T. | The Information Paradox | 2012 | American Scientist Vol. 100(6), pp. 470 |
article | |
| Abstract: [...]the concept of information seems fuzzy and abstract to many people, making it hard for them to understand how information systems really work. [...]all the components are physical, and information is always encoded into some sort of signal, which can be transmitted and translated without losing the information it encodes (see Figure 3). Because information is always represented by physical means, it takes time and energy to read, write and transform it. Bayesian inference programs are extensively used in data mining - they can infer complex hypotheses using the evidence in very large data sets.; [...]the concept of information seems fuzzy and abstract to many people, making it hard for them to understand how information systems really work. [...]all the components are physical, and information is always encoded into some sort of signal, which can be transmitted and translated without losing the information it encodes (see Figure 3). Because information is always represented by physical means, it takes time and energy to read, write and transform it. Bayesian inference programs are extensively used in data mining - they can infer complex hypotheses using the evidence in very large data sets. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{denning-information-2012,
author = {Denning, Peter J. and Bell, Tim},
title = {The Information Paradox},
journal = {American Scientist},
year = {2012},
volume = {100},
number = {6},
pages = {470}
}
|
|||||
| Mathur, S.D. | The information paradox: a pedagogical introduction | 2009 | Classical and Quantum Gravity Vol. 26(22), pp. 224001 |
article | |
| Abstract: The black hole information paradox is a very poorly understood problem. It is often believed that Hawking's argument is not precisely formulated, and a more careful accounting of naturally occurring quantum corrections will allow the radiation process to become unitary. We show that such is not the case, by proving that small corrections to the leading order Hawking computation cannot remove the entanglement between the radiation and the hole. We formulate Hawking's argument as a 'theorem': assuming 'traditional' physics at the horizon and usual assumptions of locality we will be forced into mixed states or remnants. We also argue that one cannot explain away the problem by invoking AdS/CFT duality. We conclude with recent results on the quantum physics of black holes which show that the interior of black holes have a 'fuzzball' structure. This nontrivial structure of microstates resolves the information paradox and gives a qualitative picture of how classical intuition can break down in black hole physics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mathur-information-2009,
author = {Mathur, Samir D.},
title = {The information paradox: a pedagogical introduction},
journal = {Classical and Quantum Gravity},
year = {2009},
volume = {26},
number = {22},
pages = {224001}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Information Society and Its Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments" | 2009 | The Information Society Vol. 25(3), pp. 153-158 |
article | |
| Abstract: The article introduces the special issue dedicated to "The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments." It outlines the origins of the information society and then briefly discusses the definition of the philosophy of information, the possibility of reconciling nature and technology, the informational turn as a fourth revolution (after Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud), and the metaphysics of the infosphere.; The article introduces the special issue dedicated to "The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments." It outlines the origins of the information society and then briefly discusses the definition of the philosophy of information, the possibility of reconciling nature and technology, the informational turn as a fourth revolution (after Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud), and the metaphysics of the infosphere. Adapted from the source document.; The article introduces the special issue dedicated to The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments. It outlines the origins of the information society and then briefly discusses the definition of the philosophy of information, the possibility of reconciling nature and technology, the informational turn as a fourth revolution (after Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud), and the metaphysics of the infosphere. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-information-2009,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Information Society and Its Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue on "The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments"},
journal = {The Information Society},
year = {2009},
volume = {25},
number = {3},
pages = {153--158}
}
|
|||||
| English, S., Pen, I., Shea, N. and Uller, T. | The Information Value of Non-Genetic Inheritance in Plants and Animals | 2015 | PLOS ONE Vol. 10(1), pp. e0116996 |
article | |
| Abstract: Parents influence the development of their offspring in many ways beyond the transmission of DNA. This includes transfer of epigenetic states, nutrients, antibodies and hormones, and behavioural interactions after birth. While the evolutionary consequences of such non-genetic inheritance are increasingly well understood, less is known about how inheritance mechanisms evolve. Here, we present a simple but versatile model to explore the adaptive evolution of non-genetic inheritance. Our model is based on a switch mechanism that produces alternative phenotypes in response to different inputs, including genes and non-genetic factors transmitted from parents and the environment experienced during development. This framework shows how genetic and non-genetic inheritance mechanisms and environmental conditions can act as cues by carrying correlational information about future selective conditions. Differential use of these cues is manifested as different degrees of genetic, parental or environmental morph determination. We use this framework to evaluate the conditions favouring non-genetic inheritance, as opposed to genetic determination of phenotype or within-generation plasticity, by applying it to two putative examples of adaptive non-genetic inheritance: maternal effects on seed germination in plants and transgenerational phase shift in desert locusts. Our simulation models show how the adaptive value of non-genetic inheritance depends on its mechanism, the pace of environmental change, and life history characteristics.; Parents influence the development of their offspring in many ways beyond the transmission of DNA. This includes transfer of epigenetic states, nutrients, antibodies and hormones, and behavioural interactions after birth. While the evolutionary consequences of such non-genetic inheritance are increasingly well understood, less is known about how inheritance mechanisms evolve. Here, we present a simple but versatile model to explore the adaptive evolution of non-genetic inheritance. Our model is based on a switch mechanism that produces alternative phenotypes in response to different inputs, including genes and non-genetic factors transmitted from parents and the environment experienced during development. This framework shows how genetic and non-genetic inheritance mechanisms and environmental conditions can act as cues by carrying correlational information about future selective conditions. Differential use of these cues is manifested as different degrees of genetic, parental or environmental morph determination. We use this framework to evaluate the conditions favouring non-genetic inheritance, as opposed to genetic determination of phenotype or within-generation plasticity, by applying it to two putative examples of adaptive non-genetic inheritance: maternal effects on seed germination in plants and transgenerational phase shift in desert locusts. Our simulation models show how the adaptive value of non-genetic inheritance depends on its mechanism, the pace of environmental change, and life history characteristics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{english-information-2015,
author = {English, S. and Pen, I. and Shea, N. and Uller, T.},
title = {The Information Value of Non-Genetic Inheritance in Plants and Animals},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2015},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {e0116996}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Informational Nature of Personal Identity | 2011 | Minds and Machines Vol. 21(4), pp. 549-566 |
article | |
| Abstract: In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In “Plato and the problem of the chariot”, I use Plato’s famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In “Egology and its two branches” and “Egology as synchronic individualisation”, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one concerning the individualisation of the self as an entity, the other concerning the identification of such entity. I argue that both presuppose an informational approach, defend the view that the individualisation of the self is logically prior to its identification, and suggest that such individualisation can be provided in informational terms. Hence, in “A reconciling hypothesis: the three membranes model”, I offer an informational individualisation of the self, based on a tripartite model, which can help to solve the problem of the chariot. Once this model of the self is outlined, in “ICTs as technologies of the self” I use it to show how ICTs may be interpreted as technologies of the self. In “The logic of realisation”, I introduce the concept of “realization” (Aristotle’s anagnorisis) and support the rather Spinozian view according to which, from the perspective of informational structural realism, selves are the final stage in the development of informational structures. The final “Conclusion: from the egology to the ecology of the self” briefly concludes the article with a reference to the purposeful shaping of the self, in a shift from egology to ecology.; In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In "Plato and the problem of the chariot”, I use Plato's famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In "Egology and its two branches” and "Egology as synchronic individualisation”, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one concerning the individualisation of the self as an entity, the other concerning the identification of such entity. I argue that both presuppose an informational approach, defend the view that the individualisation of the self is logically prior to its identification, and suggest that such individualisation can be provided in informational terms. Hence, in "A reconciling hypothesis: the three membranes model”, I offer an informational individualisation of the self, based on a tripartite model, which can help to solve the problem of the chariot. Once this model of the self is outlined, in "ICTs as technologies of the self” I use it to show how ICTs may be interpreted as technologies of the self. In "The logic of realisation”, I introduce the concept of "realization” (Aristotle's anagnorisis) and support the rather Spinozian view according to which, from the perspective of informational structural realism, selves are the final stage in the development of informational structures. The final "Conclusion: from the egology to the ecology of the self” briefly concludes the article with a reference to the purposeful shaping of the self, in a shift from egology to ecology. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-informational-2011,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Informational Nature of Personal Identity},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2011},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {549--566}
}
|
|||||
| Redhead, M. | The Intelligibility of the Universe [BibTeX] |
2001 | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements Vol. 48, pp. 73-90 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{redhead-intelligibility-2001,
author = {Redhead, Michael},
title = {The Intelligibility of the Universe},
journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements},
year = {2001},
volume = {48},
pages = {73--90}
}
|
|||||
| Dennett, D.C. | The intentional stance [BibTeX] |
1987 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dennett-intentional-1987,
author = {Dennett, D. C.},
title = {The intentional stance},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {1987}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetries [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 45 - 71 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-interpretation-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetries},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {45 -- 71},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030039}
}
|
|||||
| Pinker, S. | The language instinct [BibTeX] |
1994 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{pinker-language-1994,
author = {Pinker, Steven},
title = {The language instinct},
publisher = {W. Morrow and Co},
year = {1994},
edition = {1st}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. and Ellis, G.F.R. | The large scale structure of space-time [BibTeX] |
1973 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hawking-large-1973,
author = {Hawking, Stephen and Ellis, George F. R.},
title = {The large scale structure of space-time},
publisher = {University Press},
year = {1973}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Latent Nature of Global Information Warfare | 2014 | Vol. 27(3), pp. 317-319 |
article | |
| Abstract: Issue Title: Trends in the History and Philosophy of Computing | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-latent-2014,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Latent Nature of Global Information Warfare},
year = {2014},
volume = {27},
number = {3},
pages = {317--319}
}
|
|||||
| Allo, P. | The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised | 2011 | Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 153(3), pp. 417-434 |
article | |
| Abstract: The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.;The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.; The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.;The logic of 'being informed' gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{allo-logic-2011,
author = {Allo, Patrick},
title = {The logic of 'being informed' revisited and revised},
journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
year = {2011},
volume = {153},
number = {3},
pages = {417--434}
}
|
|||||
| D’Alfonso, S. | The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information | 2014 | Minds and Machines Vol. 24(3), pp. 307-325 |
article | |
| Abstract: In this paper I look at Fred Dretske's account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske's probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske's account of information flow.; In this paper I look at Fred Dretske's account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske's probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske's account of information flow.; In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske’s account of information flow. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dalfonso-logic-2014,
author = {D’Alfonso, Simon},
title = {The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2014},
volume = {24},
number = {3},
pages = {307--325}
}
|
|||||
| Nahin, P.J. | The logician and the engineer: how George Boole and Claude Shannon created the information age [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{nahin-logician-2012,
author = {Nahin, Paul J.},
title = {The logician and the engineer: how George Boole and Claude Shannon created the information age},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| DeWitt, B.S., Everett, H. and Graham, N. | The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics [BibTeX] |
1973 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dewitt-many-worlds-1973,
author = {DeWitt, Bryce S. and Everett, Hugh and Graham, Neill},
title = {The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {1973}
}
|
|||||
| Blake, I.F. and Mullin, R.C. | The Mathematical Theory of Coding [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{blake-mathematical-2014,
author = {Blake, Ian F. and Mullin, Ronald C.},
title = {The Mathematical Theory of Coding},
publisher = {Elsevier Science},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Shannon, C.E. and Weaver, W. | The mathematical theory of communication [BibTeX] |
1964 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{shannon-mathematical-1964,
author = {Shannon, Claude E. and Weaver, Warren},
title = {The mathematical theory of communication},
publisher = {University of Illinois Press},
year = {1964}
}
|
|||||
| Calude, C.S. | The mathematical theory of information [BibTeX] |
2007 | The Mathematical Intelligencer Vol. 29(1), pp. 64-65 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{calude-mathematical-2007,
author = {Calude, Cristian S.},
title = {The mathematical theory of information},
journal = {The Mathematical Intelligencer},
year = {2007},
volume = {29},
number = {1},
pages = {64--65}
}
|
|||||
| Kåhre, J. | The Mathematical Theory of Information [BibTeX] |
2002 | (684) | book | |
BibTeX:
@book{kahre-mathematical-2002,
author = {Kåhre, Jan},
title = {The Mathematical Theory of Information},
publisher = {Springer US},
year = {2002},
number = {684}
}
|
|||||
| Tegmark, M. | The Mathematical Universe | 2008 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 38(2), pp. 101-150 |
article | |
| Abstract: I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and Gödel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Gödel’s sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems.; I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and Godel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Godel's sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems.; I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH) that there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans. I argue that with a sufficiently broad definition of mathematics, it implies the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) that our physical world is an abstract mathematical structure. I discuss various implications of the ERH and MUH, ranging from standard physics topics like symmetries, irreducible representations, units, free parameters, randomness and initial conditions to broader issues like consciousness, parallel universes and Godel incompleteness. I hypothesize that only computable and decidable (in Godel's sense) structures exist, which alleviates the cosmological measure problem and may help explain why our physical laws appear so simple. I also comment on the intimate relation between mathematical structures, computations, simulations and physical systems. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{tegmark-mathematical-2008,
author = {Tegmark, Max},
title = {The Mathematical Universe},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {2008},
volume = {38},
number = {2},
pages = {101--150}
}
|
|||||
| Einstein, A. | The Meaning of Relativity [BibTeX] |
1950 | American Journal of Physics Vol. 18(6), pp. 403-404 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{einstein-meaning-1950,
author = {Einstein, Albert},
title = {The Meaning of Relativity},
journal = {American Journal of Physics},
year = {1950},
volume = {18},
number = {6},
pages = {403--404}
}
|
|||||
| Einstein, A. | The meaning of relativity [BibTeX] |
2005 | Vol. 1921 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{einstein-meaning-2005,
author = {Einstein, Albert},
title = {The meaning of relativity},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2005},
volume = {1921},
edition = {Expand Princeton science library with a new introduction by Brian Greene, 2005}
}
|
|||||
| James, W. | The meaning of truth: a sequel to 'Pragmatism' [BibTeX] |
1909 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{james-meaning-1909,
author = {James, William},
title = {The meaning of truth: a sequel to 'Pragmatism'},
publisher = {Longmans, Green},
year = {1909}
}
|
|||||
| Handfield, T., Twardy, C.R., Korb, K.B. and Oppy, G. | The Metaphysics of Causal Models: Where's the Biff? | 2008 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 68(2), pp. 149-168 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.;This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes–of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe–into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preAtextlesstextlessmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models.;This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes–of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe–into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for causal models. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{handfield-metaphysics-2008,
author = {Handfield, Toby and Twardy, Charles R. and Korb, Kevin B. and Oppy, Graham},
title = {The Metaphysics of Causal Models: Where's the Biff?},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {2008},
volume = {68},
number = {2},
pages = {149--168}
}
|
|||||
| Dretske, F. | The metaphysics of information [BibTeX] |
2008 | book | URL | |
BibTeX:
@book{dretske-metaphysics-2008,
author = {Dretske, Fred},
title = {The metaphysics of information},
publisher = {na},
year = {2008},
url = {http://wittgensteinrepository.org/agora-ontos/article/viewFile/2065/2273}
}
|
|||||
| Ellis, B. | The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{ellis-metaphysics-2014,
author = {Ellis, Brian},
title = {The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism},
publisher = {Taylor and Francis},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Maudlin, T. | The metaphysics within physics [BibTeX] |
2007 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{maudlin-metaphysics-2007,
author = {Maudlin, Tim},
title = {The metaphysics within physics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2007}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Method of Levels of Abstraction | 2008 | Minds and Machines Vol. 18(3), pp. 303-329 |
article | |
| Abstract: The use of “levels of abstraction” in philosophical analysis (levelism) has recently come under attack. In this paper, I argue that a refined version of epistemological levelism should be retained as a fundamental method, called the method of levels of abstraction. After a brief introduction, in section “Some Definitions and Preliminary Examples” the nature and applicability of the epistemological method of levels of abstraction is clarified. In section “A Classic Application of the Method of Abstraction”, the philosophical fruitfulness of the new method is shown by using Kant’s classic discussion of the “antinomies of pure reason” as an example. In section “The Philosophy of the Method of Abstraction”, the method is further specified and supported by distinguishing it from three other forms of “levelism”: (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In that context, the problems of relativism and antirealism are also briefly addressed. The conclusion discusses some of the work that lies ahead, two potential limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems.; The use of "levels of abstraction" in philosophical analysis (levelism) has recently come under attack. In this paper, I argue that a refined version of epistemological levelism should be retained as a fundamental method, called the method of levels of abstraction. After a brief introduction, in section "Some Definitions and Preliminary Examples" the nature and applicability of the epistemological method of levels of abstraction is clarified. In section "A Classic Application of the Method of Abstraction", the philosophical fruitfulness of the new method is shown by using Kant's classic discussion of the "antinomies of pure reason" as an example. In section "The Philosophy of the Method of Abstraction", the method is further specified and supported by distinguishing it from three other forms of "levelism": (i) levels of organisation; (ii) levels of explanation and (iii) conceptual schemes. In that context, the problems of relativism and antirealism are also briefly addressed. The conclusion discusses some of the work that lies ahead, two potential limitations of the method and some results that have already been obtained by applying the method to some long-standing philosophical problems. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-method-2008,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Method of Levels of Abstraction},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2008},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {303--329}
}
|
|||||
| Braddon-Mitchell, D. | The Microstructural Causation Hypothesis | 1993 | Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 39(2), pp. 257-283 |
article | |
| Abstract: I argue against a priori objections to the view that causation may be reducible to some micro-structural process in principle discoverable by physics. I distinguish explanation from causation, and argue that the main objections to such a reduction stem from conflating these two notions. Explanation is the collection of pragmatically relevant, possibly counterfactual information about causation; and causation is to be identified in a necessary a posteriori way with whatever physical processes underwrite our explanatory claims. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{braddon-mitchell-microstructural-1993,
author = {Braddon-Mitchell, David},
title = {The Microstructural Causation Hypothesis},
journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)},
year = {1993},
volume = {39},
number = {2},
pages = {257--283}
}
|
|||||
| Dretske, F. | The Mind's Awareness of Itself [BibTeX] |
1999 | Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 95(1/2), pp. 103-124 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{dretske-minds-1999,
author = {Dretske, Fred},
title = {The Mind's Awareness of Itself},
journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
year = {1999},
volume = {95},
number = {1/2},
pages = {103--124}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism | 2009 | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 23(2), pp. 179-194 |
article | |
| Abstract: Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-modal-2009,
author = {Esfeld, Michael},
title = {The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism},
journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2009},
volume = {23},
number = {2},
pages = {179--194}
}
|
|||||
| Lear, J. | The mythic defense of justice in Plato's Republic [BibTeX] |
2003 | Connecticut Law Review Vol. 35(4), pp. 1549 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{lear-mythic-2003,
author = {Lear, Jonathan},
title = {The mythic defense of justice in Plato's Republic},
journal = {Connecticut Law Review},
year = {2003},
volume = {35},
number = {4},
pages = {1549}
}
|
|||||
| Flanagan, O.J., Block, N.J. and Güzeldere, G. | The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates [BibTeX] |
1997 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{flanagan-nature-1997,
author = {Flanagan, Owen J. and Block, Ned J. and Güzeldere, Güven},
title = {The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {1997}
}
|
|||||
| Lele, S. and Taper, M.L. | The nature of scientific evidence: statistical, philosophical, and empirical considerations [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{lele-nature-2004,
author = {Lele, Subhash and Taper, Mark L.},
title = {The nature of scientific evidence: statistical, philosophical, and empirical considerations},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
year = {2004}
}
|
|||||
| Sober, E. | The nature of selection: evolutionary theory in philosophical focus [BibTeX] |
1984 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{sober-nature-1984,
author = {Sober, Elliott},
title = {The nature of selection: evolutionary theory in philosophical focus},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {1984}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. and Penrose, R. | The nature of space and time [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hawking-nature-2010,
author = {Hawking, Stephen and Penrose, Roger},
title = {The nature of space and time},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2010},
edition = {New}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. and Penrose, R. | The Nature of Space and Time [BibTeX] |
2015 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hawking-nature-2015,
author = {Hawking, Stephen and Penrose, Roger},
title = {The Nature of Space and Time},
publisher = {Princeton University Press},
year = {2015},
edition = {With a New afterword by the authors.}
}
|
|||||
| Maudlin, T. | The Nature of the Quantum State | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: Physics uses mathematical objects to represent physical ontology. Philosophy more often discusses the status of mathematics per se rather than its use as representation. Consequently the gap between mathematical objects and the physical entities they represent becomes obscured. Indeed, these two quite things often go by the same name. The wave function would seem to be a mathematical object. Our concern as metaphysicians is the entity the function represents, which we may call the quantum state. Failure to distinguish these has sometimes led to an overly naive approach to reading off the nature of the entity represented from the structure of the mathematical representation. In particular, it has led to the idea that because the mathematical representation "lives" on a high-dimensional mathematical space, there must exist some corresponding high-dimensional real physical space. Once one appreciates the role of the wave function in the mathematical representation, this supposition is shown to be groundless. What remains is a puzzle about why one would use a function on what looks like the configuration space of a collection of particles unless the theory postulates the existence of a collection of particles. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{maudlin-nature-2013,
author = {Maudlin, Tim},
title = {The Nature of the Quantum State},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Lewens, T. | The natures of selection [BibTeX] |
2010 | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 61(2), pp. 313-333 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{lewens-natures-2010,
author = {Lewens, Tim},
title = {The natures of selection},
journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {2010},
volume = {61},
number = {2},
pages = {313--333}
}
|
|||||
| Raichle, M.E. | The neural correlates of consciousness: an analysis of cognitive skill learning [BibTeX] |
1998 | Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci Vol. 353 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{raichle-neural-1998,
author = {Raichle, M. E.},
title = {The neural correlates of consciousness: an analysis of cognitive skill learning},
journal = {Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci},
year = {1998},
volume = {353},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1998.0341},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1998.0341}
}
|
|||||
| Adams, J.H., Graham, D.I. and Jennett, B. | The neuropathology of the vegetative state after an acute brain insult [BibTeX] |
2000 | Brain Vol. 123 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{adams-neuropathology-2000,
author = {Adams, J. H. and Graham, D. I. and Jennett, B.},
title = {The neuropathology of the vegetative state after an acute brain insult},
journal = {Brain},
year = {2000},
volume = {123},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/123.7.1327},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/123.7.1327}
}
|
|||||
| Alspector-Kelly, M. | The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude | 2003 | Vol. 33(3), pp. 307-322 |
article | |
| Abstract: Arthur Fine has long advocated the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) response to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding Fine's claim to have identified a position that is neither realist nor anti-realist, critics charge that NOA, as Fine describes it, is a realist position. Alspector-Kelly endorses this criticism, with attention to the relation between NOA and Bas van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{alspector-kelly-noaers-2003,
author = {Alspector-Kelly, Marc},
title = {The NOAer's Dilemma: Constructive Empiricism and the Natural Ontological Attitude},
year = {2003},
volume = {33},
number = {3},
pages = {307--322}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S.W. | The no-boundary proposal and the arrow of time [BibTeX] |
1993 | Vistas in Astronomy Vol. 37(C), pp. 559-568 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{hawking-no-boundary-1993,
