Bib: Information, SR, NOSR, QFT, Physics Pt 2.

Author	Title	Year	Journal/Proceedings	Reftype	DOI/URL
Hein, C.A.	Entropy in operational statistics and quantum logic [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1979	Foundations of Physics Vol. 9(9), pp. 751-786	article	DOI URL
Abstract: In a series of recent papers, Randall and Foulis have developed a generalized theory of probability (operational statistics) which is based on the notion of a physical operation. They have shown that the quantum logic description of quantum mechanics can be naturally imbedded into this generalized theory of probability. In this paper we shall investigate the role of entropy (in the sense of Shannon's theory of information) in operational statistics. We shall find that there are several related entropy concepts in operational statistics. We shall examine the relationships between these different entropy concepts and examine their implications for the foundations of quantum theory. We shall also examine the extension of the Jaynes inference scheme to the operational statistics formalism, and apply the latter to the case of quantum statistical mechanics.
BibTeX: @article{hein-entropy-1979, author = {Hein, Carl A.}, title = {Entropy in operational statistics and quantum logic}, journal = {Foundations of Physics}, year = {1979}, volume = {9}, number = {9}, pages = {751--786}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00711107}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF00711107} }
Oppenheim, I.	Entropy, information, and the arrow of time [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	The journal of physical chemistry. B Vol. 114(49), pp. 16184	article
Abstract: We shall investigate the relationships between the thermodynamic entropy and information theory and the implications that can be drawn for the arrow of time. This demands a careful study of classical thermodynamics and a review of its fundamental concepts. The statistical mechanical properties of time-dependent systems will be carefully studied, and the point at which the arrow of time appears will be described.
BibTeX: @article{oppenheim-entropy-2010, author = {Oppenheim, Irwin}, title = {Entropy, information, and the arrow of time}, journal = {The journal of physical chemistry. B}, year = {2010}, volume = {114}, number = {49}, pages = {16184} }
Carlson, A.	Environmental Aesthetics [BibTeX]	2016	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{carlson-environmental-2016, author = {Carlson, Allen}, title = {Environmental Aesthetics}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2016}, edition = {Summer 2016}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/environmental-aesthetics/} }
Jackson, F.	Epiphenomenal Qualia [BibTeX]	1982	The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 32(127), pp. 127-136	article
BibTeX: @article{jackson-epiphenomenal-1982, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Epiphenomenal Qualia}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1982}, volume = {32}, number = {127}, pages = {127--136} }
Bressler, S.L., Coppola, R. and Nakamura, R.	Episodic multiregional cortical coherence at multiple frequencies during visual task performance [BibTeX]	1993	Nature Vol. 366	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{bressler-episodic-1993, author = {Bressler, S. L. and Coppola, R. and Nakamura, R.}, title = {Episodic multiregional cortical coherence at multiple frequencies during visual task performance}, journal = {Nature}, year = {1993}, volume = {366}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/366153a0}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1038/366153a0} }
Beni, M.D.	Epistemic Informational Structural Realism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Minds and Machines Vol. 26(4), pp. 323-339	article
Abstract: The paper surveys Floridi’s attempt for laying down informational structural realism (ISR). After considering a number of reactions to the pars destruens of Floridi’s attack on the digital ontology, I show that Floridi’s enterprise for enriching the ISR by borrowing elements from the ontic form of structural realism (in the pars construens) is blighted by a haunting inconsistency. ISR has been originally developed by Floridi as a restricted and level dependent form of structural realism which remains mainly bonded within the borders of a Kantian perspective. I argue that this perspective doesn’t mesh nicely with the ontic interpretation that Floridi attached to the ISR. I substantiate this claim through the assessment of Floridi’s strategy for reconciling the epistemic and ontic forms of the SR, as well as by close examination of his use of method of levels of abstraction and his notion of semantic information. My proposal is that the ISR could be defended best against the mentioned and similar objections by being interpreted as an extension of the epistemic SR.;The paper surveys Floridi’s attempt for laying down informational structural realism (ISR). After considering a number of reactions to the pars destruens of Floridi’s attack on the digital ontology, I show that Floridi’s enterprise for enriching the ISR by borrowing elements from the ontic form of structural realism (in the pars construens) is blighted by a haunting inconsistency. ISR has been originally developed by Floridi as a restricted and level dependent form of structural realism which remains mainly bonded within the borders of a Kantian perspective. I argue that this perspective doesn’t mesh nicely with the ontic interpretation that Floridi attached to the ISR. I substantiate this claim through the assessment of Floridi’s strategy for reconciling the epistemic and ontic forms of the SR, as well as by close examination of his use of method of levels of abstraction and his notion of semantic information. My proposal is that the ISR could be defended best against the mentioned and similar objections by being interpreted as an extension of the epistemic SR.;The paper surveys Floridi’s attempt for laying down informational structural realism (ISR). After considering a number of reactions to the pars destruens of Floridi’s attack on the digital ontology, I show that Floridi’s enterprise for enriching the ISR by borrowing elements from the ontic form of structural realism (in the pars construens) is blighted by a haunting inconsistency. ISR has been originally developed by Floridi as a restricted and level dependent form of structural realism which remains mainly bonded within the borders of a Kantian perspective. I argue that this perspective doesn’t mesh nicely with the ontic interpretation that Floridi attached to the ISR. I substantiate this claim through the assessment of Floridi’s strategy for reconciling the epistemic and ontic forms of the SR, as well as by close examination of his use of method of levels of abstraction and his notion of semantic information. My proposal is that the ISR could be defended best against the mentioned and similar objections by being interpreted as an extension of the epistemic SR.;
BibTeX: @article{beni-epistemic-2016, author = {Beni, Majid D.}, title = {Epistemic Informational Structural Realism}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2016}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, pages = {323--339} }
Dretske, F.	Epistemology and Information [BibTeX]	2008	, pp. 29-47	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{dretske-epistemology-2008, author = {Dretske, Fred}, title = {Epistemology and Information}, year = {2008}, pages = {29--47} }
Joshi, P.S., Malafarina, D. and Narayan, R.	Equilibrium configurations from gravitational collapse [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Classical and Quantum Gravity Vol. 28, pp. 235018	article
Abstract: We develop here a new procedure within Einstein's theory of gravity to generate equilibrium configurations that result as the final state of gravitational collapse from regular initial conditions. As a simplification, we assume that the collapsing fluid is supported only by tangential pressure. We show that the equilibrium geometries generated by this method form a subset of static solutions to the Einstein equations, and that they can either be regular or develop a naked singularity at the center. When a singularity is present, there are key differences in the properties of stable circular orbits relative to those around a Schwarzschild black hole with the same mass. Therefore, if an accretion disk is present around such a naked singularity it could be observationally distinguished from a disk around a black hole.
BibTeX: @article{joshi-equilibrium-2011, author = {Joshi, Pankaj S. and Malafarina, Daniele and Narayan, Ramesh}, title = {Equilibrium configurations from gravitational collapse}, journal = {Classical and Quantum Gravity}, year = {2011}, volume = {28}, pages = {235018} }
Siegfried, T.	Erasing any doubt that information is physical [BibTeX]	2012	Vol. 181(7)	book
BibTeX: @book{siegfried-erasing-2012, author = {Siegfried, Tom}, title = {Erasing any doubt that information is physical}, year = {2012}, volume = {181}, number = {7} }
Romito, M.	Ergodicity of the Finite Dimensional Approximation of the 3D Navier–Stokes Equations Forced by a Degenerate Noise [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2004	Journal of Statistical Physics Vol. 114(1), pp. 155-177	article
Abstract: We prove ergodicity of the finite dimensional approximations of the three dimensional Navier–Stokes equations, driven by a random force. The forcing noise acts only on a few modes and some algebraic conditions on the forced modes are found that imply the ergodicity. The convergence rate to the unique invariant measure is shown to be exponential.
BibTeX: @article{romito-ergodicity-2004, author = {Romito, Marco}, title = {Ergodicity of the Finite Dimensional Approximation of the 3D Navier–Stokes Equations Forced by a Degenerate Noise}, journal = {Journal of Statistical Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, number = {1}, pages = {155--177} }
Shor, P.W.	Erratum: Equivalence of additivity questions in quantum information theory (Communication in Mathematical Physics (2004) 246 (453-472)) [BibTeX]	2004	Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 246(3), pp. 473	article
BibTeX: @article{shor-erratum:-2004, author = {Shor, Peter W.}, title = {Erratum: Equivalence of additivity questions in quantum information theory (Communication in Mathematical Physics (2004) 246 (453-472))}, journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {246}, number = {3}, pages = {473} }
Dieks, D.	Events and covariance in the interpretation of quantum field theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2002	Events and covariance in the interpretation of quantum field theory	incollection	URL
Abstract: In relativistic quantum field theory the notion of a local operation is regarded as basic: each open space-time region is associated with an algebra of observables representing possible measurements performed within this region. It is much more difficult to accommodate the notions of events taking place in such regions or of localized objects. But how can the notion of a local operation be basic in the theory if this same theory would not be able to represent localized measuring devices and localized events? After briefly reviewing these difficulties we discuss a strategy for eliminating the tension, namely by interpreting quantum theory in a realist way. To implement this strategy we use the ideas of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We then consider the question of whether the resulting scheme can be made Lorentz invariant.
BibTeX: @incollection{dieks-events-2002, author = {Dieks, Dennis}, title = {Events and covariance in the interpretation of quantum field theory}, booktitle = {Events and covariance in the interpretation of quantum field theory}, year = {2002}, url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/554/} }
Barrett, J.A.	Everett’s pure wave mechanics and the notion of worlds [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	European Journal for Philosophy of Science Vol. 1(2), pp. 277-302	article
Abstract: Everett (1957a, b, 1973) relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35, 1970) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett himself favored the language of elements, branches, or relative states in describing his theory. The result is that there is no mention of splitting worlds or parallel universes in any of Everett’s published work. Everett, however, did write of splitting observers and was willing to adopt the language of many worlds in conversation with people who were themselves using such language. While there is evidence that Everett was not entirely comfortable with talk of many worlds, it does not seem to have mattered much to him what language one used to describe pure wave mechanics. This was in part a result of Everett’s empirical understanding of the cognitive status of his theory.
BibTeX: @article{barrett-everetts-2011, author = {Barrett, Jeffrey A.}, title = {Everett’s pure wave mechanics and the notion of worlds}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2011}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {277--302} }
James, L. and Don, R.	Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{james-every-2007, author = {James, Ladyman and Don, Ross}, title = {Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized}, publisher = {Oxford: Oxford University Press}, year = {2007} }
Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D. and Collier, J.G.	Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{ladyman-every-2007, author = {Ladyman, James and Ross, Don and Spurrett, David and Collier, John G.}, title = {Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007} }
Frigg, R. and Votsis, I.	Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	European Journal for Philosophy of Science Vol. 1(2), pp. 227-276	article
Abstract: A structuralist perspective is one that sees the investigation of the structural features of a domain of interest as the primary goal of enquiry. This vision has shaped research programmes in fields as diverse as linguistics, literary criticism, aesthetics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and various branches of philosophy. The focus of this paper is structuralism in the philosophy of science, and in particular those movements that have endeavoured to articulate a structural version of scientific realism, now commonly referred to as structural realism (SR). The paper provides a critical survey of the debates raging over structural realism: it provides explicit statements of the different positions as well as the arguments put forward to support them, clarifies how the different positions relate to one another, draws attention to hitherto neglected arguments, and evaluates criticisms launched against different strands of SR. Attention to the history of the field is paid in as far as this is essential to understanding the contemporary scene, but documenting the long and intricate development of SR is beyond the scope of this paper. We begin by introducing the set theoretic conception of structure on which many of the positions that we are concerned with rely (Section 2). In Section 3 we introduce the two main strands of epistemic structural realism, discuss the central objections levelled against them, most notably Newman’s objection, and present the Ramsey sentence formulation. Section 4 is dedicated to a discussion of ontic structural realism. In Section 5 we offer some concluding remarks.;A structuralist perspective is one that sees the investigation of the structural features of a domain of interest as the primary goal of enquiry. This vision has shaped research programmes in fields as diverse as linguistics, literary criticism, aesthetics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and various branches of philosophy. The focus of this paper is structuralism in the philosophy of science, and in particular those movements that have endeavoured to articulate a structural version of scientific realism, now commonly referred to as structural realism (SR). The paper provides a critical survey of the debates raging over structural realism: it provides explicit statements of the different positions as well as the arguments put forward to support them, clarifies how the different positions relate to one another, draws attention to hitherto neglected arguments, and evaluates criticisms launched against different strands of SR. Attention to the history of the field is paid in as far as this is essential to understanding the contemporary scene, but documenting the long and intricate development of SR is beyond the scope of this paper. We begin by introducing the set theoretic conception of structure on which many of the positions that we are concerned with rely (Section 2). In Section 3 we introduce the two main strands of epistemic structural realism, discuss the central objections levelled against them, most notably Newman's objection, and present the Ramsey sentence formulation. Section 4 is dedicated to a discussion of ontic structural realism. In Section 5 we offer some concluding remarks.;
BibTeX: @article{frigg-everything-2011, author = {Frigg, Roman and Votsis, Ioannis}, title = {Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2011}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {227--276} }
Molinini, D.	Evidence, explanation and enhanced indispensability [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Synthese Vol. 193(2), pp. 403-422	article
Abstract: In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of 'explanatory indispensability' and 'genuine mathematical explanation in science' on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following 'question of evidence': What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.; Issue Title: Special issue on Indispensability and Explanation (first 13 articles appearing in issue) In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of 'explanatory indispensability' and 'genuine mathematical explanation in science' on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following 'question of evidence': What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.;In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of ‘explanatory indispensability’ and ‘genuine mathematical explanation in science’ on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following ‘question of evidence’: What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.;
BibTeX: @article{molinini-evidence-2016, author = {Molinini, Daniele}, title = {Evidence, explanation and enhanced indispensability}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2016}, volume = {193}, number = {2}, pages = {403--422} }
Worrall, J.	Evidence: philosophy of science meets medicine [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice Vol. 16(2), pp. 356-362	article
Abstract: Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess - or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go 'back to basics'; and that means turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science - sometimes under the alias of the 'theory of confirmation'. When taken together with a little philosophical common sense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply.;Obviously medicine should be evidence‐based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence‐based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess – or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go ‘back to basics’; and that means turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science – sometimes under the alias of the ‘theory of confirmation’. When taken together with a little philosophical commonsense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply.;Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess - or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go 'back to basics'; and that means turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science - sometimes under the alias of the 'theory of confirmation'. When taken together with a little philosophical commonsense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply.;Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess - or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go 'back to basics'; and that means turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science - sometimes under the alias of the 'theory of confirmation'. When taken together with a little philosophical commonsense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply.;
BibTeX: @article{worrall-evidence:-2010, author = {Worrall, John}, title = {Evidence: philosophy of science meets medicine}, journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice}, year = {2010}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, pages = {356--362} }
Gilbert, S.F.	Evo-Devo, Devo-Evo, and Devgen-Popgen [BibTeX]	2003	Biology and Philosophy Vol. 18(2), pp. 347-352	article
BibTeX: @article{gilbert-evo-devo-2003, author = {Gilbert, Scott F.}, title = {Evo-Devo, Devo-Evo, and Devgen-Popgen}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, pages = {347--352} }
Benton, M.	Evolution in four dimensions [BibTeX]	2005	Journal of Clinical Investigation Vol. 115(11), pp. 2961	article
BibTeX: @article{benton-evolution-2005, author = {Benton, Mike}, title = {Evolution in four dimensions}, journal = {Journal of Clinical Investigation}, year = {2005}, volume = {115}, number = {11}, pages = {2961} }
Skyrms, B.	Evolution of the social contract [BibTeX]	1996		book
BibTeX: @book{skyrms-evolution-1996, author = {Skyrms, Brian}, title = {Evolution of the social contract}, publisher = {Cambridge University press}, year = {1996} }
Wilkins, J.S. and Griffiths, P.E.	Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains: Fact, value, and religion [BibTeX]	2012		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{wilkins-evolutionary-2012, author = {Wilkins, John S. and Griffiths, Paul E.}, title = {Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains: Fact, value, and religion}, year = {2012} }
Page, D.	Excluding black hole firewalls with extreme cosmic censorship [BibTeX]	2014	JOURNAL OF COSMOLOGY AND ASTROPARTICLE PHYSICS Vol. 2014(6)	article
BibTeX: @article{page-excluding-2014, author = {Page, DN}, title = {Excluding black hole firewalls with extreme cosmic censorship}, journal = {JOURNAL OF COSMOLOGY AND ASTROPARTICLE PHYSICS}, year = {2014}, volume = {2014}, number = {6} }
Deranty, J.-P.	Existentialist Aesthetics [BibTeX]	2015	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{deranty-existentialist-2015, author = {Deranty, Jean-Philippe}, title = {Existentialist Aesthetics}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2015}, edition = {Spring 2015}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aesthetics-existentialist/} }
Muneyuki, E., Toyabe, S., Sagawa, T., Sano, M. and Ueda, M.	Experimental demonstration of information-to-energy conversion and validation of the generalized Jarzynski equality [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Nature Physics Vol. 6(12), pp. 988-992	article
Abstract: In 1929, Leó Szilárd invented a feedback protocol in which a hypothetical intelligence-dubbed Maxwell's demon-pumps heat from an isothermal environment and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it was finally clarified that the demon's role does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, convert information to free energy. An experimental demonstration of this information-to-energy conversion, however, has been elusive. Here we demonstrate that a non-equilibrium feedback manipulation of a Brownian particle on the basis of information about its location achieves a Szilárd-type information-to-energy conversion. Using real-time feedback control, the particle is made to climb up a spiral-staircase-like potential exerted by an electric field and gains free energy larger than the amount of work done on it. This enables us to verify the generalized Jarzynski equality, and suggests a new fundamental principle of an 'information-to-heat engine' that converts information into energy by feedback control.; In 1929, Leo Szilard invented a feedback protocol in which a hypothetical intelligence–dubbed Maxwell's demon–pumps heat from an isothermal environment and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it was finally clarified that the demon's role does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, convert information to free energy. An experimental demonstration of this information-to-energy conversion, however, has been elusive. Here we demonstrate that a non-equilibrium feedback manipulation of a Brownian particle on the basis of information about its location achieves a Szilard-type information-to-energy conversion. Using real-time feedback control, the particle is made to climb up a spiral-staircase-like potential exerted by an electric field and gains free energy larger than the amount of work done on it. This enables us to verify the generalized Jarzynski equality, and suggests a new fundamental principle of an "information-to-heat engine" that converts information into energy by feedback control. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; In 1929, Leo Szilard invented a feedback protocol in which a hypothetical intelligence–dubbed Maxwell's demon–pumps heat from an isothermal environment and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it was finally clarified that the demon's role does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, convert information to free energy. An experimental demonstration of this information-to-energy conversion, however, has been elusive. Here we demonstrate that a non-equilibrium feedback manipulation of a Brownian particle on the basis of information about its location achieves a Szilard-type information-to-energy conversion. Using real-time feedback control, the particle is made to climb up a spiral-staircase-like potential exerted by an electric field and gains free energy larger than the amount of work done on it. This enables us to verify the generalized Jarzynski equality, and suggests a new fundamental principle of an "information-to-heat engine" that converts information into energy by feedback control. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{muneyuki-experimental-2010, author = {Muneyuki, Eiro and Toyabe, Shoichi and Sagawa, Takahiro and Sano, Masaki and Ueda, Masahito}, title = {Experimental demonstration of information-to-energy conversion and validation of the generalized Jarzynski equality}, journal = {Nature Physics}, year = {2010}, volume = {6}, number = {12}, pages = {988--992} }
Freedman, S.J. and Clauser, J.F.	Experimental test of local hidden-variable theories [BibTeX]	1972	Physical Review Letters Vol. 28(14), pp. 938-941	article
BibTeX: @article{freedman-experimental-1972, author = {Freedman, Stuart J. and Clauser, John F.}, title = {Experimental test of local hidden-variable theories}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, year = {1972}, volume = {28}, number = {14}, pages = {938--941} }
Samal, J.R., Pati, A.K. and Kumar, A.	Experimental Test of the Quantum No-Hiding Theorem [BibTeX]	2011	Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 106(8), pp. 080401	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{samal-experimental-2011, author = {Samal, Jharana Rani and Pati, Arun K. and Kumar, Anil}, title = {Experimental Test of the Quantum No-Hiding Theorem}, journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.}, year = {2011}, volume = {106}, number = {8}, pages = {080401}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.080401}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.080401} }
Aspect, A., Grangier, P. and Roger, G.	Experimental tests of realistic local theories via Bell's theorem [BibTeX]	1981	Physical Review Letters Vol. 47(7), pp. 460-463	article
BibTeX: @article{aspect-experimental-1981, author = {Aspect, Alain and Grangier, Philippe and Roger, Gérard}, title = {Experimental tests of realistic local theories via Bell's theorem}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, year = {1981}, volume = {47}, number = {7}, pages = {460--463} }
Hacking, I.	Experimentation and Scientific Realism [BibTeX]	1982	Philosophical Topics Vol. 13(1), pp. 71	article
BibTeX: @article{hacking-experimentation-1982, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {Experimentation and Scientific Realism}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, year = {1982}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {71} }
Dretske, F.I.	Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes [BibTeX]	1988		book
BibTeX: @book{dretske-explaining-1988, author = {Dretske, Fred I.}, title = {Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1988} }
Collier, J.	Explaining biological functionality : is control theory enough? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte Vol. 30(1), pp. 53-62	article
Abstract: It is generally agreed that organisms are Complex Adaptive Systems. Since the rise of Cybernetics in the middle of the last century ideas from information theory and control theory have been applied to the adaptations of biological organisms in order to explain how they work. This does not, however, explain functionality, which is widely but not universally attributed to biological systems. There are two approaches to functionality, one based on etiology (what a trait was selected for), and the other based in autonomy. I argue that the etiological approach, as understood in terms of control theory, suffers from a problem of symmetry, by which function can equally well be placed in the environment as in the organism. Focusing on the autonomy view, I note that it can be understood to some degree in terms of control theory in its version called second order cybernetics. I present an approach to second order cybernetics that seems plausible for organisms with limited computational power, due to Hooker, Penfold and Evans. They hold that this approach gives something like concepts, certainly abstractions from specific situations, a trait required for functionality in its system adaptive form (i.e., control of the system by itself). Using this cue, I argue that biosemiotics provides the methodology to incorporate these quasi concepts into an account of functionality.;It is generally agreed that organisms are Complex Adaptive Systems. Since the rise of Cybernetics in the middle of the last century ideas from information theory and control theory have been applied to the adaptations of biological organisms in order to explain how they work. This does not, however, explain functionality, which is widely but not universally attributed to biological systems. There are two approaches to functionality, one based on etiology (what a trait was selected for), and the other based in autonomy. I argue that the etiological approach, as understood in terms of control theory, suffers from a problem of symmetry, by which function can equally well be placed in the environment as in the organism. Focusing on the autonomy view, I note that it can be understood to some degree in terms of control theory in its version called second order cybernetics. I present an approach to second order cybernetics that seems plausible for organisms with limited computational power, due to Hooker, Penfold and Evans. They hold that this approach gives something like concepts, certainly abstractions from specific situations, a trait required for functionality in its system adaptive form (i.e., control of the system by itself). Using this cue, I argue that biosemiotics provides the methodology to incorporate these quasi concepts into an account of functionality. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{collier-explaining-2011, author = {Collier, John}, title = {Explaining biological functionality : is control theory enough?}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte}, year = {2011}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {53--62} }
Esfeld, M.	Explanation (Deductive-Nomological, Mereological, Reductive) [BibTeX]	2009		book
BibTeX: @book{esfeld-explanation-2009, author = {Esfeld, Michael}, title = {Explanation (Deductive-Nomological, Mereological, Reductive)}, year = {2009} }
Kitcher, P.	Explanation, Conjunction, and Unification [BibTeX]	1976	The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 73(8), pp. 207-212	article
BibTeX: @article{kitcher-explanation-1976, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Explanation, Conjunction, and Unification}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1976}, volume = {73}, number = {8}, pages = {207--212} }
Yablo, S.	Explanation, extrapolation, and existence [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Mind Vol. 121(484), pp. 1007-1029	article
Abstract: Mark Colyvan (2010) raises two problems for 'easy road' nominalism about mathematical objects. The first is that a theory's mathematical commitments may run too deep to permit the extraction of nominalistic content. Taking the math out is, or could be, like taking the hobbits out of Lord of the Rings. I agree with the 'could be', but not (or not yet) the 'is'. A notion of logical subtraction is developed that supports the possibility, questioned by Colyvan, of bracketing a theory's mathematical aspects to obtain, as remainder, what it says 'mathematics aside'. The other problem concerns explanation. Several grades of mathematical involvement in physical explanation are distinguished, by analogy with Quine's three grades of modal involvement. The first two grades plausibly obtain, but they do not require mathematical objects. The third grade is likelier to require mathematical objects. But it is not clear from Colyvan's example that the third grade really obtains. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Mark Colyvan (2010) raises two problems for 'easy road' nominalism about mathematical objects. The first is that a theory's mathematical commitments may run too deep to permit the extraction of nominalistic content. Taking the math out is, or could be, like taking the hobbits out of Lord of the Rings. I agree with the 'could be', but not (or not yet) the 'is'. A notion of logical subtraction is developed that supports the possibility, questioned by Colyvan, of bracketing a theory's mathematical aspects to obtain, as remainder, what it says 'mathematics aside'. The other problem concerns explanation. Several grades of mathematical involvement in physical explanation are distinguished, by analogy with Quine's three grades of modal involvement. The first two grades plausibly obtain, but they do not require mathematical objects. The third grade is likelier to require mathematical objects. But it is not clear from Colyvan's example that the third grade really obtains.