author = {Hawking, S. W.},
title = {The no-boundary proposal and the arrow of time},
journal = {Vistas in Astronomy},
year = {1993},
volume = {37},
number = {C},
pages = {559--568}
}
|
|||||
| Kuhfittig, P.K.F. and Gladney, V.D. | The no-boundary proposal via the five-dimensional Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker model | 2015 | article | ||
| Abstract: Hawking's proposal that the Universe has no temporal boundary and hence no beginning depends on the notion of imaginary time and is usually referred to as the "no-boundary proposal." This paper discusses a simple alternative approach by means of the five-dimensional Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker model. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{kuhfittig-no-boundary-2015,
author = {Kuhfittig, Peter K. F. and Gladney, Vance D.},
title = {The no-boundary proposal via the five-dimensional Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker model},
year = {2015}
}
|
|||||
| Colyvan, M. | The Ontological Commitments of Inconsistent Theories | 2008 | Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 141(1), pp. 115-123 |
article | |
| Abstract: In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.;In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.;Issue Title: Ontological Commitment In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.;In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{colyvan-ontological-2008,
author = {Colyvan, Mark},
title = {The Ontological Commitments of Inconsistent Theories},
journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
year = {2008},
volume = {141},
number = {1},
pages = {115--123}
}
|
|||||
| Anonymous | The Ontology of Spacetime II: Philosophy and foundations of physics, v. 4 | 2008 | book | ||
| Abstract: The sixteen papers collected in this volume are expanded and revised versions of talks delivered at the Second International Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime, organized by the International Society for the Advanced Study of Spacetime (John Earman, President) at Concordia University (Montreal) from 9 to 11 June 2006. Most chapters are devoted to subjects directly relating to the ontology of spacetime. This book starts with four papers that discuss the ontological status of spacetime and the processes occurring in it from a point of view that is first of all conceptual and philosophical. The focus then slightly shifts in the five papers that follow, to considerations more directly involving technical considerations from relativity theory. After this, Time, Becoming and Change take centre stage in the next five papers. This book ends with two excursions into relatively uncharted territory: a consideration of the status of Kaluza-Klein theory, and an investigation of possible relations between the nature of spacetime and condensed matter physics, respectively. This book discusses space and time in present-day physics and philosophy. It features a relatively low level of technicality and is easily accessible. It offers an introduction from scratch of the debates surrounding time. It features a broad spectrum of approaches, coherently represented. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{anonymous-ontology-2008,
author = {Anonymous},
title = {The Ontology of Spacetime II: Philosophy and foundations of physics, v. 4},
publisher = {Elsevier Science},
year = {2008}
}
|
|||||
| Edwards, C.M. | The operational approach to algebraic quantum theory I | 1970 | Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 16(3), pp. 207-230 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: Recent work of Davies and Lewis has suggested a mathematical framework in which the notion of repeated measurements on statistical physical systems can be examined. This paper is concerned with an examination of their formulation in the abstract and its application to theC*-algebra model for quantum mechanics. In particular, a study is made of the notion of the restriction of a physical system and a definition, which coincides with the usual definition in theC*-algebra model, is formulated. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{edwards-operational-1970,
author = {Edwards, C. M.},
title = {The operational approach to algebraic quantum theory I},
journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics},
year = {1970},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {207--230},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01646788},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01646788}
}
|
|||||
| Bower, J.M. | The organization of cerebellar cortical circuitry revisited: implications for function [BibTeX] |
2002 | Ann N Y Acad Sci Vol. 978 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{bower-organization-2002,
author = {Bower, J. M.},
title = {The organization of cerebellar cortical circuitry revisited: implications for function},
journal = {Ann N Y Acad Sci},
year = {2002},
volume = {978},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2002.tb07562.x},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2002.tb07562.x}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The philosophy of information [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{floridi-philosophy-2011,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The philosophy of information},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Greco, G.M., Paronitti, G., Turilli, M. and Floridi, L. | The philosophy of information a methodological point of view [BibTeX] |
2005 | CEUR Workshop Proceedings Vol. 130 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{greco-philosophy-2005,
author = {Greco, Gian M. and Paronitti, Gianluca and Turilli, Matteo and Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The philosophy of information a methodological point of view},
journal = {CEUR Workshop Proceedings},
year = {2005},
volume = {130}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The Philosophy of Information as a Conceptual Framework [BibTeX] |
2010 | , pp. 1-29 | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-philosophy-2010,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The Philosophy of Information as a Conceptual Framework},
year = {2010},
pages = {1--29}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | The philosophy of information: Ten years later [BibTeX] |
2011 | , pp. 153-170 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{floridi-philosophy-2011-1,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {The philosophy of information: Ten years later},
year = {2011},
pages = {153--170}
}
|
|||||
| Botterill, G. and Carruthers, P. | The philosophy of psychology [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{botterill-philosophy-1999,
author = {Botterill, George and Carruthers, Peter},
title = {The philosophy of psychology},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| Sarkar, S. and Pfeifer, J. | The philosophy of science: an encyclopedia [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{sarkar-philosophy-2006,
author = {Sarkar, Sahotra and Pfeifer, Jessica},
title = {The philosophy of science: an encyclopedia},
publisher = {Routledge Taylor & Francis Group},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Landauer, R. | The physical nature of information [BibTeX] |
1996 | Physics Letters A Vol. 217(4), pp. 188-193 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{landauer-physical-1996,
author = {Landauer, Rolf},
title = {The physical nature of information},
journal = {Physics Letters A},
year = {1996},
volume = {217},
number = {4},
pages = {188--193}
}
|
|||||
| Howell, R.J. | The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism vs. A Priori Physicalism | 2015 | Philosophy Compass Vol. 10(12), pp. 905-913 |
article | |
| Abstract: Both a priori physicalism and a posteriori physicalism combine a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. They agree about the metaphysical thesis: our world is wholly physical. Most agree that this requires everything that there is must be necessitated by the sort of truths described by physics. If we call the conjunction of the basic truths of physics P, all physicalists agree that P entails for any truth Q. Where they disagree is whether or not this entailment can be known a priori . The a priori physicalist says it can, the a posteriori physicalist says it cannot. Though a posteriori physicalism is probably the dominant view, it is really a surprising and somewhat unlikely stance. In this article, the nature of the view is discussed, and two arguments are presented that should cause us to look again at the potential of a priori physicalism.; Both a priori physicalism and a posteriori physicalism combine a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. They agree about the metaphysical thesis: our world is wholly physical. Most agree that this requires everything that there is must be necessitated by the sort of truths described by physics. If we call the conjunction of the basic truths of physics P, all physicalists agree that P entails for any truth Q. Where they disagree is whether or not this entailment can be known a priori. The a priori physicalist says it can, the a posteriori physicalist says it cannot. Though a posteriori physicalism is probably the dominant view, it is really a surprising and somewhat unlikely stance. In this article, the nature of the view is discussed, and two arguments are presented that should cause us to look again at the potential of a priori physicalism.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{howell-physicalists-2015,
author = {Howell, Robert J.},
title = {The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism vs. A Priori Physicalism},
journal = {Philosophy Compass},
year = {2015},
volume = {10},
number = {12},
pages = {905--913}
}
|
|||||
| Lyotard, J.-F. | The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge [BibTeX] |
1984 | Vol. 10 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{lyotard-postmodern-1984,
author = {Lyotard, Jean-François},
title = {The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge},
publisher = {Manchester University Press},
year = {1984},
volume = {10}
}
|
|||||
| Sterner, B. | The Practical Value of Biological Information for Research | 2014 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 81(2), pp. 175-194 |
article | |
| Abstract: Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall's suggestion of taking a diagnostic approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers' misplaced skepticism in the first place.; Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall’s suggestion of taking a “diagnostic” approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers’ misplaced skepticism in the first place.; Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall's suggestion of taking a "diagnostic" approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers' misplaced skepticism in the first place. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{sterner-practical-2014,
author = {Sterner, Beckett},
title = {The Practical Value of Biological Information for Research},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2014},
volume = {81},
number = {2},
pages = {175--194}
}
|
|||||
| Esfeld, M. | The primitive ontology of quantum physics: Guidelines for an assessment of the proposals | 2014 | STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS Vol. 47(1), pp. 99-106 |
article | |
| Abstract: The paper seeks to make progress from stating primitive ontology theories of quantum physics – notably Bohmian mechanics, the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory – to assessing these theories. Four criteria are set out: (a) internal coherence; (b) empirical adequacy; (c) relationship to other theories; and (d) explanatory value. The paper argues that the stock objections against these theories do not withstand scrutiny. Its focus then is on their explanatory value: they pursue different strategies to ground the textbook formalism of quantum mechanics, and they develop different explanations of quantum non-locality. In conclusion, it is argued that Bohmian mechanics offers a better prospect for making quantum non-locality intelligible than the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory.; The paper seeks to make progress from stating primitive ontology theories of quantum physics-notably Bohmian mechanics, the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory-to assessing these theories. Four criteria are set out: (a) internal coherence; (b) empirical adequacy; (c) relationship to other theories; and (d) explanatory value. The paper argues that the stock objections against these theories do not withstand scrutiny. Its focus then is on their explanatory value: they pursue different strategies to ground the textbook formalism of quantum mechanics, and they develop different explanations of quantum non-locality. In conclusion, it is argued that Bohmian mechanics offers a better prospect for making quantum non-locality intelligible than the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.; The paper seeks to make progress from stating primitive ontology theories of quantum physics notably Bohmian mechanics, the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory to assessing these theories. Four criteria are set out: (a) internal coherence; (b) empirical adequacy; (c) relationship to other theories; and (d) explanatory value. The paper argues that the stock objections against these theories do not withstand scrutiny. Its focus then is on their explanatory value: they pursue different strategies to ground the textbook formalism of quantum mechanics, and they develop different explanations of quantum non-locality. In conclusion, it is argued that Bohmian mechanics offers a better prospect for making quantum non-locality intelligible than the GRW matter density theory and the GRW flash theory. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{esfeld-primitive-2014,
author = {Esfeld, M.},
title = {The primitive ontology of quantum physics: Guidelines for an assessment of the proposals},
journal = {STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS},
year = {2014},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {99--106}
}
|
|||||
| Mashkevich, V.S. | The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Quantum Determinism | 2010 | article | ||
| Abstract: The Principle of Sufficient Reason implies determinism. An explicit indeterministic quantum jump dynamics is constructed, which may be naturally transformed into a deterministic one. A consistent application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason results in a canonical deterministic dynamics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mashkevich-principle-2010,
author = {Mashkevich, Vladimir S.},
title = {The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Quantum Determinism},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Dirac, P.A.M. | The Principles of Quantum Mechanics [BibTeX] |
1981 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dirac-principles-1981,
author = {Dirac, Paul Adrien Maurice},
title = {The Principles of Quantum Mechanics},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {1981}
}
|
|||||
| Drouet, I. and Merlin, F. | The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability [BibTeX] |
2014 | Erkenntnis | article | |
BibTeX:
@article{drouet-propensity-2014,
author = {Drouet, Isabelle and Merlin, Francesca},
title = {The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness and the Propensity Interpretation of Probability},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Stone, M.W.F. and Wolff, J. | The proper ambition of science [BibTeX] |
2013 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{stone-proper-2013,
author = {Stone, M. W. F. and Wolff, Jonathan},
title = {The proper ambition of science},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | The Prospective Stance in Realism | 2011 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 78(5), pp. 1223-1234 |
article | |
| Abstract: Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The primary aim of this article is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The primary aim of this article is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival.;Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The primary aim of this article is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{votsis-prospective-2011,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {The Prospective Stance in Realism},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2011},
volume = {78},
number = {5},
pages = {1223--1234}
}
|
|||||
| Dill, K.A., Ozkan, S.B., Shell, M.S. and Weikl, T.R. | The protein folding problem | 2008 | Vol. 37, pp. 289-316 |
inproceedings | |
| Abstract: The "protein folding problem" consists of three closely related puzzles: (a)What is the folding code? (b) What is the folding mechanism? (c) Can we predict the native structure of a protein from its amino acid sequence? Once regarded as a grand challenge, protein folding has seen great progress in recent years. Now, foldable proteins and nonbiological polymers are being designed routinely and moving toward successful applications. The structures of small proteins are now often well predicted by computer methods. And, there is now a testable explanation for how a protein can fold so quickly: A protein solves its large global optimization problem as a series of smaller local optimization problems, growing and assembling the native structure from peptide fragments, local structures first.; The "protein folding problem" consists of three closely related puzzles: (a) What is the folding code? (b) What is the folding mechanism? (c) Can we predict the native structure of a protein from its amino acid sequence? Once regarded as a grand challenge, protein folding has seen great progress in recent years. Now, foldable proteins and nonbiological polymers are being designed routinely and moving toward successful applications. The structures of small proteins are now often well predicted by computer methods. And, there is now a testable explanation for how a protein can fold so quickly: A protein solves its large global optimization problem as a series of smaller local optimization problems, growing and assembling the native structure from peptide fragments, local structures first. | |||||
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{dill-protein-2008,
author = {Dill, Ken A. and Ozkan, S. B. and Shell, M. S. and Weikl, Thomas R.},
title = {The protein folding problem},
publisher = {ANNUAL REVIEWS},
year = {2008},
volume = {37},
pages = {289--316}
}
|
|||||
| Dill, K.A., Ozkan, S.B., Shell, M.S. and Weikl, T.R. | The protein folding problem | 2008 | Annual review of biophysics Vol. 37(1), pp. 289-316 |
article | |
| Abstract: The "protein folding problem" consists of three closely related puzzles: (a) What is the folding code? (b) What is the folding mechanism? (c) Can we predict the native structure of a protein from its amino acid sequence? Once regarded as a grand challenge, protein folding has seen great progress in recent years. Now, foldable proteins and nonbiological polymers are being designed routinely and moving toward successful applications. The structures of small proteins are now often well predicted by computer methods. And, there is now a testable explanation for how a protein can fold so quickly: A protein solves its large global optimization problem as a series of smaller local optimization problems, growing and assembling the native structure from peptide fragments, local structures first. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dill-protein-2008-1,
author = {Dill, Ken A. and Ozkan, S. B. and Shell, M. S. and Weikl, Thomas R.},
title = {The protein folding problem},
journal = {Annual review of biophysics},
year = {2008},
volume = {37},
number = {1},
pages = {289--316}
}
|
|||||
| Dill, K.A., Ozkan, S.B., Weikl, T.R., Chodera, J.D. and Voelz, V.A. | The protein folding problem: when will it be solved? | 2007 | Current Opinion in Structural Biology Vol. 17(3), pp. 342-346 |
article | |
| Abstract: The protein folding problem can be viewed as three different problems: defining the thermodynamic folding code; devising a good computational structure prediction algorithm; and answering Levinthal's question regarding the kinetic mechanism of how proteins can fold so quickly. Once regarded as a grand challenge, protein folding has seen much progress in recent years. Folding codes are now being used to successfully design proteins and non-biological foldable polymers; aided by the Critical Assessment of Techniques for Structure Prediction (CASP) competition, protein structure prediction has now become quite good. Even the once-challenging Levinthal puzzle now seems to have an answer–a protein can avoid searching irrelevant conformations and fold quickly by making local independent decisions first, followed by non-local global decisions later. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dill-protein-2007,
author = {Dill, Ken A. and Ozkan, S. B. and Weikl, Thomas R. and Chodera, John D. and Voelz, Vincent A.},
title = {The protein folding problem: when will it be solved?},
journal = {Current Opinion in Structural Biology},
year = {2007},
volume = {17},
number = {3},
pages = {342--346}
}
|
|||||
| Dill, K.A. and MacCallum, J.L. | The Protein-Folding Problem, 50 Years On [BibTeX] |
2012 | Science Vol. 338(6110), pp. 1042-1046 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{dill-protein-folding-2012,
author = {Dill, Ken A. and MacCallum, Justin L.},
title = {The Protein-Folding Problem, 50 Years On},
journal = {Science},
year = {2012},
volume = {338},
number = {6110},
pages = {1042--1046}
}
|
|||||
| Hilton, D.J., Mandel, D.R. and Catellani, P. | The psychology of counterfactual thinking [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hilton-psychology-2005,
author = {Hilton, Denis J. and Mandel, David R. and Catellani, Patrizia},
title = {The psychology of counterfactual thinking},
publisher = {Routledge},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Berta, M., Christandl, M. and Renner, R. | The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem Based on One-Shot Information Theory | 2011 | Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 306(3), pp. 579-615 |
article | |
| Abstract: The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem states that any quantum channel can be simulated by an unlimited amount of shared entanglement and an amount of classical communication equal to the channel's entanglement assisted classical capacity. In this paper, we provide a new proof of this theorem, which has previously been proved by Bennett, Devetak, Harrow, Shor, and Winter. Our proof has a clear structure being based on two recent information-theoretic results: one-shot Quantum State Merging and the Post-Selection Technique for quantum channels.;The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem states that any quantum channel can be simulated by an unlimited amount of shared entanglement and an amount of classical communication equal to the channel's entanglement assisted classical capacity. In this paper, we provide a new proof of this theorem, which has previously been proved by Bennett, Devetak, Harrow, Shor, and Winter. Our proof has a clear structure being based on two recent information-theoretic results: one-shot Quantum State Merging and the Post-Selection Technique for quantum channels.;The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem states that any quantum channel can be simulated by an unlimited amount of shared entanglement and an amount of classical communication equal to the channel's entanglement assisted classical capacity. In this paper, we provide a new proof of this theorem, which has previously been proved by Bennett, Devetak, Harrow, Shor, and Winter. Our proof has a clear structure being based on two recent information-theoretic results: one-shot Quantum State Merging and the Post-Selection Technique for quantum channels.;The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem states that any quantum channel can be simulated by an unlimited amount of shared entanglement and an amount of classical communication equal to the channel’s entanglement assisted classical capacity. In this paper, we provide a new proof of this theorem, which has previously been proved by Bennett, Devetak, Harrow, Shor, and Winter. Our proof has a clear structure being based on two recent information-theoretic results: one-shot Quantum State Merging and the Post-Selection Technique for quantum channels.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{berta-quantum-2011,
author = {Berta, Mario and Christandl, Matthias and Renner, Renato},
title = {The Quantum Reverse Shannon Theorem Based on One-Shot Information Theory},
journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics},
year = {2011},
volume = {306},
number = {3},
pages = {579--615}
}
|
|||||
| Weinberg, S. | The quantum theory of fields [BibTeX] |
1995 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{weinberg-quantum-1995,
author = {Weinberg, Steven},
title = {The quantum theory of fields},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1995}
}
|
|||||
| Rugh, S.E. and Zinkernagel, H. | The quantum vacuum and the cosmological constant problem [BibTeX] |
2002 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 33(4), pp. 663-705 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{rugh-quantum-2002,
author = {Rugh, S. E. and Zinkernagel, H.},
title = {The quantum vacuum and the cosmological constant problem},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2002},
volume = {33},
number = {4},
pages = {663--705}
}
|
|||||
| Boi, L. | The quantum vacuum: a scientific and philosophical concept, from electrodynamics to string theory and the geometry of the microscopic world [BibTeX] |
2011 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{boi-quantum-2011,
author = {Boi, L.},
title = {The quantum vacuum: a scientific and philosophical concept, from electrodynamics to string theory and the geometry of the microscopic world},
publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press},
year = {2011}
}
|
|||||
| Milonni, P.W. and Eberlein, C. | The Quantum Vacuum: An Introduction to Quantum Electrodynamics [BibTeX] |
1994 | Vol. 62(12) |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{milonni-quantum-1994,
author = {Milonni, Peter W. and Eberlein, Claudia},
title = {The Quantum Vacuum: An Introduction to Quantum Electrodynamics},
year = {1994},
volume = {62},
number = {12}
}
|
|||||
| Rabbås, Ø., Emilsson, E.K., Fossheim, H., Tuominen, M. and Press, O.U. | The quest for the good life: ancient philosophers on happiness | 2015 | book | ||
| Abstract: How should I live? How can I be happy? What is happiness, really? These are perennial questions, which in recent times have become the object of diverse kinds of academic research. Ancient philosophers placed happiness at the centre of their thought, and we can trace the topic through nearly a millennium. While the centrality of the notion of happiness in ancient ethics is well known, this book is unique in that it focuses directly on this notion, as it appears in the ancient texts. Fourteen papers by an international team of scholars map the various approaches and conceptions found from the Pre-Socratics through Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic Philosophy, to the Neo-Platonists and Augustine in late antiquity. While not promising a formula that can guarantee a greater share in happiness to the reader, the book addresses questions raised by ancient thinkers that are still of deep concern to many people today: Do I have to be a morally good person in order to be happy? Are there purely external criteria for happiness such as success according to received social norms or is happiness merely a matter of an internal state of the person? How is happiness related to the stages of life and generally to time? In this book the reader will find an informed discussion of these and many other questions relating to happiness. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{rabbas-quest-2015,
author = {Rabbås, Øyvind and Emilsson, Eyjólfur K. and Fossheim, Hallvard and Tuominen, Miira and Press, Oxford University},
title = {The quest for the good life: ancient philosophers on happiness},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2015},
edition = {1st}
}
|
|||||
| O'Keefe, T. | The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25 | 2002 | Phronesis Vol. 47(2), pp. 153-186 |
article | |
| Abstract: Epicurus' "On Nature" 25 is the key text for anti-reductionist interpretations of Epicurus' philosophy of mind. In it, Epicurus is trying to argue against those, like Democritus, who say that everything occurs 'of necessity,' and in the course of this argument, he says many things that appear to conflict with an Identity Theory of Mind and with causal determinism. In this paper, I engage in a close reading of this text in order to show that it does not contain any clear statement of either a doctrine of radically emergent properties and "downwards causation" (contra David Sedley) or of the non-reducibility of the mental to the atomic (contra Julia Annas). I argue that Epicurus' main thesis is that we cannot consistently argue against our conception of ourselves as rational agents, and that it is our reason that allows us to reform our characters, control our actions, and blame and praise one another appropriately. The way that Epicurus describes the development and causal efficacy of reason in "On Nature" book 25 is consistent both with reductionism and (more surprisingly) with causal determinism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{okeefe-reductionist-2002,
author = {O'Keefe, Tim},
title = {The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument of Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25},
journal = {Phronesis},
year = {2002},
volume = {47},
number = {2},
pages = {153--186}
}
|
|||||
| Heinrich, S. | The Relativity of Existence | 2012 | article | ||
| Abstract: Despite the success of modern physics in formulating mathematical theories that can predict the outcome of experiments, we have made remarkably little progress towards answering the most fundamental question of: why is there a universe at all, as opposed to nothingness? In this paper, it is shown that this seemingly mind-boggling question has a simple logical answer if we accept that existence in the universe is nothing more than mathematical existence relative to the axioms of our universe. This premise is not baseless; it is shown here that there are indeed several independent strong logical arguments for why we should believe that mathematical existence is the only kind of existence. Moreover, it is shown that, under this premise, the answers to many other puzzling questions about our universe come almost immediately. Among these questions are: why is the universe apparently fine-tuned to be able to support life? Why are the laws of physics so elegant? Why do we have three dimensions of space and one of time, with approximate locality and causality at macroscopic scales? How can the universe be non-local and non-causal at the quantum scale? How can the laws of quantum mechanics rely on true randomness? | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{heinrich-relativity-2012,
author = {Heinrich, Stuart},
title = {The Relativity of Existence},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Edelman, G.M. | The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness [BibTeX] |
1989 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{edelman-remembered-1989,
author = {Edelman, G. M.},
title = {The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness},
publisher = {BasicBooks, Inc},
year = {1989}
}
|
|||||
| Sterelny, K. and Kitcher, P. | The Return of the Gene [BibTeX] |
1988 | The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 85(7), pp. 339-361 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{sterelny-return-1988,
author = {Sterelny, Kim and Kitcher, Philip},
title = {The Return of the Gene},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {1988},
volume = {85},
number = {7},
pages = {339--361}
}
|
|||||
| Papineau, D. | The rise of physicalism [BibTeX] |
2001 | article | ||
BibTeX:
@article{papineau-rise-2001,
author = {Papineau, David},
title = {The rise of physicalism},
year = {2001}
}
|
|||||
| Papineau, D. | The rise of physicalism [BibTeX] |
2013 | , pp. 174-208 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{papineau-rise-2013,
author = {Papineau, David},
title = {The rise of physicalism},
year = {2013},
pages = {174--208}
}
|
|||||
| Godfrey-Smith, P. | The role of information and replication in selection processes | 2001 | Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 24(3), pp. 538-538 |
article | |
| Abstract: Hull et al. argue that information and replication are both essential ingredients in any selection process, But both information and replication are found in only some selection processes, and should not be included in abstract descriptions of selection intended to help researchers discover and describe selection processes in new domains.; Hull et al. argue that information and replication are both essential ingredients in any selection process. But both information and replication are found in only some selection processes, and should not be included in abstract descriptions of selection intented to help researchers deiscover describe selection processes in new domains. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{godfrey-smith-role-2001,
author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
title = {The role of information and replication in selection processes},
journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
year = {2001},
volume = {24},
number = {3},
pages = {538--538}
}
|
|||||
| Laan, S.v.d. | The Role of Theory in Explaining Motivation for Corporate Social Disclosures: Voluntary Disclosures vs 'Solicited' Disclosures | 2009 | Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal Vol. 3(4), pp. 15A-29 |
article | |
| Abstract: Social accounting as the "universe of all possible accountings" (Gray et al, 1997, p. 328) consists of many researchable subsets. These subsets encompass diverse 'accountings' from traditional mainstream research to those considered 'alternative' accountabilities, engaging with the social and environmental aspects of corporations and the relationships between corporations and society. The focus of prior research has been whether these disclosures constitute the discharge of accountability or are part of a legitimation process. This research, however, is yet to acknowledge an emerging alternate style of corporate social disclosure, the 'solicited' disclosure. Increasingly, companies are being asked to 'account' in various forms about their interactions with and impacts on society. Non-government organisations (NGOs), regulatory agencies, ethical or socially responsible investment fund managers, ratings agencies and other interested parties are requesting social information from corporations. This shift from predominantly voluntary information provision to demanded information can be seen as a natural consequence of the increasing pressures on corporations to be 'socially responsible', particularly in light of intensified world wide attention on unethical corporate behaviour and corporate collapse.;Corporate social disclosures (CSD) are primarily voluntary in nature and subsequently provide an area forresearch into motivational aspects of disclosures. The main focus of prior research has been whethercorporate social disclosures constitute a discharge of accountability or are part of a process of legitimation.Prior research, however, ignores the emergence of an alternate style of corporate social disclosure, the‘solicited’ disclosure. Increasingly companies are requested to report on their interactions with society invarious forms. Non-government organisations (NGOs), regulatory agencies, ethical or socially responsibleinvestment fund managers and other researchers are requesting social information from corporations. Thisshift from voluntary information provision to demanded information can be viewed as a natural consequenceof the increasing pressures on corporations to be ‘responsible’, particularly in light of intensified world wideattention on unethical corporate behaviour and corporate collapse. These contemporary variants of socialdisclosure are worthy of scrutiny when considering these ‘solicited’ disclosures potentially reduce acorporation’s power in defining the scope and nature of disclosures. Two theories, which are similar andderived from the broader political economy perspective, are commonly offered as explanations of motivationsfor social disclosures. Stakeholder theory offers an explanation of accountability to stakeholders. Legitimacytheory, on the other hand, suggests voluntary disclosures are part of a process of legitimation. This paperargues that these theoretical perspectives may provide greater insights into managerial motivation fordisclosure if they are linked more explicitly to the nature of corporate social disclosure under examination:voluntary or solicited.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{laan-role-2009,
author = {Laan, Sandra van der},
title = {The Role of Theory in Explaining Motivation for Corporate Social Disclosures: Voluntary Disclosures vs 'Solicited' Disclosures},
journal = {Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal},
year = {2009},
volume = {3},
number = {4},
pages = {15A--29}
}
|
|||||
| Peacocke, A. | The sciences of complexity: a new theological resource? [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 249-281 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{peacocke-sciences-2010,
author = {Peacocke, Arthur},
title = {The sciences of complexity: a new theological resource?},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {249--281},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.012}
}
|
|||||
| Fraassen, V. and Bas, C. | The scientific image [BibTeX] |
1980 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{van-fraassen-scientific-1980,
author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.},
title = {The scientific image},
publisher = {Clarendon Press},
year = {1980}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J. | The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled [BibTeX] |
2011 | Synthese Vol. 178(1), pp. 87-98 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{ladyman-scientistic-2011,
author = {Ladyman, James},
title = {The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2011},
volume = {178},
number = {1},
pages = {87--98}
}
|
|||||
| Dawkins, R. | The selfish gene [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{dawkins-selfish-2006,
author = {Dawkins, Richard},
title = {The selfish gene},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2006},
edition = {30th anniversary}
}
|
|||||
| Brueckner, A. | The Simulation Argument Again [BibTeX] |
2008 | Analysis Vol. 68(3), pp. 224-226 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{brueckner-simulation-2008,
author = {Brueckner, Anthony},
title = {The Simulation Argument Again},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2008},
volume = {68},
number = {3},
pages = {224--226}
}
|
|||||
| Bostrom, N. | The Simulation Argument: some explanations [BibTeX] |
2009 | Analysis Vol. 69(3), pp. 458-461 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{bostrom-simulation-2009,
author = {Bostrom, Nick},
title = {The Simulation Argument: some explanations},
journal = {Analysis},
year = {2009},
volume = {69},
number = {3},
pages = {458--461}
}
|
|||||
| Ismael, J. | The situated self [BibTeX] |
2007 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{ismael-situated-2007,
author = {Ismael, Jenann},
title = {The situated self},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2007}
}
|
|||||
| Hacking, I. | The social construction of what? [BibTeX] |
1999 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hacking-social-1999,
author = {Hacking, Ian},
title = {The social construction of what?},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
year = {1999}
}
|
|||||
| Rousseau, J.-J. and Tozer, H.J. | The social contract: or, Principles of political right [BibTeX] |
1909 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{rousseau-social-1909,
author = {Rousseau, Jean-Jacques and Tozer, Henry J.},
title = {The social contract: or, Principles of political right},
publisher = {S. Sonnenschein},
year = {1909},
edition = {5th}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D., French, S. and Saatsi, J. | The structural foundations of quantum gravity [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{rickles-structural-2006,
author = {Rickles, Dean and French, Steven and Saatsi, Juha},
title = {The structural foundations of quantum gravity},
publisher = {Clarendon},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Lam, V. and Esfeld, M. | The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity | 2012 | Journal for General Philosophy of Science Vol. 43(2), pp. 243-258 |
article | |
| Abstract: The paper compares ontic structural realism in quantum physics with ontic structural realism about space-time. We contend that both quantum theory and general relativity theory support a common, contentful metaphysics of ontic structural realism. After recalling the main claim of ontic structural realism and its physical support, we point out that both in the domain of quantum theory and in the domain of general relativity theory, there are objects whose essential ways of being are certain relations so that these objects do not possess an intrinsic identity. Nonetheless, the qualitative, physical nature of these relations is in the quantum case (entanglement) fundamentally different from the classical, metrical relations treated in general relativity theory.; The paper compares ontic structural realism in quantum physics with ontic structural realism about space-time. We contend that both quantum theory and general relativity theory support a common, contentful metaphysics of ontic structural realism. After recalling the main claim of ontic structural realism and its physical support, we point out that both in the domain of quantum theory and in the domain of general relativity theory, there are objects whose essential ways of being are certain relations so that these objects do not possess an intrinsic identity. Nonetheless, the qualitative, physical nature of these relations is in the quantum case (entanglement) fundamentally different from the classical, metrical relations treated in general relativity theory.; The paper compares ontic structural realism in quantum physics with ontic structural realism about space–time. We contend that both quantum theory and general relativity theory support a common, contentful metaphysics of ontic structural realism. After recalling the main claim of ontic structural realism and its physical support, we point out that both in the domain of quantum theory and in the domain of general relativity theory, there are objects whose essential ways of being are certain relations so that these objects do not possess an intrinsic identity. Nonetheless, the qualitative, physical nature of these relations is in the quantum case (entanglement) fundamentally different from the classical, metrical relations treated in general relativity theory. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lam-structural-2012,
author = {Lam, Vincent and Esfeld, Michael},
title = {The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity},
journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
year = {2012},
volume = {43},
number = {2},
pages = {243--258}
}
|
|||||
| Chakravartty, A. | The Structuralist Conception of Objects | 2003 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70(5), pp. 867-878 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know-objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects.;This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know—objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects.;This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know-objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{chakravartty-structuralist-2003,
author = {Chakravartty, Anjan},
title = {The Structuralist Conception of Objects},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2003},
volume = {70},
number = {5},
pages = {867--878}
}
|
|||||
| McCabe, G. | The structure and interpretation of cosmology: Part I—general relativistic cosmology | 2004 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 549 - 595 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: The purpose of this work is to review, clarify, and critically analyse modern mathematical cosmology. The emphasis is upon mathematical objects and structures, rather than numerical computations. This paper concentrates on general relativistic cosmology. The opening section reviews and clarifies the Friedmann–Robertson–Walker models of general relativistic cosmology, while Section 2 deals with the spatially homogeneous models. Particular attention is paid in these opening sections to the topological and geometrical aspects of cosmological models. Section 3 explains how the mathematical formalism can be linked with astronomical observation. In particular, the informal, observational notion of the celestial sphere is given a rigorous mathematical implementation. Part II\ of this work will concentrate on inflationary cosmology and quantum cosmology. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mccabe-structure-2004,
author = {McCabe, Gordon},
title = {The structure and interpretation of cosmology: Part I—general relativistic cosmology},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics},
year = {2004},
volume = {35},
number = {4},
pages = {549 -- 595},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219804000541},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2004.05.002}
}
|
|||||
| North, J. | The Structure of a Quantum World | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: I argue that the fundamental space of a quantum mechanical world is the wave function's space. I argue for this using some very general principles that guide our inferences to the fundamental nature of a world on any fundamental physical theory. I suggest that ordinary three-dimensional space exists in such a world but is nonfundamental; it emerges from the fundamental space of the wave function. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{north-structure-2013,
author = {North, Jill},
title = {The Structure of a Quantum World},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| French, S. | The structure of the World: metaphysics and representation [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{french-structure-2014,
author = {French, Steven},
title = {The structure of the World: metaphysics and representation},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Hutter, M. | The subjective computable universe [BibTeX] |
2012 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{hutter-subjective-2012,
author = {Hutter, Marcus},
title = {The subjective computable universe},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Brady, E. | The sublime in modern philosophy: aesthetics, ethics and nature [BibTeX] |
2014 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{brady-sublime-2014,
author = {Brady, Emily},
title = {The sublime in modern philosophy: aesthetics, ethics and nature},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2014}
}
|
|||||
| Clifton, R. | The Subtleties of Entanglement and its Role in Quantum Information Theory | 2002 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 69(S3), pp. S150-S167 |
article | |
| Abstract: My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, entanglement-assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics.;My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, entanglement‐assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics.;My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, entanglement-assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics.;My aim in this paper is a modest one. I do not have any particular thesis to advance about the nature of entanglement, nor can I claim novelty for any of the material I shall discuss. My aim is simply to raise some questions about entanglement that spring naturally from certain developments in quantum information theory and are, I believe, worthy of serious consideration by philosophers of science. The main topics I discuss are different manifestations of quantum nonlocality, entanglement-assisted communication, and entanglement thermodynamics.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{clifton-subtleties-2002,
author = {Clifton, Rob},
title = {The Subtleties of Entanglement and its Role in Quantum Information Theory},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2002},
volume = {69},
number = {S3},
pages = {S150--S167}
}
|
|||||
| Bringsjord, S. | The symbol grounding problem . remains unsolved | 2015 | Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence Vol. 27(1), pp. 63-72 |
article | |
| Abstract: Taddeo and Floridi [2007. A praxical solution of the symbol grounding problem. Minds and Machines, 17, 369-389. (This paper is reprinted in Floridi, L. (2011). The philosophy of information. Oxford: Oxford University Press)] propose a solution to the symbol grounding problem (SGP). Unfortunately, their proposal, while certainly innovative, interesting and – given the acute difficulty of SGP – brave, merely shows that a class of robots can in theory connect, in some sense, the symbols it manipulates with the external world it perceives, and can, on the strength of that connection, communicate in sub-human fashion.; Taddeo and Floridi [2007. A praxical solution of the symbol grounding problem. Minds and Machines, 17, 369-389. (This paper is reprinted in Floridi, L. (2011). The philosophy of information. Oxford: Oxford University Press)] propose a solution to the symbol grounding problem (SGP). Unfortunately, their proposal, while certainly innovative, interesting and – given the acute difficulty of SGP – brave, merely shows that a class of robots can in theory connect, in some sense, the symbols it manipulates with the external world it perceives, and can, on the strength of that connection, communicate in sub-human fashion.;Taddeo and Floridi [2007. A praxical solution of the symbol grounding problem. Minds and Machines, 17, 369-389. (This paper is reprinted in Floridi, L. (2011). The philosophy of information. Oxford: Oxford University Press)] propose a solution to the symbol grounding problem (SGP). Unfortunately, their proposal, while certainly innovative, interesting and - given the acute difficulty of SGP - brave, merely shows that a class of robots can in theory connect, in some sense, the symbols it manipulates with the external world it perceives, and can, on the strength of that connection, communicate in sub-human fashion.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bringsjord-symbol-2015,
author = {Bringsjord, Selmer},
title = {The symbol grounding problem . remains unsolved},
journal = {Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2015},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
pages = {63--72}
}
|
|||||
| Hacking, I. | The taming of chance [BibTeX] |
1990 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hacking-taming-1990,
author = {Hacking, Ian},
title = {The taming of chance},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1990}
}
|
|||||
| Cristinel Stoica, O. | The Tao of It and Bit [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 51-64 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{cristinel-stoica-tao-2015,
author = {Cristinel Stoica, Ovidiu},
title = {The Tao of It and Bit},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {51--64}
}
|
|||||
| McEliece, R.J. | The theory of information and coding [BibTeX] |
2002 | Vol. 86 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{mceliece-theory-2002,
author = {McEliece, Robert J.},
title = {The theory of information and coding},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2002},
volume = {86},
edition = {2nd}
}
|
|||||
| Barbour, J.B. | The timelessness of quantum gravity: I. The evidence from the classical theory [BibTeX] |
1994 | Classical and Quantum Gravity Vol. 11(12), pp. 2853-2873 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{barbour-timelessness-1994,
author = {Barbour, Julian B.},
title = {The timelessness of quantum gravity: I. The evidence from the classical theory},
journal = {Classical and Quantum Gravity},
year = {1994},
volume = {11},
number = {12},
pages = {2853--2873}
}
|
|||||
| Barbour, J.B. | The timelessness of quantum gravity: II. The appearance of dynamics in static configurations [BibTeX] |
1994 | Classical and Quantum Gravity Vol. 11(12), pp. 2875-2897 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{barbour-timelessness-1994-2,
author = {Barbour, Julian B.},
title = {The timelessness of quantum gravity: II. The appearance of dynamics in static configurations},
journal = {Classical and Quantum Gravity},
year = {1994},
volume = {11},
number = {12},
pages = {2875--2897}
}
|
|||||
| Barbour, J. | THE TIMELESSNESS OF QUANTUM-GRAVITY .1. THE EVIDENCE FROM THE CLASSICAL-THEORY [BibTeX] |
1994 | Vol. 11(12), pp. 2853-2873 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{barbour-timelessness-1994-1,
author = {Barbour, Julian},
title = {THE TIMELESSNESS OF QUANTUM-GRAVITY .1. THE EVIDENCE FROM THE CLASSICAL-THEORY},
year = {1994},
volume = {11},
number = {12},
pages = {2853--2873}
}
|
|||||
| Bergstrom, C.T. and Rosvall, M. | The transmission sense of information | 2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 159-176 |
article | |
| Abstract: Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon's theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon's theory is only useful for developing a shallow notion of correlation, the so-called "causal sense" of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a "semantic sense," whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon's theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: a transmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon's theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence. Keywords Information * Evolution * Shannon theory * Natural selection * Entropy * Mutual information;Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon’s theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon’s theory is only useful for developing a shallow notion of correlation, the so-called “causal sense” of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a “semantic sense,” whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon’s theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: a transmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon’s theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence.;Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon’s theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon’s theory is only useful for developing a shallow notion of correlation, the so-called “causal sense” of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a “semantic sense,” whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon’s theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: atransmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon’s theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence.; Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon's theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon's theory is only useful for developing a shallow notion of correlation, the so-called "causal sense" of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a "semantic sense," whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon's theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: a transmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon's theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{bergstrom-transmission-2011,
author = {Bergstrom, Carl T. and Rosvall, Martin},
title = {The transmission sense of information},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {159--176}
}
|
|||||
| Carnap, R. | The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability [BibTeX] |
1945 | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 5(4), pp. 513-532 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{carnap-two-1945,
author = {Carnap, Rudolf},
title = {The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {1945},
volume = {5},
number = {4},
pages = {513--532}
}
|
|||||
| Chalmers, D.J. and Balog, K. | The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism | 2009 | Vol. 1, pp. 313-337 |
incollection | |
| Abstract: The Conceivability Argument – Varieties of Conceivability – A Refined Conceivability Argument – Objections – Are there Counter-examples to CP? – Conclusion;A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths and truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusions. This article views that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if one is careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic premises to modal conclusions (about necessity and possibility), and from there to ontological conclusions. Here the crucial issue is the link between the epistemic and modal domains.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{chalmers-twodimensional-2009,
author = {Chalmers, David J. and Balog, Katalin},
title = {The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2009},
volume = {1},
pages = {313--337}
}
|
|||||
| Kuhlmann, M. | The Ultimate Constituents of the Material World: In Search of an Ontology for Fundamental Physics [BibTeX] |
2010 | Vol. 37 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{kuhlmann-ultimate-2010,
author = {Kuhlmann, Meinard},
title = {The Ultimate Constituents of the Material World: In Search of an Ontology for Fundamental Physics},
publisher = {De Gruyter},
year = {2010},
volume = {37}
}
|
|||||
| Lloyd, S. | The universe as quantum computer [BibTeX] |
2012 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{lloyd-universe-2012,
author = {Lloyd, Seth},
title = {The universe as quantum computer},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Lloyd, S. | The universe as quantum computer | 2013 | article | ||
| Abstract: This article reviews the history of digital computation, and investigates just how far the concept of computation can be taken. In particular, I address the question of whether the universe itself is in fact a giant computer, and if so, just what kind of computer it is. I will show that the universe can be regarded as a giant quantum computer. The quantum computational model of the universe explains a variety of observed phenomena not encompassed by the ordinary laws of physics. In particular, the model shows that the the quantum computational universe automatically gives rise to a mix of randomness and order, and to both simple and complex systems. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lloyd-universe-2013,
author = {Lloyd, Seth},
title = {The universe as quantum computer},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Hawking, S. | The universe in a nutshell [BibTeX] |
2001 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hawking-universe-2001,
author = {Hawking, Stephen},
title = {The universe in a nutshell},
publisher = {Bantam},
year = {2001}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | The Upward Path to Structural Realism | 2005 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 72(5), pp. 1361-1372 |
article | |
| Abstract: In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos' offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];In a recent PSA paper ( ), as well as some other papers ( , , ) and a book chapter ( , Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos’ offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing.;In a recent PSA paper (2001a), as well as some other papers (1995, 2000, 2001b) and a book chapter (1999, Chapter 7), Stathis Psillos raised a number of objections against structural realism. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to evaluate part of Psillos' offence on the Russellian version of epistemic structural realism (ESR); (2) to elaborate more fully what Russellian ESR involves; and (3) to suggest improvements where it is indeed failing.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{votsis-upward-2005,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {The Upward Path to Structural Realism},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {2005},
volume = {72},
number = {5},
pages = {1361--1372}
}
|
|||||
| Harms, W.F. | The Use of Information Theory in Epistemology | 1998 | Philosophy of Science Vol. 65(3), pp. 472-501 |
article | |
| Abstract: Information theory offers a measure of "mutual information" which provides an appropriate measure of tracking efficiency for the naturalistic epistemologist.;Information theory offers a measure of "mutual information" which provides an appropriate measure of tracking efficiency for the naturalistic epistemologist. The statistical entropy on which it is based is arguably the best way of characterizing the uncertainty associated with the behavior of a system, and it is ontologically neutral. Though not appropriate for the naturalization of meaning, mutual information can serve as a measure of epistemic success independent of semantic maps and payoff structures. While not containing payoffs as terms, mutual information places both upper and lower bounds on payoffs. This constitutes a non-trivial relationship to utility.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{harms-use-1998,
author = {Harms, William F.},
title = {The Use of Information Theory in Epistemology},
journal = {Philosophy of Science},
year = {1998},
volume = {65},
number = {3},
pages = {472--501}
}
|
|||||
| Fyffe, R. | The Value of Information: Normativity, Epistemology, and LIS in Luciano Floridi | 2015 | PORTAL-LIBRARIES AND THE ACADEMY Vol. 15(2), pp. 267-286 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper is a critical reconstruction of Luciano Floridi's view of librarianship as "stewardship of a semantic environment," a view that is at odds with the dominant tradition in which library and information science (LIS) is understood as social epistemology. Floridi's work helps to explain the normative dimensions of librarianship in ways that epistemology does not, and his Philosophy of Information frames librarians' traditional stewardship role in terms appropriate for our growing involvement in the management and preservation of information through its entire life cycle. Floridi's work also helps illuminate what is coming to be called "knowledge as a commons." Librarianship is concerned with maintaining and enhancing information environments over time, environments that include the behavior of the people who create and use them. The integrity of these environments makes possible the epistemic projects of faculty, students, and other researchers, but librarianship is not, itself, epistemological. Floridi's ecological reframing of philosophy of information and information ethics, bridging the dichotomy between information and user, has a variety of implications for information literacy education and other academic library services in higher education.;This paper is a critical reconstruction of Luciano Floridi's view of librarianship as "stewardship of a semantic environment," a view that is at odds with the dominant tradition in which library and information science (LIS) is understood as social epistemology. Floridi's work helps to explain the normative dimensions of librarianship in ways that epistemology does not, and his Philosophy of Information frames librarians' traditional stewardship role in terms appropriate for our growing involvement in the management and preservation of information through its entire life cycle. Floridi's work also helps illuminate what is coming to be called "knowledge as a commons." Librarianship is concerned with maintaining and enhancing information environments over time, environments that include the behavior of the people who create and use them. The integrity of these environments makes possible the epistemic projects of faculty, students, and other researchers, but librarianship is not, itself, epistemological. Floridi's ecological reframing of philosophy of information and information ethics, bridging the dichotomy between information and user, has a variety of implications for information literacy education and other academic library services in higher education.;This paper is a critical reconstruction of Luciano Floridi's view of librarianship as "stewardship of a semantic environment," a view that is at odds with the dominant tradition in which library and information science (LIS) is understood as social epistemology. Floridi's work helps to explain the normative dimensions of librarianship in ways that epistemology does not, and his Philosophy of Information frames librarians' traditional stewardship role in terms appropriate for our growing involvement in the management and preservation of information through its entire life cycle. Floridi's work also helps illuminate what is coming to be called "knowledge as a commons." Librarianship is concerned with maintaining and enhancing information environments over time, environments that include the behavior of the people who create and use them. The integrity of these environments makes possible the epistemic projects of faculty, students, and other researchers, but librarianship is not, itself, epistemological. Floridi's ecological reframing of philosophy of information and information ethics, bridging the dichotomy between information and user, has a variety of implications for information literacy education and other academic library services in higher education.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{fyffe-value-2015,
author = {Fyffe, R.},