BibTeX: @article{yablo-explanation-2012, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {Explanation, extrapolation, and existence}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2012}, volume = {121}, number = {484}, pages = {1007--1029} }
Kitcher, P.	Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World [BibTeX]	1989	MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Vol. 13, pp. 410-505	article
BibTeX: @article{kitcher-explanatory-1989, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World}, journal = {MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, year = {1989}, volume = {13}, pages = {410--505} }
Humphreys, P.	Extending ourselves: computational science, empiricism, and scientific method [BibTeX]	2004		book
BibTeX: @book{humphreys-extending-2004, author = {Humphreys, Paul}, title = {Extending ourselves: computational science, empiricism, and scientific method}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004} }
Brustein, R. and Medved, A.J.M.	Falling through the black hole horizon [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2015(6), pp. 1-19	article
Abstract: We consider the fate of a small classical object, a “stick”, as it falls through the horizon of a large black hole (BH). Classically, the equivalence principle dictates that the stick is affected by small tidal forces, and Hawking’s quantum-mechanical model of BH evaporation makes essentially the same prediction. If, on the other hand, the BH horizon is surrounded by a “firewall”, the stick will be consumed as it falls through. We have recently extended Hawking’s model by taking into account the quantum fluctuations of the geometry and the classical back-reaction of the emitted particles. Here, we calculate the train exerted on the falling stick for our model. The strain depends on the near-horizon state of the Hawking pairs. We find that, after the Page time when the state of the pairs deviates significantly from maximal entanglement (as required by unitarity), the induced strain in our semiclassical model is still parametrically small. This is because the number of the disentangled pairs is parametrically smaller than the BH entropy. A firewall does, however, appear if the number of disentangled pairs near the horizon is of order of the BH entropy, as implicitly assumed in previous discussions in the literature.;We consider the fate of a small classical object, a "stick", as it falls through the horizon of a large black hole (BH). Classically, the equivalence principle dictates that the stick is affected by small tidal forces, and Hawking's quantum-mechanical model of BH evaporation makes essentially the same prediction. If, on the other hand, the BH horizon is surrounded by a "firewall", the stick will be consumed as it falls through. We have recently extended Hawking's model by taking into account the quantum fluctuations of the geometry and the classical back-reaction of the emitted particles. Here, we calculate the train exerted on the falling stick for our model. The strain depends on the near-horizon state of the Hawking pairs. We find that, after the Page time when the state of the pairs deviates significantly from maximal entanglement (as required by unitarity), the induced strain in our semiclassical model is still parametrically small. This is because the number of the disentangled pairs is parametrically smaller than the BH entropy. A firewall does, however, appear if the number of disentangled pairs near the horizon is of order of the BH entropy, as implicitly assumed in previous discussions in the literature.;
BibTeX: @article{brustein-falling-2015, author = {Brustein, Ram and Medved, A. J. M.}, title = {Falling through the black hole horizon}, journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics}, year = {2015}, volume = {2015}, number = {6}, pages = {1--19} }
Salinas, E.	Fast remapping of sensory stimuli onto motor actions on the basis of contextual modulation [BibTeX]	2004	J Neurosci Vol. 24	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{salinas-fast-2004, author = {Salinas, E.}, title = {Fast remapping of sensory stimuli onto motor actions on the basis of contextual modulation}, journal = {J Neurosci}, year = {2004}, volume = {24}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4569-03.2004}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4569-03.2004} }
Dierckx, B., Fannes, M. and Pogorzelska, M.	Fermionic quasifree states and maps in information theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2008	Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 49(3), pp. 032109-032109-18	article
Abstract: This paper and the results therein are geared toward building a basic toolbox for calculations in quantum information theory of quasifree fermionic systems. Various entropy and relative entropy measures are discussed. The main emphasis is on completely positive quasifree maps. The set of quasifree affine maps on the state space is determined and fully characterized in terms of operations on one-particle subspaces. For a subclass of trace-preserving completely positive maps and for their duals, Choi matrices and Jamiolkowski states are discussed. (C) 2008 American Institute of Physics.;This paper and the results therein are geared toward building a basic toolbox for calculations in quantum information theory of quasifree fermionic systems. Various entropy and relative entropy measures are discussed. The main emphasis is on completely positive quasifree maps. The set of quasifree affine maps on the state space is determined and fully characterized in terms of operations on one-particle subspaces. For a subclass of trace-preserving completely positive maps and for their duals, Choi matrices and Jamiolkowski states are discussed.;This paper and the results therein are geared toward building a basic toolbox for calculations in quantum information theory of quasifree fermionic systems. Various entropy and relative entropy measures are discussed. The main emphasis is on completely positive quasifree maps. The set of quasifree affine maps on the state space is determined and fully characterized in terms of operations on one-particle subspaces. For a subclass of trace-preserving completely positive maps and for their duals, Choi matrices and Jamiolkowski states are discussed.;
BibTeX: @article{dierckx-fermionic-2008, author = {Dierckx, B. and Fannes, M. and Pogorzelska, M.}, title = {Fermionic quasifree states and maps in information theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics}, year = {2008}, volume = {49}, number = {3}, pages = {032109--032109--18} }
Balaguer, M.	Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics [BibTeX]	2008		article
BibTeX: @article{balaguer-fictionalism-2008, author = {Balaguer, Mark}, title = {Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics}, year = {2008} }
Sherry, D.	Fields and the Intelligibility of Contact Action [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	PHILOSOPHY Vol. 90(3), pp. 457-477	article
Abstract: This article concerns arguments for the impossibility of contact action and, subsequently, the use of force fields to render intelligible apparent cases of contact action. I argue that instead of unraveling the mystery of contact action, fields only deepen the mystery. Further, I show that there is a confusion underlying arguments for the impossibility of contact and present an analysis of contact, based upon Korner's treatment of empirical continuity, which restores intelligibility to apparent cases of contact action.; This article concerns arguments for the impossibility of contact action and, subsequently, the use of force fields to render intelligible apparent cases of contact action. I argue that instead of unraveling the mystery of contact action, fields only deepen the mystery. Further, I show that there is a confusion underlying arguments for the impossibility of contact and present an analysis of contact, based upon Körner's treatment of empirical continuity, which restores intelligibility to apparent cases of contact action.;
BibTeX: @article{sherry-fields-2015, author = {Sherry, D.}, title = {Fields and the Intelligibility of Contact Action}, journal = {PHILOSOPHY}, year = {2015}, volume = {90}, number = {3}, pages = {457--477} }
Hines, R.D.	Financial Accounting Knowledge, Conceptual Framework Projects and the Social Construction of the Accounting Profession [BibTeX]	1989	Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal Vol. 2(2), pp. 72-92	article
BibTeX: @article{hines-financial-1989, author = {Hines, Ruth D.}, title = {Financial Accounting Knowledge, Conceptual Framework Projects and the Social Construction of the Accounting Profession}, journal = {Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {72--92} }
Frieden, B.R., Plastino, A. and Plastino, A.R.	Fisher order measure and Petri’s universe [BibTeX]	2011	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications	article
BibTeX: @article{frieden-fisher-2011, author = {Frieden, B. R. and Plastino, A. and Plastino, A. R.}, title = {Fisher order measure and Petri’s universe}, journal = {Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications}, year = {2011} }
Taylor, Y.	Fitting into place?: class and gender geographies and temporalities [BibTeX]	2012		book
BibTeX: @book{taylor-fitting-2012, author = {Taylor, Yvette}, title = {Fitting into place?: class and gender geographies and temporalities}, publisher = {Ashgate Publishing Ltd}, year = {2012} }
Vermeulen, P.	Flights of Memory: Teju Cole's Open City and the Limits of Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	jml: Journal of Modern Literature Vol. 37(1), pp. 40-57	article
Abstract: While Teju Cole’s 2011 novel Open City has been received as an exemplary cosmopolitan performance, a careful reading of the novel’s engagement with memories of suffering and of its evocations of aesthetic experiences shows that it interrogates rather than affirms an aesthetic cosmopolitan program. Through its use of a flat, nearly affectless tone, it renders visible the inability of contemporary calls for aesthetic and memorial cosmopolitan practices to engage a global landscape riven by injustice and inequality. As the novel progresses, its apparent celebration of the exemplary cosmopolitan figure of the flâneur makes way for the decidedly less glamorous figure of the fugueur. By mobilizing this marginal figure from the history of psychiatry, a condition marked by unwanted restlessness and ambulatory automatism, Open City exposes the limited critical purchase of the imaginative mobility and intercultural curiosity celebrated by cosmopolitan defenses of literature and art.;While Teju Cole's 2011 novel Open City has been received as an exemplary cosmopolitan performance, a careful reading of the novel's engagement with memories of suffering and of its evocations of aesthetic experiences shows that it interrogates rather than affirms an aesthetic cosmopolitan program. Through its use of a flat, nearly affectless tone, it renders visible the inability of contemporary calls for aesthetic and memorial cosmopolitan practices to engage a global landscape riven by injustice and inequality. As the novel progresses, its apparent celebration of the exemplary cosmopolitan figure of the flâneur makes way for the decidedly less glamorous figure of the fugueur. By mobilizing this marginal figure from the history of psychiatry, a condition marked by unwanted restlessness and ambulatory automatism, Open City exposes the limited critical purchase of the imaginative mobility and intercultural curiosity celebrated by cosmopolitan defenses of literature and art.; While Teju Cole's 2011 novel Open City has been received as an exemplary cosmopolitan performance, a careful reading of the novel's engagement with memories of suffering and of its evocations of aesthetic experiences shows that it interrogates rather than affirms an aesthetic cosmopolitan program. Through its use of a flat, nearly affectless tone, it renders visible the inability of contemporary calls for aesthetic and memorial cosmopolitan practices to engage a global landscape riven by injustice and inequality. As the novel progresses, its apparent celebration of the exemplary cosmopolitan figure of the flâneur makes way for the decidedly less glamorous figure of the fugueur. By mobilizing this marginal figure from the history of psychiatry, a condition marked by unwanted restlessness and ambulatory automatism, Open City exposes the limited critical purchase of the imaginative mobility and intercultural curiosity celebrated by cosmopolitan defenses of literature and art. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];While Teju Cole's 2011 novel Open City has been received as an exemplary cosmopolitan performance, a careful reading of the novel's engagement with memories of suffering and of its evocations of aesthetic experiences shows that it interrogates rather than affirms an aesthetic cosmopolitan program. Through its use of aflat, nearly affectless tone, it renders visible the inability of contemporary calls for aesthetic and memorial cosmopolitan practices to engage a global landscape riven by injustice and inequality. As the novel progresses, its apparent celebration of the exemplary cosmopolitan figure of the flaneur makes way for the decidedly less glamorous figure of the fugueur. By mobilizing this marginal figure from the history of psychiatry, a condition marked by unwanted restlessness and ambulatory automatism, Open City exposes the limited critical purchase of the imaginative mobility and intercultural curiosity celebrated by cosmopolitan defenses of literature and art.;While Teju Cole's 2011 novel Open City has been received as an exemplary cosmopolitan performance, a careful reading of the novel's engagement with memories of suffering and of its evocations of aesthetic experiences shows that it interrogates rather than affirms an aesthetic cosmopolitan program. Through its use of a flat, nearly affectless tone, it renders visible the inability of contemporary calls for aesthetic and memorial cosmopolitan practices to engage a global landscape riven by injustice and inequality. As the novel progresses, its apparent celebration of the exemplary cosmopolitan figure of the flâneur makes way for the decidedly less glamorous figure of the fugueur. By mobilizing this marginal figure from the history of psychiatry, a condition marked by unwanted restlessness and ambulatory automatism, Open City exposes the limited critical purchase of the imaginative mobility and intercultural curiosity celebrated by cosmopolitan defenses of literature and art.;
BibTeX: @article{vermeulen-flights-2013, author = {Vermeulen, Pieter}, title = {Flights of Memory: Teju Cole's Open City and the Limits of Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism}, journal = {jml: Journal of Modern Literature}, year = {2013}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {40--57} }
Worrall, J.	For Universal Rules, Against Induction [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Philosophy of Science Vol. 77(5), pp. 740-753	article
Abstract: This essay criticizes John Norton's 2010 defense of the thesis that "all induction is local." Norton's local inductions are bound, if cogent, to involve general principles, and the need to accredit these general principles threatens to lead to all the usual problems associated with the 'problem of induction'. Norton, in fact, recognizes this threat, but his responses are inadequate. The right response involves not induction but a sophisticated version of hypothetico-deduction. Norton's secondary thesis-that if there is a general account of cogent scientific reasoning, then it is certainly not the one supported by personalist Bayesians-is also criticized.;This essay criticizes John Norton's 2010 defense of the thesis that "all induction is local." Norton's local inductions are bound, if cogent, to involve general principles, and the need to accredit these general principles threatens to lead to all the usual problems associated with the 'problem of induction'. Norton, in fact, recognizes this threat, but his responses are inadequate. The right response involves not induction but a sophisticated version of hypothetico-deduction. Norton's secondary thesis – that if there is a general account of cogent scientific reasoning, then it is certainly not the one supported by personalist Bayesians – is also criticized. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];This essay criticizes John Norton's 2010 defense of the thesis that “all induction is local.” Norton's local inductions are bound, if cogent, to involve general principles, and the need to accredit these general principles threatens to lead to all the usual problems associated with the ‘problem of induction’. Norton, in fact, recognizes this threat, but his responses are inadequate. The right response involves not induction but a sophisticated version of hypothetico-deduction. Norton’s secondary thesis—that if there is a general account of cogent scientific reasoning, then it is certainly not the one supported by personalist Bayesians—is also criticized.;
BibTeX: @article{worrall-for-2010, author = {Worrall, John}, title = {For Universal Rules, Against Induction}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, volume = {77}, number = {5}, pages = {740--753} }
Jackson, F.	Foreward [BibTeX]	2005	There's Something About Mary Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{jackson-foreward-2005, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Foreward}, booktitle = {There's Something About Mary Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2005} }
Bateson, G.	Form, substance and difference [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	ETC.: A Review of General Semantics Vol. 72(1), pp. 90	article
Abstract: This article is taken from the text of Gregory Bateson's 1970 presentation at the Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture. The author biography is from the original AKML program notes.
BibTeX: @article{bateson-form-2015, author = {Bateson, Gregory}, title = {Form, substance and difference}, journal = {ETC.: A Review of General Semantics}, year = {2015}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, pages = {90} }
Sun, F., Hu, D. and Liu, H.	Foundations and Practical Applications of Cognitive Systems and Information Processing: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Cognitive Systems and Information Processing, Beijing, China, Dec 2012 (CSIP2012) [BibTeX]	2013	Vol. 215	book
BibTeX: @book{sun-foundations-2013, author = {Sun, Fuchun and Hu, Dewen and Liu, Huaping}, title = {Foundations and Practical Applications of Cognitive Systems and Information Processing: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Cognitive Systems and Information Processing, Beijing, China, Dec 2012 (CSIP2012)}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2013}, volume = {215} }
Nodelman, U. and Zalta, E.	Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	MIND Vol. 123(489), pp. 39-78	article
Abstract: We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts.; We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts.
BibTeX: @article{nodelman-foundations-2014, author = {Nodelman, U. and Zalta, EN}, title = {Foundations for Mathematical Structuralism}, journal = {MIND}, year = {2014}, volume = {123}, number = {489}, pages = {39--78} }
Salmon, W.	Four decades of scientific explanation [BibTeX]	1984	Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{salmon-four-1984, author = {Salmon, WC}, title = {Four decades of scientific explanation}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {University of Minnesota Press}, year = {1984} }
Cao, T.Y.	From current algebra to quantum chromodynamics: a case for structural realism [BibTeX]	2010		book
BibTeX: @book{cao-current-2010, author = {Cao, Tian Y.}, title = {From current algebra to quantum chromodynamics: a case for structural realism}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010} }
Floridi, L.	From data to semantic information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Entropy Vol. 5(2), pp. 125-145	article
Abstract: There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates the important implications of the revised definition for the analysis of the deflationary theories of truth, the standard definition of knowledge and the classic, quantitative theory of semantic information.