title = {The Value of Information: Normativity, Epistemology, and LIS in Luciano Floridi},
journal = {PORTAL-LIBRARIES AND THE ACADEMY},
year = {2015},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {267--286}
}
|
|||||
| Koons, R.C. and Bealer, G. | The waning of materialism [BibTeX] |
2010 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{koons-waning-2010,
author = {Koons, Robert C. and Bealer, George},
title = {The waning of materialism},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2010}
}
|
|||||
| Ney, A. and Albert, D.Z. | The wave function: essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics | 2013 | book | ||
| Abstract: This is a new volume of original essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The essays address questions such as: What fundamental metaphysics is best motivated by quantum mechanics? What is the ontological status of the wave function? Does quantum mechanics support the existence of any other fundamental entities, e.g. particles? What is the nature of the fundamental space (or space-time manifold) of quantum mechanics? What is the relationship between the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics and ordinary, macroscopic objects like tables, chairs, and persons? The volume includes a comprehensive introduction with a history of quantum mechanics and the debate over its metaphysical interpretation focusing especially on the main realist alternatives.;This is a new volume of original essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, in particular the ontological status of the wave function. The essays address questions such as: What fundamental metaphysics is best motivated by quantum mechanics? What is the ontological status of the wave function? Is it a substance? Is it an entity of some other ontological category? Does quantum mechanics support the existence of any other fundamental entities, for example, particles? What is the nature of the fundamental space (or space-time manifold) of quantum mechanics? What is the relationship between the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics and ordinary, macroscopic objects like tables, chairs, and persons?;This is a new volume of original essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The essays address questions such as: What fundamental metaphysics is best motivated by quantum mechanics? What is the ontological status of the wave function? What is the nature of the fundamental space (or space-time manifold) of quantum mechanics?; | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{ney-wave-2013,
author = {Ney, Alyssa and Albert, David Z.},
title = {The wave function: essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Allen, A. | The weatherman who fell down a black hole: What he can teach us about reality | 2012 | PHYSICS ESSAYS Vol. 25(1), pp. 76-82 |
article | |
| Abstract: A previous mathematical proof that the universe is not reversible in time is supplemented with a physical interpretation analogous to quantum mechanics. This is aided by three postulates from Susskind, which help to confirm that the universe consists of embedded, overlapping, nonisomorphic realities (frame-dependent experiences). These realities continually measure the universe, thereby precluding a superimposed and reversible universe. Susskind's postulates can be generalized to eliminate the twin paradox of special relativity although they are intended to conserve information despite the evaporation of black holes caused by Hawking radiation. All this is investigated by considering a weatherman who falls into a black hole. Vacuum friction and his kinetic energy allow the weatherman to report on the stretched horizon in an external reality, whereas, in his own reality, the stretched horizon vanishes in accordance with the equivalence principle of general relativity. In both realities, the weatherman's signal is lost when he reaches the horizon, making this an absolute experience. Absolute experiences distinguish the present theory from the theory of multiple universes. Because the equivalence principle is crucial for the above conclusions, it is fortunate that real observations favor the equivalence principle over the competing concept of Unruh radiation. [DOI: 10.4006/0836-1398-25.1.76]; A previous mathematical proof that the universe is not reversible in time is supplemented with a physical interpretation analogous to quantum mechanics. This is aided by three postulates from Susskind, which help to confirm that the universe consists of embedded, overlapping, nonisomorphic realities (frame-dependent experiences). These realities continually measure the universe, thereby precluding a superimposed and reversible universe. Susskind's postulates can be generalized to eliminate the twin paradox of special relativity although they are intended to conserve information despite the evaporation of black holes caused by Hawking radiation. All this is investigated by considering a weatherman who falls into a black hole. Vacuum friction and his kinetic energy allow the weatherman to report on the stretched horizon in an external reality, whereas, in his own reality, the stretched horizon vanishes in accordance with the equivalence principle of general relativity. In both realities, the weatherman's signal is lost when he reaches the horizon, making this an absolute experience. Absolute experiences distinguish the present theory from the theory of multiple universes. Because the equivalence principle is crucial for the above conclusions, it is fortunate that real observations favor the equivalence principle over the competing concept of Unruh radiation. (C) 2012 Physics Essays Publication. [DOI: 10.4006/0836-1398-25.1.76] | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{allen-weatherman-2012,
author = {Allen, AD},
title = {The weatherman who fell down a black hole: What he can teach us about reality},
journal = {PHYSICS ESSAYS},
year = {2012},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {76--82}
}
|
|||||
| Susskind, L. | The world as a hologram | 1995 | Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 36(11), pp. 6377-6396 |
article | |
| Abstract: According to ’t Hooft the combination of quantum mechanics and gravity requires the three‐dimensional world to be an image of data that can be stored on a two‐dimensional projection much like a holographic image. The two‐dimensional description only requires one discrete degree of freedom per Planck area and yet it is rich enough to describe all three‐dimensional phenomena. After outlining ’t Hooft’s proposal we give a preliminary informal description of how it may be implemented. One finds a basic requirement that particles must grow in size as their momenta are increased far above the Planck scale. The consequences for high‐energy particle collisions are described. The phenomenon of particle growth with momentum was previously discussed in the context of string theory and was related to information spreading near black hole horizons. The considerations of this paper indicate that the effect is much more rapid at all but the earliest times. In fact the rate of spreading is found to saturate the bound from causality. Finally we consider string theory as a possible realization of ’t Hooft’s idea. The light front lattice string model of Klebanov and Susskind is reviewed and its similarities with the holographic theory are demonstrated. The agreement between the two requires unproven but plausible assumptions about the nonperturbative behavior of string theory. Very similar ideas to those in this paper have long been held by Charles Thorn.; According to 't Hooft the combination of quantum mechanics and gravity requires the three-dimensional world to be an image of data that can be stored on a two-dimensional projection much like a holographic image. The two-dimensional description only requires one discrete degree of freedom per Planck area and yet it is rich enough to describe all three-dimensional phenomena. After outlining 't Hooft's proposal we give a preliminary informal description of how it may be implemented. One finds a basic requirement that particles must grow in size as their momenta are increased far above the Planck scale. The consequences for high-energy particle collisions are described. The phenomenon of particle growth with momentum was previously discussed in the context of string theory and was related to information spreading near black hole horizons. The considerations of this paper indicate that the effect is much more rapid at all but the earliest times. In fact the rate of spreading is found to saturate the bound from causality. Finally we consider string theory as a possible realization of 't Hooft's idea. The light front lattice string model of Klebanov and Susskind is reviewed and its similarities with the holographic theory are demonstrated. The agreement between the two requires unproven but plausible assumptions about the nonperturbative behavior of string theory. Very similar ideas to those in this paper have long been held by Charles Thorn. (C) 1995 American Institute of Physics. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{susskind-world-1995,
author = {Susskind, Leonard},
title = {The world as a hologram},
journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics},
year = {1995},
volume = {36},
number = {11},
pages = {6377--6396}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. | The world in the data [BibTeX] |
2013 | Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{ladyman-world-2013,
author = {Ladyman, J and Ross, D},
title = {The world in the data},
booktitle = {Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Berto, F. and Tagliabue, J. | The World Is either Digital or Analogue | 2014 | Synthese Vol. 191(3), pp. 481-497 |
article | |
| Abstract: We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151-178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens.;We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens.;We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi's Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi's argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi's view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4) (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world's having parts (Sect. 5) (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn't make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi's position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi's modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists') modus tollens.; We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151-178, 2009 ; 2011a ), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi's Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi's argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi's view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world's having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn't make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi's position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi's modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists') modus tollens.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{berto-world-2014,
author = {Berto, F. and Tagliabue, J.},
title = {The World Is either Digital or Analogue},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2014},
volume = {191},
number = {3},
pages = {481--497}
}
|
|||||
| Brüning, E. and Petruccione, F. | Theoretical foundations of quantum information processing and communication: selected topics | 2010 | Vol. 787 |
book | |
| Abstract: Based on eight extensive lectures selected from those given at the renowned Chris Engelbrecht Summer School in Theoretical Physics in South Africa, this text on the theoretical foundations of quantum information processing and communication covers an array of topics, including quantum probabilities, open systems, and non-Markovian dynamics and decoherence. It also addresses quantum information and relativity as well as testing quantum mechanics in high energy physics. Because these self-contained lectures discuss topics not typically covered in advanced undergraduate courses, they are ideal for post-graduate students entering this field of research. Some of the lectures are written at a more introductory level while others are presented as tutorials that survey recent developments and results in various subfields. | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{bruning-theoretical-2010,
author = {Brüning, Erwin and Petruccione, F.},
title = {Theoretical foundations of quantum information processing and communication: selected topics},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2010},
volume = {787}
}
|
|||||
| Kallosh, R., Orazi, E. and service) , S.(O. | Theoretical Frontiers in Black Holes and Cosmology: Theoretical Perspective in High Energy Physics [BibTeX] |
2016 | Vol. 176 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{kallosh-theoretical-2016,
author = {Kallosh, Renata and Orazi, Emanuele and service), SpringerLink (Online},
title = {Theoretical Frontiers in Black Holes and Cosmology: Theoretical Perspective in High Energy Physics},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
year = {2016},
volume = {176}
}
|
|||||
| Sporns, O., Tononi, G. and Edelman, G.M. | Theoretical neuroanatomy and the connectivity of the cerebral cortex [BibTeX] |
2002 | Behav Brain Res Vol. 135 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{sporns-theoretical-2002,
author = {Sporns, O. and Tononi, G. and Edelman, G. M.},
title = {Theoretical neuroanatomy and the connectivity of the cerebral cortex},
journal = {Behav Brain Res},
year = {2002},
volume = {135},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4328(02)00157-2},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4328(02)00157-2}
}
|
|||||
| Ibekwe-SanJuan, F. and Dousa, T.M. | Theories of Information, Communication and Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Approach | 2013 | Vol. 34 |
book | |
| Abstract: This book addresses some of the key questions that scientists have been asking themselves for centuries: what is knowledge? What is information? How do we know that we know something? How do we construct meaning from the perceptions of things? Although no consensus exists on a common definition of the concepts of information and communication, few can reject the hypothesis that information - whether perceived as « object » or as « process » - is a pre-condition for knowledge. Epistemology is the study of how we know things (anglophone meaning) or the study of how scientific knowledge is arrived at and validated (francophone conception). To adopt an epistemological stance is to commit oneself to render an account of what constitutes knowledge or in procedural terms, to render an account of when one can claim to know something. An epistemological theory imposes constraints on the interpretation of human cognitive interaction with the world. It goes without saying that different epistemological theories will have more or less restrictive criteria to distinguish what constitutes knowledge from what is not. If information is a pre-condition for knowledge acquisition, giving an account of how knowledge is acquired should impact our comprehension of information and communication as concepts. While a lot has been written on the definition of these concepts, less research has attempted to establish explicit links between differing theoretical conceptions of these concepts and the underlying epistemological stances. This is what this volume attempts to do. It offers a multidisciplinary exploration of information and communication as perceived in different disciplines and how those perceptions affect theories of knowledge.;This book addresses some of the key questions that scientists have been asking themselves for centuries: what is knowledge? What is information? How do we know that we know something? How do we construct meaning from the perceptions of things? Although no consensus exists on a common definition of the concepts of information and communication, few can reject the hypothesis that information - whether perceived as object or as process - is a pre-condition for knowledge. Epistemology is the study of how we know things (anglophone meaning) or the study of how scientific knowledge is arrived at and validated (francophone conception). To adopt an epistemological stance is to commit oneself to render an account of what constitutes knowledge or in procedural terms, to render an account of when one can claim to know something. An epistemological theory imposes constraints on the interpretation of human cognitive interaction with the world. It goes without saying that different epistemological theories will have more or less restrictive criteria to distinguish what constitutes knowledge from what is not. If information is a pre-condition for knowledge acquisition, giving an account of how knowledge is acquired should impact our comprehension of information and communication as concepts. While a lot has been written on the definition of these concepts, less research has attempted to establish explicit links between differing theoretical conceptions of these concepts and the underlying epistemological stances. This is what this volume attempts to do. It offers a multidisciplinary exploration of information and communication as perceived in different disciplines and how those perceptions affect theories of knowledge.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@book{ibekwe-sanjuan-theories-2013,
author = {Ibekwe-SanJuan, Fidelia and Dousa, Thomas M.},
title = {Theories of Information, Communication and Knowledge: A Multidisciplinary Approach},
publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
year = {2013},
volume = {34},
edition = {1;2014;}
}
|
|||||
| Schneider, T.D. | Theory of molecular machines. I. Channel capacity of molecular machines | 1991 | Journal of Theoretical Biology Vol. 148(1), pp. 83-123 |
article | |
| Abstract: Like macroscopic machines, molecular-sized machines are limited by their material components, their design, and their use of power. One of these limits is the maximum number of states that a machine can choose from. The logarithm to the base 2 of the number of states is defined to be the number of bits of information that the machine could "gain" during its operation. The maximum possible information gain is a function of the energy that a molecular machine dissipates into the surrounding medium (Py), the thermal noise energy which disturbs the machine (Ny) and the number of independently moving parts involved in the operation (dspace): Cy = dspace log2 [( Py + Ny)/Ny] bits per operation. This "machine capacity" is closely related to Shannon's channel capacity for communications systems. An important theorem that Shannon proved for communication channels also applies to molecular machines. With regard to molecular machines, the theorem states that if the amount of information which a machine gains is less than or equal to Cy, then the error rate (frequency of failure) can be made arbitrarily small by using a sufficiently complex coding of the molecular machine's operation. Thus, the capacity of a molecular machine is sharply limited by the dissipation and the thermal noise, but the machine failure rate can be reduced to whatever low level may be required for the organism to survive.;Like macroscopic machines, molecular-sized machines are limited by their material components, their design, and their use of power. One of these limits is the maximum number of states that a machine can choose from. The logarithm to the base 2 of the number of states is defined to be the number of bits of information that the machine could "gain" during its operation. The maximum possible information gain is a function of the energy that a molecular machine dissipates into the surrounding medium (Py), the thermal noise energy which disturbs the machine (Ny) and the number of independently moving parts involved in the operation (dspace): Cy = dspace log2 [( Py + Ny)/Ny] bits per operation. This "machine capacity" is closely related to Shannon's channel capacity for communications systems. An important theorem that Shannon proved for communication channels also applies to molecular machines. With regard to molecular machines, the theorem states that if the amount of information which a machine gains is less than or equal to Cy, then the error rate (frequency of failure) can be made arbitrarily small by using a sufficiently complex coding of the molecular machine's operation. Thus, the capacity of a molecular machine is sharply limited by the dissipation and the thermal noise, but the machine failure rate can be reduced to whatever low level may be required for the organism to survive.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{schneider-theory-1991,
author = {Schneider, Thomas D.},
title = {Theory of molecular machines. I. Channel capacity of molecular machines},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology},
year = {1991},
volume = {148},
number = {1},
pages = {83--123}
}
|
|||||
| Schneider, T.D. | Theory of molecular machines. II. Energy dissipation from molecular machines | 1991 | Journal of Theoretical Biology Vol. 148(1), pp. 125-137 |
article | |
| Abstract: Single molecules perform a variety of tasks in cells, from replicating, controlling and translating the genetic material to sensing the outside environment. These operations all require that specific actions take place. In a sense, each molecule must make tiny decisions. To make a decision, each "molecular machine" must dissipate an energy Py in the presence of thermal noise Ny. The number of binary decisions that can be made by a machine which has dspace independently moving parts is the "machine capacity" Cy = dspace log2 [(Py + Ny)/Ny]. This formula is closely related to Shannon's channel capacity for communications systems, C = W log2 [(P + N)/N]. This paper shows that the minimum amount of energy that a molecular machine must dissipate in order to gain one bit of information is epsilon min = kB T ln (2) joules/bit. This equation is derived in two distinct ways. The first derivation begins with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which shows that the statement that there is a minimum energy dissipation is a restatement of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The second derivation begins with the machine capacity formula, which shows that the machine capacity is also related to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. One of Shannon's theorems for communications channels is that as long as the channel capacity is not exceeded, the error rate may be made as small as desired by a sufficiently involved coding. This result also applies to the dissipation formula for molecular machines. So there is a precise upper bound on the number of choices a molecular machine can make for a given amount of energy loss. This result will be important for the design and construction of molecular computers. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{schneider-theory-1991-1,
author = {Schneider, Thomas D.},
title = {Theory of molecular machines. II. Energy dissipation from molecular machines},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology},
year = {1991},
volume = {148},
number = {1},
pages = {125--137}
}
|
|||||
| Onuchic, J.N. and Wolynes, P.G. | Theory of protein folding | 2004 | Current opinion in structural biology Vol. 14(1), pp. 70-75 |
article | |
| Abstract: Protein folding should be complex. Proteins organize themselves into specific three-dimensional structures, through a myriad of conformational changes. The classical view of protein folding describes this process as a nearly sequential series of discrete intermediates. In contrast, the energy landscape theory of folding considers folding as the progressive organization of an ensemble of partially folded structures through which the protein passes on its way to the natively folded structure. As a result of evolution, proteins have a rugged funnel-like landscape biased toward the native structure. Connecting theory and simulations of minimalist models with experiments has completely revolutionized our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that control protein folding.; Protein folding should be complex. Proteins organize themselves into specific three-dimensional structures, through a myriad of conformational changes. The classical view of protein folding describes this process as a nearly sequential series of discrete intermediates. In contrast, the energy landscape theory of folding considers folding as the progressive organization of an ensemble of partially folded structures through which the protein passes on its way to the natively folded structure. As a result of evolution, proteins have a rugged funnel-like landscape biased toward the native structure. Connecting theory and simulations of minimalist models with experiments has completely revolutionized our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that control protein folding.; Protein folding should be complex. Proteins organize themselves into specific three-dimensional structures, through a myriad of conformational changes. The classical view of protein folding describes this process as a nearly sequential series of discrete intermediates. In contrast, the energy landscape theory of folding considers folding as the progressive organization of an ensemble of partially folded structures through which the protein passes on its way to the natively folded structure. As a result of evolution, proteins have a rugged funnel-like landscape biased toward the native structure. Connecting theory and simulations of minimalist models with experiments has completely revolutionized our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that control protein folding. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{onuchic-theory-2004,
author = {Onuchic, José N. and Wolynes, Peter G.},
title = {Theory of protein folding},
journal = {Current opinion in structural biology},
year = {2004},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {70--75}
}
|
|||||
| Colyvan, M. | There is No Easy Road to Nominalism | 2010 | Mind Vol. 119(474), pp. 285-306 |
article | |
| Abstract: Hartry Field has shown us a way to be nominalists: we must purge our scientific theories of quantification over abstracta and we must prove the appropriate conservativeness results. This is not a path for the faint hearted. Indeed, the substantial technical difficulties facing Field's project have led some to explore other, easier options. Recently, Jody Azzouni, Joseph Melia, and Stephen Yablo have argued (in different ways) that it is a mistake to read our ontological commitments simply from what the quantifiers of our best scientific theories range over. In this paper, I argue that all three arguments fail and they fail for much the same reason; would-be nominalists are thus left facing Field's hard road.; Hartry Field has shown us a way to be nominalists: we must purge our scientific theories of quantification over abstracta and we must prove the appropriate conservativeness results. This is not a path for the faint hearted. Indeed, the substantial technical difficulties facing Field's project have led some to explore other, easier options. Recently, Jody Azzouni, Joseph Melia, and Stephen Yablo have argued (in different ways) that it is a mistake to read our ontological commitments simply from what the quantifiers of our best scientific theories range over. In this paper, I argue that all three arguments fail and they fail for much the same reason; would-be nominalists are thus left facing Field's hard road. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{colyvan-there-2010,
author = {Colyvan, Mark},
title = {There is No Easy Road to Nominalism},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2010},
volume = {119},
number = {474},
pages = {285--306}
}
|
|||||
| Crane, T. and Mellor, D.H. | There is No Question of Physicalism [BibTeX] |
1990 | Mind Vol. 99(394), pp. 185-206 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{crane-there-1990,
author = {Crane, Tim and Mellor, D. H.},
title = {There is No Question of Physicalism},
journal = {Mind},
year = {1990},
volume = {99},
number = {394},
pages = {185--206}
}
|
|||||
| Ludlow, P., Yujin, N. and Stoljar, D. | There's Something About Mary Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{ludlow-theres-2005,
author = {Ludlow, Peter and Yujin, Nagasaka and Stoljar, Daniel},
title = {There's Something About Mary Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument},
publisher = {MIT Press},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Zurek, W.H. | Thermodynamic cost of computation, algorithmic complexity and the information metric | 1989 | Nature Vol. 341(6238), pp. 119-124 |
article | |
| Abstract: Algorithmic complexity is a measure of randomness, which is defined without a recourse to probabilities. A study shows that algorithmic complexity sets limits on the thermodynamic costs of computations, and casts a new light on the lomitations of Maxwell's demon and can be used to define distance between binary strings.; Algorithmic complexity is a measure of randomness, which is defined without a recourse to probabilities. A study shows that algorithmic complexity sets limits on the thermodynamic costs of computations, and casts a new light on the lomitations of Maxwell's demon and can be used to define distance between binary strings.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{zurek-thermodynamic-1989,
author = {Zurek, W. H.},
title = {Thermodynamic cost of computation, algorithmic complexity and the information metric},
journal = {Nature},
year = {1989},
volume = {341},
number = {6238},
pages = {119--124}
}
|
|||||
| Fang, Y. | Thermodynamic Principle Revisited: Theory of Protein Folding | 2015 | Advances in Bioscience and Biotechnology Vol. 6(1), pp. 37-48 |
article | |
| Abstract: Anfinsen's thermodynamic hypothesis is reviewed and misunderstandings are clarified. It really should be called the thermodynamic principle of protein folding. Energy landscape is really just the mathematical graph of the Gibbs free energy function G(X; U, Ctextasciicircumsub Ntextasciicircum), a very high dimensional hyper surface. Without knowing it any picture of the Gibbs free energy landscape has no theoretical base, including that funnel shape claims. New insight given by newly obtained analytic Gibbs free energy function G (X; U, Ctextasciicircumsub Ntextasciicircum) of protein folding derived via quantum statistical mechanics are discussed. Disputes such as target-based or cause-based; what is the folding force, hydrophobic effect or hydrophilic force? Single molecule or ensemble of molecules to be used for the statistical physics study of protein folding, are discussed. Classical observations of 1970's and 1980's about global geometric characteristics of native structures of globular proteins turn out to have grabbed the essence of protein folding, but unfortunately have been largely forgotten.; Anfinsen’s thermodynamic hypothesis is reviewed and misunderstandings are clarified. It really should be called the thermodynamic principle of protein folding. Energy landscape is really just the mathematical graph of the Gibbs free energy function G(X;U ,EN), a very high dimensional hyper surface. Without knowing it any picture of the Gibbs free energy landscape has no theoretical base, including the funnel shape claims. New insight given by newly obtained analytic Gibbs free energy function G(X;U ,EN) of protein folding derived via quantum statistical mechanics are discussed. Disputes such as target-based or cause-based; what is the folding force, hydrophobic effect or hydrophilic force? Single molecule or ensemble of molecules to be used for the statistical physics study of protein folding, are discussed. Classical observations of 1970’s and 1980’s about global geometric characteristics of native structures of globular proteins turn out to have grabbed the essence of protein folding, but unfortunately have been largely forgotten.; Anfinsen's thermodynamic hypothesis is reviewed and misunderstandings are clarified. It really should be called the thermodynamic principle of protein folding. Energy landscape is really just the mathematical graph of the Gibbs free energy function G(X; U, Ctextasciicircumsub Ntextasciicircum), a very high dimensional hyper surface. Without knowing it any picture of the Gibbs free energy landscape has no theoretical base, including that funnel shape claims. New insight given by newly obtained analytic Gibbs free energy function G (X; U, Ctextasciicircumsub Ntextasciicircum) of protein folding derived via quantum statistical mechanics are discussed. Disputes such as target-based or cause-based; what is the folding force, hydrophobic effect or hydrophilic force? Single molecule or ensemble of molecules to be used for the statistical physics study of protein folding, are discussed. Classical observations of 1970's and 1980's about global geometric characteristics of native structures of globular proteins turn out to have grabbed the essence of protein folding, but unfortunately have been largely forgotten. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{fang-thermodynamic-2015,
author = {Fang, Yi},
title = {Thermodynamic Principle Revisited: Theory of Protein Folding},
journal = {Advances in Bioscience and Biotechnology},
year = {2015},
volume = {6},
number = {1},
pages = {37--48}
}
|
|||||
| Bennett, C.H., Gács, P., Li, M., Vitányi, P.M.B. and Zurek, W.H. | Thermodynamics of Computation and Information Distance [BibTeX] |
1993 | Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 21-30 | inproceedings | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{bennett-thermodynamics-1993,
author = {Bennett, Charles H. and Gács, Péter and Li, Ming and Vitányi, Paul M. B. and Zurek, Wojciech H.},
title = {Thermodynamics of Computation and Information Distance},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing},
publisher = {ACM},
year = {1993},
pages = {21--30},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/167088.167098},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1145/167088.167098}
}
|
|||||
| Tribus, M. | Thermostatics and thermodynamics: an introduction to energy, information and states of matter, with engineering applications [BibTeX] |
1961 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{tribus-thermostatics-1961,
author = {Tribus, Myron},
title = {Thermostatics and thermodynamics: an introduction to energy, information and states of matter, with engineering applications},
publisher = {Van Nostrand},
year = {1961}
}
|
|||||
| Shikano, Y. | These from Bits [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 113-118 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{shikano-these-2015,
author = {Shikano, Yutaka},
title = {These from Bits},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {113--118}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Things | 2013 | Philosophy & Technology Vol. 26(4), pp. 349-352 |
article | |
| Abstract: Issue Title: Online Security and Civil Rights | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-things-2013,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Things},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
year = {2013},
volume = {26},
number = {4},
pages = {349--352}
}
|
|||||
| Sasaki, M. and Yeom, D.-h. | Thin-shell bubbles and information loss problem in anti de Sitter background | 2014 | Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2014(12), pp. 1-16 |
article | |
| Abstract: We study the motion of thin-shell bubbles and their tunneling in anti de Sitter (AdS) background. We are interested in the case when the outside of a, shell is a, Schwarzschild-AdS space (false vacuum) and the inside of it is an AdS space with a lower vacuum energy (true vacuum). If a collapsing true vacuum bubble is created, classically it will form a Schwarzschild-AdS black hole. However, this collapsing bubble can tunnel to a bouncing bubble that moves out to spatial infinity. Then, although the classical causal structure of a collapsing true vacuum bubble has the singularity and the event horizon, quantum mechanically the wavefunction has support for a history without any singularity nor event horizon which is mediated by the non-perturbative, quantum tunneling effect. This may be regarded an explicit example that shows the unitarity of an asymptotic observer in AdS, while a classical observer who only follows the most probable history effectively lose information due to the formation of an event horizon.; We study the motion of thin-shell bubbles and their tunneling in anti de Sitter (AdS) background. We are interested in the case when the outside of a shell is a Schwarzschild-AdS space (false vacuum) and the inside of it is an AdS space with a lower vacuum energy (true vacuum). If a collapsing true vacuum bubble is created, classically it will form a Schwarzschild-AdS black hole. However, this collapsing bubble can tunnel to a bouncing bubble that moves out to spatial infinity. Then, although the classical causal structure of a collapsing true vacuum bubble has the singularity and the event horizon, quantum mechanically the wavefunction has support for a history without any singularity nor event horizon which is mediated by the non-perturbative, quantum tunneling effect. This may be regarded an explicit example that shows the unitarity of an asymptotic observer in AdS, while a classical observer who only follows the most probable history effectively lose information due to the formation of an event horizon. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{sasaki-thin-shell-2014,
author = {Sasaki, Misao and Yeom, Dong-han},
title = {Thin-shell bubbles and information loss problem in anti de Sitter background},
journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics},
year = {2014},
volume = {2014},
number = {12},
pages = {1--16}
}
|
|||||
| Boër, S.E. | Thought-Contents and the Formal Ontology of Sense | 2003 | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 32(1), pp. 43-114 |
article | |
| Abstract: This paper articulates a formal theory of belief incorporating three key theses: (1) belief is a dyadic relation between an agent and a property; (2) this property is not the belief's truth condition (i.e., the intuitively self-ascribed property which the agent must exemplify for the belief to be true) but is instead a certain abstract property (a “thought-content”) which contains a way of thinking of that truth condition; (3) for an agent a to have a belief “about” such-and-such items it is necessary that a possesses a language of thought, M a , and that a (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a sentence of M a in which there are terms that denote those objects.Employing an extended version of E. Zalta's system ILAO, the proffered theory locates thought-contents within a typed hierarchy of “senses” and their “modes of presentation”, the provisional definitions of which (suppressing complications added later to accommodate the contents of beliefs about beliefs) are as follows. A mode of presentation of e is a ternary relation of the sort [λxyz z is a name in M y that denotes x, and D e yz] in which D e is an e-determiner – a relation between agents and their mental expressions imposing a syntactico-semantic condition sufficient for such an expression to denote e therein. A sense of an entity e is an abstract property that “contains” a mode of presentation R e of e by dint of encoding its property-reduct [λx(∃y)(∃z)R e xyz]. In particular, a thought-content is a sense T of an ordinary first-order property P containing a mode of presentation whose P-determiner D P is such that, for any y and z, D P yz entails that z is a λ-abstract [ λ v S] of M y in which S is a sentence whose non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantic relations to the constituents of T's (some of which may themselves be senses).Where I a is agent a's dedicated self-demonstrative and textbarTtextbar is the mode of presentation contained in a thought-content T, the belief relation itself is then characterized as obtaining between a and T iff a( is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms the substitution instance S(I a / v) of a sentence S in M a such that textbarTtextbar(P,a,[λ v S]). The aforementioned “constituents” and “appropriate semantic relations” are formally characterized so as to permit a system of canonical descriptions for thought-contents of arbitrary complexity. These canonical descriptions are then employed to chart the nature and interrelations of belief de re, de dicto and de se and to identify the source of opacity in belief ascription.;This paper articulates a formal theory of belief incorporating three key theses: (1) belief is a dyadic relation between an agent and a property; (2) this property is not the belief's truth condition (i.e., the intuitively self-ascribed property which the agent must exemplify for the belief to be true) but is instead a certain abstract property (a "thought-content") which contains a way of thinking of that truth condition; (3) for an agent a to have a belief "about" such-and-such items it is necessary that a possesses a language of thought, , and that a (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a sentence of in which there are terms that denote those objects. Employing an extended version of E. Zalta's system ILAO, the proffered theory locates thought-contents within a typed hierarchy of "senses" and their "modes of presentation", the provisional definitions of which (suppressing complications added later to accommodate the contents of beliefs about beliefs) are as follows. A mode of presentation of e is a ternary relation of the sort [λxyz z is a name in that denotes x, and ] in which is an e-determiner - a relation between agents and their mental expressions imposing a syntactico-semantic condition sufficient for such an expression to denote e therein. A sense of an entity e is an abstract property that "contains" a mode of presentation of e by dint of encoding its property-reduct [λx(∃y)(∃z) ]. In particular, a thought-content is a sense T of an ordinary first-order property P containing a mode of presentation whose P-determiner is such that, for any y and z, entails that z is a λ-abstract [λv S] of in which S is a sentence whose non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantic relations to the constituents of T's (some of which may themselves be senses). Where is agent a's dedicated self-demonstrative and textbarTtextbar is the mode of presentation contained in a thought-content T, the belief relation itself is then characterized as obtaining between a and T iff a( is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms the substitution instance of a sentence S in such that textbarTtextbar(P, a, [λv S]). The aforementioned "constituents" and "appropriate semantic relations" are formally characterized so as to permit a system of canonical descriptions for thought-contents of arbitrary complexity. These canonical descriptions are then employed to chart the nature and interrelations of belief de re, de dicto and de se and to identify the source of opacity in belief ascription.;This paper articulates a formal theory of belief incorporating three key theses: (1) belief is a dyadic relation between an agent and a property; (2) this property is not the belief's truth condition (i.e., the intuitively self-ascribed property which the agent must exemplify for the belief to be true) but is instead a certain abstract property (a "thought-content") which contains a way of thinking of that truth condition; (3) for an agent a to have a belief "about" such-and-such items it is necessary that a possesses a language of thought, Ma, and that a (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a sentence of Ma in which there are terms that denote those objects. Employing an extended version of E. Zalta's system ILAO, the proffered theory locates thought-contents within a typed hierarchy of "senses" and their "modes of presentation", the provisional definitions of which (suppressing complications added later to accommodate the contents of beliefs about beliefs) are as follows. A mode of presentation of e is a ternary relation of the sort [λxyzz is a name in My that denotes x, and Deyz] in which De is an e-determiner - a relation between agents and their mental expressions imposing a syntactico-semantic condition sufficient for such an expression to denote e therein. A sense of an entity e is an abstract property that "contains" a mode of presentation Re of e by dint of encoding its property-reduct [λx(∃y)(∃z)Rexyz]. In particular, a thought-content is a sense T of an ordinary first-order property P containing a mode of presentation whose P-determiner DP is such that, for any y and z, DPyz entails that z is a λ-abstract [λv S] of My in which S is a sentence whose non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantic relations to the constituents of T's (some of which may themselves be senses). Where Ia is agent a's dedicated self-demonstrative and textbarTtextbar is the mode of presentation contained in a thought-content T, the belief relation itself is then characterized as obtaining between a and T iff a( is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms the substitution instance S(Ia/v) of a sentence S in Ma such that textbarTtextbar(P,a,[λv S]). The aforementioned "constituents" and "appropriate semantic relations" are formally characterized so as to permit a system of canonical descriptions for thought-contents of arbitrary complexity. These canonical descriptions are then employed to chart the nature and interrelations of belief de re, de dicto and de se and to identify the source of opacity in belief ascription.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{boer-thought-contents-2003,
author = {Boër, Steven E.},
title = {Thought-Contents and the Formal Ontology of Sense},
journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
year = {2003},
volume = {32},
number = {1},
pages = {43--114}
}
|
|||||
| Kolmogorov, A.N. | Three approaches to the quantitative definition of information [BibTeX] |
1968 | International Journal of Computer Mathematics Vol. 2(1-4), pp. 157-168 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{kolmogorov-three-1968,
author = {Kolmogorov, A. N.},
title = {Three approaches to the quantitative definition of information},
journal = {International Journal of Computer Mathematics},
year = {1968},
volume = {2},
number = {1-4},
pages = {157--168},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207166808803030},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1080/00207166808803030}
}
|
|||||
| Vitanyi, P. | Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information in an Individual Pure Quantum State [BibTeX] |
2000 | Proceedings of the 15th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pp. 263- | inproceedings | URL |
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{vitanyi-three-2000,
author = {Vitanyi, Paul},
title = {Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information in an Individual Pure Quantum State},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 15th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
year = {2000},
pages = {263--},
url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=792765.793427}
}
|
|||||
| Barbieri, M. | Three Types of Semiosis | 2009 | Biosemiotics Vol. 2(1), pp. 19-30 |
article | |
| Abstract: The existence of different types of semiosis has been recognized, so far, in two ways. It has been pointed out that different semiotic features exist in different taxa and this has led to the distinction between zoosemiosis, phytosemiosis, mycosemiosis, bacterial semiosis and the like. Another type of diversity is due to the existence of different types of signs and has led to the distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic semiosis. In all these cases, however, semiosis has been defined by the Peirce model, i.e., by the idea that the basic structure is a triad of 'sign, object and interpretant', and that interpretation is an essential component of semiosis. This model is undoubtedly applicable to animals, since it was precisely the discovery that animals are capable of interpretation that allowed Thomas Sebeok to conclude that they are also capable of semiosis. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear how far the Peirce model can be extended beyond the animal kingdom, and we already know that we cannot apply it to the cell. The rules of the genetic code have been virtually the same in all living systems and in all environments ever since the origin of life, which clearly shows that they do not depend on interpretation. Luckily, it has been pointed out that semiosis is not necessarily based on interpretation and can be defined exclusively in terms of coding. According to the 'code model', a semiotic system is made of signs, meanings and coding rules, all produced by the same codemaker, and in this form it is immediately applicable to the cell. The code model, furthermore, allows us to recognize the existence of many organic codes in living systems, and to divide them into two main types that here are referred to as manufacturing semiosis and signalling semiosis. The genetic code and the splicing codes, for example, take part in processes that actually manufacture biological objects, whereas signal transduction codes and compartment codes organize existing objects into functioning supramolecular structures. The organic codes of single cells appeared in the first three billion years of the history of life and were involved either in manufacturing semiosis or in signalling semiosis. With the origin of animals, however, a third type of semiosis came into being, a type that can be referred to as interpretive semiosis because it became closely involved with interpretation. We realize in this way that the contribution of semiosis to life was far greater than that predicted by the Peirce model, where semiosis is always a means of interpreting the world. Life is essentially about three things: (1) it is about manufacturing objects, (2) it is about organizing objects into functioning systems, and (3) it is about interpreting the world. The idea that these are all semiotic processes, tells us that life depends on semiosis much more deeply and extensively than we thought. We realize in this way that there are three distinct types of semiosis in Nature, and that they gave very different contributions to the origin and the evolution of life.;The existence of different types of semiosis has been recognized, so far, in two ways. It has been pointed out that different semiotic features exist in different taxa and this has led to the distinction between zoosemiosis, phytosemiosis, mycosemiosis, bacterial semiosis and the like. Another type of diversity is due to the existence of different types of signs and has led to the distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic semiosis. In all these cases, however, semiosis has been defined by the Peirce model, i.e., by the idea that the basic structure is a triad of ‘sign, object and interpretant’, and that interpretation is an essential component of semiosis. This model is undoubtedly applicable to animals, since it was precisely the discovery that animals are capable of interpretation that allowed Thomas Sebeok to conclude that they are also capable of semiosis. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear how far the Peirce model can be extended beyond the animal kingdom, and we already know that we cannot apply it to the cell. The rules of the genetic code have been virtually the same in all living systems and in all environments ever since the origin of life, which clearly shows that they do not depend on interpretation. Luckily, it has been pointed out that semiosis is not necessarily based on interpretation and can be defined exclusively in terms of coding. According to the ‘code model’, a semiotic system is made of signs, meanings and coding rules, all produced by the same codemaker, and in this form it is immediately applicable to the cell. The code model, furthermore, allows us to recognize the existence of many organic codes in living systems, and to divide them into two main types that here are referred to as manufacturing semiosis and signalling semiosis. The genetic code and the splicing codes, for example, take part in processes that actually manufacture biological objects, whereas signal transduction codes and compartment codes organize existing objects into functioning supramolecular structures. The organic codes of single cells appeared in the first three billion years of the history of life and were involved either in manufacturing semiosis or in signalling semiosis. With the origin of animals, however, a third type of semiosis came into being, a type that can be referred to as interpretive semiosis because it became closely involved with interpretation. We realize in this way that the contribution of semiosis to life was far greater than that predicted by the Peirce model, where semiosis is always a means of interpreting the world. Life is essentially about three things: (1) it is about manufacturing objects, (2) it is about organizing objects into functioning systems, and (3) it is about interpreting the world. The idea that these are all semiotic processes, tells us that life depends on semiosis much more deeply and extensively than we thought. We realize in this way that there are three distinct types of semiosis in Nature, and that they gave very different contributions to the origin and the evolution of life.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{barbieri-three-2009,
author = {Barbieri, Marcello},
title = {Three Types of Semiosis},
journal = {Biosemiotics},
year = {2009},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {19--30}
}
|
|||||
| Müller, M.P. and Masanes, L. | Three-dimensionality of space and the quantum bit: an information-theoretic approach | 2013 | New Journal of Physics Vol. 15(5), pp. 053040 |
article | URL |
| Abstract: It is sometimes pointed out as a curiosity that the state space of quantum two-level systems, i.e. the qubit, and actual physical space are both three-dimensional and Euclidean. In this paper, we suggest an information-theoretic analysis of this relationship, by proving a particular mathematical result: suppose that physics takes place in d spatial dimensions, and that some events happen probabilistically (not assuming quantum theory in any way). Furthermore, suppose there are systems that carry ‘minimal amounts of direction information’, interacting via some continuous reversible time evolution. We prove that this uniquely determines spatial dimension d = 3 and quantum theory on two qubits (including entanglement and unitary time evolution), and that it allows observers to infer local spatial geometry from probability measurements. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{muller-three-dimensionality-2013,
author = {Müller, Markus P. and Masanes, Lluís},
title = {Three-dimensionality of space and the quantum bit: an information-theoretic approach},
journal = {New Journal of Physics},
year = {2013},
volume = {15},
number = {5},
pages = {053040},
url = {http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/15/i=5/a=053040}
}
|
|||||
| Corda, C. | Time dependent Schrödinger equation for black hole evaporation: No information loss | 2015 | Annals of Physics Vol. 353, pp. 71-82 |
article | |
| Abstract: In 1976 S. Hawking claimed that ". Because part of the information about the state of the system is lost down the hole, the final situation is represented by a density matrix rather than a pure quantum state". 1Verbatim from Ref. [2]. This was the starting point of the popular "black hole (BH) information paradox".In a series of papers, together with collaborators, we naturally interpreted BH quasi-normal modes (QNMs) in terms of quantum levels discussing a model of excited BH somewhat similar to the historical semi-classical Bohr model of the structure of a hydrogen atom. Here we explicitly write down, for the same model, a time dependent Schrödinger equation for the system composed by Hawking radiation and BH QNMs. The physical state and the correspondent wave function are written in terms of a unitary evolution matrix instead of a density matrix. Thus, the final state results to be a pure quantum state instead of a mixed one. Hence, Hawking's claim is falsified because BHs result to be well defined quantum mechanical systems, having ordered, discrete quantum spectra, which respect 't Hooft's assumption that Schrödinger equations can be used universally for all dynamics in the universe. As a consequence, information comes out in BH evaporation in terms of pure states in a unitary time dependent evolution.In Section 4 of this paper we show that the present approach permits also to solve the entanglement problem connected with the information paradox.; In 1976 S. Hawking claimed that "Because part of the information about the state of the system is lost down the hole, the final situation is represented by a density matrix rather than a pure quantum state â[euro]. 1 1 Verbatim from Ref. [2]. This was the starting point of the popular "black hole (BH) information paradoxâ[euro]. In a series of papers, together with collaborators, we naturally interpreted BH quasi-normal modes (QNMs) in terms of quantum levels discussing a model of excited BH somewhat similar to the historical semi-classical Bohr model of the structure of a hydrogen atom. Here we explicitly write down, for the same model, a time dependent Schrödinger equation for the system composed by Hawking radiation and BH QNMs. The physical state and the correspondent wave function are written in terms of a unitary evolution matrix instead of a density matrix. Thus, the final state results to be a pure quantum state instead of a mixed one. Hence, Hawking's claim is falsified because BHs result to be well defined quantum mechanical systems, having ordered, discrete quantum spectra, which respect 't Hooft's assumption that Schrödinger equations can be used universally for all dynamics in the universe. As a consequence, information comes out in BH evaporation in terms of pure states in a unitary time dependent evolution. In Section 4 of this paper we show that the present approach permits also to solve the entanglement problem connected with the information paradox.; In 1976 S. Hawking claimed that "Because part of the information about the state of the system is lost down the hole, the final situation is represented by a density matrix rather than a pure quantum state".(1) This was the starting point of the popular "black hole (BH) information paradox". In a series of papers, together with collaborators, we naturally interpreted BH quasi-normal modes (QNMs) in terms of quantum levels discussing a model of excited BH somewhat similar to the historical semi-classical Bohr model of the structure of a hydrogen atom. Here we explicitly write down, for the same model, a time dependent Schrodinger equation for the system composed by Hawking radiation and BH QNMs. The physical state and the correspondent wave function are written in terms of a unitary evolution matrix instead of a density matrix. Thus, the final state results to be a pure quantum state instead of a mixed one. Hence, Hawking's claim is falsified because BHs result to be well defined quantum mechanical systems, having ordered, discrete quantum spectra, which respect't Hooft's assumption that Schrodinger equations can be used universally for all dynamics in the universe. As a consequence, information comes out in BH evaporation in terms of pure states in a unitary time dependent evolution. In Section 4 of this paper we show that the present approach permits also to solve the entanglement problem connected with the information paradox. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{corda-time-2015,
author = {Corda, Christian},
title = {Time dependent Schrödinger equation for black hole evaporation: No information loss},
journal = {Annals of Physics},
year = {2015},
volume = {353},
pages = {71--82}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | Time, Change, and Gauge [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 139 - 171 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-time-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {Time, Change, and Gauge},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {139 -- 171},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030076}
}
|
|||||
| Saunders, S. | Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability | 1998 | Synthese Vol. 114(3), pp. 373-404 |
article | |
| Abstract: A variety of ideas arising in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995; 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert Space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content.;A variety of ideas arising in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995; 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert Space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{saunders-time-1998,
author = {Saunders, Simon},
title = {Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {1998},
volume = {114},
number = {3},
pages = {373--404}
}
|
|||||
| Weber, Z., Hyde, D., Ripley, D., Colyvan, M. and Priest, G. | Tolerating Gluts [BibTeX] |
2014 | MIND Vol. 123(491), pp. 813-828 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{weber-tolerating-2014,
author = {Weber, Z. and Hyde, D. and Ripley, D. and Colyvan, M. and Priest, G.},
title = {Tolerating Gluts},
journal = {MIND},
year = {2014},
volume = {123},
number = {491},
pages = {813--828}
}
|
|||||
| Wilce, A. | Topological Test Spaces | 2005 | International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 44(8), pp. 1227-1238 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: A test space is the set of outcome-sets associated with a collection of experiments. This notion provides a simple mathematical framework for the study of probabilistic theories—notably, quantum mechanics—in which one is faced with incommensurable random quantities. In the case of quantum mechanics, the relevant test space, the set of orthonormal bases of a Hilbert space, carries significant topological structure. This paper inaugurates a general study of topological test spaces. Among other things, we show that any topological test space with a compact space of outcomes is of finite rank. We also generalize results of Meyer and Clifton-Kent by showing that, under very weak assumptions, any second-countable topological test space contains a dense semi-classical test space. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{wilce-topological-2005,
author = {Wilce, Alexander},
title = {Topological Test Spaces},
journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics},
year = {2005},
volume = {44},
number = {8},
pages = {1227--1238},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10773-005-4682-1},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/s10773-005-4682-1}
}
|
|||||
| Stampe, D. | Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation [BibTeX] |
1977 | Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 2(1), pp. 42-63 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{stampe-toward-1977,
author = {Stampe, Dennis},
title = {Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation},
journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},
year = {1977},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {42--63}
}
|
|||||
| Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. | Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework [BibTeX] |
2001 | Cognition Vol. 79 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{dehaene-towards-2001,
author = {Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L.},
title = {Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework},
journal = {Cognition},
year = {2001},
volume = {79},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00123-2}
}
|
|||||
| Caticha, A. | Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism | 2014 | Minds and Machines Vol. 24(1), pp. 37-70 |
article | |
| Abstract: I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main contribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information. (2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is designed through an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting framework includes as special cases both MaxEnt and Bayes’ rule. It therefore unifies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general inference scheme. I find that similar pragmatic elements are an integral part of Putnam’s internal realism, of Floridi’s informational structural realism, and also of van Fraasen’s empiricist structuralism. I conclude with the conjecture that their valuable insights can be incorporated into a single coherent doctrine—an informational pragmatic realism.; I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main contribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information. (2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is designed through an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting framework includes as special cases both MaxEnt and Bayes' rule. It therefore unifies entropic and Bayesian methods into a single general inference scheme. I find that similar pragmatic elements are an integral part of Putnam's internal realism, of Floridi's informational structural realism, and also of van Fraasen's empiricist structuralism. I conclude with the conjecture that their valuable insights can be incorporated into a single coherent doctrine-an informational pragmatic realism. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{caticha-towards-2014,
author = {Caticha, Ariel},
title = {Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2014},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {37--70}
}
|
|||||
| Hardy, L. | Towards quantum gravity: a framework for probabilistic theories with non-fixed causal structure | 2007 | Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical Vol. 40(12), pp. 3081 |
article | URL |