BibTeX: @article{floridi-data-2003, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {From data to semantic information}, journal = {Entropy}, year = {2003}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {125--145} }
Leuenberger, S.	From Grounding to Supervenience? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Erkenntnis Vol. 79(1), pp. 227-240	article
Abstract: The concept of supervenience and a regimented concept of grounding are often taken to provide rival explications of pre-theoretical concepts of dependence and determination. Friends of grounding typically point out that supervenience claims do not entail corresponding grounding claims. Every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded in itself, and the fact that a thing exists supervenes on the fact that its singleton exists, but is not grounded in it. Common lore has it, though, that grounding claims do entail corresponding supervenience claims. In this article, I show that this assumption is problematic. On one way of understanding it, the corresponding supervenience claim is just an entailment claim under a different name. On another way of understanding it, the corresponding claim is a distinctive supervenience claim, but its specification gives rise to what I call the "reference type problem": to associate the classes of facts that are the relata of grounding with the types of facts that are the relata of supervenience. However it is understood, supervenience rules out prima facie possibilities: alien realizers, blockers, heterogeneous realizers, floaters, and heterogeneous blockers. Instead of being rival explications of one and the same pre-theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience may be complementary concepts capturing different aspects of determination and dependence.; The concept of supervenience and a regimented concept of grounding are often taken to provide rival explications of pre-theoretical concepts of dependence and determination. Friends of grounding typically point out that supervenience claims do not entail corresponding grounding claims. Every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded in itself, and the fact that a thing exists supervenes on the fact that its singleton exists, but is not grounded in it. Common lore has it, though, that grounding claims do entail corresponding supervenience claims. In this article, I show that this assumption is problematic. On one way of understanding it, the corresponding supervenience claim is just an entailment claim under a different name. On another way of understanding it, the corresponding claim is a distinctive supervenience claim, but its specification gives rise to what I call the "reference type problem": to associate the classes of facts that are the relata of grounding with the types of facts that are the relata of supervenience. However it is understood, supervenience rules out prima facie possibilities: alien realizers, blockers, heterogeneous realizers, floaters, and heterogeneous blockers. Instead of being rival explications of one and the same pre-theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience may be complementary concepts capturing different aspects of determination and dependence.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];The concept of supervenience and a regimented concept of grounding are often taken to provide rival explications of pre-theoretical concepts of dependence and determination. Friends of grounding typically point out that supervenience claims do not entail corresponding grounding claims. Every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded in itself, and the fact that a thing exists supervenes on the fact that its singleton exists, but is not grounded in it. Common lore has it, though, that grounding claims do entail corresponding supervenience claims. In this article, I show that this assumption is problematic. On one way of understanding it, the corresponding supervenience claim is just an entailment claim under a different name. On another way of understanding it, the corresponding claim is a distinctive supervenience claim, but its specification gives rise to what I call the "reference type problem": to associate the classes of facts that are the relata of grounding with the types of facts that are the relata of supervenience. However it is understood, supervenience rules out prima facie possibilities: alien realizers, blockers, heterogeneous realizers, floaters, and heterogeneous blockers. Instead of being rival explications of one and the same pre-theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience may be complementary concepts capturing different aspects of determination and dependence.;The concept of supervenience and a regimented concept of grounding are often taken to provide rival explications of pre-theoretical concepts of dependence and determination. Friends of grounding typically point out that supervenience claims do not entail corresponding grounding claims. Every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded in itself, and the fact that a thing exists supervenes on the fact that its singleton exists, but is not grounded in it. Common lore has it, though, that grounding claims do entail corresponding supervenience claims. In this article, I show that this assumption is problematic. On one way of understanding it, the corresponding supervenience claim is just an entailment claim under a different name. On another way of understanding it, the corresponding claim is a distinctive supervenience claim, but its specification gives rise to what I call the "reference type problem": to associate the classes of facts that are the relata of grounding with the types of facts that are the relata of supervenience. However it is understood, supervenience rules out prima facie possibilities: alien realizers, blockers, heterogeneous realizers, floaters, and heterogeneous blockers. Instead of being rival explications of one and the same pre-theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience may be complementary concepts capturing different aspects of determination and dependence.;
BibTeX: @article{leuenberger-grounding-2014, author = {Leuenberger, Stephan}, title = {From Grounding to Supervenience?}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {2014}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {227--240} }
McMullin, E.	From matter to materialism … and (almost) back [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 13-37	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{mcmullin-matter-2010, author = {McMullin, Ernan}, title = {From matter to materialism … and (almost) back}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {13--37}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.002} }
Jackson, F.	From metaphysics to ethics [BibTeX]	1998		article
BibTeX: @article{jackson-metaphysics-1998-1, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {From metaphysics to ethics}, year = {1998} }
Jackson, F.	From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis [BibTeX]	1998		book
BibTeX: @book{jackson-metaphysics-1998, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis}, publisher = {Clarendon}, year = {1998} }
Redhead, M.	From physics to metaphysics [BibTeX]	1995		book
BibTeX: @book{redhead-physics-1995, author = {Redhead, Michael}, title = {From physics to metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1995} }
Kernaghan, M.	From Physics to Metaphysics Michael Redhead Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, xiii + 87 pp [BibTeX]	1998	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Vol. 37(3), pp. 630-631	article
BibTeX: @article{kernaghan-physics-1998, author = {Kernaghan, Michael}, title = {From Physics to Metaphysics Michael Redhead Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, xiii + 87 pp}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie}, year = {1998}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, pages = {630--631} }
Siegfried, T.	FROM THE EDITOR: Erasing any doubt that information is physical [BibTeX]	2012	Vol. 181(7)	book
BibTeX: @book{siegfried-editor:-2012, author = {Siegfried, Tom}, title = {FROM THE EDITOR: Erasing any doubt that information is physical}, year = {2012}, volume = {181}, number = {7} }
Cartier, P., Moussa, P., Julia, B., Vanhove, P. and service) , S.(O.	Frontiers in Number Theory, Physics, and Geometry II: On Conformal Field Theories, Discrete Groups and Renormalization [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{cartier-frontiers-2007, author = {Cartier, Pierre and Moussa, Pierre and Julia, Bernard and Vanhove, Pierre and service), SpringerLink (Online}, title = {Frontiers in Number Theory, Physics, and Geometry II: On Conformal Field Theories, Discrete Groups and Renormalization}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, year = {2007} }
Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R.	Functions [BibTeX]	1987	, pp. 181-196	article
BibTeX: @article{bigelow-functions-1987, author = {Bigelow, John and Pargetter, Robert}, title = {Functions}, year = {1987}, pages = {181--196} }
Knuth, D.E.	Fundamental Algorithms [BibTeX]	1973		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{knuth-fundamental-1973, author = {Knuth, Donald E.}, title = {Fundamental Algorithms}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1973} }
Borda, M.	Fundamentals in information theory and coding [BibTeX]	2011		book
BibTeX: @book{borda-fundamentals-2011, author = {Borda, Monica}, title = {Fundamentals in information theory and coding}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {2011} }
Kolb, B. and Whishaw, I.Q.	Fundamentals of human neuropsychology [BibTeX]	1996		book
BibTeX: @book{kolb-fundamentals-1996, author = {Kolb, B. and Whishaw, I. Q.}, title = {Fundamentals of human neuropsychology}, publisher = {WH. Freeman}, year = {1996} }
Healey, R.	Gauge theories and holisms [BibTeX]	2004	Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 619-642	article
BibTeX: @article{healey-gauge-2004, author = {Healey, Richard}, title = {Gauge theories and holisms}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {619--642} }
Healey, R.	Gauging what's real: the conceptual foundations of contemporary gauge theories [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{healey-gauging-2007, author = {Healey, Richard}, title = {Gauging what's real: the conceptual foundations of contemporary gauge theories}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007} }
Barnum, H., Knill, E., Ortiz, G. and Viola, L.	Generalizations of entanglement based on coherent states and convex sets [BibTeX]	2003	Phys. Rev. A Vol. 68(3), pp. 032308	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{barnum-generalizations-2003, author = {Barnum, Howard and Knill, Emanuel and Ortiz, Gerardo and Viola, Lorenza}, title = {Generalizations of entanglement based on coherent states and convex sets}, journal = {Phys. Rev. A}, year = {2003}, volume = {68}, number = {3}, pages = {032308}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.68.032308}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.68.032308} }
Barnum, H., Barrett, J., Leifer, M. and Wilce, A.	Generalized No-Broadcasting Theorem [BibTeX]	2007	Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 99(24), pp. 240501	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{barnum-generalized-2007, author = {Barnum, Howard and Barrett, Jonathan and Leifer, Matthew and Wilce, Alexander}, title = {Generalized No-Broadcasting Theorem}, journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.}, year = {2007}, volume = {99}, number = {24}, pages = {240501}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.99.240501}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.99.240501} }
Janotta, P. and Lal, R.	Generalized probabilistic theories without the no-restriction hypothesis [BibTeX]	2013	Phys. Rev. A Vol. 87(5), pp. 052131	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{janotta-generalized-2013, author = {Janotta, Peter and Lal, Raymond}, title = {Generalized probabilistic theories without the no-restriction hypothesis}, journal = {Phys. Rev. A}, year = {2013}, volume = {87}, number = {5}, pages = {052131}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.87.052131}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.87.052131} }
Stegmann, U.E.	Genetic Information as Instructional Content [BibTeX]	2005	Philosophy of Science Vol. 72(3), pp. 425-443	article
BibTeX: @article{stegmann-genetic-2005, author = {Stegmann, Ulrich E}, title = {Genetic Information as Instructional Content}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2005}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, pages = {425--443} }
Griffiths, P.E.	Genetic Information: A Metaphor in Search of a Theory [BibTeX]	2001	Philosophy of Science Vol. 68(3), pp. 394-412	article
BibTeX: @article{griffiths-genetic-2001, author = {Griffiths, Paul E.}, title = {Genetic Information: A Metaphor in Search of a Theory}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, volume = {68}, number = {3}, pages = {394--412} }
Graziano, M.	Genetics and Philosophy by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 270, £50 (hardback) [BibTeX]	2015	Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 93(2), pp. 408-408	article
BibTeX: @article{graziano-genetics-2015, author = {Graziano, Mario}, title = {Genetics and Philosophy by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 270, £50 (hardback)}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2015}, volume = {93}, number = {2}, pages = {408--408} }
Griffiths, P. and Stotz, K.	Genetics and philosophy: an introduction [BibTeX]	2013		book
BibTeX: @book{griffiths-genetics-2013, author = {Griffiths, Paul and Stotz, Karola}, title = {Genetics and philosophy: an introduction}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2013} }
Sarkar, S.	Genetics and reductionism [BibTeX]	1998		book
BibTeX: @book{sarkar-genetics-1998, author = {Sarkar, Sahotra}, title = {Genetics and reductionism}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998} }
Edensor Tim, D.	Geographies of Rhythm: Nature, Place, Mobilities and Bodies [BibTeX]	2012		book
BibTeX: @book{edensor-geographies-2012, author = {Edensor, Tim, Dr}, title = {Geographies of Rhythm: Nature, Place, Mobilities and Bodies}, publisher = {Ashgate Publishing Ltd}, year = {2012} }
Giammei, A.	Giorgio de Chirico and the Metaphysical City. Nietzsche, Modernism, Paris [BibTeX]	2016	Italian Culture Vol. 34(2), pp. 124-125	article
BibTeX: @article{giammei-giorgio-2016, author = {Giammei, Alessandro}, title = {Giorgio de Chirico and the Metaphysical City. Nietzsche, Modernism, Paris}, journal = {Italian Culture}, year = {2016}, volume = {34}, number = {2}, pages = {124--125} }
Primiero, G.	Giovanni Sommaruga (ed): Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5363, Springer, New York, 2009, vii+269, $ 64.95, ISBN 978-3-642-00658-6 [BibTeX]	2011	Minds and Machines Vol. 21(1), pp. 119-122	article
BibTeX: @article{primiero-giovanni-2011, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, title = {Giovanni Sommaruga (ed): Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5363, Springer, New York, 2009, vii+269, $ 64.95, ISBN 978-3-642-00658-6}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2011}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, pages = {119--122} }
Ward, K.	God as the ultimate informational principle [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 282-300	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{ward-god-2010, author = {Ward, Keith}, title = {God as the ultimate informational principle}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {282--300}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.013} }
Hawking, S.	God created the integers: the mathematical breakthroughs that changed history [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{hawking-god-2007, author = {Hawking, Stephen}, title = {God created the integers: the mathematical breakthroughs that changed history}, publisher = {Running Press}, year = {2007} }
Chaitin, G.J.	Gödel's theorem and information [BibTeX]	1982	International Journal of Theoretical Physics Vol. 21(12), pp. 941-954	article
BibTeX: @article{chaitin-gos-1982, author = {Chaitin, Gregory J.}, title = {Gödel's theorem and information}, journal = {International Journal of Theoretical Physics}, year = {1982}, volume = {21}, number = {12}, pages = {941--954} }
Lam, V.	Gravitational and Nongravitational Energy: The Need for Background Structures [BibTeX]	2011	Vol. 78(5), pp. 1012-1023	article
BibTeX: @article{lam-gravitational-2011, author = {Lam, Vincent}, title = {Gravitational and Nongravitational Energy: The Need for Background Structures}, year = {2011}, volume = {78}, number = {5}, pages = {1012--1023} }
Lee, J.-W., Kim, H.-C. and Lee, J.	Gravity from quantum information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Journal of the Korean Physical Society Vol. 63(5), pp. 1094-1098	article	DOI URL
Abstract: We suggest that the Einstein equation can be derived from Landauer's principle applied to an information erasing process at a local Rindler horizon and Jacobson's idea linking the Einstein equation with thermodynamics. When matter crosses the horizon, information on the matter disappears, and the horizon entanglement entropy increases to compensate for the entropy reduction. The Einstein equation describes an information-energy relation during this process, which implies that entropic gravity is related to the quantum entanglement of the vacuum and has a quantuminformation theoretic origin.
BibTeX: @article{lee-gravity-2013, author = {Lee, Jae-Weon and Kim, Hyeong-Chan and Lee, Jungjai}, title = {Gravity from quantum information}, journal = {Journal of the Korean Physical Society}, year = {2013}, volume = {63}, number = {5}, pages = {1094--1098}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3938/jkps.63.1094}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.3938/jkps.63.1094} }
Everitt, C.W.F., DeBra, D.B., Parkinson, B.W., Turneaure, J.P., Conklin, J.W., Heifetz, M.I., Keiser, G.M., Silbergleit, A.S., Holmes, T., Kolodziejczak, J., Al-Meshari, M., Mester, J.C., Muhlfelder, B., Solomonik, V.G., Stahl, K., Worden, P.W., Bencze, W., Buchman, S., Clarke, B., Al-Jadaan, A., Al-Jibreen, H., Li, J., Lipa, J.A., Lockhart, J.M., Al-Suwaidan, B., Taber, M. and Wang, S.	Gravity Probe B: Final Results of a Space Experiment to Test General Relativity [BibTeX]	2011	Phys. Rev. Lett. Vol. 106(22), pp. 221101	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{everitt-gravity-2011, author = {Everitt, C. W. F. and DeBra, D. B. and Parkinson, B. W. and Turneaure, J. P. and Conklin, J. W. and Heifetz, M. I. and Keiser, G. M. and Silbergleit, A. S. and Holmes, T. and Kolodziejczak, J. and Al-Meshari, M. and Mester, J. C. and Muhlfelder, B. and Solomonik, V. G. and Stahl, K. and Worden, P. W. and Bencze, W. and Buchman, S. and Clarke, B. and Al-Jadaan, A. and Al-Jibreen, H. and Li, J. and Lipa, J. A. and Lockhart, J. M. and Al-Suwaidan, B. and Taber, M. and Wang, S.}, title = {Gravity Probe B: Final Results of a Space Experiment to Test General Relativity}, journal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.}, year = {2011}, volume = {106}, number = {22}, pages = {221101}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.221101}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.221101} }
Trogdon, K.	Grounding: Necessary or Contingent? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 94(4), pp. 465-485	article
Abstract: Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with F ine's A ristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary.; Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is 'yes' in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with Fine's Aristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is 'yes' in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with Fine's Aristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary.; Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse-grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is 'yes' in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with Fine's Aristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{trogdon-grounding:-2013, author = {Trogdon, Kelly}, title = {Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2013}, volume = {94}, number = {4}, pages = {465--485} }
Audi, P.	Grounding: toward a theory of the in-virtue-of relation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Journal of Philosophy Vol. 109(12), pp. 685	article
Abstract: Audi argues that people must recognize grounding as a distinct relation of determination, and say with as much precision as possible what grounding is and how the concept can be useful in philosophy. There are certain non-fundamental properties, properties that are never instantiated brutely, but always because some other properties are. It is in making sense of the force of this because that grounding earns its keep.; Audi argues that people must recognize grounding as a distinct relation of determination, and say with as much precision as possible what grounding is and how the concept can be useful in philosophy. There are certain non-fundamental properties, properties that are never instantiated brutely, but always because some other properties are. It is in making sense of the force of this because that grounding earns its keep.;
BibTeX: @article{audi-grounding:-2012, author = {Audi, Paul}, title = {Grounding: toward a theory of the in-virtue-of relation}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2012}, volume = {109}, number = {12}, pages = {685} }
Resnik, D.B.	Hacking's experimental realism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1994	Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 24(3), pp. 395	article
Abstract: Ian Hacking's argument for experimental realism is another version of the "success of science" argument. Hacking does not succeed in shifting the defense of realism away from questions of scientific representation.
BibTeX: @article{resnik-hackings-1994, author = {Resnik, David B.}, title = {Hacking's experimental realism}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1994}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {395} }
Rovelli, C.	Halfway through the woods: Contemporary research on space and time [BibTeX]	1997	The Cosmos of Science, pp. 180-223	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{rovelli-halfway-1997, author = {Rovelli, Carlo}, title = {Halfway through the woods: Contemporary research on space and time}, booktitle = {The Cosmos of Science}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {1997}, pages = {180--223}, url = {http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/text-idx?idno=31735057894010;view=toc;c=pittpress} }
Anand, P.	Happiness explained: what human flourishing is and what we can do to promote it [BibTeX]	2016		book
BibTeX: @book{anand-happiness-2016, author = {Anand, Paul}, title = {Happiness explained: what human flourishing is and what we can do to promote it}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2016}, edition = {First} }
Cahn, S.M. and Vitrano, C.	Happiness: classic and contemporary readings in philosophy [BibTeX]	2007		book
BibTeX: @book{cahn-happiness:-2007, author = {Cahn, Steven M. and Vitrano, Christine}, title = {Happiness: classic and contemporary readings in philosophy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007} }
Prinz, J.	Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2 [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Mind Vol. 120(478), pp. 485-501	article
Abstract: Prinz reviews LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited by Jerry A. Fodor.