| Abstract: General relativity is a deterministic theory with non-fixed causal structure. Quantum theory is a probabilistic theory with fixed causal structure. In this paper, we build a framework for probabilistic theories with non-fixed causal structure. This combines the radical elements of general relativity and quantum theory. We adopt an operational methodology for the purposes of theory construction (though without committing to operationalism as a fundamental philosophy). The key idea in the construction is physical compression . A physical theory relates quantities. Thus, if we specify a sufficiently large set of quantities (this is the compressed set), we can calculate all the others. We apply three levels of physical compression. First, we apply it locally to quantities (actually probabilities) that might be measured in a particular region of spacetime. Then we consider composite regions. We find that there is a second level of physical compression for a composite region over and above the first level physical compression for the component regions. Each application of first and second level physical compression is quantified by a matrix. We find that these matrices themselves are related by the physical theory and can therefore be subject to compression. This is the third level of physical compression. The third level of physical compression gives rise to a new mathematical object which we call the causaloid. From the causaloid for a particular physical theory we can calculate everything the physical theory can calculate. This approach allows us to set up a framework for calculating probabilistic correlations in data without imposing a fixed causal structure (such as a background time). We show how to put quantum theory in this framework (thus providing a new formulation of this theory). We indicate how general relativity might be put into this framework and how the framework might be used to construct a theory of quantum gravity. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hardy-towards-2007,
author = {Hardy, Lucien},
title = {Towards quantum gravity: a framework for probabilistic theories with non-fixed causal structure},
journal = {Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical},
year = {2007},
volume = {40},
number = {12},
pages = {3081},
url = {http://stacks.iop.org/1751-8121/40/i=12/a=S12}
}
|
|||||
| Wheeler, M. | Traits, genes, and coding | 2007 | , pp. 369-399 | incollection | |
| Abstract: Genes are special biological component that contributes to an organism. However, the view that genes, or complexes of genes, code for phenotypic traits is a part of current biological orthodoxy. Coding talk about genes claims that genes are special developmental factors, and they count as being privileged causal elements in the developmental process. If the primary goal of introducing the concept of genetic coding is to single out genes as privileged causal elements in the developmental process, then it might well seem that any successful account of coding talk must have the consequence that, of the many causal factors that combine causally during development, the genes alone code for phenotypic traits. In recent years some of the most persistent critics of the idea that genes are informational entities that code for traits have come from the ranks of the developmental systems theorists. Those modifications in the components called genes-dramatically affect the structure. So it seems that if the representational theory of genes is tied to this condition, then the theory is straightforwardly undermined by the presence of developmental explanatory spread. Genes contain sequence of base pairs that are functionally redundant with respect to protein synthesis. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{wheeler-traits-2007,
author = {Wheeler, Michael},
title = {Traits, genes, and coding},
year = {2007},
pages = {369--399}
}
|
|||||
| Weikl, T.R. and Dill, K.A. | Transition-states in protein folding kinetics: the structural interpretation of Phi values | 2007 | Journal of molecular biology Vol. 365(5), pp. 1578 |
article | |
| Abstract: Phi values are experimental measures of the effects of mutations on the folding kinetics of a protein. A central question is what structural information Phi values give about the transition-state of folding. Traditionally, a Phi value is interpreted as representing the "nativeness" of a mutated residue in the transition-state. However, this interpretation is often problematic. We present here a better structural interpretation of Phi values for mutations within a given helix. Our interpretation is based on a simple physical model that distinguishes between secondary and tertiary free energy contributions of helical residues. From a linear fit of the model to experimental data, we obtain two structural parameters: the extent of helix formation in the transition-state, and the nativeness of tertiary interactions in the transition-state. We apply the model to all proteins with well-characterized helices for which more than 10 Phi values are available: protein A, CI2, and protein L. The model is simple to apply to experimental data, captures nonclassical Phi values textless0 or textgreater1 in these helices, and explains how different mutations at a given site can lead to different Phi values. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{weikl-transition-states-2007,
author = {Weikl, Thomas R. and Dill, Ken A.},
title = {Transition-states in protein folding kinetics: the structural interpretation of Phi values},
journal = {Journal of molecular biology},
year = {2007},
volume = {365},
number = {5},
pages = {1578}
}
|
|||||
| Hartley, R.V.L. | Transmission of information | 1928 | The Bell System Technical Journal Vol. 7(3), pp. 535-563 |
article | |
| Abstract: A quantitative measure of "information" is developed which is based on physical as contrasted with psychological considerations. How the rate of transmission of this information over a system is limited by the distortion resulting from storage of energy is discussed from the transient viewpoint. The relation between the transient and steady state viewpoints is reviewed. It is shown that when the storage of energy is used to restrict the steady state transmission to a limited range of frequencies the amount of information that can be transmitted is proportional to the product of the width of the frequency-range by the time it is available. Several illustrations of the application of this principle to practical systems are included. In the case of picture transmission and television the spacial variation of intensity is analyzed by a steady state method analogous to that commonly used for variations with time. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hartley-transmission-1928,
author = {Hartley, R. V. L.},
title = {Transmission of information},
journal = {The Bell System Technical Journal},
year = {1928},
volume = {7},
number = {3},
pages = {535--563}
}
|
|||||
| Buettiker, M. and Landauer, R. | TRAVERSAL TIME FOR TUNNELING [BibTeX] |
1986 | IBM Journal of Research and Development Vol. 30(5), pp. 451-454 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{buettiker-traversal-1986,
author = {Buettiker, Markus and Landauer, Rolf},
title = {TRAVERSAL TIME FOR TUNNELING},
journal = {IBM Journal of Research and Development},
year = {1986},
volume = {30},
number = {5},
pages = {451--454}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Trends in the Philosophy of Information [BibTeX] |
2008 | , pp. 113-131 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{floridi-trends-2008,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Trends in the Philosophy of Information},
year = {2008},
pages = {113--131}
}
|
|||||
| Millikan, R.G. | Troubles with Plantinga's Reading of Millikan [BibTeX] |
2013 | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 87(2), pp. 454-456 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{millikan-troubles-2013,
author = {Millikan, Ruth G.},
title = {Troubles with Plantinga's Reading of Millikan},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2013},
volume = {87},
number = {2},
pages = {454--456}
}
|
|||||
| Armstrong, D.M. | Truth and truthmakers [BibTeX] |
2004 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{armstrong-truth-2004,
author = {Armstrong, D. M.},
title = {Truth and truthmakers},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2004}
}
|
|||||
| Blackburn, S. | Truth: a guide for the perplexed [BibTeX] |
2005 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{blackburn-truth:-2005,
author = {Blackburn, Simon},
title = {Truth: a guide for the perplexed},
publisher = {Allen Lane},
year = {2005}
}
|
|||||
| Vance, C. | Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem | 2014 | Ratio Vol. 27(3), pp. 291-305 |
article | |
| Abstract: Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is either identical to, or else causally related to, the state of affairs which makes the believed proposition true. This amendment of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified by Gettier cases. In this paper, I will examine two particular recent endorsements of this solution - those from Sven Bernecker and Adrian Heathcote - and argue that truthmaker theory is not the key to solving the Gettier problem.;Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. E dmund G ettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is either identical to, or else causally related to, the state of affairs which makes the believed proposition true. This amendment of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified by G ettier cases. In this paper, I will examine two particular recent endorsements of this solution – those from S ven B ernecker and A drian H eathcote – and argue that truthmaker theory is not the key to solving the Gettier problem.; Truthmaker theory has become immensely popular in recent years. So, it is not surprising that we are beginning to see it put to work in other areas of philosophy. Recently, several philosophers have proposed that truthmaker theory is the key to solving the Gettier problem. Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as justified, true belief) was unsatisfactory. The truthmaker solution proposes that knowledge is a justified, true belief, where the source of one's justification is either identical to, or else causally related to, the state of affairs which makes the believed proposition true. This amendment of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified by Gettier cases. In this paper, I will examine two particular recent endorsements of this solution - those from Sven Bernecker and Adrian Heathcote - and argue that truthmaker theory is not the key to solving the Gettier problem. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{vance-truthmaker-2014,
author = {Vance, Chad},
title = {Truthmaker Theory Does Not Solve The Gettier Problem},
journal = {Ratio},
year = {2014},
volume = {27},
number = {3},
pages = {291--305}
}
|
|||||
| Dahlsten, O.C.O., Lercher, D. and Renner, R. | Tsirelson's bound from a generalized data processing inequality | 2012 | New Journal of Physics Vol. 14(6), pp. 063024 |
article | URL |
| Abstract: The strength of quantum correlations is bounded from above by Tsirelson's bound. We establish a connection between this bound and the fact that correlations between two systems cannot increase under local operations, a property known as the data processing inequality (DPI). More specifically, we consider arbitrary convex probabilistic theories. These can be equipped with an entropy measure that naturally generalizes the von Neumann entropy, as shown recently in Short and Wehner (2010 New J. Phys. 12 033023) and Barnum et al (2010 New J. Phys. 12 033024). We prove that if the DPI holds with respect to this generalized entropy measure then the underlying theory necessarily respects Tsirelson's bound. We, moreover, generalize this statement to any entropy measure satisfying certain minimal requirements. A consequence of our result is that not all the entropic relations used for deriving Tsirelson's bound via information causality in Pawlowski et al (2009 Nature 461 1101–4) are necessary. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{dahlsten-tsirelsons-2012,
author = {Dahlsten, Oscar C. O. and Lercher, Daniel and Renner, Renato},
title = {Tsirelson's bound from a generalized data processing inequality},
journal = {New Journal of Physics},
year = {2012},
volume = {14},
number = {6},
pages = {063024},
url = {http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/14/i=6/a=063024}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Turing's three philosophical lessons and the philosophy of information | 2012 | Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences Vol. 370(1971), pp. 3536-3542 |
article | |
| Abstract: In this article, I outline the three main philosophical lessons that we may learn from Turing's work, and how they lead to a new philosophy of information. After a brief introduction, I discuss his work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA), and his insistence that questions could be meaningfully asked only by specifying the correct LoA. I then look at his second lesson, about the sort of philosophical questions that seem to be most pressing today. Finally, I focus on the third lesson, concerning the new philosophical anthropology that owes so much to Turing's work. I then show how the lessons are learned by the philosophy of information. In the conclusion, I draw a general synthesis of the points made, in view of the development of the philosophy of information itself as a continuation of Turing's work.; In this article, I outline the three main philosophical lessons that we may learn from Turing's work, and how they lead to a new philosophy of information. After a brief introduction, I discuss his work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA), and his insistence that questions could be meaningfully asked only by specifying the correct LoA. I then look at his second lesson, about the sort of philosophical questions that seem to be most pressing today. Finally, I focus on the third lesson, concerning the new philosophical anthropology that owes so much to Turing's work. I then show how the lessons are learned by the philosophy of information. In the conclusion, I draw a general synthesis of the points made, in view of the development of the philosophy of information itself as a continuation of Turing's work. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-turings-2012,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Turing's three philosophical lessons and the philosophy of information},
journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences},
year = {2012},
volume = {370},
number = {1971},
pages = {3536--3542}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L., Taddeo, M. and Turilli, M. | Turing’s Imitation Game: Still an Impossible Challenge for All Machines and Some Judges––An Evaluation of the 2008 Loebner Contest | 2009 | Vol. 19(1), pp. 145-150 |
article | |
| Abstract: An evaluation of the 2008 Loebner contest | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-turings-2009,
author = {Floridi, Luciano and Taddeo, Mariarosaria and Turilli, Matteo},
title = {Turing’s Imitation Game: Still an Impossible Challenge for All Machines and Some Judges––An Evaluation of the 2008 Loebner Contest},
year = {2009},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {145--150}
}
|
|||||
| Floridi, L. | Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information [BibTeX] |
2003 | Minds and Machines Vol. 13(4), pp. 459-469 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{floridi-two-2003,
author = {Floridi, Luciano},
title = {Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {2003},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
pages = {459--469}
}
|
|||||
| Mitrokhin, Y. | Two faces of entropy and information in biological systems | 2014 | Journal of theoretical biology Vol. 359, pp. 192-198 |
article | |
| Abstract: The article attempts to overcome the well-known paradox of contradictions between the emerging biological organization and entropy production in biological systems. It is assumed that quality, speculative correlation between entropy and antientropy processes taking place both in the past and today in the metabolic and genetic cellular systems may be perfectly authorized for adequate description of the evolution of biological organization. So far as thermodynamic entropy itself cannot compensate for the high degree of organization which exists in the cell, we discuss the mode of conjunction of positive entropy events (mutations) in the genetic systems of the past generations and the formation of organized structures of current cells. We argue that only the information which is generated in the conditions of the information entropy production (mutations and other genome reorganization) in genetic systems of the past generations provides the physical conjunction of entropy and antientropy processes separated from each other in time generations. It is readily apparent from the requirements of the Second law of thermodynamics.; The article attempts to overcome the well-known paradox of contradictions between the emerging biological organization and entropy production in biological systems. It is assumed that quality, speculative correlation between entropy and antientropy processes taking place both in the past and today in the metabolic and genetic cellular systems may be perfectly authorized for adequate description of the evolution of biological organization. So far as thermodynamic entropy itself cannot compensate for the high degree of organization which exists in the cell, we discuss the mode of conjunction of positive entropy events (mutations) in the genetic systems of the past generations and the formation of organized structures of current cells. We argue that only the information which is generated in the conditions of the information entropy production (mutations and other genome reorganization) in genetic systems of the past generations provides the physical conjunction of entropy and antientropy processes separated from each other in time generations. It is readily apparent from the requirements of the Second law of thermodynamics. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.; The article attempts to overcome the well-known paradox of contradictions between the emerging biological organization and entropy production in biological systems. It is assumed that quality, speculative correlation between entropy and antientropy processes taking place both in the past and today in the metabolic and genetic cellular systems may be perfectly authorized for adequate description of the evolution of biological organization. So far as thermodynamic entropy itself cannot compensate for the high degree of organization which exists in the cell, we discuss the mode of conjunction of positive entropy events (mutations) in the genetic systems of the past generations and the formation of organized structures of current cells. We argue that only the information which is generated in the conditions of the information entropy production (mutations and other genome reorganization) in genetic systems of the past generations provides the physical conjunction of entropy and antientropy processes separated from each other in time generations. It is readily apparent from the requirements of the Second law of thermodynamics.; The article attempts to overcome the well-known paradox of contradictions between the emerging biological organization and entropy production in biological systems. It is assumed that quality, speculative correlation between entropy and antientropy processes taking place both in the past and today in the metabolic and genetic cellular systems may be perfectly authorized for adequate description of the evolution of biological organization. So far as thermodynamic entropy itself cannot compensate for the high degree of organization which exists in the cell, we discuss the mode of conjunction of positive entropy events (mutations) in the genetic systems of the past generations and the formation of organized structures of current cells. We argue that only the information which is generated in the conditions of the information entropy production (mutations and other genome reorganization) in genetic systems of the past generations provides the physical conjunction of entropy and antientropy processes separated from each other in time generations. It is readily apparent from the requirements of the Second law of thermodynamics. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{mitrokhin-two-2014,
author = {Mitrokhin, Y.},
title = {Two faces of entropy and information in biological systems},
journal = {Journal of theoretical biology},
year = {2014},
volume = {359},
pages = {192--198}
}
|
|||||
| Ferguson, T.M. | Two paradoxes of semantic information | 2015 | Synthese Vol. 192(11), pp. 3719-3730 |
article | |
| Abstract: Issue Title: Special Issue on Ontology & Methodology, guest edited by Benjamin C. Jantzen, Deborah G. Mayo, and Lydia Patton Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolph Carnap's classical theory of semantic information entails the counterintuitive feature that inconsistent statements convey maximal information. Theories preserving Bar-Hillel and Carnap's modal intuitions while imposing a veridicality requirement on which statements convey information–such as the theories of Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi–avoid this commitment, as inconsistent statements are deemed not information-conveying by fiat. This paper produces a pair of paradoxical statements that such "veridical-modal" theories must evaluate as both conveying and not conveying information, although Bar-Hillel and Carnap's theory accommodates these statements without inconsistency. Moreover, the paradoxes are independently interesting as the mode in which they self-refer bears on their evaluation.;Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolph Carnap's classical theory of semantic information entails the counterintuitive feature that inconsistent statements convey maximal information. Theories preserving Bar-Hillel and Carnap's modal intuitions while imposing a veridicality requirement on which statements convey information-such as the theories of Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi-avoid this commitment, as inconsistent statements are deemed not information-conveying by fiat. This paper produces a pair of paradoxical statements that such "veridical-modal" theories must evaluate as both conveying and not conveying information, although Bar-Hillel and Carnap's theory accommodates these statements without inconsistency. Moreover, the paradoxes are independently interesting as the mode in which they self-refer bears on their evaluation.;Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolph Carnap’s classical theory of semantic information entails the counterintuitive feature that inconsistent statements convey maximal information. Theories preserving Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s modal intuitions while imposing a veridicality requirement on which statements convey information—such as the theories of Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi—avoid this commitment, as inconsistent statements are deemed not information-conveying by fiat. This paper produces a pair of paradoxical statements that such “veridical-modal” theories must evaluate as both conveying and not conveying information, although Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory accommodates these statements without inconsistency. Moreover, the paradoxes are independently interesting as the mode in which they self-refer bears on their evaluation.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{ferguson-two-2015,
author = {Ferguson, Thomas M.},
title = {Two paradoxes of semantic information},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2015},
volume = {192},
number = {11},
pages = {3719--3730}
}
|
|||||
| Rocchi, P. | Ubiquity symposium: What is information?: beyond the jungle of information theories | 2011 | Ubiquity Vol. 2011(March), pp. 1-9 |
article | |
| Abstract: This fourteenth piece is inspired by a question left over from the Ubiquity Symposium entitled What is Computation? Computing saw the light as a branch of mathematics in the forties, and progressively revealed ever new aspects. Nowadays computer science exhibits many faces [gol97]. Even laymen have become aware of the broad assortment of functions achieved by systems and the prismatic nature of computing challenges [mul98]. The Ubiquity Symposium "What is Computation?" is the most recent collection of commentaries from multiple viewpoints about computing. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{rocchi-ubiquity-2011,
author = {Rocchi, Paolo},
title = {Ubiquity symposium: What is information?: beyond the jungle of information theories},
journal = {Ubiquity},
year = {2011},
volume = {2011},
number = {March},
pages = {1--9}
}
|
|||||
| Chergui, M. | Ultrafast Structural Dynamics of Biological Systems | 2012 | Comprehensive Biophysics, pp. 398 - 424 | incollection | URL |
| Abstract: In this chapter, I present the rationale for ultrafast structural studies of biological systems in the femtosecond to tens of picosecond time domain. I review the various optical methods (transient absorption, fluorescence, resonance Raman, etc.) that have been and still are used to probe ultrafast processes in biological systems. I then present the various novel ultrafast structural methods that are being implemented to probe in a direct way the structure changes in biological systems: x-ray diffraction, x-ray absorption spectroscopy, and electron diffraction and microscopy. Examples of applications are presented, dealing mainly with heme proteins but also with peptides and membranes. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{chergui-ultrafast-2012,
author = {Chergui, M.},
title = {Ultrafast Structural Dynamics of Biological Systems},
booktitle = {Comprehensive Biophysics},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2012},
pages = {398 -- 424},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123749208001235}
}
|
|||||
| Kohlas, J. and Eichenberger, C. | Uncertain information [BibTeX] |
2009 | Vol. 5363, pp. 128-160 |
inproceedings | |
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{kohlas-uncertain-2009,
author = {Kohlas, Jurg and Eichenberger, Christian},
title = {Uncertain information},
year = {2009},
volume = {5363},
pages = {128--160}
}
|
|||||
| Rastegin, A.E. | Uncertainty and certainty relations for complementary qubit observables in terms of Tsallis’ entropies | 2013 | Quantum Information Processing Vol. 12(9), pp. 2947-2963 |
article | |
| Abstract: Uncertainty relations for more than two observables have found use in quantum information, though commonly known relations pertain to a pair of observables. We present novel uncertainty and certainty relations of state-independent form for the three Pauli observables with use of the Tsallis $$\textbackslashalpha $$ -entropies. For all real $$\textbackslashalpha ın (0;1]$$ and integer $$\textbackslashalpha \textbackslashge 2$$ , lower bounds on the sum of three $$\textbackslashalpha $$ -entropies are obtained. These bounds are tight in the sense that they are always reached with certain pure states. The necessary and sufficient condition for equality is that the qubit state is an eigenstate of one of the Pauli observables. Using concavity with respect to the parameter $$\textbackslashalpha $$ , we derive approximate lower bounds for non-integer $$\textbackslashalpha ın (1;+ınfty )$$ . In the case of pure states, the developed method also allows to obtain upper bounds on the entropic sum for real $$\textbackslashalpha ın (0;1]$$ and integer $$\textbackslashalpha \textbackslashge 2$$ . For applied purposes, entropic bounds are often used with averaging over the individual entropies. Combining the obtained bounds leads to a band, in which the rescaled average $$\textbackslashalpha $$ -entropy ranges in the pure-state case. A width of this band is essentially dependent on $$\textbackslashalpha $$ . It can be interpreted as an evidence for sensitivity in quantifying the complementarity.;Uncertainty relations for more than two observables have found use in quantum information, though commonly known relations pertain to a pair of observables. We present novel uncertainty and certainty relations of state-independent form for the three Pauli observables with use of the Tsallis [alpha] -entropies. For all real [alpha] [member of] (0 1] and integer [alpha] 2 , lower bounds on the sum of three [alpha] -entropies are obtained. These bounds are tight in the sense that they are always reached with certain pure states. The necessary and sufficient condition for equality is that the qubit state is an eigenstate of one of the Pauli observables. Using concavity with respect to the parameter [alpha] , we derive approximate lower bounds for non-integer [alpha] [member of] (1 +[infinity] ) . In the case of pure states, the developed method also allows to obtain upper bounds on the entropic sum for real [alpha] [member of] (0 1] and integer [alpha] 2 . For applied purposes, entropic bounds are often used with averaging over the individual entropies. Combining the obtained bounds leads to a band, in which the rescaled average [alpha] -entropy ranges in the pure-state case. A width of this band is essentially dependent on [alpha] . It can be interpreted as an evidence for sensitivity in quantifying the complementarity.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{rastegin-uncertainty-2013,
author = {Rastegin, Alexey E.},
title = {Uncertainty and certainty relations for complementary qubit observables in terms of Tsallis’ entropies},
journal = {Quantum Information Processing},
year = {2013},
volume = {12},
number = {9},
pages = {2947--2963}
}
|
|||||
| Klir, G.J. | Uncertainty and information: foundations of generalized information theory [BibTeX] |
2006 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{klir-uncertainty-2006,
author = {Klir, George J.},
title = {Uncertainty and information: foundations of generalized information theory},
publisher = {Wiley-Interscience},
year = {2006}
}
|
|||||
| Devitt, M. | Underdetermination and Realism [BibTeX] |
2002 | Noûs Vol. 36(s1), pp. 26-50 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{devitt-underdetermination-2002,
author = {Devitt, Michael},
title = {Underdetermination and Realism},
journal = {Noûs},
year = {2002},
volume = {36},
number = {s1},
pages = {26--50}
}
|
|||||
| Worrall, J. | Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence | 2011 | Synthese Vol. 180(2), pp. 157-172 |
article | |
| Abstract: Are theories 'underdetermined by the evidence' in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised—two such 'rival' theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent 'rival' to any accepted theory would have—even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend—structural realism—such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.;Are theories 'underdetermined by the evidence' in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised–two such 'rival' theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent 'rival' to any accepted theory would have–even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend–structural realism–such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.;Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised—two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any accepted theory would have—even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend—structural realism—such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.; Issue Title: SCIENTIFIC REALISM QUO VADIS? THEORIES, STRUCTURES, UNDERDETERMINATION AND REFERENCE Are theories 'underdetermined by the evidence' in any way that should worry the scientific realist? I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so. A crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger requirement than has hitherto been recognised–two such 'rival' theories must in fact agree on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature. Given this, it is unclear how much of an impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent 'rival' to any accepted theory would have–even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in the case of the version of realism that I defend–structural realism–such a demonstration would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{worrall-underdetermination-2011,
author = {Worrall, John},
title = {Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2011},
volume = {180},
number = {2},
pages = {157--172}
}
|
|||||
| Votsis, I. | Unification: Not Just a Thing of Beauty | 2015 | Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science Vol. 30(1), pp. 97-114 |
article | |