BibTeX: @article{prinz-has-2011, author = {Prinz, Jesse}, title = {Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2011}, volume = {120}, number = {478}, pages = {485--501} }
Ercan, I. and Anderson, N.G.	Heat Dissipation in Nanocomputing: Lower Bounds From Physical Information Theory [BibTeX]	2013	IEEE Transactions on Nanotechnology Vol. 12(6), pp. 1047-1060	article
BibTeX: @article{ercan-heat-2013, author = {Ercan, Ilke and Anderson, Neal G.}, title = {Heat Dissipation in Nanocomputing: Lower Bounds From Physical Information Theory}, journal = {IEEE Transactions on Nanotechnology}, year = {2013}, volume = {12}, number = {6}, pages = {1047--1060} }
Johnson, H. and Boelter, L.	Heat Transfer, Thermodynamics, and Education: Boelter Anniversary Volume [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1964		book	URL
Abstract: LCCN: 63022596
BibTeX: @book{johnson-heat-1964, author = {Johnson, H.A. and Boelter, L.M.K.}, title = {Heat Transfer, Thermodynamics, and Education: Boelter Anniversary Volume}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {1964}, url = {https://books.google.com.au/books?id=RdohAQAAIAAJ} }
Reeb, D., Kastoryano, M.J. and Wolf, M.M.	Hilbert's projective metric in quantum information theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 52(8), pp. 082201-082201-33	article
Abstract: We introduce and apply Hilbert's projective metric in the context of quantum information theory. The metric is induced by convex cones such as the sets of positive, separable or positive partial transpose operators. It provides bounds on measures for statistical distinguishability of quantum states and on the decrease of entanglement under protocols involving local quantum operations and classical communication or under other cone-preserving operations. The results are formulated in terms of general cones and base norms and lead to contractivity bounds for quantum channels, for instance, improving Ruskai's trace-norm contraction inequality. A new duality between distinguishability measures and base norms is provided. For two given pairs of quantum states we show that the contraction of Hilbert's projective metric is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a probabilistic quantum operation that maps one pair onto the other. Inequalities between Hilbert's projective metric and the Chernoff bound, the fidelity and various norms are proven. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];We introduce and apply Hilbert's projective metric in the context of quantum information theory. The metric is induced by convex cones such as the sets of positive, separable or positive partial transpose operators. It provides bounds on measures for statistical distinguishability of quantum states and on the decrease of entanglement under protocols involving local quantum operations and classical communication or under other cone-preserving operations. The results are formulated in terms of general cones and base norms and lead to contractivity bounds for quantum channels, for instance, improving Ruskai's trace-norm contraction inequality. A new duality between distinguishability measures and base norms is provided. For two given pairs of quantum states we show that the contraction of Hilbert's projective metric is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a probabilistic quantum operation that maps one pair onto the other. Inequalities between Hilbert's projective metric and the Chernoff bound, the fidelity and various norms are proven. (C) 2011 American Institute of Physics. [doi: 10.1063/1.3615729];We introduce and apply Hilbert's projective metric in the context of quantum information theory. The metric is induced by convex cones such as the sets of positive, separable or positive partial transpose operators. It provides bounds on measures for statistical distinguishability of quantum states and on the decrease of entanglement under protocols involving local quantum operations and classical communication or under other cone-preserving operations. The results are formulated in terms of general cones and base norms and lead to contractivity bounds for quantum channels, for instance, improving Ruskai's trace-norm contraction inequality. A new duality between distinguishability measures and base norms is provided. For two given pairs of quantum states we show that the contraction of Hilbert's projective metric is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a probabilistic quantum operation that maps one pair onto the other. Inequalities between Hilbert's projective metric and the Chernoff bound, the fidelity and various norms are proven. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];We introduce and apply Hilbert's projective metric in the context of quantum information theory. The metric is induced by convex cones such as the sets of positive, separable or positive partial transpose operators. It provides bounds on measures for statistical distinguishability of quantum states and on the decrease of entanglement under protocols involving local quantum operations and classical communication or under other cone-preserving operations. The results are formulated in terms of general cones and base norms and lead to contractivity bounds for quantum channels, for instance, improving Ruskai's trace-norm contraction inequality. A new duality between distinguishability measures and base norms is provided. For two given pairs of quantum states we show that the contraction of Hilbert's projective metric is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a probabilistic quantum operation that maps one pair onto the other. Inequalities between Hilbert's projective metric and the Chernoff bound, the fidelity and various norms are proven.;We introduce and apply Hilbert's projective metric in the context of quantum information theory. The metric is induced by convex cones such as the sets of positive, separable or positive partial transpose operators. It provides bounds on measures for statistical distinguishability of quantum states and on the decrease of entanglement under protocols involving local quantum operations and classical communication or under other cone-preserving operations. The results are formulated in terms of general cones and base norms and lead to contractivity bounds for quantum channels, for instance, improving Ruskai's trace-norm contraction inequality. A new duality between distinguishability measures and base norms is provided. For two given pairs of quantum states we show that the contraction of Hilbert's projective metric is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a probabilistic quantum operation that maps one pair onto the other. Inequalities between Hilbert's projective metric and the Chernoff bound, the fidelity and various norms are proven.;
BibTeX: @article{reeb-hilberts-2011, author = {Reeb, David and Kastoryano, Michael J. and Wolf, Michael M.}, title = {Hilbert's projective metric in quantum information theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics}, year = {2011}, volume = {52}, number = {8}, pages = {082201--082201--33} }
Hacking, I.	Historical ontology [BibTeX]	2002		book
BibTeX: @book{hacking-historical-2002, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {Historical ontology}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {2002} }
Collier, J.	Holism and emergence : dynamical complexity defeats Laplace's demon [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte Vol. 30(2), pp. 229-243	article
Abstract: The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace's demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, and that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, and violate the Lapacean requirements of locality and predictability, opening the door to holism and nonreducibility, i.e., emergence. Despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo, though emergence has been used somewhat indiscriminately in recent scientific literature. I make some remarks at the end about the proper use of emergence in its traditional sense going back to C.D. Broad. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];The paradigm of Laplacean determinism combines three regulative principles: determinism, predictability, and the explanatory adequacy of universal laws together with purely local conditions. Historically, it applied to celestial mechanics, but it has been expanded into an ideal for scientific theories whose cogency is often not questioned. Laplace's demon is an idealization of mechanistic scientific method. Its principles together imply reducibility, and rule out holism and emergence. I will argue that Laplacean determinism fails even in the realm of planetary dynamics, and that it does not give suitable criteria for explanatory success except within very well defined and rather exceptional domains. Ironically, the very successes of Laplacean method in the Solar System were made possible only by processes that are not themselves tractable to Laplacean methodology. The results of some of these processes were first observed in 1964, and violate the Lapacean requirements of locality and predictability, opening the door to holism and nonreducibility, i.e., emergence. Despite the falsification of Laplacean methodology, the explanatory resources of holism and emergence remain in scientific limbo, though emergence has been used somewhat indiscriminately in recent scientific literature. I make some remarks at the end about the proper use of emergence in its traditional sense going back to C.D. Broad.;
BibTeX: @article{collier-holism-2011, author = {Collier, John}, title = {Holism and emergence : dynamical complexity defeats Laplace's demon}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy = Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Wysbegeerte}, year = {2011}, volume = {30}, number = {2}, pages = {229--243} }
Healey, R.A.	Holism and Nonseparability [BibTeX]	1991	The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88(8), pp. 393-421	article
BibTeX: @article{healey-holism-1991, author = {Healey, Richard A.}, title = {Holism and Nonseparability}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1991}, volume = {88}, number = {8}, pages = {393--421} }
Arageorgis, A.	Holism and nonseparability by analogy [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 44(3), pp. 206	article
Abstract: This paper explores the issues of holism and nonseparability in relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) by focusing on an analog of the typical model featuring in many discussions of holism and nonseparability in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. It is argued that the quantum field theoretic model does exhibit holism in a metaphysical sense and that there are plausible grounds to view QFT holistic in an epistemological sense. However, the complexities arising from the fact that quantum fields have infinite degrees of freedom prohibit the exploitation of the elaborated analogy toward demonstrating that the QFT model exhibits the kind of state nonseparability familiar from ordinary quantum mechanics. Still, it is argued that the QFT model does satisfy a rather weak epistemological criterion for state nonseparability.
BibTeX: @article{arageorgis-holism-2013, author = {Arageorgis, Aristidis}, title = {Holism and nonseparability by analogy}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2013}, volume = {44}, number = {3}, pages = {206} }
Lyre, H.	Holism and structuralism in U(1) gauge theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2004	Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 643-670	article
Abstract: After decades of neglect philosophers of physics have discovered gauge theories-arguably the paradigm of modern field physics-as a genuine topic for foundational and philosophical research. Incidentally, in the last couple of years interest from the philosophy of physics in structural realism-in the eyes of its proponents the best suited realist position towards modern physics-has also raised. This paper tries to connect both topics and aims to show that structural realism gains further credence from an ontological analysis of gauge theories-in particular U(I) gauge theory. In the first part of the paper the framework of fiber bundle gauge theories is briefly presented and the interpretation of local gauge symmetry will be examined. In the second part, an ontological underdetermination of gauge theories is carved out by considering the various kinds of non-locality involved in such typical effects as the Aharonov-Bohm effect. The analysis shows that the peculiar form of non-separability figuring in gauge theories is a variant of spatiotemporal holism and can be distinguished from quantum theoretic holism. In the last part of the paper the arguments for a gauge theoretic support of structural realism are laid out and discussed. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.; After decades of neglect philosophers of physics have discovered gauge theories-arguably the paradigm of modern field physics-as a genuine topic for foundational and philosophical research. Incidentally, in the last couple of years interest from the philosophy of physics in structural realism-in the eyes of its proponents the best suited realist position towards modern physics-has also raised. This paper tries to connect both topics and aims to show that structural realism gains further credence from an ontological analysis of gauge theories-in particular U(1) gauge theory. In the first part of the paper the framework of fiber bundle gauge theories is briefly presented and the interpretation of local gauge symmetry will be examined. In the second part, an ontological underdetermination of gauge theories is carved out by considering the various kinds of non-locality involved in such typical effects as the Aharonov-Bohm effect. The analysis shows that the peculiar form of non-separability figuring in gauge theories is a variant of spatiotemporal holism and can be distinguished from quantum theoretic holism. In the last part of the paper the arguments for a gauge theoretic support of structural realism are laid out and discussed. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
BibTeX: @article{lyre-holism-2004, author = {Lyre, Holger}, title = {Holism and structuralism in U(1) gauge theory}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {643--670} }
Seevinck, M.P.	Holism, physical theories and quantum mechanics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2004	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 693 - 712	article	DOI URL
Abstract: Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by `holism'. For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology. I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.
BibTeX: @article{seevinck-holism-2004, author = {Seevinck, M. P.}, title = {Holism, physical theories and quantum mechanics}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {693 -- 712}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219804000577}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2004.08.001} }
Lengagne, T., Aubin, T., Lauga, J. and Jouventin, P.	How do king penguins (Aptenodytes patagonicus apply the mathematical theory of information to communicate in windy conditions? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1999	Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences Vol. 266(1429), pp. 1623-1628	article
Abstract: In the king penguin (
BibTeX: @article{lengagne-how-1999, author = {Lengagne, T. and Aubin, T. and Lauga, J. and Jouventin, P.}, title = {How do king penguins (Aptenodytes patagonicus apply the mathematical theory of information to communicate in windy conditions?}, journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {266}, number = {1429}, pages = {1623--1628} }
Schulte, P.	How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test [BibTeX]	2012	Philosophia (United States) Vol. 40(3), pp. 483-496	article
BibTeX: @article{schulte-how-2012, author = {Schulte, Peter}, title = {How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test}, journal = {Philosophia (United States)}, year = {2012}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, pages = {483--496} }
Sarkar, S.	How Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits [BibTeX]	2006	Molecular Models of Life: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology, pp. 261-286	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{sarkar-how-2006, author = {Sarkar, Sahotra}, title = {How Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits}, booktitle = {Molecular Models of Life: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2006}, pages = {261--286} }
Humphreys, P.	How Properties Emerge [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1997	Philosophy of Science Vol. 64(1), pp. 1-17	article
Abstract: A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.;A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exlusion argument is then provided.;
BibTeX: @article{humphreys-how-1997, author = {Humphreys, Paul}, title = {How Properties Emerge}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, number = {1}, pages = {1--17} }
Rutter, M.	How the environment affects mental health [BibTeX]	2005	The British Journal of Psychiatry Vol. 186(1), pp. 4-6	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{rutter-how-2005, author = {Rutter, Michael}, title = {How the environment affects mental health}, journal = {The British Journal of Psychiatry}, year = {2005}, volume = {186}, number = {1}, pages = {4--6}, url = {http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/186/1/4}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.186.1.4} }
Floridi, L.	How to account for information [BibTeX]	2010	, pp. 1-15	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{floridi-how-2010, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {How to account for information}, year = {2010}, pages = {1--15} }
Pincock, C.	How to avoid inconsistent idealizations [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Synthese Vol. 191(13), pp. 2957-2972	article
Abstract: Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation.; Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation.; Issue Title: IS SCIENCE INCONSISTENT? Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation.
BibTeX: @article{pincock-how-2014, author = {Pincock, Christopher}, title = {How to avoid inconsistent idealizations}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2014}, volume = {191}, number = {13}, pages = {2957--2972} }
Landry, E.	How to be a structuralist all the way down [BibTeX]	2011	Synthese Vol. 179(3), pp. 435-454	article
BibTeX: @article{landry-how-2011, author = {Landry, Elaine}, title = {How to be a structuralist all the way down}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2011}, volume = {179}, number = {3}, pages = {435--454} }
Greco, G.M., Paronitti, G., Turilli, M. and Floridi, L.	How to do philosophy informationally [BibTeX]	2005	Vol. 3782, pp. 623-634	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{greco-how-2005, author = {Greco, Gian M. and Paronitti, Gianluca and Turilli, Matteo and Floridi, Luciano}, title = {How to do philosophy informationally}, year = {2005}, volume = {3782}, pages = {623--634} }
Iser, W.	How to do theory [BibTeX]	2006		book
BibTeX: @book{iser-how-2006, author = {Iser, Wolfgang}, title = {How to do theory}, publisher = {Blackwell Pub}, year = {2006} }
Chaitin, G.J.	How to run algorithmic information theory on a computer:Studying the limits of mathematical reasoning [BibTeX]	1996	Complexity Vol. 2(1), pp. 15-21	article
BibTeX: @article{chaitin-how-1996, author = {Chaitin, Gregory J.}, title = {How to run algorithmic information theory on a computer:Studying the limits of mathematical reasoning}, journal = {Complexity}, year = {1996}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {15--21} }
Bandyopadhyay, P.S., Bennett, J.G. and Higgs, M.D.	How to Undermine Underdetermination? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Foundations of Science Vol. 20(2), pp. 107-127	article
Abstract: The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.;The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.;The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.;
BibTeX: @article{bandyopadhyay-how-2015, author = {Bandyopadhyay, Prasanta S. and Bennett, John G. and Higgs, Megan D.}, title = {How to Undermine Underdetermination?}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, year = {2015}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, pages = {107--127} }
Russell, B.	Human knowledge; its scope and limits. (reprint, 1948) [BibTeX]	1948	Vol. 24(3)	book
BibTeX: @book{russell-human-1948, author = {Russell, Bertrand}, title = {Human knowledge; its scope and limits. (reprint, 1948)}, publisher = {Simon and Schuster}, year = {1948}, volume = {24}, number = {3} }
Lewis, D.	Humean Supervenience Debugged [BibTeX]	1994	Mind Vol. 103(412), pp. 473-490	article
BibTeX: @article{lewis-humean-1994, author = {Lewis, David}, title = {Humean Supervenience Debugged}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1994}, volume = {103}, number = {412}, pages = {473--490} }
Gracyk, T.	Hume's Aesthetics [BibTeX]	2016	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{gracyk-humes-2016, author = {Gracyk, Theodore}, title = {Hume's Aesthetics}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2016}, edition = {Summer 2016}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/hume-aesthetics/} }
Spiegelberg, H.	Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism [BibTeX]	1960	The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 57(2), pp. 62-74	article	URL
BibTeX: @article{spiegelberg-husserls-1960, author = {Spiegelberg, Herbert}, title = {Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1960}, volume = {57}, number = {2}, pages = {62--74}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2022808} }
Bernhardt, H. and Tate, W.	Hypothesis The transition from noncoded to coded protein synthesis: did coding mRNAs arise from stability-enhancing binding partners to tRNA? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	BIOLOGY DIRECT Vol. 5	article
Abstract: Background: Understanding the origin of protein synthesis has been notoriously difficult. We have taken as a starting premise Wolf and Koonin's view that "evolution of the translation system is envisaged to occur in a compartmentalized ensemble of replicating, co-selected RNA segments, i. e., in an RNA world containing ribozymes with versatile activities". Presentation of the hypothesis: We propose that coded protein synthesis arose from a noncoded process in an RNA world as a natural consequence of the accumulation of a range of early tRNAs and their serendipitous RNA binding partners. We propose that, initially, RNA molecules with 3' CCA termini that could be aminoacylated by ribozymes, together with an ancestral peptidyl transferase ribozyme, produced small peptides with random or repetitive sequences. Our concept is that the first tRNA arose in this context from the ligation of two RNA hairpins and could be similarly aminoacylated at its 3' end to become a substrate for peptidyl transfer catalyzed by the ancestral ribozyme. Within this RNA world we hypothesize that proto-mRNAs appeared first simply as serendipitous binding partners, forming complementary base pair interactions with the anticodon loops of tRNA pairs. Initially this may have enhanced stability of the paired tRNA molecules so they were held together in close proximity, better positioning the 3' CCA termini for peptidyl transfer and enhancing the rate of peptide synthesis. If there were a selective advantage for the ensemble through the peptide products synthesized, it would provide a natural pathway for the evolution of a coding system with the expansion of a cohort of different tRNAs and their binding partners. The whole process could have occurred quite unremarkably for such a profound acquisition. Testing the hypothesis: It should be possible to test the different parts of our model using the isolated contemporary 50S ribosomal subunit initially, and then with RNAs transcribed in vitro together with a minimal set of ribosomal proteins that are required today to support protein synthesis. Implications of the hypothesis: This model proposes that genetic coding arose de novo from complementary base pair interactions between tRNAs and single-stranded RNAs present in the immediate environment. Reviewers: This article was reviewed by Eugene Koonin, Rob Knight and Berthold Kastner (nominated by Laura Landweber).
BibTeX: @article{bernhardt-hypothesis-2010, author = {Bernhardt, HS and Tate, WP}, title = {Hypothesis The transition from noncoded to coded protein synthesis: did coding mRNAs arise from stability-enhancing binding partners to tRNA?}, journal = {BIOLOGY DIRECT}, year = {2010}, volume = {5} }
Colyvan, M.	Idealisations in normative models [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Synthese Vol. 190(8), pp. 1337-1350	article
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories–logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.;In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories-logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.;In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories—logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.;In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories—logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.; Issue Title: FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY MEETS EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theoriesâ[euro]"logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{colyvan-idealisations-2013, author = {Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Idealisations in normative models}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2013}, volume = {190}, number = {8}, pages = {1337--1350} }
Barbour, J., Koslowski, T. and Mercati, F.	Identification of a Gravitational Arrow of Time [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Physical Review Letters Vol. 113(18), pp. 181101	article
Abstract: It is widely believed that special initial conditions must be imposed on any time-symmetric law if its solutions are to exhibit behavior of any kind that defines an "arrow of time." We show that this is not so. The simplest nontrivial time-symmetric law that can be used to model a dynamically closed universe is the Newtonian N-body problem with vanishing total energy and angular momentum. Because of special properties of this system (likely to be shared by any law of the Universe), its typical solutions all divide at a uniquely defined point into two halves. In each, a well-defined measure of shape complexity fluctuates but grows irreversibly between rising bounds from that point. Structures that store dynamical information are created as the complexity grows and act as "records." Each solution can be viewed as having a single past and two distinct futures emerging from it. Any internal observer must be in one half of the solution and will only be aware of the records of one branch and deduce a unique past and future direction from inspection of the available records.; It is widely believed that special initial conditions must be imposed on any time-symmetric law if its solutions are to exhibit behavior of any kind that defines an "arrow of time." We show that this is not so. The simplest nontrivial time-symmetric law that can be used to model a dynamically closed universe is the Newtonian N-body problem with vanishing total energy and angular momentum. Because of special properties of this system (likely to be shared by any law of the Universe), its typical solutions all divide at a uniquely defined point into two halves. In each, a well-defined measure of shape complexity fluctuates but grows irreversibly between rising bounds from that point. Structures that store dynamical information are created as the complexity grows and act as "records." Each solution can be viewed as having a single past and two distinct futures emerging from it. Any internal observer must be in one half of the solution and will only be aware of the records of one branch and deduce a unique past and future direction from inspection of the available records.
BibTeX: @article{barbour-identification-2014, author = {Barbour, J. and Koslowski, T. and Mercati, F.}, title = {Identification of a Gravitational Arrow of Time}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, year = {2014}, volume = {113}, number = {18}, pages = {181101} }
Huggett, N.	Identity, Quantum Mechanics and Common Sense [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1997	The Monist Vol. 80(1), pp. 118-130	article
Abstract: Huggert examines some of the ways in which quantum mechanics seems to affront "common-sense" notions of identity and sketches the logical geography of identity in such a way as to relieve these tensions or affronts.