| Abstract: There is a strong tendency in science to opt for simpler and more unified hypotheses. A view that has often been voiced is that such qualities, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful, are at best pragmatic considerations in matters of choosing between rival hypotheses. This essay offers a novel conception and an associated measure of unification, both of which are manifestly more than just pragmatic considerations. The discussion commences with a brief survey of some failed attempts to conceptualise unification. It then proceeds to an analysis of the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness, as these are essential ingredients in the proposed conception of unification and its associated measure. Roughly speaking, the notions attempt to capture the way support flows or fails to flow between the content parts of a hypothesis. Equally roughly, the more the content of a hypothesis is confirmationally connected, i.e. support flows between its content parts, the more that content is unified. Since the confirmational connectedness of two content parts is determined by purely objective matters of fact, the proposed notion and measure of unification are themselves strictly objective, i.e. not merely pragmatic. The essay concludes with a discussion of how the proposed measure handles several examples but also how it relates to the debate over measures of coherence. En la ciencia hay una marcada tendencia a preferir las hipótesis más simples y unificadas. Una opinión mantenida a menudo es que tales cualidades, aun siendo atractivas o estéticamente satisfactorias, constituyen consideraciones pragmáticas, a lo sumo, en el asunto de la elección entre teorías rivales. Este ensayo ofrece una concepción novedosa de unificación y una medida asociada a ella, ambas claramente algo más que meras consideraciones pragmáticas. La discusión comienza con un breve repaso de algunos intentos fallidos de conceptualizar la unificación. Después se analizan las nociones de conexión y desconexión confirmacional, componentes esenciales en la noción de unificación y la medida asociada que aquí se proponen. Dicho brevemente, esas nociones pretenden captar el modo en que el apoyo discurre o no entre las partes del contenido de las hipótesis. Simplificando, cuanto más conectado confirmacionalmente está el contenido de una hipótesis, más unificado está. Dado que la conectividad confirmacional de dos partes del contenido está determinada por cuestiones de hecho objetivas, la noción y la medida que propongo son también estrictamente objetivas, esto es, su valor no es meramente pragmático. El ensayo concluye con una discusión sobre cómo la medida propuesta afronta diversos ejemplos y sobre su relación con el debate sobre las diferentes medidas de coherencia.;We often hear that simplicity, explanatory power and unification, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful qualities, are at best pragmatic considerations in matters of choosing between rival hypotheses. This paper aims to offer a novel conception and an associated measure of unification, both of which are demonstrably more than just pragmatic considerations. The discussion departs from a brief survey of some failed attempts to carve out adequate conceptions of unification. It then proceeds to an analysis of the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness. Roughly speaking, these notions attempt to capture the way support propagates or fails to propagate between the content parts of a hypothesis or, equivalently, between the contents of two or more hypotheses. The two notions are instrumental in helping to tackle the problem of ad hoc, and in particular monstrous, hypotheses. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, they are essential ingredients in the proposed conception of unification and its associated measure. In simple terms, the more the content of a hypothesis (or, equivalently, the content of a set of hypotheses) is confirmationally connected the more that content is unified. Since the confirmational connectedness of two content parts is determined by purely objective matters of fact, the proposed notion and measure of unification are themselves strictly objective, i.e. not merely pragmatic considerations in matters of hypothesis choice. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the proposed measure handles real and hypothetical examples but also how it stands up to various objections.;There is a strong tendency in science to opt for simpler and more unified hypotheses. A view that has often been voiced is that such qualities, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful, are at best pragmatic considerations in matters of choosing between rival hypotheses. This essay offers a novel conception and an associated measure of unification, both of which are manifestly more than just pragmatic considerations. The discussion commences with a brief survey of some failed attempts to conceptualise unification. It then proceeds to an analysis of the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness, as these are essential ingredients in the proposed conception of unification and its associated measure. Roughly speaking, the notions attempt to capture the way support flows or fails to flow between the content parts of a hypothesis. Equally roughly, the more the content of a hypothesis is confirmationally connected, i.e. support flows between its content parts, the more that content is unified. Since the confirmational connectedness of two content parts is determined by purely objective matters of fact, the proposed notion and measure of unification are themselves strictly objective, i.e. not merely pragmatic. The essay concludes with a discussion of how the proposed measure handles several examples but also how it relates to the debate over measures of coherence.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{votsis-unification:-2015,
author = {Votsis, Ioannis},
title = {Unification: Not Just a Thing of Beauty},
journal = {Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
year = {2015},
volume = {30},
number = {1},
pages = {97--114}
}
|
|||||
| Müller, M.P., Dahlsten, O.C.O. and Vedral, V. | Unifying Typical Entanglement and Coin Tossing: on Randomization in Probabilistic Theories | 2012 | Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 316(2), pp. 441-487 |
article | DOI URL |
| Abstract: It is well-known that pure quantum states are typically almost maximally entangled, and thus have close to maximally mixed subsystems. We consider whether this is true for probabilistic theories more generally, and not just for quantum theory. We derive a formula for the expected purity of a subsystem in any probabilistic theory for which this quantity is well-defined. It applies to typical entanglement in pure quantum states, coin tossing in classical probability theory, and randomization in post-quantum theories; a simple generalization yields the typical entanglement in (anti)symmetric quantum subspaces. The formula is exact and simple, only containing the number of degrees of freedom and the information capacity of the respective systems. It allows us to generalize statistical physics arguments in a way which depends only on coarse properties of the underlying theory. The proof of the formula generalizes several randomization notions to general probabilistic theories. This includes a generalization of purity, contributing to the recent effort of finding appropriate generalized entropy measures. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{muller-unifying-2012,
author = {Müller, Markus P. and Dahlsten, Oscar C. O. and Vedral, Vlatko},
title = {Unifying Typical Entanglement and Coin Tossing: on Randomization in Probabilistic Theories},
journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics},
year = {2012},
volume = {316},
number = {2},
pages = {441--487},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00220-012-1605-x},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/s00220-012-1605-x}
}
|
|||||
| Orlitsky, A., Santhanam, N.P. and Zhang, J. | Universal compression of memoryless sources over unknown alphabets | 2004 | IEEE Transactions on Information Theory Vol. 50(7), pp. 1469-1481 |
article | |
| Abstract: It has long been known that the compression redundancy of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) strings increases to infinity as the alphabet size grows. It is also apparent that any string can be described by separately conveying its symbols, and its pattern–the order in which the symbols appear. Concentrating on the latter, we show that the patterns of i.i.d. strings over all, including infinite and even unknown, alphabets, can be compressed with diminishing redundancy, both in block and sequentially, and that the compression can be performed in linear time.;It has long been known that the compression redundancy of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) strings increases to infinity as the alphabet size grows. It is also apparent that any string can be described by separately conveying its symbols, and its pattern-the order in which the symbols appear. Concentrating on the latter, we show that the patterns of i.i.d. strings over all, including infinite and even unknown, alphabets, can be compressed with diminishing redundancy, both in block and sequentially, and that the compression can be performed in linear time. To establish these results, we show that the number of patterns is the Bell number, that the number of patterns with a given number of symbols is the Stirling number of the second kind, and that the redundancy of patterns can be bounded using results of Hardy and Ramanujan on the number of integer partitions. The results also imply an asymptotically optimal solution for the Good-Turing probability-estimation problem.; It has long been known that the compression redundancy of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) strings increases to infinity as the alphabet size grows. It is also apparent that any string can be described by separately conveying its symbols, and its pattern-the order in which the symbols appear. Concentrating on the latter, we show that the patterns of i.i.d. strings over all, including infinite and even unknown, alphabets, can be compressed with diminishing redundancy, both in block and sequentially, and that the compression can be performed in linear time. To establish these results, we show that the number of patterns is the Bell number, that the number of patterns with a given number of symbols is the Stirling number of the second kind, and that the redundancy of patterns can be bounded using results of Hardy and Ramanujan on the number of integer partitions. The results also imply an asymptotically optimal solution for the Good-Turing probability-estimation problem. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; It has long been known that the compression redundancy of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) strings increases to infinity as the alphabet size grows. It is also apparent that any string can be described by separately conveying its symbols, and its pattern-the order in which the symbols appear. Concentrating on the latter, we show that the patterns of i.i.d. strings over all, including infinite and even unknown, alphabets, can be compressed with diminishing redundancy, both in block and sequentially, and that the compression can be performed in linear time. To establish these results, we show that the number of patterns is the Bell number, that the number of patterns with a given number of symbols is the Stirling number of the second kind, and that the redundancy of patterns can be bounded using results of Hardy and Ramanujan on the number of integer partitions. The results also imply an asymptotically optimal solution for the Good-Turing probability-estimation problem. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{orlitsky-universal-2004,
author = {Orlitsky, A. and Santhanam, N. P. and Zhang, Junan},
title = {Universal compression of memoryless sources over unknown alphabets},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},
year = {2004},
volume = {50},
number = {7},
pages = {1469--1481}
}
|
|||||
| Armstrong, D.M. | Universals and scientific realism [BibTeX] |
1978 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{armstrong-universals-1978,
author = {Armstrong, D. M.},
title = {Universals and scientific realism},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1978}
}
|
|||||
| Davies, P. | Universe from bit [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 65-91 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{davies-universe-2010,
author = {Davies, Paul},
title = {Universe from bit},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {65--91},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.004}
}
|
|||||
| Mitchell, S.D. | Unsimple truths: science, complexity, and policy [BibTeX] |
2009 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{mitchell-unsimple-2009,
author = {Mitchell, Sandra D.},
title = {Unsimple truths: science, complexity, and policy},
publisher = {The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London},
year = {2009}
}
|
|||||
| Clayton, P. | Unsolved dilemmas: the concept of matter in the history of philosophy and in contemporary physics [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 38-62 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{clayton-unsolved-2010,
author = {Clayton, Philip},
title = {Unsolved dilemmas: the concept of matter in the history of philosophy and in contemporary physics},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {38--62},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.003}
}
|
|||||
| Renart, A. and Machens, C.K. | Variability in neural activity and behavior | 2014 | Current opinion in neurobiology Vol. 25, pp. 211-220 |
article | |
| Abstract: Neural activity and behavior in laboratory experiments are surprisingly variable across trials. This variability and its potential causes have been the focus of a spirited debate. Here we review recent research that has shed light on the sources of neural variability and its impact on behavior. We explain how variability may arise from incomplete knowledge about an animal's internal states and its environment. We discuss the problem of incomplete knowledge both from the experimenter's point of view and from the animal's point of view. Both view points are illustrated through several examples from the literature. We furthermore consider both mechanistic and normative models that explain how neural and behavioral variability may be linked. Finally, we review why variability may confer an adaptive advantage to organisms.;acents Insufficient knowledge by the experimenter results in neural variability. acents What counts as variability for the experimenter and for the organism may be different. acents The sources of variability can be targeted through modeling studies. acents Variability may have an adaptive functional role.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{renart-variability-2014,
author = {Renart, Alfonso and Machens, Christian K.},
title = {Variability in neural activity and behavior},
journal = {Current opinion in neurobiology},
year = {2014},
volume = {25},
pages = {211--220}
}
|
|||||
| Stampe, D. | Verificationism and a Causal Account of Meaning [BibTeX] |
1986 | Synthese Vol. 69(1), pp. 107-137 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{stampe-verificationism-1986,
author = {Stampe, Dennis},
title = {Verificationism and a Causal Account of Meaning},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {1986},
volume = {69},
number = {1},
pages = {107--137}
}
|
|||||
| Liu, K., Yin, X., Fan, X. and He, Q. | Virtual assembly with physical information: a review | 2015 | Assembly Automation Vol. 35(3), pp. 206-220 |
article | |
| Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to give a comprehensive survey on the physics-based virtual assembly (PBVA) technology in a novel perspective, to analyze current drawbacks and propose several promising future directions. Design/methodology/approach - To provide a deep insight of PBVA, a discussion of the developing context of PBVA and a comparison against constraint-based virtual assembly (CBVA) is put forward. The core elements and general structure are analyzed based on typical PBVA systems. Some common key issues as well as common drawbacks are discussed, based on which the research trend and several promising future directions are proposed. Findings - Special attention is paid to new research progresses and new ideas concerning recent development as well as new typical systems of the technology. Advantages of PBVA over CBVA are investigated. Based on the analysis of typical PBVA systems and the evolution of PBVA, the core elements of the technology and the general structure of its implementation are identified. Then, current PBVA systems are summarized and classified. After that, key issues in the technology and current drawbacks are explored in detail. Finally, promising future directions are given, including both the further perfecting of the technology and the combination with other technologies. Originality/value - The PBVA technology is put into a detailed review and analysis in a novel way, providing a better insight of both the theory and the implementation of the technology.; Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give a comprehensive survey on the physics-based virtual assembly (PBVA) technology in a novel perspective, to analyze current drawbacks and propose several promising future directions. Design/methodology/approach – To provide a deep insight of PBVA, a discussion of the developing context of PBVA and a comparison against constraint-based virtual assembly (CBVA) is put forward. The core elements and general structure are analyzed based on typical PBVA systems. Some common key issues as well as common drawbacks are discussed, based on which the research trend and several promising future directions are proposed. Findings – Special attention is paid to new research progresses and new ideas concerning recent development as well as new typical systems of the technology. Advantages of PBVA over CBVA are investigated. Based on the analysis of typical PBVA systems and the evolution of PBVA, the core elements of the technology and the general structure of its implementation are identified. Then, current PBVA systems are summarized and classified. After that, key issues in the technology and current drawbacks are explored in detail. Finally, promising future directions are given, including both the further perfecting of the technology and the combination with other technologies. Originality/value – The PBVA technology is put into a detailed review and analysis in a novel way, providing a better insight of both the theory and the implementation of the technology. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{liu-virtual-2015,
author = {Liu, Keyan and Yin, Xuyue and Fan, Xiumin and He, Qichang},
title = {Virtual assembly with physical information: a review},
journal = {Assembly Automation},
year = {2015},
volume = {35},
number = {3},
pages = {206--220}
}
|
|||||
| Nashef, H.A.M. | Virtuality and différance in the age of the hyperreal | 2016 | Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication Vol. 7(1), pp. 39-56 |
article | |
| Abstract: Jean Baudrillard sees in today’s simulation the model ‘of a real but without origin or reality: a hyperreal’. With the hyperreal, the individual is unable to distinguish what is real and what is not. In this article, I argue how the pervasiveness of media, in the form of mobile phones, tablets with their applications and social networking sites, singularly or in unison create and sustain the existence of the hyperreal. They succeed at once through an imagined call for urgency and an implosion of meaning that cannot be contained. This type of media is a priori a form of simulation, and has not only erased the boundaries that exit between the real and the unreal but has also developed as a site accountable for continual deference of the being-in-theworld, forcing on the latter a perpetual existence in the hyperreal. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{nashef-virtuality-2016,
author = {Nashef, Hania A. M.},
title = {Virtuality and différance in the age of the hyperreal},
journal = {Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication},
year = {2016},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
pages = {39--56}
}
|
|||||
| Greco, J. and Turri, J. | Virtue Epistemology [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{greco-virtue-2016,
author = {Greco, John and Turri, John},
title = {Virtue Epistemology},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Winter 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-virtue/}
}
|
|||||
| Hursthouse, R. and Pettigrove, G. | Virtue Ethics [BibTeX] |
2016 | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{hursthouse-virtue-2016,
author = {Hursthouse, Rosalind and Pettigrove, Glen},
title = {Virtue Ethics},
booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
year = {2016},
edition = {Winter 2016},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-virtue/}
}
|
|||||
| Cosmelli, D., David, O., Lachaux, J.P., Martinerie, J., Garnero, L., Renault, B. and Varela, F. | Waves of consciousness: ongoing cortical patterns during binocular rivalry [BibTeX] |
2004 | Neuroimage Vol. 23 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{cosmelli-waves-2004,
author = {Cosmelli, D. and David, O. and Lachaux, J. P. and Martinerie, J. and Garnero, L. and Renault, B. and Varela, F.},
title = {Waves of consciousness: ongoing cortical patterns during binocular rivalry},
journal = {Neuroimage},
year = {2004},
volume = {23},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.05.008},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.05.008}
}
|
|||||
| Melia, J. | Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument | 2000 | Mind Vol. 109(435), pp. 455-479 |
article | |
| Abstract: According to the indispensability argument, the fact that we quantify over numbers, sets and functions in our best scientific theories gives us reason for believing that such objects exist. I examine a strategy to dispense with such quantification by simply replacing any given platonistic theory by the set of sentences in the nominalist vocabulary it logically entails. I argue that, as a strategy, this response fails: for there is no guarantee that the nominalist content of the platonistic theory is exhausted by this set of sentences. Indeed, there are platonistic theories that have consequences for the nominalist world that go beyond the set of sentences in the nominalist language such theories entail. However, I argue that what such theories show is that mathematics can enable us to express possibilities about the concrete world that may not be expressible in nominalistically acceptable language. While I grant that this may make quantification over abstracta indispensable, I deny that such indispensability is a reason for accepting them into our ontology. I urge that the nominalist should be allowed to quantify over abstracta whilst denying their existence and I explain how this apparently contradictory practice (a practice I call "weaseling") is in fact coherent, unproblematic and rational. Finally, I examine the view that platonistic theories are simpler or more attractive than their nominalistic reformulations, and thus that abstracta ought to be accepted into our ontology for the-same sorts of reasons as other theoretical objects. I argue that, at least in the case of numbers, functions and sets, such arguments misunderstand the kind of simplicity and attractiveness we seek. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{melia-weaseling-2000,
author = {Melia, Joseph},
title = {Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument},
journal = {Mind},
year = {2000},
volume = {109},
number = {435},
pages = {455--479}
}
|
|||||
| Markosian, N. | What are Physical Objects? | 2000 | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 61(2), pp. 375-395 |
article | |
| Abstract: The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account of physical objects that I recommend-the Spatial Location Account-defines physical objects as objects with spatial locations. The intuitive idea behind the Spatial Location Account is this Objects from all of the different ontological categories-physical objects; non-physical objects like souls, if there are any; propositions; universals; etc.-have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e., the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects.; The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. The account of physical objects that I recommend-the Spatial Location Account-defines physical objects as objects with spatial locations. The intuitive idea behind the Spatial Location Account is this. Objects from all of the different ontological categories-physical objects; non-physical objects like souls, if there are any; propositions; universals; etc.-have this much in common: they all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. The ones that exist in time and space, i.e., the ones that have spatial locations, are the ones that count as physical objects. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{markosian-what-2000,
author = {Markosian, Ned},
title = {What are Physical Objects?},
journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
year = {2000},
volume = {61},
number = {2},
pages = {375--395}
}
|
|||||
| Ismael, J. | What Chances Could Not Be [BibTeX] |
1996 | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 47(1), pp. 79-91 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{ismael-what-1996,
author = {Ismael, Jenann},
title = {What Chances Could Not Be},
journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
year = {1996},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {79--91}
}
|
|||||
| Ladyman, J. | What does it mean to say that a physical system implements a computation? | 2009 | Theoretical Computer Science Vol. 410(4), pp. 376-383 |
article | |
| Abstract: When we are concerned with the logical form of a computation and its formal properties, then it can be theoretically described in terms of mathematical and logical functions and relations between abstract entities. However, actual computation is realised by some physical process, and the latter is of course subject to physical laws and the laws of thermodynamics in particular. An issue that has been the subject of much controversy is that of whether or not there are any systematic connections between the logical properties of computations considered abstractly and the thermodynamical properties of their concrete physical realizations. Landauer [R. Landauer, Irreversibility and heat generation in the computing process, IBM Journal of Research and Development 5 (1961) 183-191. Reprinted in Leff and Rex (1990)] proposed such a general connection, known as Landauer's Principle. To resolve this matter an analysis of the notion of the implementation of a computation by a physical system is clearly required. Another issue that calls for an analysis of implementation is that of realism about computation. The account of implementation presented here is based on the notion of an L-machine. This is a hybrid physical-logical entity that combines a physical device, a specification of which physical states of that device correspond to various logical states, and an evolution of that device which corresponds to the logical transformation L. The most general form of Landauer's Principle can be precisely stated in terms of L-machines, namely that the logical irreversibility of L implies the thermodynamic irreversibility of every corresponding L-machine. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.; When we are concerned with the logical form of a computation and its formal properties, then it can be theoretically described in terms of mathematical and logical functions and relations between abstract entities. However, actual computation is realised by some physical process, and the latter is of course subject to physical laws and the laws of thermodynamics in Particular. An issue that has been the subject of much controversy is that of whether or not there are any systematic connections between the logical properties of computations considered abstractly and the thermodynamical properties of their concrete physical realizations. Landauer [R. Landauer, Irreversibility and heat generation in the computing process, IBM journal of Research and Development 5 (1961) 183-191. Reprinted in Leff and Rex (1990)] proposed such a general connection, known as Landauer's Principle. To resolve this matter an analysis of the notion of the implementation of a computation by a physical system is clearly required. Another issue that calls for an analysis of implementation is that of realism about computation. The account of implementation presented here is based on the notion of an L-machine. This is a hybrid physical-logical entity that combines a physical device, a specification of which physical states of that device correspond to various logical states, and an evolution of that device which corresponds to the logical transformation L. The most general form of Landauer's Principle can be precisely stated in terms of L-machines, namely that the logical irreversibility of L implies the thermodynamic irreversibility of every corresponding L-machine. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{ladyman-what-2009,
author = {Ladyman, James},
title = {What does it mean to say that a physical system implements a computation?},
journal = {Theoretical Computer Science},
year = {2009},
volume = {410},
number = {4},
pages = {376--383}
}
|
|||||
| Cohen, M.R. and Newsome, W.T. | What electrical microstimulation has revealed about the neural basis of cognition [BibTeX] |
2004 | Curr Opin Neurobiol Vol. 14 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{cohen-what-2004,
author = {Cohen, M. R. and Newsome, W. T.},
title = {What electrical microstimulation has revealed about the neural basis of cognition},
journal = {Curr Opin Neurobiol},
year = {2004},
volume = {14},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2004.03.016},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2004.03.016}
}
|
|||||
| Witten, E. | What every physicist should know about string theory | 2015 | Physics Today Vol. 68(11), pp. 38 |
article | |
| Abstract: Some of nature's rhymes–the appearance of similar structures in different areas of physics–underlie the way that string theory potentially unifies gravity with the other forces of nature and eliminates the ultraviolet divergences that plague quantum gravity. Anyone who has studied physics is aware that although physics–like history–does not precisely repeat if self, it does rhyme, with similar structures appearing in different areas. For example, Albert Einstein's gravitalional waves are analogous to electromagnetic waves or to the water waves at the surface of a pond. Here, Witten discusses the analogy between quantum gravity and the theory of a single particle.; Some of nature's rhymes–the appearance of similar structures in different areas of physics–underlie the way that string theory potentially unifies gravity with the other forces of nature and eliminates the ultraviolet divergences that plague quantum gravity. Anyone who has studied physics is aware that although physics–like history–does not precisely repeat if self, it does rhyme, with similar structures appearing in different areas. For example, Albert Einstein's gravitalional waves are analogous to electromagnetic waves or to the water waves at the surface of a pond. Here, Witten discusses the analogy between quantum gravity and the theory of a single particle.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{witten-what-2015,
author = {Witten, Edward},
title = {What every physicist should know about string theory},
journal = {Physics Today},
year = {2015},
volume = {68},
number = {11},
pages = {38}
}
|
|||||
| Papineau, D. | What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? [BibTeX] |
2011 | Philosophia Vol. 39(1), pp. 5-19 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{papineau-what-2011,
author = {Papineau, David},
title = {What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?},
journal = {Philosophia},
year = {2011},
volume = {39},
number = {1},
pages = {5--19}
}
|
|||||
| Mathur, S.D. | What Exactly is the Information Paradox? | 2009 | Vol. 769, pp. 3-48 |
incollection | |
| Abstract: The black hole information paradox tells us something important about the way quantum mechanics and gravity fit together. In these lectures I try to give a pedagogical review of the essential physics leading to the paradox, using mostly pictures. Hawking’s argument is recast as a ‘theorem’: if quantum gravity effects are confined to within a given length scale and the vacuum is assumed to be unique, then there will be information loss. We conclude with a brief summary of how quantum effects in string theory violate the first condition and make the interior of the hole a ‘fuzzball’. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{mathur-what-2009,
author = {Mathur, S. D.},
title = {What Exactly is the Information Paradox?},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