BibTeX: @article{huggett-identity-1997, author = {Huggett, Nick}, title = {Identity, Quantum Mechanics and Common Sense}, journal = {The Monist}, year = {1997}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {118--130} }
Faye, J.	Identity, Spacetime, and Cosmology [BibTeX]	2008	Vol. 4, pp. 39-57	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{faye-identity-2008, author = {Faye, Jan}, title = {Identity, Spacetime, and Cosmology}, publisher = {Elsevier Science & Technology}, year = {2008}, volume = {4}, pages = {39--57} }
Jaeger, G.	Identity, wholes, and parts in quantum mechanics [BibTeX]	2012	Vol. 1508, pp. 237-243	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{jaeger-identity-2012, author = {Jaeger, Gregg}, title = {Identity, wholes, and parts in quantum mechanics}, year = {2012}, volume = {1508}, pages = {237--243} }
Brooks, M.	If Information.. Then Universe [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Vol. 215(2884)	book
Abstract: Brooks discusses that the universe is a computer and everything that goes on in it can be explained in terms of information processing. The connection between reality and computing may not be immediately obvious, but strip away the layers and that's exactly what some researchers think people find. People think of the world as made up of particles held together by forces, but quantum theory tells them that these are just a mess of field they can only properly describe by invoking the mathematics of quantum physics.; Brooks discusses that the universe is a computer and everything that goes on in it can be explained in terms of information processing. The connection between reality and computing may not be immediately obvious, but strip away the layers and that's exactly what some researchers think people find. People think of the world as made up of particles held together by forces, but quantum theory tells them that these are just a mess of field they can only properly describe by invoking the mathematics of quantum physics.;
BibTeX: @book{brooks-if-2012, author = {Brooks, Michael}, title = {If Information.. Then Universe}, year = {2012}, volume = {215}, number = {2884} }
Votsis, I.	Ilkka Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism [BibTeX]	2003	Vol. 70(2)	book
BibTeX: @book{votsis-ilkka-2003, author = {Votsis, Ioannis}, title = {Ilkka Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism}, year = {2003}, volume = {70}, number = {2} }
Van Fraassen, B.C., Churchland, P.M. and Hooker, C.A.	Images of science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen [BibTeX]	1985		book
BibTeX: @book{van-fraassen-images-1985, author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C. and Churchland, Paul M. and Hooker, C. A.}, title = {Images of science: essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1985} }
Barwise, J. and Seligman, J.	Imperfect information flow [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1993	, pp. 252-260	inproceedings
Abstract: The view that computers are information processors is commonplace. They are used, for the most part successfully, throughout our society, as reliable links in the transmission of information and knowledge. Yet the formulation of a precise, qualitative conception of information and a theory of the transmission of information has proved elusive, despite the many other successes of computer science. The authors set out the motivation for and a skeleton of a new mathematical model of information flow, one that is compatible with less than perfect flow.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{barwise-imperfect-1993, author = {Barwise, J. and Seligman, J.}, title = {Imperfect information flow}, year = {1993}, pages = {252--260} }
Fodor, J.A.	In critical condition: polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind [BibTeX]	1998		book
BibTeX: @book{fodor-critical-1998, author = {Fodor, Jerry A.}, title = {In critical condition: polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1998} }
Wallace, D.	In Defence of Naiveté: The Conceptual Status of Lagrangian Quantum Field Theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2006	Synthese Vol. 151(1), pp. 33-80	article
Abstract: I analyse the conceptual and mathematical foundations of Lagrangian quantum field theory (QFT) (that is, the 'naive' (QFT) used in mainstream physics, as opposed to algebraic quantum field theory). The objective is to see whether Lagrangian (QFT) has a sufficiently firm conceptual and mathematical basis to be a legitimate object of foundational study, or whether it is too ill-defined. The analysis covers renormalisation and infinities, inequivalent representations, and the concept of localised states; the conclusion is that Lagrangian QFT (at least as described here) is a perfectly respectable physical theory, albeit somewhat different in certain respects from most of those studied in foundational work.;I analyse the conceptual and mathematical foundations of Lagrangian quantum field theory (QFT) (that is, the ‘naive’ (QFT) used in mainstream physics, as opposed to algebraic quantum field theory). The objective is to see whether Lagrangian (QFT) has a sufficiently firm conceptual and mathematical basis to be a legitimate object of foundational study, or whether it is too ill-defined. The analysis covers renormalisation and infinities, inequivalent representations, and the concept of localised states; the conclusion is that Lagrangian QFT (at least as described here) is a perfectly respectable physical theory, albeit somewhat different in certain respects from most of those studied in foundational work.;I analyse the conceptual and mathematical foundations of Lagrangian quantum field theory (QFT) (that is, the 'naive' (QFT) used in mainstream physics, as opposed to algebraic quantum field theory). The objective is to see whether Lagrangian (QFT) has a sufficiently firm conceptual and mathematical basis to be a legitimate object of foundational study, or whether it is too ill-defined. The analysis covers renormalisation and infinities, inequivalent representations, and the concept of localised states; the conclusion is that Lagrangian QFT (at least as described here) is a perfectly respectable physical theory, albeit somewhat different in certain respects from most of those studied in foundational work.;
BibTeX: @article{wallace-defence-2006, author = {Wallace, David}, title = {In Defence of Naiveté: The Conceptual Status of Lagrangian Quantum Field Theory}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2006}, volume = {151}, number = {1}, pages = {33--80} }
Campbell, D.E.	Incentives: motivation and the economics of information [BibTeX]	2006		book
BibTeX: @book{campbell-incentives:-2006, author = {Campbell, Donald E.}, title = {Incentives: motivation and the economics of information}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2006}, edition = {2nd} }
Peres, A.	Incompatible results of quantum measurements [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1990	Physics Letters A Vol. 151(3), pp. 107-108	article
Abstract: Quantum theory is incompatible with the following propositions. (1) The result of the measurement of an operator A depends solely on A and on the system being measured. (2) If operators A and B commute, the result of a measurement of their product AB is the product of the results of separate measurements of A and of B. © 1990.
BibTeX: @article{peres-incompatible-1990, author = {Peres, Asher}, title = {Incompatible results of quantum measurements}, journal = {Physics Letters A}, year = {1990}, volume = {151}, number = {3}, pages = {107--108} }
Srinivasan, R., Russell, D.P., Edelman, G.M. and Tononi, G.	Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception [BibTeX]	1999	J Neurosci Vol. 19	article
BibTeX: @article{srinivasan-increased-1999, author = {Srinivasan, R. and Russell, D. P. and Edelman, G. M. and Tononi, G.}, title = {Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception}, journal = {J Neurosci}, year = {1999}, volume = {19} }
Baker, A. and Colyvan, M.	Indexing and Mathematical Explanation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Philosophia Mathematica Vol. 19(3), pp. 323-334	article
Abstract: We discuss a recent attempt by Chris Daly and Simon Langford to do away with mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Daly and Langford suggest that mathematics merely indexes parts of the physical world, and on this understanding of the role of mathematics in science, there is no need to countenance mathematical explanation of physical facts. We argue that their strategy is at best a sketch and only looks plausible in simple cases. We also draw attention to how frequently Daly and Langford find themselves in conflict with mathematical and scientific practice.;We discuss a recent attempt by Chris Daly and Simon Langford to do away with mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Daly and Langford suggest that mathematics merely indexes parts of the physical world, and on this understanding of the role of mathematics in science, there is no need to countenance mathematical explanation of physical facts. We argue that their strategy is at best a sketch and only looks plausible in simple cases. We also draw attention to how frequently Daly and Langford find themselves in conflict with mathematical and scientific practice.;
BibTeX: @article{baker-indexing-2011, author = {Baker, Alan and Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Indexing and Mathematical Explanation}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, year = {2011}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {323--334} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Indication and Adaptation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1992	Synthese Vol. 92(2), pp. 283-312	article
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between a family of concepts involving reliable correlation, and a family of concepts involving adaptation and biological function, as these concepts are used in the naturalistic semantic theory of Dretske's "Explaining Behavior." I argue that Dretske's attempt to marry correlation and function to produce representation fails, though aspects of his failure point the way forward to a better theory.
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-indication-1992, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Indication and Adaptation}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1992}, volume = {92}, number = {2}, pages = {283--312} }
Hunt, J.	Indispensability and the problem of compatible explanations: A reply to ‘Should scientific realists be platonists?’ [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Synthese Vol. 193(2), pp. 451-467	article
Abstract: Alan Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument (EIA) supports mathematical platonism through the explanatory role of mathematics in science. Busch and Morrison defend nominalism by denying that scientific realists use inference to the best explanation (IBE) to directly establish ontological claims. In response to Busch and Morrison, I argue that nominalists can rebut the EIA while still accepting Baker’s form of IBE. Nominalists can plausibly require that defenders of the EIA establish the indispensability of a particular mathematical entity. Next, I argue that IBE cannot establish that any particular mathematical entity is indispensable. Mathematical entities do not compete with each other in the way physical unobservables do. This lack of competition enables alternative formulations of scientific explanations that use different, but compatible, mathematical entities. The compatibility of these explanations prevents IBE from establishing platonism.; Issue Title: Special issue on Indispensability and Explanation (first 13 articles appearing in issue) Alan Baker's enhanced indispensability argument (EIA) supports mathematical platonism through the explanatory role of mathematics in science. Busch and Morrison defend nominalism by denying that scientific realists use inference to the best explanation (IBE) to directly establish ontological claims. In response to Busch and Morrison, I argue that nominalists can rebut the EIA while still accepting Baker's form of IBE. Nominalists can plausibly require that defenders of the EIA establish the indispensability of a particular mathematical entity. Next, I argue that IBE cannot establish that any particular mathematical entity is indispensable. Mathematical entities do not compete with each other in the way physical unobservables do. This lack of competition enables alternative formulations of scientific explanations that use different, but compatible, mathematical entities. The compatibility of these explanations prevents IBE from establishing platonism.;
BibTeX: @article{hunt-indispensability-2016, author = {Hunt, Josh}, title = {Indispensability and the problem of compatible explanations: A reply to ‘Should scientific realists be platonists?’}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2016}, volume = {193}, number = {2}, pages = {451--467} }
Zhao, W., Serpedin, E. and Dougherty, E.R.	Inferring gene regulatory networks from time series data using the minimum description length principle [BibTeX]	2006	Bioinformatics Vol. 22(17), pp. 2129-2135	article
BibTeX: @article{zhao-inferring-2006, author = {Zhao, Wentao and Serpedin, Erchin and Dougherty, Edward R.}, title = {Inferring gene regulatory networks from time series data using the minimum description length principle}, journal = {Bioinformatics}, year = {2006}, volume = {22}, number = {17}, pages = {2129--2135} }
Kohlas, J. and Schneuwly, C.	Information algebra [BibTeX]	2009	Vol. 5363, pp. 95-127	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{kohlas-information-2009, author = {Kohlas, Jürg and Schneuwly, Cesar}, title = {Information algebra}, year = {2009}, volume = {5363}, pages = {95--127} }
Küppers, B.-O.	Information and communication in living matter [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 170-184	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{kuppers-information-2010, author = {Küppers, Bernd-Olaf}, title = {Information and communication in living matter}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {170--184}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.009} }
Harms, W.F.	Information and meaning in evolutionary processes [BibTeX]	2004		book
BibTeX: @book{harms-information-2004, author = {Harms, William F.}, title = {Information and meaning in evolutionary processes}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2004} }
Bassi, A., Ghosh, S. and Singh, T.	Information and the foundations of quantum theory [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 87-95	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{bassi-information-2015, author = {Bassi, Angelo and Ghosh, Saikat and Singh, Tejinder}, title = {Information and the foundations of quantum theory}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {87--95} }
Davies, P.C.W. and Gregersen, N.H.	Information and the nature of reality: from physics to metaphysics [BibTeX]	2010		book
BibTeX: @book{davies-information-2010, author = {Davies, P. C. W. and Gregersen, Niels H.}, title = {Information and the nature of reality: from physics to metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010} }
Plastino, A. and Plastino, A.R.	Information and thermal physics [BibTeX]	2007	, pp. 119-154	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{plastino-information-2007, author = {Plastino, Angelo and Plastino, Angelo R.}, title = {Information and thermal physics}, year = {2007}, pages = {119--154} }
Al-Safi, S.W. and Short, A.J.	Information causality from an entropic and a probabilistic perspective [BibTeX]	2011	Phys. Rev. A Vol. 84(4), pp. 042323	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{al-safi-information-2011, author = {Al-Safi, Sabri W. and Short, Anthony J.}, title = {Information causality from an entropic and a probabilistic perspective}, journal = {Phys. Rev. A}, year = {2011}, volume = {84}, number = {4}, pages = {042323}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.84.042323}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.84.042323} }
Floridi, L.	Information closure and the sceptical objection [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Synthese Vol. 191(6), pp. 1037-1050	article
Abstract: In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of " S S is informed that p p " among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of " S S is informed that p p " should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of " S S is informed that p p ", which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.; (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae and/or non-USASCII text omitted; see image) In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of "... is informed that ..." among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of "... is informed that ..." should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of "... is informed that ...", which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of “ $$S$$ S is informed that $$p$$ p ” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “ $$S$$ S is informed that $$p$$ p ” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “ $$S$$ S is informed that $$p$$ p ”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.; In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of " is informed that " among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of " is informed that " should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of " is informed that ", which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.
BibTeX: @article{floridi-information-2014, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Information closure and the sceptical objection}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2014}, volume = {191}, number = {6}, pages = {1037--1050} }
WEISS, O., JIMÉNEZ-MONTAÑO, M.A. and HERZEL, H.	Information Content of Protein Sequences [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	Journal of Theoretical Biology Vol. 206(3), pp. 379-386	article
Abstract: The complexity of large sets of non-redundant protein sequences is measured. This is done by estimating the Shannon entropy as well as applying compression algorithms to estimate the algorithmic complexity. The estimators are also applied to randomly generated surrogates of the protein data. Our results show that proteins are fairly close to random sequences. The entropy reduction due to correlations is only about 1%. However, precise estimations of the entropy of the source are not possible due to finite sample effects. Compression algorithms also indicate that the redundancy is in the order of 1%. These results confirm the idea that protein sequences can be regarded as slightly edited random strings. We discuss secondary structure and low-complexity regions as causes of the redundancy observed. The findings are related to numerical and biochemical experiments with random polypeptides. Copyright 2000 Academic Press;The complexity of large sets of non-redundant protein sequences is measured. This is done by estimating the Shannon entropy as well as applying compression algorithms to estimate the algorithmic complexity. The estimators are also applied to randomly generated surrogates of the protein data. Our results show that proteins are fairly close to random sequences. The entropy reduction due to correlations is only about 1%. However, precise estimations of the entropy of the source are not possible due to finite sample effects. Compression algorithms also indicate that the redundancy is in the order of 1%. These results confirm the idea that protein sequences can be regarded as slightly edited random strings. We discuss secondary structure and low-complexity regions as causes of the redundancy observed. The findings are related to numerical and biochemical experiments with random polypeptides.;
BibTeX: @article{weiss-information-2000, author = {WEISS, OLAF and JIMÉNEZ-MONTAÑO, MIGUEL A. and HERZEL, HANSPETER}, title = {Information Content of Protein Sequences}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, year = {2000}, volume = {206}, number = {3}, pages = {379--386} }
Chatzisavvas, K.C., Moustakidis, C.C. and Panos, C.P.	Information entropy, information distances, and complexity in atoms [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2005	Journal of Chemical Physics Vol. 123(17), pp. 174111	article
Abstract: Shannon information entropies in position and momentum spaces and their sum are calculated as functions of Z(2 textless= Z textless= 54) in atoms. Roothaan-Hartree-Fock electron wave functions are used. The universal property S = a+ b ln Z is verified. In addition, we calculate the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy, the Jensen-Shannon divergence, Onicescu's information energy, and a complexity measure recently proposed. Shell effects at closed-shell atoms are observed. The complexity measure shows local minima at the closed-shell atoms indicating that for the above atoms complexity decreases with respect to neighboring atoms. It is seen that complexity fluctuates around an average value, indicating that the atom cannot grow in complexity as Z increases. Onicescu's information energy is correlated with the ionization potential. Kullback distance and Jensen-Shannon distance are employed to compare Roothaan-Hartree-Fock density distributions with other densities of previous works. (c) 2005 American Institute of Physics.Shannon information entropies in position and momentum spaces and their sum are calculated as functions of Z(2 textless= Z textless= 54) in atoms. Roothaan-Hartree-Fock electron wave functions are used. The universal property S=a+b ln Z is verified. In addition, we calculate the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy, the Jensen-Shannon divergence, Onicescu's information energy, and a complexity measure recently proposed. Shell effects at closed-shell atoms are observed. The complexity measure shows local minima at the closed-shell atoms indicating that for the above atoms complexity decreases with respect to neighboring atoms. It is seen that complexity fluctuates around an average value, indicating that the atom cannot grow in complexity as Z increases. Onicescu's information energy is correlated with the ionization potential. Kullback distance and Jensen-Shannon distance are employed to compare Roothaan-Hartree-Fock density distributions with other densities of previous works.;Shannon information entropies in position and momentum spaces and their sum are calculated as functions of Z(2 textless or = Z textless or = 54) in atoms. Roothaan-Hartree-Fock electron wave functions are used. The universal property S = a + b ln Z is verified. In addition, we calculate the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy, the Jensen-Shannon divergence, Onicescu's information energy, and a complexity measure recently proposed. Shell effects at closed-shell atoms are observed. The complexity measure shows local minima at the closed-shell atoms indicating that for the above atoms complexity decreases with respect to neighboring atoms. It is seen that complexity fluctuates around an average value, indicating that the atom cannot grow in complexity as Z increases. Onicescu's information energy is correlated with the ionization potential. Kullback distance and Jensen-Shannon distance are employed to compare Roothaan-Hartree-Fock density distributions with other densities of previous works.;Shannon information entropies in position and momentum spaces and their sum are calculated as functions of Z (Z=2-54) in atoms. Roothaan-Hartree-Fock electron wave functions are used. The universal property S=a+b lnZ is verified. In addition, we calculate the Kullback-Leibler relative entropy, the Jensen-Shannon divergence, Onicescu's information energy and a complexity measure recently proposed. Shell effects at closed shells atoms are observed. The complexity measure shows local minima at the closed shells atoms indicating that for the above atoms complexity decreases with respect to neighboring atoms. It is seen that complexity fluctuates around an average value, indicating that the atom cannot grow in complexity as Z increases. Onicescu's information energy is correlated with the ionization potential. Kullback distance and Jensen-Shannon distance are employed to compare Roothaan-Hartree-Fock density distributions with other densities of previous works.;
BibTeX: @article{chatzisavvas-information-2005, author = {Chatzisavvas, K. C. and Moustakidis, Ch C. and Panos, C. P.}, title = {Information entropy, information distances, and complexity in atoms}, journal = {Journal of Chemical Physics}, year = {2005}, volume = {123}, number = {17}, pages = {174111} }
Deutsch, D. and Hayden, P.	Information flow in entangled quantum systems [BibTeX]	2000	Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A. Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences Vol. 456(1999), pp. 1759-1774	article
BibTeX: @article{deutsch-information-2000, author = {Deutsch, David and Hayden, Patrick}, title = {Information flow in entangled quantum systems}, journal = {Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A. Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {456}, number = {1999}, pages = {1759--1774} }
Devlin, K.	Information flow: the logic of distributed systems by Jon Barwise and Jerry Seligman [BibTeX]	1998	Complexity Vol. 4(2), pp. 30-32	article
BibTeX: @article{devlin-information-1998, author = {Devlin, Keith}, title = {Information flow: the logic of distributed systems by Jon Barwise and Jerry Seligman}, journal = {Complexity}, year = {1998}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {30--32} }
Losee, R.M.	Information from Processes: About the Nature of Information Creation, Use, and Representation [BibTeX]	2012		book
BibTeX: @book{losee-information-2012, author = {Losee, Robert M.}, title = {Information from Processes: About the Nature of Information Creation, Use, and Representation}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2012} }
Collier, J.	Information in Biological Systems [BibTeX]	2008	, pp. 763-787	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{collier-information-2008, author = {Collier, John}, title = {Information in Biological Systems}, year = {2008}, pages = {763--787} }
Demirel, Y.	Information in Biological Systems and the Fluctuation Theorem [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	ENTROPY Vol. 16(4), pp. 1931-1948	article
Abstract: Some critical trends in information theory, its role in living systems and utilization in fluctuation theory are discussed. The mutual information of thermodynamic coupling is incorporated into the generalized fluctuation theorem by using information theory and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Thermodynamically coupled dissipative structures in living systems are capable of degrading more energy, and processing complex information through developmental and environmental constraints. The generalized fluctuation theorem can quantify the hysteresis observed in the amount of the irreversible work in nonequilibrium regimes in the presence of information and thermodynamic coupling.; Some critical trends in information theory, its role in living systems and utilization in fluctuation theory are discussed. The mutual information of thermodynamic coupling is incorporated into the generalized fluctuation theorem by using information theory and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Thermodynamically coupled dissipative structures in living systems are capable of degrading more energy, and processing complex information through developmental and environmental constraints. The generalized fluctuation theorem can quantify the hysteresis observed in the amount of the irreversible work in nonequilibrium regimes in the presence of information and thermodynamic coupling.
BibTeX: @article{demirel-information-2014, author = {Demirel, Y.}, title = {Information in Biological Systems and the Fluctuation Theorem}, journal = {ENTROPY}, year = {2014}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, pages = {1931--1948} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Information in Biology [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2007	, pp. 103-119	incollection
Abstract: INTRODUCTION The concept of information has acquired a strikingly prominent role in contemporary biology. This trend is especially marked within genetics, but it has also become important in other areas, such as evolutionary theory and developmental biology, especially where these fields border on genetics. The most distinctive biological role for informational concepts, and the one that has generated the most discussion, is in the description of the relations between genes and the various structures and processes that genes play a role in causing. For many biologists, the causal role of genes should be understood in terms of their carrying information about their various products. That information might require the cooperation of various environmental factors before it can be "expressed," but the same can be said of other kinds of message. An initial response might be to think that this mode of description is entirely anchored in a set of well-established facts about the role of DNA and RNA within protein synthesis, summarized in the familiar chart representing the "genetic code," mapping DNA base triplets to amino acids. However, informational enthusiasm in biology predates even a rudimentary understanding of these mechanisms (Schrodinger 1944). And more importantly, current applications of informational concepts extend far beyond anything that can receive an obvious justification in terms of the familiar facts about the specification of protein molecules by DNA.
BibTeX: @incollection{godfrey-smith-information-2007, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Information in Biology}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2007}, pages = {103--119} }
Levy, A.	Information in Biology: A Fictionalist Account [BibTeX]	2011	Noûs Vol. 45(4), pp. 640-657	article
BibTeX: @article{levy-information-2011, author = {Levy, Arnon}, title = {Information in Biology: A Fictionalist Account}, journal = {Noûs}, year = {2011}, volume = {45}, number = {4}, pages = {640--657} }
Page, D.N.	Information in black hole radiation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1993	Physical Review Letters Vol. 71(23), pp. 3743-3746	article
Abstract: If black hole formation and evaporation can be described by an S matrix, information would be expected to come out in black hole radiation. An estimate shows that it may come out initially so slowly, or else be so spread out, that it would never show up in an analysis perturbative in M(Planck)/M, or in 1/N for two-dimensional dilatonic black holes with a large number N of minimally coupled scalar fields.
BibTeX: @article{page-information-1993, author = {Page, Don N.}, title = {Information in black hole radiation}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, year = {1993}, volume = {71}, number = {23}, pages = {3743--3746} }
Sarkar, S.	Information in Genetics and Developmental Biology: Comments on Maynard Smith [BibTeX]	2000	Philosophy of Science Vol. 67(2), pp. 208-213	article
BibTeX: @article{sarkar-information-2000, author = {Sarkar, Sahotra}, title = {Information in Genetics and Developmental Biology: Comments on Maynard Smith}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, number = {2}, pages = {208--213} }
Kamp, H. and Stokhof, M.	Information in Natural Language [BibTeX]	2008	, pp. 49-111	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{kamp-information-2008, author = {Kamp, Hans and Stokhof, Martin}, title = {Information in Natural Language}, year = {2008}, pages = {49--111} }
Bekenstein, J.D.	Information in the Holographic Universe [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Vol. 289(2)	book	URL
Abstract: By studying the mysterious properties of black holes, physicists have reduced absolute limits on how much information a region of space or a quantity of matter and energy can hold. The holographic principle holds that the principle is like a hologram, and that the seemingly three-dimensional universe could be completely equivalent to alternative quantum fields and physical laws painted on a distant, vast surface.
BibTeX: @book{bekenstein-information-2003, author = {Bekenstein, Jacob D.}, title = {Information in the Holographic Universe}, year = {2003}, volume = {289}, number = {2}, url = {http://www.phys.huji.ac.il/ bekenste/Holographic-Univ.pdf} }
Landauer, R.	Information is a physical entity [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1999	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications Vol. 263(1), pp. 63-67	article
Abstract: This paper, associated with a broader conference talk on the fundamental physical limits of information handling, emphasizes the aspects still least appreciated. Information is not an abstract entity but exists only through a physical representation, thus tying it to all the restrictions and possibilities of our real physical universe. The mathematician's vision of an unlimited sequence of totally reliable operations is unlikely to be implementable in this real universe. Speculative remarks about the possible impact of that, on the ultimate nature of the laws of physics are included.
BibTeX: @article{landauer-information-1999, author = {Landauer, Rolf}, title = {Information is a physical entity}, journal = {Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications}, year = {1999}, volume = {263}, number = {1}, pages = {63--67} }
Long, B.R.	Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Synthese Vol. 191(14), pp. 3447-3467	article
Abstract: In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic on a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information.;In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic on a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information.;In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic on a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information.; In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic on a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{long-information-2014, author = {Long, Bruce R.}, title = {Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2014}, volume = {191}, number = {14}, pages = {3447--3467} }
Landauer, R.	Information is physical [BibTeX]	1991	Physics Today Vol. 44(5), pp. 23-29	article
BibTeX: @article{landauer-information-1991, author = {Landauer, Rolf}, title = {Information is physical}, journal = {Physics Today}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, number = {5}, pages = {23--29} }
Hawking, S.W.	Information loss in black holes [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2005	Physical Review D - Particles, Fields, Gravitation and Cosmology Vol. 72(8)	article
Abstract: The question of whether information is lost in black holes is investigated using Euclidean path integrals. The formation and evaporation of black holes is regarded as a scattering problem with all measurements being made at infinity. This seems to be well formulated only in asymptotically AdS spacetimes. The path integral over metrics with trivial topology is unitary and information preserving. On the other hand, the path integral over metrics with nontrivial topologies leads to correlation functions that decay to zero. Thus at late times only the unitary information preserving path integrals over trivial topologies will contribute. Elementary quantum gravity interactions do not lose information or quantum coherence.
BibTeX: @article{hawking-information-2005, author = {Hawking, S. W.}, title = {Information loss in black holes}, journal = {Physical Review D - Particles, Fields, Gravitation and Cosmology}, year = {2005}, volume = {72}, number = {8} }
Frolov, V.P.	Information loss problem and a ‘black hole’ model with a closed apparent horizon [BibTeX]	2014	Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2014(5), pp. 1-21	article
BibTeX: @article{frolov-information-2014, author = {Frolov, Valeri P.}, title = {Information loss problem and a ‘black hole’ model with a closed apparent horizon}, journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics}, year = {2014}, volume = {2014}, number = {5}, pages = {1--21} }
Tononi, G.	Information measures for conscious experience [BibTeX]	2001	Arch Ital Biol Vol. 139	article
BibTeX: @article{tononi-information-2001, author = {Tononi, G.}, title = {Information measures for conscious experience}, journal = {Arch Ital Biol}, year = {2001}, volume = {139} }
Hawking, S.W.	Information Preservation and Weather Forecasting for Black Holes [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Vol. arXiv:1401.5761(arXiv:1401.5761 [hep-th])	article	URL
Abstract: It has been suggested [1] that the resolution of the information paradox for evaporating black holes is that the holes are surrounded by firewalls, bolts of outgoing radiation that would destroy any infalling observer. Such firewalls would break the CPT invariance of quantum gravity and seem to be ruled out on other grounds. A different resolution of the paradox is proposed, namely that gravitational collapse produces apparent horizons but no event horizons behind which information is lost. This proposal is supported by ADS-CFT and is the only resolution of the paradox compatible with CPT. The collapse to form a black hole will in general be chaotic and the dual CFT on the boundary of ADS will be turbulent. Thus, like weather forecasting on Earth, information will effectively be lost, although there would be no loss of unitarity.
BibTeX: @article{hawking-information-2014, author = {Hawking, S. W.}, title = {Information Preservation and Weather Forecasting for Black Holes}, year = {2014}, volume = {arXiv:1401.5761}, number = {arXiv:1401.5761 [hep-th]}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5761} }
Floridi, L.	Information Quality [BibTeX]	2013	Philosophy & Technology Vol. 26(1), pp. 1-6	article
BibTeX: @article{floridi-information-2013, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Information Quality}, journal = {Philosophy & Technology}, year = {2013}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {1--6} }
Moles, A.A.	Information theory and esthetic perception [BibTeX]	1966		book
BibTeX: @book{moles-information-1966, author = {Moles, Abraham A.}, title = {Information theory and esthetic perception}, publisher = {University of Illinois Press}, year = {1966} }
Tribus, M.	Information Theory and Thermodynamics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1963	Heat Transfer, Thermodynamics, and Education: Boelter Anniversary Volume, pp. 348-68	incollection
Abstract: LCCN: 63022596
BibTeX: @incollection{tribus-information-1963, author = {Tribus, Myron}, title = {Information Theory and Thermodynamics}, booktitle = {Heat Transfer, Thermodynamics, and Education: Boelter Anniversary Volume}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {1963}, pages = {348--68} }
Gatenby, R.A. and Frieden, B.R.	Information Theory in Living Systems, Methods, Applications, and Challenges [BibTeX]	2007	Bulletin of mathematical biology Vol. 69(2), pp. 635-657	article
BibTeX: @article{gatenby-information-2007, author = {Gatenby, Robert A. and Frieden, B. R.}, title = {Information Theory in Living Systems, Methods, Applications, and Challenges}, journal = {Bulletin of mathematical biology}, year = {2007}, volume = {69}, number = {2}, pages = {635--657} }
Adami, C.	Information theory in molecular biology [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2004	Physics of Life Reviews Vol. 1(1), pp. 3-22	article
Abstract: This article introduces the physics of information in the context of molecular biology and genomics. Entropy and information, the two central concepts of Shannon's theory of information and communication, are often confused with each other but play transparent roles when applied to statistical ensembles (i.e., identically prepared sets) of symbolic sequences. Such an approach can distinguish between entropy and information in genes, predict the secondary structure of ribozymes, and detect the covariation between residues in folded proteins. We also review applications to molecular sequence and structure analysis, and introduce new tools in the characterization of resistance mutations, and in drug design. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.;This article introduces the physics of information in the context of molecular biology and genomics. Entropy and information, the two central concepts of Shannon's theory of information and communication, are often confused with each other but play transparent roles when applied to statistical ensembles (i.e., identically prepared sets) of symbolic sequences. Such an approach can distinguish between entropy and information in genes, predict the secondary structure of ribozymes, and detect the covariation between residues in folded proteins. We also review applications to molecular sequence and structure analysis, and introduce new tools in the characterization of resistance mutations, and in drug design.;This article introduces the physics of information in the context of molecular biology and genomics. Entropy and information, the two central concepts of Shannon's theory of information and communication, are often confused with each other but play transparent roles when applied to statistical ensembles (i.e., identically prepared sets) of symbolic sequences. Such an approach can distinguish between entropy and information in genes, predict the secondary structure of ribozymes, and detect the covariation between residues in folded proteins. We also review applications to molecular sequence and structure analysis, and introduce new tools in the characterization of resistance mutations, and in drug design. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.;
BibTeX: @article{adami-information-2004, author = {Adami, Christoph}, title = {Information theory in molecular biology}, journal = {Physics of Life Reviews}, year = {2004}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {3--22} }
Doyle, L.R., McCowan, B., Johnston, S. and Hanser, S.F.	Information theory, animal communication, and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence [BibTeX]	2011	Acta Astronautica Vol. 68(3), pp. 406-417	article
BibTeX: @article{doyle-information-2011, author = {Doyle, Laurance R. and McCowan, Brenda and Johnston, Simon and Hanser, Sean F.}, title = {Information theory, animal communication, and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence}, journal = {Acta Astronautica}, year = {2011}, volume = {68}, number = {3}, pages = {406--417} }
Bavaud, F.	Information theory, relative entropy and statistics [BibTeX]	2009	Vol. 5363, pp. 54-78	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{bavaud-information-2009, author = {Bavaud, Francois}, title = {Information theory, relative entropy and statistics}, year = {2009}, volume = {5363}, pages = {54--78} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Information, Arbitrariness, and Selection: Comments on Maynard Smith [BibTeX]	2000	Philosophy of Science Vol. 67(2), pp. 202-207	article
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-information-2000, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Information, Arbitrariness, and Selection: Comments on Maynard Smith}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, number = {2}, pages = {202--207} }
Hodgson, G.M. and Knudsen, T.	Information, complexity and generative replication [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2008	Biology & Philosophy Vol. 23(1), pp. 47-65	article
Abstract: The established definition of replication in terms of the conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer is very broad. We draw inspiration from the literature on self-reproducing automata to strengthen the notion of information transfer in replication processes. To the triple conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer, we add a fourth condition that defines a “generative replicator” as a conditional generative mechanism, which can turn input signals from an environment into developmental instructions. Generative replication must have the potential to enhance complexity, which in turn requires that developmental instructions are part of the information that is transmitted in replication. Demonstrating the usefulness of the generative replicator concept in the social domain, we identify social generative replicators that satisfy all of the four proposed conditions.; The established definition of replication in terms of the conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer is very broad. We draw inspiration from the literature on self-reproducing automata to strengthen the notion of information transfer in replication processes. To the triple conditions of causality, similarity and information transfer, we add a fourth condition that defines a "generative replicator" as a conditional generative mechanism, which can turn input signals from an environment into developmental instructions. Generative replication must have the potential to enhance complexity, which in turn requires that developmental instructions are part of the information that is transmitted in replication. Demonstrating the usefulness of the generative replicator concept in the social domain, we identify social generative replicators that satisfy all of the four proposed conditions.
BibTeX: @article{hodgson-information-2008, author = {Hodgson, Geoffrey M. and Knudsen, Thorbjørn}, title = {Information, complexity and generative replication}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, year = {2008}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {47--65} }
Wheeler, J.	Information, physics, quantum: the search for links [BibTeX]	1989	Proceedings III International Symposium on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, pp. 354-368	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{wheeler-information-1989, author = {Wheeler, John}, title = {Information, physics, quantum: the search for links}, booktitle = {Proceedings III International Symposium on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics}, year = {1989}, pages = {354--368} }
Floridi, L.	Information, possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Synthese Vol. 175(S1), pp. 63-88	article
Abstract: The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an informationtheoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borei numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borei numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borei numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.; The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.; The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.; The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.; Issue Title: Special issue on The Nature and Scope of Information The article investigates the sceptical challenge from an information-theoretic perspective. Its main goal is to articulate and defend the view that either informational scepticism is radical, but then it is epistemologically innocuous because redundant; or it is moderate, but then epistemologically beneficial because useful. In order to pursue this cooptation strategy, the article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets up the problem. Section 2 introduces Borel numbers as a convenient way to refer uniformly to (the data that individuate) different possible worlds. Section 3 adopts the Hamming distance between Borel numbers as a metric to calculate the distance between possible worlds. In Sects. 4 and 5, radical and moderate informational scepticism are analysed using Borel numbers and Hamming distances, and shown to be either harmless (extreme form) or actually fruitful (moderate form). Section 6 further clarifies the approach by replying to some potential objections. In the conclusion, the Peircean nature of the overall approach is briefly discussed.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
BibTeX: @article{floridi-information-2010, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Information, possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2010}, volume = {175}, number = {S1}, pages = {63--88} }
Haught, J.F.	Information, theology, and the universe [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 301-318	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{haught-information-2010, author = {Haught, John F.}, title = {Information, theology, and the universe}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {301--318}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.014} }
Floridi, L.	Information: a very short introduction [BibTeX]	2010	Vol. 225.	book
BibTeX: @book{floridi-information:-2010, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Information: a very short introduction}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2010}, volume = {225.} }
Jablonka, E.	Information: Its Interpretation, Its Inheritance, and Its Sharing [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2002	Philosophy of Science Vol. 69(4), pp. 578-605	article
Abstract: The semantic concept of information is one of the most important, and one of the most problematical concepts in biology. I suggest a broad definition of biological information: a source becomes an informational input when an interpreting receiver can react to the form of the source (and variations in this form) in a functional manner. The definition accommodates information stemming from environmental cues as well as from evolved signals, and calls for a comparison between information-transmission in different types of inheritance systems-the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the cultural-symbolic. This comparative perspective highlights the different ways in which information is acquired and transmitted, and the role that such information plays in heredity and evolution. Focusing on the special properties of the transfer of information, which are very different from those associated with the transfer of materials or energy, also helps to uncover interesting evolutionary effects and suggests better explanations for some aspects of the evolution of communication.; The semantic concept of information is one of the most important, and one of the most problematical concepts in biology. I suggest a broad definition of biological information: a source becomes an informational input when an interpreting receiver can react to the form of the source (and variations in this form) in a functional manner. The definition accommodates information stemming from environmental cues as well as from evolved signals, and calls for a comparison between information‐transmission in different types of inheritance systems—the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the cultural‐symbolic. This comparative perspective highlights the different ways in which information is acquired and transmitted, and the role that such information plays in heredity and evolution. Focusing on the special properties of the transfer of information, which are very different from those associated with the transfer of materials or energy, also helps to uncover interesting evolutionary effects and suggests better explanations for some aspects of the evolution of communication.; The semantic concept of information is one of the most important, and one of the most problematical concepts in biology. I suggest a broad definition of biological information: a source becomes an informational input when an interpreting receiver can react to the form of the source (and variations in this form) in a functional manner. The definition accommodates information stemming from environmental cues as well as from evolved signals, and calls for a comparison between information-transmission in different types of inheritance systems-the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the cultural-symbolic. This comparative perspective highlights the different ways in which information is acquired and transmitted, and the role that such information plays in heredity and evolution. Focusing on the special properties of the transfer of information, which are very different from those associated with the transfer of materials or energy, also helps to uncover interesting evolutionary effects and suggests better explanations for some aspects of the evolution of communication.; The semantic concept of information is one of the most important, and one of the most problematical concepts in biology. I suggest a broad definition of biological information: a source becomes an informational input when an interpreting receiver can react to the form of the source (and variations in this form) in a functional manner. The definition accommodates information stemming from environmental cues as well as from evolved signals, and calls for a comparison between information-transmission in different types of inheritance systems-the genetic, the epigenetic, the behavioral, and the cultural-symbolic. This comparative perspective highlights the different ways in which information is acquired and transmitted, and the role that such information plays in heredity and evolution. Focusing on the special properties of the transfer of information, which are very different from those associated with the transfer of materials or energy, also helps to uncover interesting evolutionary effects and suggests better explanations for some aspects of the evolution of communication.
BibTeX: @article{jablonka-information:-2002, author = {Jablonka, Eva}, title = {Information: Its Interpretation, Its Inheritance, and Its Sharing}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, volume = {69}, number = {4}, pages = {578--605} }
Calude, C.S.	Information: the algorithmic paradigm [BibTeX]	2009	Vol. 5363, pp. 79-94	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{calude-information:-2009, author = {Calude, Cristian S.}, title = {Information: the algorithmic paradigm}, year = {2009}, volume = {5363}, pages = {79--94} }
Gillies, D.	Informational Realism and World 3 [BibTeX]	2010	Knowledge, Technology & Policy, pp. 1-18	article
BibTeX: @article{gillies-informational-2010, author = {Gillies, Donald}, title = {Informational Realism and World 3}, journal = {Knowledge, Technology & Policy}, year = {2010}, pages = {1--18} }
Knuth, K.H.	Information-based physics and the influence network [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 65-78	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{knuth-information-based-2015, author = {Knuth, Kevin H}, title = {Information-based physics and the influence network}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {65--78} }
Frieden, B.R.	Information-based uncertainty for a photon [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2007	Optics Communications Vol. 271(1), pp. 71 - 72	article	DOI URL
Abstract: It is shown on the basis of Fisher information that the ultimate root-mean square uncertainty in the position of a single photon of wavelength λ is 0.112λ in vacuum. This is as well an “effective size” for the photon.