year = {2009},
volume = {769},
pages = {3--48}
}
|
|||||
| Millikan, R.G. | What has natural information to do with intentional representation? | 2001 | Philosophy(supplemet 49), pp. 105 | article | |
| Abstract: Millikan discusses Fred Dretske's "Knowledge and the Flow of Information" and argues that what an animal needs to know about its environment is not available as natural information of the intentional representation kind. She proposes a softer view of natural information that is at least hinted at by Dretske and shows that it does not have verificationist consequences. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{millikan-what-2001,
author = {Millikan, Ruth G.},
title = {What has natural information to do with intentional representation?},
journal = {Philosophy},
year = {2001},
number = {supplemet 49},
pages = {105}
}
|
|||||
| Rickles, D. | What Is an Observable in General Relativity? [BibTeX] |
2008 | Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 127 - 137 |
incollection | URL |
BibTeX:
@incollection{rickles-what-2008,
author = {Rickles, Dean},
title = {What Is an Observable in General Relativity?},
booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime},
publisher = {Elsevier},
year = {2008},
volume = {3},
pages = {127 -- 137},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030064}
}
|
|||||
| Tolstoy Leo, g. and Maude, A. | What is art? [BibTeX] |
1971 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{tolstoy-what-1971,
author = {Tolstoy, Leo, graf and Maude, Aylmer},
title = {What is art?},
publisher = {Minet},
year = {1971}
}
|
|||||
| Sesonske, A. | What is art?: Aesthetic theory from Plato to Tolstoy [BibTeX] |
1965 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{sesonske-what-1965,
author = {Sesonske, Alexander},
title = {What is art?: Aesthetic theory from Plato to Tolstoy},
publisher = {O.U.P},
year = {1965}
}
|
|||||
| Tolstoy Leo, g. and Maude, A. | What is art?: and essays on art [BibTeX] |
1932 | Vol. 331. |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{tolstoy-what-1932,
author = {Tolstoy, Leo, graf and Maude, Aylmer},
title = {What is art?: and essays on art},
publisher = {Oxford university press},
year = {1932},
volume = {331.}
}
|
|||||
| Calude, C.S., Chaitin, G.J., Fredkin, E., Leggett, A.J., de Ruyter, R., Toffoli, T. and Wolfram, S. | What is computation? (How) does nature compute? [BibTeX] |
2012 | incollection | ||
BibTeX:
@incollection{calude-what-2012,
author = {Calude, Cristian S. and Chaitin, Gregory J. and Fredkin, Edward and Leggett, Anthony J. and de Ruyter, Rob and Toffoli, Tommaso and Wolfram, Stephen},
title = {What is computation? (How) does nature compute?},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Adami, C. | What is information? | 2016 | PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A-MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES Vol. 374(2063) |
article | |
| Abstract: Information is a precise concept that can be defined mathematically, but its relationship to what we call 'knowledge' is not always made clear. Furthermore, the concepts 'entropy' and 'information', while deeply related, are distinct and must be used with care, something that is not always achieved in the literature. In this elementary introduction, the concepts of entropy and information are laid out one by one, explained intuitively, but defined rigorously. I argue that a proper understanding of information in terms of prediction is key to a number of disciplines beyond engineering, such as physics and biology.;Information is a precise concept that can be defined mathematically, but its relationship to what we call "knowledge" is not always made clear. Furthermore, the concepts "entropy" and "information", while deeply related, are distinct and must be used with care, something that is not always achieved in the literature. In this elementary introduction, the concepts of entropy and information are laid out one by one, explained intuitively, but defined rigorously. I argue that a proper understanding of information in terms of prediction is key to a number of disciplines beyond engineering, such as physics and biology.;Information is a precise concept that can be defined mathematically, but its relationship to what we call 'knowledge' is not always made clear. Furthermore, the concepts 'entropy' and 'information', while deeply related, are distinct and must be used with care, something that is not always achieved in the literature. In this elementary introduction, the concepts of entropy and information are laid out one by one, explained intuitively, but defined rigorously. I argue that a proper understanding of information in terms of prediction is key to a number of disciplines beyond engineering, such as physics and biology.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{adami-what-2016,
author = {Adami, C.},
title = {What is information?},
journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A-MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES},
year = {2016},
volume = {374},
number = {2063}
}
|
|||||
| Barbieri, M. | What is Information? [BibTeX] |
2012 | Biosemiotics Vol. 5(2), pp. 147-152 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{barbieri-what-2012,
author = {Barbieri, Marcello},
title = {What is Information?},
journal = {Biosemiotics},
year = {2012},
volume = {5},
number = {2},
pages = {147--152}
}
|
|||||
| Lombardi, O. | What is Information? | 2004 | Foundations of Science Vol. 9(2), pp. 105-134 |
article | |
| Abstract: The main aim of this work is to contribute tothe elucidation of the concept of informationby comparing three different views about thismatter: the view of Fred Dretske's semantictheory of information, the perspective adoptedby Peter Kosso in his interaction-informationaccount of scientific observation, and thesyntactic approach of Thomas Cover and JoyThomas. We will see that these views involvevery different concepts of information, eachone useful in its own field of application. This comparison will allow us to argue in favorof a terminological `cleansing': it is necessaryto make a terminological distinction among thedifferent concepts of information, in order toavoid conceptual confusions when the word`information' is used to elucidate relatedconcepts as knowledge, observation orentropy. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lombardi-what-2004,
author = {Lombardi, Olimpia},
title = {What is Information?},
journal = {Foundations of Science},
year = {2004},
volume = {9},
number = {2},
pages = {105--134}
}
|
|||||
| Rowley, J. | What is information? [BibTeX] |
1998 | Information Services & Use Vol. 18(4), pp. 243 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{rowley-what-1998,
author = {Rowley, Jennifer},
title = {What is information?},
journal = {Information Services & Use},
year = {1998},
volume = {18},
number = {4},
pages = {243}
}
|
|||||
| Timpson, C.G. | What is Information? | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: Distinctions are drawn between a number of different information concepts. It is noted that ‘information’ in both the everyday and Shannon-theory setting is an abstract noun, though derived in different ways. A general definition of the concept(s) of information in the Shannon mould is provided and it is shown that a concept of both bits (how much) and pieces (what) of Shannon information is available. It is emphasised that the Shannon information, as a measure of information, should not be understood as an uncertainty; neither is the notion of correlation key to the Shannon concept. Corollaries regarding the ontological status of information and on the notion of information’s flow are drawn. The chapter closes with a brief discussion of Dretske’s attempt to base a semantic notion of information on Shannon’s theory. It is argued that the attempt is not successful. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{timpson-what-2013,
author = {Timpson, Christopher G.},
title = {What is Information?},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Harms, W.F. | What Is Information? Three Concepts | 2006 | Biological Theory Vol. 1(3), pp. 230-242 |
article | |
| Abstract: The concept of information tempts us as a theoretical primitive, partly because of the respectability lent to it by highly successful applications of Shannon’s information theory, partly because of its broad range of applicability in various domains, partly because of its neutrality with respect to what basic sorts of things there are. This versatility, however, is the very reason why information cannot be the theoretical primitive we might like it to be. “Information,” as it is variously used, is systematically ambiguous between whether it involves continuous or discrete quantities, causal or noncausal relationships, and intrinsic or relational properties. Many uses can be firmly grounded in existing theory, however. Continuous quantities of information involving probabilities can be related to information theory proper. Information defined relative to systems of rules or conventions can be understood relative to the theory of meaning (semantics). A number of causal notions may possibly be located relative to standard notions in physics. Precise specification of these distinct properties involved in the common notion of information can allow us to map the relationships between them. Consequently, while information is not in itself the kind of single thing that can play a significant unifying role, analyzing its ambiguities may facilitate headway toward that goal. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{harms-what-2006,
author = {Harms, William F.},
title = {What Is Information? Three Concepts},
journal = {Biological Theory},
year = {2006},
volume = {1},
number = {3},
pages = {230--242}
}
|
|||||
| Schrödinger, E. | What is life?: the physical aspect of the living cell ; with, Mind and matter ; & Autobiographical sketches [BibTeX] |
1992 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{schrodinger-what-1992,
author = {Schrödinger, Erwin},
title = {What is life?: the physical aspect of the living cell ; with, Mind and matter ; & Autobiographical sketches},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {1992}
}
|
|||||
| Deacon, T.W. | What is missing from theories of information? [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 146-169 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{deacon-what-2010,
author = {Deacon, Terrence W.},
title = {What is missing from theories of information?},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {146--169},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.008}
}
|
|||||
| Logothetis, N.K., Leopold, D.A. and Sheinberg, D.L. | What is rivalling during binocular rivalry? [BibTeX] |
1996 | Nature Vol. 380 |
article | DOI URL |
BibTeX:
@article{logothetis-what-1996,
author = {Logothetis, N. K. and Leopold, D. A. and Sheinberg, D. L.},
title = {What is rivalling during binocular rivalry?},
journal = {Nature},
year = {1996},
volume = {380},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/380621a0},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1038/380621a0}
}
|
|||||
| Lombardi, O., Holik, F. and Vanni, L. | What is Shannon information? | 2016 | Synthese Vol. 193(7), pp. 1983-2012 |
article | |
| Abstract: Despite of its formal precision and its great many applications, Shannon's theory still offers an active terrain of debate when the interpretation of its main concepts is the task at issue. In this article we try to analyze certain points that still remain obscure or matter of discussion, and whose elucidation contribute to the assessment of the different interpretative proposals about the concept of information. In particular, we argue for a pluralist position, according to which the different views about information are no longer rival, but different interpretations of a single formal concept.;Despite of its formal precision and its great many applications, Shannon's theory still offers an active terrain of debate when the interpretation of its main concepts is the task at issue. In this article we try to analyze certain points that still remain obscure or matter of discussion, and whose elucidation contribute to the assessment of the different interpretative proposals about the concept of information. In particular, we argue for a pluralist position, according to which the different views about information are no longer rival, but different interpretations of a single formal concept.;Despite of its formal precision and its great many applications, Shannon’s theory still offers an active terrain of debate when the interpretation of its main concepts is the task at issue. In this article we try to analyze certain points that still remain obscure or matter of discussion, and whose elucidation contribute to the assessment of the different interpretative proposals about the concept of information. In particular, we argue for a pluralist position, according to which the different views about information are no longer rival, but different interpretations of a single formal concept.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{lombardi-what-2016,
author = {Lombardi, Olimpia and Holik, Federico and Vanni, Leonardo},
title = {What is Shannon information?},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2016},
volume = {193},
number = {7},
pages = {1983--2012}
}
|
|||||
| Hamame, C.M., Cosmelli, D. and Aboitiz, F. | What is so informative about information? | 2007 | Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 30(4), pp. 371-372 |
article | |
| Abstract: Understanding evolution beyond a gene-centered vision is a fertile ground for new questions and approaches. However, in this systemic perspective, we take issue with the necessity of the concept of information. Through the example of brain and language evolution, we propose the autonomous systems theory as a more biologically relevant framework for the evolutionary perspective offered by Jablonka & Lamb (J&L). [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{hamame-what-2007,
author = {Hamame, Carlos M. and Cosmelli, Diego and Aboitiz, Francisco},
title = {What is so informative about information?},
journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
year = {2007},
volume = {30},
number = {4},
pages = {371--372}
}
|
|||||
| Nagel, T. | What is the mind-body problem? [BibTeX] |
1993 | Ciba Foundation Symposium Vol. 174 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{nagel-what-1993,
author = {Nagel, T.},
title = {What is the mind-body problem?},
journal = {Ciba Foundation Symposium},
year = {1993},
volume = {174}
}
|
|||||
| Montero, B. | What is the Physical? | 2009 | Vol. 1, pp. 173-189 |
incollection | |
| Abstract: Addressing the question of what is the physical is important not only for understanding the general thesis of physicalism, but also for assessing the strength and significance of a number of the central arguments regarding physicalism and the physical nature of the mind. For example, debates over the possibility of zombies pervade the literature on consciousness. Zombies, in the relevant sense, are supposed to be creatures that are just like us in every physical respect yet lack consciousness. Are such creatures possible? Some have argued that while it is not conceivable, or logically possible, that there could be, say, H O that is not water, it is conceivable that there could be worlds that are physical duplicates of ours yet populated by zombies rather than conscious human beings, and thus consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical.;Introduction – Mental Causation – The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism – Dualism – Epiphenomenalism – Anomalous Monism – Non-reductive Materialism – Functionalism – What is Property Physicalism? – What is the Physical? – Idealism – Panpsychism – Subjectivity – Higher-order Theories of Consciousness – Representationalist Theories of Consciousness – Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities – The Explanatory Gap – Phenomenal Concepts – The Two-dimensional Argument Against Materialism – Intentional Systems Theory – Wide Content – Narrow Content – Information-theoretic Semantics – Biosemantics – A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes – The Normativity of the Intentional – Concepts and Possession Conditions – The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content – Intentionalism – The Content of Perceptual Experience – Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind – The Self – Unity of Consciousness – Personal Identity and Metaphysics – Imagination – Thinking – Language and Thought – Consciousness and Reference – Memory – Emotions: Motivating Feelings – Intention and Intentional Action – Folk Psychology – Other Minds – Introspection – Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge – Self-Deception; | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{montero-what-2009,
author = {Montero, Barbara},
title = {What is the Physical?},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2009},
volume = {1},
pages = {173--189}
}
|
|||||
| Welker, M. | What is the ‘spiritual body’? On what may be regarded as ‘ultimate’ in the interrelation between God, matter, and information [BibTeX] |
2010 | Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 349-364 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{welker-what-2010,
author = {Welker, Michael},
title = {What is the ‘spiritual body’? On what may be regarded as ‘ultimate’ in the interrelation between God, matter, and information},
booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = {2010},
pages = {349--364},
note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.016}
}
|
|||||
| Shea, N. | What's transmitted? Inherited information | 2011 | Biology and Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 183-189 |
article | |
| Abstract: Commentary on Bergstrom and Rosvall, 'The transmission sense of information', Biology and Philosophy. In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or insubstantial, Bergstrom and Rosvall have identified a sense in which DNA transmits information down the generations. Their 'transmission view of information' is founded on a claim about DNA's teleofunction. Bergstrom and Rosvall see their transmission view of information as a rival to semantic accounts. This commentary argues that it is complementary. The idea that DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a message, that is to say if it has semantic content[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Commentary on Bergstrom and Rosvall, 'The transmission sense of information', Biology and Philosophy. In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or insubstantial, Bergstrom and Rosvall have identified a sense in which DNA transmits information down the generations. Their 'transmission view of information' is founded on a claim about DNA's teleofunction. Bergstrom and Rosvall see their transmission view of information as a rival to semantic accounts. This commentary argues that it is complementary. The idea that DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a message, that is to say if it has semantic content.; Commentary on Bergstrom and Rosvall, 'The transmission sense of information', Biology and Philosophy. In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or insubstantial, Bergstrom and Rosvall have identified a sense in which DNA transmits information down the generations. Their 'transmission view of information' is founded on a claim about DNA's teleofunction. Bergstrom and Rosvall see their transmission view of information as a rival to semantic accounts. This commentary argues that it is complementary. The idea that DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a message, that is to say if it has semantic content Keywords Genetic information * Genetic representation * Inheritance systems * Information transmission * Natural selection * Evolution * Entropy; Commentary on Bergstrom and Rosvall, 'The transmission sense of information', Biology and Philosophy. In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or insubstantial, Bergstrom and Rosvall have identified a sense in which DNA transmits information down the generations. Their 'transmission view of information' is founded on a claim about DNA's teleofunction. Bergstrom and Rosvall see their transmission view of information as a rival to semantic accounts. This commentary argues that it is complementary. The idea that DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a message, that is to say if it has semantic content | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{shea-whats-2011,
author = {Shea, Nicholas},
title = {What's transmitted? Inherited information},
journal = {Biology and Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {183--189}
}
|
|||||
| Shea, N. | What's transmitted? Inherited information.(DISCUSSION NOTE) [BibTeX] |
2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 183 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{shea-whats-2011-1,
author = {Shea, Nicholas},
title = {What's transmitted? Inherited information.(DISCUSSION NOTE)},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {183}
}
|
|||||
| Leng, M. | What's Wrong with Indispensability? (Or, the Case for Recreational Mathematics) | 2002 | Synthese Vol. 131(3), pp. 395-417 |
article | |
| Abstract: For many philosophers not automatically inclined to Platonism, the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objectshas provided the best (and perhaps only) evidence for mathematicalrealism. Recently, however, this argument has been subject to attack, most notably by Penelope Maddy (1992, 1997),on the grounds that its conclusions do not sit well with mathematical practice. I offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the indispensability argument (I claim that mathematics is indispensable in the wrong way), and, taking my cue from Mark Colyvan's (1998) attempt to provide a Quinean account of unapplied mathematics as `recreational', suggest that, if one approaches the problem from a Quinean naturalist starting point, one must conclude that all mathematics is recreational in this way.;For many philosophers not automatically inclined to Platonism, the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objectshas provided the best (and perhaps only) evidence for mathematicalrealism. Recently, however, this argument has been subject to attack, most notably by Penelope Maddy (1992, 1997),on the grounds that its conclusions do not sit well with mathematical practice. I offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the indispensability argument (I claim that mathematics is indispensable in the wrong way), and, taking my cue from Mark Colyvan's (1998) attempt to provide a Quinean account of unapplied mathematics as `recreational', suggest that, if one approaches the problem from a Quinean naturalist starting point, one must conclude that all mathematics is recreational in this way.;For many philosophers not automatically inclined to Platonism, the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects has provided the best (and perhaps only) evidence for mathematical realism. Recently, however, this argument has been subject to attack, most notably by Penelope Maddy (1992, 1997), on the grounds that its conclusions do not sit well with mathematical practice. I offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the indispensability argument (I claim that mathematics is indispensable in the wrong way), and, taking my cue from Mark Colyvan's (1998) attempt to provide a Quinean account of unapplied mathematics as 'recreational', suggest that, if one approaches the problem from a Quinean naturalist starting point, one must conclude that all mathematics is recreational in this way.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{leng-whats-2002,
author = {Leng, Mary},
title = {What's Wrong with Indispensability? (Or, the Case for Recreational Mathematics)},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2002},
volume = {131},
number = {3},
pages = {395--417}
}
|
|||||
| Hüttemann, A. | What's wrong with microphysicalism? [BibTeX] |
2003 | Vol. 9780203390771 |
book | |
BibTeX:
@book{huttemann-whats-2003,
author = {Hüttemann, Andreas},
title = {What's wrong with microphysicalism?},
year = {2003},
volume = {9780203390771}
}
|
|||||
| Griffiths, P.E. and Wilkins, J.S. | When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief? (preprint) [BibTeX] |
2010 | PhilSci Archive | article | URL |
BibTeX:
@article{griffiths-when-2010,
author = {Griffiths, Paul E. and Wilkins, John S.},
title = {When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief? (preprint)},
journal = {PhilSci Archive},
year = {2010},
url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5314/}
}
|
|||||
| Guerra, F., Leone, M. and Robotti, N. | When Energy Conservation Seems to Fail: The Prediction of the Neutrino | 2014 | Science & Education Vol. 23(6), pp. 1339-1359 |
article | |
| Abstract: A historical case study concerning the serious doubts that arose in early 1930s about the validity of the law of energy conservation in nuclear disintegrations, and the hypothesis of neutrino, will be closely analyzed with the goal of promoting understanding of the nature of science. This work is based upon primary archival and printed sources, with a particular focus on the proceedings of the first International Conference of Nuclear Physics which was held in Rome on October 1931.; A historical case study concerning the serious doubts that arose in early 1930s about the validity of the law of energy conservation in nuclear disintegrations, and the hypothesis of neutrino, will be closely analyzed with the goal of promoting understanding of the nature of science. This work is based upon primary archival and printed sources, with a particular focus on the proceedings of the first International Conference of Nuclear Physics which was held in Rome on October 1931.; A historical case study concerning the serious doubts that arose in early 1930s about the validity of the law of energy conservation in nuclear disintegrations, and the hypothesis of neutrino, will be closely analyzed with the goal of promoting understanding of the nature of science. This work is based upon primary archival and printed sources, with a particular focus on the proceedings of the first International Conference of Nuclear Physics which was held in Rome on October 1931. | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{guerra-when-2014,
author = {Guerra, Francesco and Leone, Matteo and Robotti, Nadia},
title = {When Energy Conservation Seems to Fail: The Prediction of the Neutrino},
journal = {Science & Education},
year = {2014},
volume = {23},
number = {6},
pages = {1339--1359}
}
|
|||||
| Teller, P. | Whither Constructive Empiricism? [BibTeX] |
2001 | Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 106(1/2), pp. 123-150 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{teller-whither-2001,
author = {Teller, Paul},
title = {Whither Constructive Empiricism?},
journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition},
year = {2001},
volume = {106},
number = {1/2},
pages = {123--150}
}
|
|||||
| French, S. | Whither Wave Function Realism? | 2013 | incollection | ||
| Abstract: Wave function realism has attracted considerable attention. Interestingly, it has served both as the focus of metaphysically inspired criticism and as support for certain metaphysical views. On one hand it has been criticized for its supposed inability to accommodate our judgments concerning "everyday" objects and, on the other, it has been invoked as support for the apparent restoration of intrinsic properties within the quantum context. Both the criticisms and deployment of wave function realism assume certain relationships between physics and metaphysics. This chapter exposes these relationships in the context of a broad understanding of both the impact of physics and metaphysics and the manner in which the latter might inform the former. In that context I aim to articulate an appropriate understanding of this position that will be appropriately and metaphysically realist. | |||||
BibTeX:
@incollection{french-whither-2013,
author = {French, Steven},
title = {Whither Wave Function Realism?},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
year = {2013}
}
|
|||||
| Kuhlmann, M. | Why Conceptual Rigour Matters to Philosophy: on the Ontological Significance of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory [BibTeX] |
2010 | Vol. 40(9), pp. 1625-1637 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{kuhlmann-why-2010,
author = {Kuhlmann, Meinard},
title = {Why Conceptual Rigour Matters to Philosophy: on the Ontological Significance of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory},
year = {2010},
volume = {40},
number = {9},
pages = {1625--1637}
}
|
|||||
| Rovelli, C. | Why Gauge? | 2014 | Foundations of Physics Vol. 44(1), pp. 91-104 |
article | |
| Abstract: The world appears to be well described by gauge theories why? I suggest that gauge is more than mathematical redundancy. Gauge-dependent quantities can not be predicted, but there is a sense in which they can be measured. They describe "handles" though which systems couple: they represent real relational structures to which the experimentalist has access in measurement by supplying one of the relata in the measurement procedure itself. This observation leads to a physical interpretation for the ubiquity of gauge: it is a consequence of a relational structure of physical quantities.;The world appears to be well described by gauge theories; why? I suggest that gauge is more than mathematical redundancy. Gauge-dependent quantities can not be predicted, but there is a sense in which they can be measured. They describe “handles” though which systems couple: they represent real relational structures to which the experimentalist has access in measurement by supplying one of the relata in the measurement procedure itself. This observation leads to a physical interpretation for the ubiquity of gauge: it is a consequence of a relational structure of physical quantities.; | |||||
BibTeX:
@article{rovelli-why-2014,
author = {Rovelli, Carlo},
title = {Why Gauge?},
journal = {Foundations of Physics},
year = {2014},
volume = {44},
number = {1},
pages = {91--104}
}
|
|||||
| Hacking, I. | Why is there philosophy of mathematics at all? [BibTeX] |
2012 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{hacking-why-2012,
author = {Hacking, Ian},
title = {Why is there philosophy of mathematics at all?},
year = {2012}
}
|
|||||
| Humphreys, P. | Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities [BibTeX] |
1985 | The Philosophical Review Vol. 94(4), pp. 557-570 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{humphreys-why-1985,
author = {Humphreys, Paul},
title = {Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities},
journal = {The Philosophical Review},
year = {1985},
volume = {94},
number = {4},
pages = {557--570}
}
|
|||||
| Rosenberg, A. | William C. Wimsatt: Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality [BibTeX] |
2011 | Biology & Philosophy Vol. 26(2), pp. 261 |
article | |
BibTeX:
@article{rosenberg-william-2011,
author = {Rosenberg, Alex},
title = {William C. Wimsatt: Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality},
journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
year = {2011},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {261}
}
|
|||||
| Feeley, M. | Without Cause [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 169-179 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{feeley-without-2015,
author = {Feeley, Mark},
title = {Without Cause},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {169--179}
}
|
|||||
| Quine, W.V. | Word and object [BibTeX] |
1960 | book | ||
BibTeX:
@book{quine-word-1960,
author = {Quine, W. V.},
title = {Word and object},
publisher = {Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology},
year = {1960}
}
|
|||||
| Einstein, A. | Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper. (German) [On the electrodynamics of moving bodies] [BibTeX] |
1905 | Vol. 322(10), pp. 891-921 |
article | DOI |
BibTeX:
@article{einstein-zur-1905,
author = {Einstein, Albert},
title = {Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper. (German) [On the electrodynamics of moving bodies]},
year = {1905},
volume = {322},
number = {10},
pages = {891--921},
doi = {http://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19053221004}
}
|
|||||
| Leifer, M. | “It from bit” and the quantum probability rule [BibTeX] |
2015 | It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 5-23 | incollection | |
BibTeX:
@incollection{leifer-it-2015,
author = {Leifer, MS},
title = {“It from bit” and the quantum probability rule},
booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2015},
pages = {5--23}
}
|
|||||
Dr Bruce Long. PhD Philosophy, BA Hons 1 (Philosophy), M Phil. (English), B App Sc. (Computing).
Search This Blog
Bib: Information, SR, NOSR, QFT, Physics Pt 3.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)