BibTeX: @article{frieden-information-based-2007, author = {Frieden, B. Roy}, title = {Information-based uncertainty for a photon}, journal = {Optics Communications}, year = {2007}, volume = {271}, number = {1}, pages = {71 -- 72}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030401806011795}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/j.optcom.2006.10.071} }
Roy Frieden, B.	Information-based uncertainty for a photon [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2007	Optics Communications Vol. 271(1), pp. 71-72	article
Abstract: It is shown on the basis of Fisher information that the ultimate root-mean square uncertainty in the position of a single photon of wavelength I' is 0.112I' in vacuum. This is as well an "effective size" for the photon.; It is shown on the basis of Fisher information that the ultimate root-mean square uncertainty in the position of a single photon of wavelength lambda is 0.112 lambda in vacuum. This is as well an "effective size" for the photon. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.; It is shown on the basis of Fisher information that the ultimate root-mean square uncertainty in the position of a single photon of wavelength λ is 0.112λ in vacuum. This is as well an "effective size" for the photon. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
BibTeX: @article{roy-frieden-information-based-2007, author = {Roy Frieden, B.}, title = {Information-based uncertainty for a photon}, journal = {Optics Communications}, year = {2007}, volume = {271}, number = {1}, pages = {71--72} }
Long, B.R.	Informationist Science Fiction and Informationist Science Fiction Theory [BibTeX]	2009	School: The University of Sydney	phdthesis	URL
BibTeX: @phdthesis{long-informationist-2009, author = {Long, Bruce R.}, title = {Informationist Science Fiction and Informationist Science Fiction Theory}, school = {The University of Sydney}, year = {2009}, url = {http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/5838/1/InformationistScienceFictionTheoryand%20InformationistScienceFictionBruceRLongePublish.pdf} }
Adami, C.	Information-Theoretic Considerations Concerning the Origin of Life [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres Vol. 45(3), pp. 309-317	article
Abstract: Research investigating the origins of life usually either focuses on exploring possible life-bearing chemistries in the pre-biotic Earth, or else on synthetic approaches. Comparatively little work has explored fundamental issues concerning the spontaneous emergence of life using only concepts (such as information and evolution) that are divorced from any particular chemistry. Here, I advocate studying the probability of spontaneous molecular self-replication as a function of the information contained in the replicator, and the environmental conditions that might enable this emergence. I show (under certain simplifying assumptions) that the probability to discover a self-replicator by chance depends exponentially on the relative rate of formation of the monomers. If the rate at which monomers are formed is somewhat similar to the rate at which they would occur in a self-replicating polymer, the likelihood to discover such a replicator by chance is increased by many orders of magnitude. I document such an increase in searches for a self-replicator within the digital life system avida.;Research investigating the origins of life usually focuses on exploring possible life-bearing chemistries in the pre-biotic Earth, or else on synthetic approaches. Little work has been done exploring fundamental issues concerning the spontaneous emergence of life using only concepts (such as information and evolution) that are divorced from any particular chemistry. Here, I advocate studying the probability of spontaneous molecular self-replication as a function of the information contained in the replicator, and the environmental conditions that might enable this emergence. I show that (under certain simplifying assumptions) the probability to discover a self-replicator by chance depends exponentially on the rate of formation of the monomers. If the rate at which monomers are formed is somewhat similar to the rate at which they would occur in a self-replicating polymer, the likelihood to discover such a replicator by chance is increased by many orders of magnitude. I document such an increase in searches for a self-replicator within the digital life system avida; Research investigating the origins of life usually either focuses on exploring possible life-bearing chemistries in the pre-biotic Earth, or else on synthetic approaches. Comparatively little work has explored fundamental issues concerning the spontaneous emergence of life using only concepts (such as information and evolution) that are divorced from any particular chemistry. Here, I advocate studying the probability of spontaneous molecular self-replication as a function of the information contained in the replicator, and the environmental conditions that might enable this emergence. I show (under certain simplifying assumptions) that the probability to discover a self-replicator by chance depends exponentially on the relative rate of formation of the monomers. If the rate at which monomers are formed is somewhat similar to the rate at which they would occur in a self-replicating polymer, the likelihood to discover such a replicator by chance is increased by many orders of magnitude. I document such an increase in searches for a self-replicator within the digital life system avida.;Research investigating the origins of life usually either focuses on exploring possible life-bearing chemistries in the pre-biotic Earth, or else on synthetic approaches. Comparatively little work has explored fundamental issues concerning the spontaneous emergence of life using only concepts (such as information and evolution) that are divorced from any particular chemistry. Here, I advocate studying the probability of spontaneous molecular self-replication as a function of the information contained in the replicator, and the environmental conditions that might enable this emergence. I show (under certain simplifying assumptions) that the probability to discover a self-replicator by chance depends exponentially on the relative rate of formation of the monomers. If the rate at which monomers are formed is somewhat similar to the rate at which they would occur in a self-replicating polymer, the likelihood to discover such a replicator by chance is increased by many orders of magnitude. I document such an increase in searches for a self-replicator within the digital life system avida.;Research investigating the origins of life usually either focuses on exploring possible life-bearing chemistries in the pre-biotic Earth, or else on synthetic approaches. Comparatively little work has explored fundamental issues concerning the spontaneous emergence of life using only concepts (such as information and evolution) that are divorced from any particular chemistry. Here, I advocate studying the probability of spontaneous molecular self-replication as a function of the information contained in the replicator, and the environmental conditions that might enable this emergence. I show (under certain simplifying assumptions) that the probability to discover a self-replicator by chance depends exponentially on the relative rate of formation of the monomers. If the rate at which monomers are formed is somewhat similar to the rate at which they would occur in a self-replicating polymer, the likelihood to discover such a replicator by chance is increased by many orders of magnitude. I document such an increase in searches for a self-replicator within the digital life system avida.;
BibTeX: @article{adami-information-theoretic-2015, author = {Adami, Christoph}, title = {Information-Theoretic Considerations Concerning the Origin of Life}, journal = {Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres}, year = {2015}, volume = {45}, number = {3}, pages = {309--317} }
Beavers, A.F. and Harrison, C.D.	Information-theoretic teleodynamics in natural and artificial systems [BibTeX]	2012		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{beavers-information-theoretic-2012, author = {Beavers, Anthony F. and Harrison, Christopher D.}, title = {Information-theoretic teleodynamics in natural and artificial systems}, year = {2012} }
Shea, N.	Inherited representations are read in development [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 64(1), pp. 1-31	article
Abstract: Recent theoretical work has identified a tightly constrained sense in which genes carry representational content. Representational properties of the genome are founded in the transmission of DNA over phylogenetic time and its role in natural selection. However, genetic representation is not just relevant to questions of selection and evolution. This article goes beyond existing treatments and argues for the heterodox view that information generated by a process of selection over phylogenetic time can be read in ontogenetic time, in the course of individual development. Recent results in evolutionary biology, drawn both from modelling work, and from experimental and observational data, support a role for genetic representation in explaining individual ontogeny: both genetic representations and environmental information are read by the mechanisms of development, in an individual, so as to lead to adaptive phenotypes. Furthermore, in some cases there appears to have been selection between individuals that rely to different degrees on the two sources of information. Thus, the theory of representation in inheritance systems like the genome is much more than just a coherent reconstruction of information talk in biology. Genetic representation is a property with considerable explanatory utility. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Recent theoretical work has identified a tightly constrained sense in which genes carry representational content. Representational properties of the genome are founded in the transmission of DNA over phylogenetic time and its role in natural selection. However, genetic representation is not just relevant to questions of selection and evolution. This article goes beyond existing treatments and argues for the heterodox view that information generated by a process of selection over phylogenetic time can be read in ontogenetic time, in the course of individual development. Recent results in evolutionary biology, drawn both from modelling work, and from experimental and observational data, support a role for genetic representation in explaining individual ontogeny: both genetic representations and environmental information are read by the mechanisms of development, in an individual, so as to lead to adaptive phenotypes. Furthermore, in some cases there appears to have been selection between individuals that rely to different degrees on the two sources of information. Thus, the theory of representation in inheritance systems like the genome is much more than just a coherent reconstruction of information talk in biology. Genetic representation is a property with considerable explanatory utility.; Recent theoretical work has identified a tightly constrained sense in which genes carry representational content. Representational properties of the genome are founded in the transmission of DNA over phylogenetic time and its role in natural selection. However, genetic representation is not just relevant to questions of selection and evolution. This article goes beyond existing treatments and argues for the heterodox view that information generated by a process of selection over phylogenetic time can be read in ontogenetic time, in the course of individual development. Recent results in evolutionary biology, drawn both from modelling work, and from experimental and observational data, support a role for genetic representation in explaining individual ontogeny: both genetic representations and environmental information are read by the mechanisms of development, in an individual, so as to lead to adaptive phenotypes. Furthermore, in some cases there appears to have been selection between individuals that rely to different degrees on the two sources of information. Thus, the theory of representation in inheritance systems like the genome is much more than just a coherent reconstruction of information talk in biology. Genetic representation is a property with considerable explanatory utility.; Recent theoretical work has identified a tightly constrained sense in which genes carry representational content. Representational properties of the genome are founded in the transmission of DNA over phylogenetic time and its role in natural selection. However, genetic representation is not just relevant to questions of selection and evolution. This article goes beyond existing treatments and argues for the heterodox view that information generated by a process of selection over phylogenetic time can be read in ontogenetic time, in the course of individual development. Recent results in evolutionary biology, drawn both from modelling work, and from experimental and observational data, support a role for genetic representation in explaining individual ontogeny: both genetic representations and environmental information are read by the mechanisms of development, in an individual, so as to lead to adaptive phenotypes. Furthermore, in some cases there appears to have been selection between individuals that rely to different degrees on the two sources of information. Thus, the theory of representation in inheritance systems like the genome is much more than just a coherent reconstruction of information talk in biology. Genetic representation is a property with considerable explanatory utility. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
BibTeX: @article{shea-inherited-2013, author = {Shea, Nicholas}, title = {Inherited representations are read in development}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2013}, volume = {64}, number = {1}, pages = {1--31} }
Frank, S.	Input-output relations in biological systems: measurement, information and the Hill equation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	BIOLOGY DIRECT Vol. 8(1), pp. 31-31	article
Abstract
BibTeX: @article{frank-input-output-2013, author = {Frank, SA}, title = {Input-output relations in biological systems: measurement, information and the Hill equation}, journal = {BIOLOGY DIRECT}, year = {2013}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {31--31} }
Edlund, J.A., Chaumont, N., Hintze, A., Koch, C., Tononi, G. and Adami, C.	Integrated information increases with fitness in the evolution of animats [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	PLoS Computational Biology Vol. 7(10), pp. e1002236	article
Abstract: One of the hallmarks of biological organisms is their ability to integrate disparate information sources to optimize their behavior in complex environments. How this capability can be quantified and related to the functional complexity of an organism remains a challenging problem, in particular since organismal functional complexity is not well-defined. We present here several candidate measures that quantify information and integration, and study their dependence on fitness as an artificial agent ("animat") evolves over thousands of generations to solve a navigation task in a simple, simulated environment. We compare the ability of these measures to predict high fitness with more conventional information-theoretic processing measures. As the animat adapts by increasing its "fit" to the world, information integration and processing increase commensurately along the evolutionary line of descent. We suggest that the correlation of fitness with information integration and with processing measures implies that high fitness requires both information processing as well as integration, but that information integration may be a better measure when the task requires memory. A correlation of measures of information integration (but also information processing) and fitness strongly suggests that these measures reflect the functional complexity of the animat, and that such measures can be used to quantify functional complexity even in the absence of fitness data.;One of the hallmarks of biological organisms is their ability to integrate disparate information sources to optimize their behavior in complex environments. How this capability can be quantified and related to the functional complexity of an organism remains a challenging problem, in particular since organismal functional complexity is not well-defined. We present here several candidate measures that quantify information and integration, and study their dependence on fitness as an artificial agent ("animat") evolves over thousands of generations to solve a navigation task in a simple, simulated environment. We compare the ability of these measures to predict high fitness with more conventional information-theoretic processing measures. As the animat adapts by increasing its "fit" to the world, information integration and processing increase commensurately along the evolutionary line of descent. We suggest that the correlation of fitness with information integration and with processing measures implies that high fitness requires both information processing as well as integration, but that information integration may be a better measure when the task requires memory. A correlation of measures of information integration (but also information processing) and fitness strongly suggests that these measures reflect the functional complexity of the animat, and that such measures can be used to quantify functional complexity even in the absence of fitness data.;One of the hallmarks of biological organisms is their ability to integrate disparate information sources to optimize their behavior in complex environments. How this capability can be quantified and related to the functional complexity of an organism remains a challenging problem, in particular since organismal functional complexity is not well-defined. We present here several candidate measures that quantify information and integration, and study their dependence on fitness as an artificial agent ("animat”) evolves over thousands of generations to solve a navigation task in a simple, simulated environment. We compare the ability of these measures to predict high fitness with more conventional information-theoretic processing measures. As the animat adapts by increasing its "fit” to the world, information integration and processing increase commensurately along the evolutionary line of descent. We suggest that the correlation of fitness with information integration and with processing measures implies that high fitness requires both information processing as well as integration, but that information integration may be a better measure when the task requires memory. A correlation of measures of information integration (but also information processing) and fitness strongly suggests that these measures reflect the functional complexity of the animat, and that such measures can be used to quantify functional complexity even in the absence of fitness data.;One of the hallmarks of biological organisms is their ability to integrate disparate information sources to optimize their behavior in complex environments. How this capability can be quantified and related to the functional complexity of an organism remains a challenging problem, in particular since organismal functional complexity is not well-defined. We present here several candidate measures that quantify information and integration, and study their dependence on fitness as an artificial agent ("animat") evolves over thousands of generations to solve a navigation task in a simple, simulated environment. We compare the ability of these measures to predict high fitness with more conventional information-theoretic processing measures. As the animat adapts by increasing its "fit" to the world, information integration and processing increase commensurately along the evolutionary line of descent. We suggest that the correlation of fitness with information integration and with processing measures implies that high fitness requires both information processing as well as integration, but that information integration may be a better measure when the task requires memory. A correlation of measures of information integration (but also information processing) and fitness strongly suggests that these measures reflect the functional complexity of the animat, and that such measures can be used to quantify functional complexity even in the absence of fitness data.;
BibTeX: @article{edlund-integrated-2011, author = {Edlund, Jeffrey A. and Chaumont, Nicolas and Hintze, Arend and Koch, Christof and Tononi, Giulio and Adami, Christoph}, title = {Integrated information increases with fitness in the evolution of animats}, journal = {PLoS Computational Biology}, year = {2011}, volume = {7}, number = {10}, pages = {e1002236} }
McIntosh, A.R., Rajah, M.N. and Lobaugh, N.J.	Interactions of prefrontal cortex in relation to awareness in sensory learning [BibTeX]	1999	Science Vol. 284	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{mcintosh-interactions-1999, author = {McIntosh, A. R. and Rajah, M. N. and Lobaugh, N. J.}, title = {Interactions of prefrontal cortex in relation to awareness in sensory learning}, journal = {Science}, year = {1999}, volume = {284}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.284.5419.1531}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1126/science.284.5419.1531} }
Rickles, D.	Interpretation Formalism [BibTeX]	2008	Vol. 3Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime, pp. 1 - 22	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{rickles-interpretation-2008-1, author = {Rickles, Dean}, title = {Interpretation Formalism}, booktitle = {Symmetry, Structure and Spacetime}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2008}, volume = {3}, pages = {1 -- 22}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408030015} }
Zwier, K.R.	Interventionist causation in physical science [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014		book
Abstract: The current consensus view of causation in physics, as commonly held by scientists and philosophers, has several serious problems. It fails to provide an epistemology for the causal knowledge that it claims physics to possess; it is inapplicable in a prominent area of physics (classical thermodynamics); and it is difficult to reconcile with our everyday use of causal concepts and claims. In this dissertation, I use historical examples and philosophical arguments to show that the interventionist account of causation constitutes a promising alternative for a "physically respectable" account of causation. The interventionist account explicates important parts of the experimental practice of physics and important aspects of the ways in which physical theory is used and applied. Moreover, the interventionist account succeeds where the consensus view of causation in physics fails. I argue that the interventionist account provides an epistemology of causal knowledge in physics that is rooted in experiment. On the interventionist view, there is a close link between experiment and the testing of causal claims. I give several examples of experiments from the early history of thermodynamics that scientists used in interventionist-type arguments. I also argue that interventionist claims made in the context of a physical theory can be epistemically justified by reference to the experimental interventions and observations that serve as evidence for the theory. I then show that the interventionist account of causation is well-suited to the patterns of reasoning that are intrinsic to thermodynamic theory. I argue that interventionist reasoning constitutes the structural foundation of thermodynamic theory, and that thermodynamic theory can provide clear answers to meaningful questions about whether or not a certain variable is a cause of another in a given context. Finally, I argue that the interventionist account offers the prospect of a unification of "physically respectable" causation and our everyday notion of causation. I conclude the dissertation by sketching an anti-foundationalist unification of causation, according to which causal reasoning occurs in the same manner in physics as it does in other branches of life and scientific research.
BibTeX: @book{zwier-interventionist-2014, author = {Zwier, Karen R.}, title = {Interventionist causation in physical science}, year = {2014} }
Epting, S.	Intra-Disciplinary Research as Progress in Philosophy: Lessons from Philosophy of the City [BibTeX]	2016	Philosophia	article
BibTeX: @article{epting-intra-disciplinary-2016, author = {Epting, Shane}, title = {Intra-Disciplinary Research as Progress in Philosophy: Lessons from Philosophy of the City}, journal = {Philosophia}, year = {2016} }
Frolov, V.P. and Zelnikov, A.	Introduction to black hole physics [BibTeX]	2011		book
BibTeX: @book{frolov-introduction-2011, author = {Frolov, V. P. and Zelnikov, Andrei}, title = {Introduction to black hole physics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2011} }
Barbieri, M.	Introduction to Code Biology [BibTeX]	2014	Biosemiotics Vol. 7(2), pp. 167-179	article
BibTeX: @article{barbieri-introduction-2014, author = {Barbieri, Marcello}, title = {Introduction to Code Biology}, journal = {Biosemiotics}, year = {2014}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, pages = {167--179} }
Frieden, B.R.	Introduction to Fisher information: Its origin, uses, and predictions [BibTeX]	2007	, pp. 1-41	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{frieden-introduction-2007, author = {Frieden, B. R.}, title = {Introduction to Fisher information: Its origin, uses, and predictions}, year = {2007}, pages = {1--41} }
Dyson, H.J. and A. G. Palmer, III	Introduction to Solution State {NMR}\ Spectroscopy [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Comprehensive Biophysics, pp. 136 - 159	incollection	URL
Abstract: Since its beginnings as an obscure technique of interest only to molecular physicists, solution NMR\ has developed into an important tool in chemistry and biochemistry. This is because the magnetic properties of nuclei in molecules are strongly influenced by their local chemical environment, to the extent that magnetic-resonance measurements can be used to give direct information on the chemical bonding, structure, and motions of nuclei. This article provides a basic introduction to the phenomenon of magnetic resonance and a brief description of its occurrence and limitations. The majority of the text is concerned with the application of solution NMR\ in biophysics, particularly the use of this technique in obtaining structural information on molecules in solution.
BibTeX: @incollection{dyson-introduction-2012, author = {Dyson, H. J. and III, A. G. Palmer}, title = {Introduction to Solution State {NMR}\ Spectroscopy}, booktitle = {Comprehensive Biophysics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2012}, pages = {136 -- 159}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123749208001132} }
Kawahigashi, Y., Pérez García, D. and Ruskai, M.B.	Introduction to Special Issue: Operator Algebras and Quantum Information Theory [BibTeX]	2016	Journal of Mathematical Physics Vol. 57(1), pp. 15101	article
BibTeX: @article{kawahigashi-introduction-2016, author = {Kawahigashi, Yasuyuki and Pérez García, David and Ruskai, Mary B.}, title = {Introduction to Special Issue: Operator Algebras and Quantum Information Theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Physics}, year = {2016}, volume = {57}, number = {1}, pages = {15101} }
Black, E., Floridi, L. and Third, A.	Introduction to the special issue on the nature and scope of information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Synthese Vol. 175(S1), pp. 1-3	article
Abstract: Issue Title: Special issue on The Nature and Scope of Information
BibTeX: @article{black-introduction-2010, author = {Black, Elizabeth and Floridi, Luciano and Third, Allan}, title = {Introduction to the special issue on the nature and scope of information}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2010}, volume = {175}, number = {S1}, pages = {1--3} }
Davies, P. and Gregersen, N.H.	Introduction: does information matter? [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 1-10	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{davies-introduction:-2010, author = {Davies, Paul and Gregersen, Niels Henrik}, title = {Introduction: does information matter?}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {1--10}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.001} }
Baumgaertner, B. and Floridi, L.	Introduction: The Philosophy of Information [BibTeX]	2016	Topoi Vol. 35(1), pp. 157-159	article
BibTeX: @article{baumgaertner-introduction:-2016, author = {Baumgaertner, Bert and Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Introduction: The Philosophy of Information}, journal = {Topoi}, year = {2016}, volume = {35}, number = {1}, pages = {157--159} }
Priemer, R.	Introductory signal processing [BibTeX]	1991	Vol. 6	book
BibTeX: @book{priemer-introductory-1991, author = {Priemer, Roland}, title = {Introductory signal processing}, publisher = {World Scientific}, year = {1991}, volume = {6} }
Flandoli, F.	Irreducibility of the 3-D Stochastic Navier–Stokes Equation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1997	Journal of Functional Analysis Vol. 149(1), pp. 160 - 177	article	DOI
Abstract: A 3-dimensional Navier–Stokes equation with random force is investigated. A form of irreducibility, of interest in ergodic theory, is proved, under a full noise assumption. The basic tool is the fact that, even if the equation is a priori non-well-posed, the solutions depend continuously on the noise around regular solutions.
BibTeX: @article{flandoli-irreducibility-1997, author = {Flandoli, Franco}, title = {Irreducibility of the 3-D Stochastic Navier–Stokes Equation}, journal = {Journal of Functional Analysis}, year = {1997}, volume = {149}, number = {1}, pages = {160 -- 177}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1006/jfan.1996.3089} }
Landauer, R.	Irreversibility and heat generation in the computing process [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	IBM Journal of Research and Development Vol. 44(1/2), pp. 261-269	article
Abstract: It is argued that computing machines inevitably involve devices which perform logical functions that do not have a single-valued inverse. This logical irreversibility is associated with physical irreversibility and requires a minimal heat generation, per machine cycle, typically of the order of kT for each irreversible function.; It is argued that computing machines inevitably involve devices which perform logical functions that do not have a single-valued inverse. This logical irreversibility is associated with physical irreversibility and requires a minimal heat generation, per machine cycle, typically of the order of kT for each irreversible function.;
BibTeX: @article{landauer-irreversibility-2000, author = {Landauer, R.}, title = {Irreversibility and heat generation in the computing process}, journal = {IBM Journal of Research and Development}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, number = {1/2}, pages = {261--269} }
Colyvan, M.	Is Probability the Only Coherent Approach to Uncertainty? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2008	Risk Analysis Vol. 28(3), pp. 645-652	article
Abstract: In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to be non-probabilistic uncertainty.;In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to be non-probabilistic uncertainty. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to be non-probabilistic uncertainty.;In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to be non‐probabilistic uncertainty.;In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to be non-probabilistic uncertainty.;
BibTeX: @article{colyvan-is-2008, author = {Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Is Probability the Only Coherent Approach to Uncertainty?}, journal = {Risk Analysis}, year = {2008}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, pages = {645--652} }
Lyre, H.	Is Really Something Wrong with Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann, “What’s Wrong with Microphysicalism?”: Routledge, London, New York, 2004, 152 pp, Hardcover, €93.90, ISBN 0-415-32794-6 [BibTeX]	2008	Vol. 39(1)	book
BibTeX: @book{lyre-is-2008, author = {Lyre, Holger}, title = {Is Really Something Wrong with Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann, “What’s Wrong with Microphysicalism?”: Routledge, London, New York, 2004, 152 pp, Hardcover, €93.90, ISBN 0-415-32794-6}, year = {2008}, volume = {39}, number = {1} }
Papineau, D.	Is Representation Rife? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Ratio Vol. 16(2), pp. 107-123	article
Abstract: This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief‐desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than beliefs and desires can also have representational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a system‐relative way: such states must be ascribed varying contents when viewed as components in different biological systems. I conclude by arguing that ‘the genetic code’ does not even embody this kind of system‐relative representation.; This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familiar realm of belief-desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than beliefs and desires can also have presentational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a system-relative way: such states must be ascribed varying contents when viewed as components in different biological systems. I conclude by arguing that 'the genetic code' does not even embody this kind of system-relative representation.
BibTeX: @article{papineau-is-2003, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Is Representation Rife?}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {2003}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, pages = {107--123} }
Floridi, L.	Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2005	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 70(2), pp. 351-370	article
Abstract: There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.; There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.; There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This article contributes to the current debate by criticising & revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favor of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful & well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information; & misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information - in other words, not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarizes the main results of the article & indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition. 30 . Adapted from the source document; There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske‐Grice approach: meaningful and well‐formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth‐values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo‐information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo‐information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth‐condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.; There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition.
BibTeX: @article{floridi-is-2005, author = {Floridi, Luciano}, title = {Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, pages = {351--370} }
Gryb, S. and Ngui, M.	Is Spacetime Countable? [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 153-168	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{gryb-is-2015, author = {Gryb, Sean and Ngui, Marc}, title = {Is Spacetime Countable?}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {153--168} }
Psillos, S.	Is Structural Realism Possible? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2001	Philosophy of Science Vol. 68(3), pp. S13-S24	article
Abstract: This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive-and viable-realist thesis.; This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position.; This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable, The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The do it inward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive-and viable-realist thesis.
BibTeX: @article{psillos-is-2001, author = {Psillos, Stathis}, title = {Is Structural Realism Possible?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, volume = {68}, number = {3}, pages = {S13--S24} }
Psillos, S.	Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1995	Dialectica Vol. 49(1), pp. 15-46	article
Abstract: In a recent series of papers, John Worrall has defended and elaborated a philosophical position – traced back to Poincaré – which he calls structural realism. This view stands in between scientific realism and agnostic instrumentalism and intends to accommodate both the intuitions that underwrite the 'no miracles' argument for scientific realism and the existence of scientific revolutions which lead to radical theoretical changes. Structural realism presents itself as the best of both worlds. In this paper I critically examine the epistemic status of structural realism, and argue that it is not the best of both worlds. Yet, I stress that it reveals an insight which, properly understood, can cast new light on the debates over scientific realism.
BibTeX: @article{psillos-is-1995, author = {Psillos, Stathis}, title = {Is Structural Realism the Best of Both Worlds?}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {1995}, volume = {49}, number = {1}, pages = {15--46} }
Dorato, M.	Is Structural Spacetime Realism Relationism in Disguise? The Supererogatory Nature of the Substantivalism/Relationism Debate [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2008	Vol. 4The Ontology of Spacetime II, pp. 17 - 37	incollection	URL
Abstract: In this chapter I position the substantivalism/relationism debate in the wider context of the scientific realism issue, and investigate the place of structural realism in this debate.
BibTeX: @incollection{dorato-is-2008, author = {Dorato, Mauro}, title = {Is Structural Spacetime Realism Relationism in Disguise? The Supererogatory Nature of the Substantivalism/Relationism Debate}, booktitle = {The Ontology of Spacetime II}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2008}, volume = {4}, pages = {17 -- 37}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871177408000028} }
Lyre, H.	Is structural underdetermination possible? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Synthese Vol. 180(2), pp. 235-247	article
Abstract: Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.;Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.;Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.; Issue Title: SCIENTIFIC REALISM QUO VADIS? THEORIES, STRUCTURES, UNDERDETERMINATION AND REFERENCE Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Structural realism is sometimes said to undermine the theory underdetermination (TUD) argument against realism, since, in usual TUD scenarios, the supposed underdetermination concerns the object-like theoretical content but not the structural content. The paper explores the possibility of structural TUD by considering some special cases from modern physics, but also questions the validity of the TUD argument itself. The upshot is that cases of structural TUD cannot be excluded, but that TUD is perhaps not such a terribly serious anti-realistic argument.;
BibTeX: @article{lyre-is-2011, author = {Lyre, Holger}, title = {Is structural underdetermination possible?}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2011}, volume = {180}, number = {2}, pages = {235--247} }
Votsis, I.	Is Structure Not Enough? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Philosophy of Science Vol. 70(5), pp. 879-890	article
Abstract: This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser‐known epistemological views, viz. “structural realism” (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninformative. Moreover, appealing to Quine's notion of ontological relativity, I suggest that far from being false, SR knowledge claims seem to be the most that we can hope for.;This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser-known epistemological views, viz. "structural realism" (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninformative. Moreover, appealing to Quine's notion of ontological relativity, I suggest that far from being false, SR knowledge claims seem to be the most that we can hope for.;This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell's lesser-known epistemological views, viz. "structural realism" (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman's allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninfbrmative. Moreover, appealing to Quine's notion of ontological relativity, I suggest that far from being false, SR knowledge claims seem to be the most that we can hope for. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{votsis-is-2003, author = {Votsis, Ioannis}, title = {Is Structure Not Enough?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2003}, volume = {70}, number = {5}, pages = {879--890} }
Morganti, M.	Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Philosophy of Science Vol. 78(5), pp. 1165-1176	article
Abstract: Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, 'ontic' form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting.; Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, '‘ontic'’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting.
BibTeX: @article{morganti-is-2011, author = {Morganti, Matteo}, title = {Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2011}, volume = {78}, number = {5}, pages = {1165--1176} }
Adams, F. and de Moraes, J.A.	Is There a Philosophy of Information? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Topoi Vol. 35(1), pp. 161-171	article
Abstract: In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi's proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.;In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.;
BibTeX: @article{adams-is-2016, author = {Adams, Fred and de Moraes, João A.}, title = {Is There a Philosophy of Information?}, journal = {Topoi}, year = {2016}, volume = {35}, number = {1}, pages = {161--171} }
McHarris, W.C.	It from Bit from It from Bit... Nature and Nonlinear Logic [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 225-234	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{mcharris-it-2015, author = {McHarris, Wm C}, title = {It from Bit from It from Bit... Nature and Nonlinear Logic}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {225--234} }
Aguirre, A., Foster, B. and Merali, Z.	It From Bit or Bit From It?: On Physics and Information [BibTeX]	2015		book
BibTeX: @book{aguirre-it-2015, author = {Aguirre, Anthony and Foster, Brendan and Merali, Zeeya}, title = {It From Bit or Bit From It?: On Physics and Information}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, year = {2015} }
D’Ariano, G.M.	It from Qubit [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 25-35	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{dariano-it-2015, author = {D’Ariano, Giacomo Mauro}, title = {It from Qubit}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {25--35} }
Planat, M.	It from Qubit: How to Draw Quantum Contextuality [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Information Vol. 5(2), pp. 209-218	article
Abstract: Wheeler’s observer-participancy and the related it from bit credo refer to quantum non-locality and contextuality. The mystery of these concepts slightly starts unveiling if one encodes the (in)compatibilities between qubit observables in the relevant finite geometries. The main objective of this treatise is to outline another conceptual step forward by employing Grothendieck’s dessins d’enfants to reveal the topological and (non)algebraic machinery underlying the measurement acts and their information content.
BibTeX: @article{planat-it-2014, author = {Planat, Michel}, title = {It from Qubit: How to Draw Quantum Contextuality}, journal = {Information}, year = {2014}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {209--218} }
Steward, H.	I—What is a Continuant? [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Vol. 89(1), pp. 109-123	article
Abstract: In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should accept that processes are both occurrents and continuants; nothing, I argue, can truly occur or happen (unless it is instantaneous), which does not have temporal parts. I make an alternative suggestion as to how one might deal with the peculiar status of processes without jettisoning a very natural account of occurrence; and assess the consequences for the category of continuant.;In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should accept that processes are both occurrents and continuants; nothing, I argue, can truly occur or happen (unless it is instantaneous), which does not have temporal parts. I make an alternative suggestion as to how one might deal with the peculiar status of processes without jettisoning a very natural account of occurrence; and assess the consequences for the category of continuant.; In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally–and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should accept that processes are both occurrents and continuants; nothing, I argue, can truly occur or happen (unless it is instantaneous), which does not have temporal parts. I make an alternative suggestion as to how one might deal with the peculiar status of processes without jettisoning a very natural account of occurrence; and assess the consequences for the category of continuant.;
BibTeX: @article{steward-iwhat-2015, author = {Steward, Helen}, title = {I—What is a Continuant?}, journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume}, year = {2015}, volume = {89}, number = {1}, pages = {109--123} }
Lawlor, L.	Jacques Derrida [BibTeX]	2016	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{lawlor-jacques-2016, author = {Lawlor, Leonard}, title = {Jacques Derrida}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}, year = {2016}, edition = {Winter 2016}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/derrida/} }
Bueno, O. and Colyvan, M.	Just What is Vagueness [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Ratio Vol. 25(1), pp. 19-33	article
Abstract: We argue that standard definitions of 'vagueness' prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of 'vagueness' in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of 'vagueness' should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of 'vagueness' must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total-ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of 'vagueness', we propose a very general non-question-begging definition.; We argue that standard definitions of 'vagueness' prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of 'vagueness' in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of 'vagueness' should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of 'vagueness' must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total-ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of 'vagueness', we propose a very general non-question-begging definition. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth‐value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of ‘vagueness’ must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total‐ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of ‘vagueness’, we propose a very general non‐question‐begging definition.;We argue that standard definitions of vagueness prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of vagueness in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of vagueness should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over how to best deal with the sorites paradox. Moreover, a definition of vagueness must be able to accommodate the variety of forms sorites arguments can take. These include numerical, total-ordered sorites arguments, discrete versions, continuous versions, as well as others without any obvious metric structure at all. After considering the shortcomings of various definitions of vagueness, we propose a very general non-question-begging definition.;
BibTeX: @article{bueno-just-2012, author = {Bueno, Otávio and Colyvan, Mark}, title = {Just What is Vagueness}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {2012}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, pages = {19--33} }
Peres, A.	Karl Popper and the Copenhagen interpretation [BibTeX]	2002	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Vol. 33(1), pp. 23	article
BibTeX: @article{peres-karl-2002, author = {Peres, Asher}, title = {Karl Popper and the Copenhagen interpretation}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {23} }
Ferreira, M.J. and service) , W.I.(O.	Kierkegaard [BibTeX]	2009	Vol. 8	book
BibTeX: @book{ferreira-kierkegaard-2009, author = {Ferreira, M. J. and service), Wiley InterScience (Online}, title = {Kierkegaard}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, year = {2009}, volume = {8} }
Marras, A.	Kim on Reduction [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2002	Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 57(2), pp. 231-257	article
Abstract: In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction - a functional model of reduction - is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.; In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.; In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of 'non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction–a functional model of reduction–is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.; In "Mind in a Physical World" (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of 'non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction.
BibTeX: @article{marras-kim-2002, author = {Marras, A.}, title = {Kim on Reduction}, journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)}, year = {2002}, volume = {57}, number = {2}, pages = {231--257} }
Psillos, S. and service) , P.C.(O.	Knowing the structure of nature: essays on realism and explanation [BibTeX]	2009		book
BibTeX: @book{psillos-knowing-2009, author = {Psillos, Stathis and service), Palgrave Connect (Online}, title = {Knowing the structure of nature: essays on realism and explanation}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2009} }
Dretske, F.I.	Knowledge and the flow of information [BibTeX]	1981		book
BibTeX: @book{dretske-knowledge-1981, author = {Dretske, Fred I.}, title = {Knowledge and the flow of information}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1981} }
Dretske, F.	Knowledge and the Flow of Information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1999		book	URL
Abstract: LCCN: 99012546
BibTeX: @book{dretske-knowledge-1999, author = {Dretske, F.I.}, title = {Knowledge and the Flow of Information}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, url = {https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GC9xQgAACAAJ} }
Hetherington, S.	Knowledge and the Gettier Problem [BibTeX]	2016		book
BibTeX: @book{hetherington-knowledge-2016, author = {Hetherington, Stephen}, title = {Knowledge and the Gettier Problem}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2016} }
Dretske, F.I. and Bernecker, S.	Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology [BibTeX]	2000		book
BibTeX: @book{dretske-knowledge:-2000, author = {Dretske, Fred I. and Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000} }
Grünwald, P.D. and Vitányi, P.M.B.	Kolmogorov Complexity and Information Theory: With an Interpretation in Terms of Questions and Answers [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Journal of Logic, Language and Information Vol. 12(4), pp. 497-529	article
Abstract: We compare the elementary theories of Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity, the extent to which they have a common purpose, and where they are fundamentally different. We discuss and relate the basic notions of both theories: Shannon entropy, Kolmogorov complexity, Shannon mutual information and Kolmogorov ("algorithmic") mutual information. We explain how universal coding may be viewed as a middle ground between the two theories. We consider Shannon's rate distortion theory, which quantifies useful (in a certain sense) information. We use the communication of information as our guiding motif, and we explain how it relates to sequential question-answer sessions.; We compare the elementary theories of Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity, the extent to which they have a common purpose, and wherethey are fundamentally different. We discuss and relate the basicnotions of both theories: Shannon entropy, Kolmogorov complexity, Shannon mutual informationand Kolmogorov (“algorithmic”) mutual information. We explainhow universal coding may be viewed as a middle ground betweenthe two theories. We consider Shannon's rate distortion theory, whichquantifies useful (in a certain sense) information.We use the communication of information as our guiding motif, and we explain howit relates to sequential question-answer sessions.
BibTeX: @article{grunwald-kolmogorov-2003, author = {Grünwald, Peter D. and Vitányi, Paul M. B.}, title = {Kolmogorov Complexity and Information Theory: With an Interpretation in Terms of Questions and Answers}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, year = {2003}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {497--529} }
Xia, J., Flynn, W.F., Gallicchio, E., Zhang, B.W., He, P., Tan, Z. and Levy, R.M.	Large‐scale asynchronous and distributed multidimensional replica exchange molecular simulations and efficiency analysis [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Journal of Computational Chemistry Vol. 36(23), pp. 1772-1785	article
Abstract: We describe methods to perform replica exchange molecular dynamics (REMD) simulations asynchronously (ASyncRE). The methods are designed to facilitate large scale REMD simulations on grid computing networks consisting of heterogeneous and distributed computing environments as well as on homogeneous high-performance clusters. We have implemented these methods on NSF (National Science Foundation) XSEDE (Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment) clusters and BOINC (Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) distributed computing networks at Temple University and Brooklyn College at CUNY (the City University of New York). They are also being implemented on the IBM World Community Grid. To illustrate the methods, we have performed extensive (more than 60 ms in aggregate) simulations for the beta-cyclodextrin-heptanoate host-guest system in the context of one- and two-dimensional ASyncRE, and we used the results to estimate absolute binding free energies using the binding energy distribution analysis method. We propose ways to improve the efficiency of REMD simulations: these include increasing the number of exchanges attempted after a specified molecular dynamics (MD) period up to the fast exchange limit and/or adjusting the MD period to allow sufficient internal relaxation within each thermodynamic state. Although ASyncRE simulations generally require long MD periods (textgreaterpicoseconds) per replica exchange cycle to minimize the overhead imposed by heterogeneous computing networks, we found that it is possible to reach an efficiency similar to conventional synchronous REMD, by optimizing the combination of the MD period and the number of exchanges attempted per cycle.; We describe methods to perform replica exchange molecular dynamics (REMD) simulations asynchronously (ASyncRE). The methods are designed to facilitate large scale REMD simulations on grid computing networks consisting of heterogeneous and distributed computing environments as well as on homogeneous high‐performance clusters. We have implemented these methods on NSF (National Science Foundation) XSEDE (Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment) clusters and BOINC (Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) distributed computing networks at Temple University and Brooklyn College at CUNY (the City University of New York). They are also being implemented on the IBM World Community Grid. To illustrate the methods, we have performed extensive (more than 60 ms in aggregate) simulations for the beta‐cyclodextrin‐heptanoate host‐guest system in the context of one‐ and two‐dimensional ASyncRE, and we used the results to estimate absolute binding free energies using the binding energy distribution analysis method. We propose ways to improve the efficiency of REMD simulations: these include increasing the number of exchanges attempted after a specified molecular dynamics (MD) period up to the fast exchange limit and/or adjusting the MD period to allow sufficient internal relaxation within each thermodynamic state. Although ASyncRE simulations generally require long MD periods (textgreaterpicoseconds) per replica exchange cycle to minimize the overhead imposed by heterogeneous computing networks, we found that it is possible to reach an efficiency similar to conventional synchronous REMD, by optimizing the combination of the MD period and the number of exchanges attempted per cycle. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. The ASyncRE methodology is presented, allowing the performance of large‐scale replica exchange molecular dynamics (REMD) simulations asynchronously on grid computing networks consisting of heterogeneous and distributed computing environments, as well as on homogeneous high performance clusters like NSF XSEDE clusters and BOINC distributed computing networks at Temple University and Brooklyn College at CUNY. Several ways to improve the efficiency of REMD simulations in the context of the ASyncRE methodology are also proposed.; We describe methods to perform replica exchange molecular dynamics (REMD) simulations asynchronously (ASyncRE). The methods are designed to facilitate large scale REMD simulations on grid computing networks consisting of heterogeneous and distributed computing environments as well as on homogeneous high-performance clusters. We have implemented these methods on NSF (National Science Foundation) XSEDE (Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment) clusters and BOINC (Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) distributed computing networks at Temple University and Brooklyn College at CUNY (the City University of New York). They are also being implemented on the IBM World Community Grid. To illustrate the methods, we have performed extensive (more than 60 ms in aggregate) simulations for the beta-cyclodextrin-heptanoate host-guest system in the context of one- and two-dimensional ASyncRE, and we used the results to estimate absolute binding free energies using the binding energy distribution analysis method. We propose ways to improve the efficiency of REMD simulations: these include increasing the number of exchanges attempted after a specified molecular dynamics (MD) period up to the fast exchange limit and/or adjusting the MD period to allow sufficient internal relaxation within each thermodynamic state. Although ASyncRE simulations generally require long MD periods (textgreaterpicoseconds) per replica exchange cycle to minimize the overhead imposed by heterogeneous computing networks, we found that it is possible to reach an efficiency similar to conventional synchronous REMD, by optimizing the combination of the MD period and the number of exchanges attempted per cycle.; We describe methods to perform replica exchange molecular dynamics (REMD) simulations asynchronously (ASyncRE). The methods are designed to facilitate large scale REMD simulations on grid computing networks consisting of heterogeneous and distributed computing environments as well as on homogeneous high-performance clusters. We have implemented these methods on NSF (National Science Foundation) XSEDE (Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment) clusters and BOINC (Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing) distributed computing networks at Temple University and Brooklyn College at CUNY (the City University of New York). They are also being implemented on the IBM World Community Grid. To illustrate the methods, we have performed extensive (more than 60 ms in aggregate) simulations for the beta-cyclodextrin-heptanoate host-guest system in the context of one- and two-dimensional ASyncRE, and we used the results to estimate absolute binding free energies using the binding energy distribution analysis method. We propose ways to improve the efficiency of REMD simulations: these include increasing the number of exchanges attempted after a specified molecular dynamics (MD) period up to the fast exchange limit and/or adjusting the MD period to allow sufficient internal relaxation within each thermodynamic state. Although ASyncRE simulations generally require long MD periods (textgreaterpicoseconds) per replica exchange cycle to minimize the overhead imposed by heterogeneous computing networks, we found that it is possible to reach an efficiency similar to conventional synchronous REMD, by optimizing the combination of the MD period and the number of exchanges attempted per cycle. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
BibTeX: @article{xia-largescale-2015, author = {Xia, Junchao and Flynn, William F. and Gallicchio, Emilio and Zhang, Bin W. and He, Peng and Tan, Zhiqiang and Levy, Ronald M.}, title = {Large‐scale asynchronous and distributed multidimensional replica exchange molecular simulations and efficiency analysis}, journal = {Journal of Computational Chemistry}, year = {2015}, volume = {36}, number = {23}, pages = {1772--1785} }
Fraassen, V. and Bas, C.	Laws and symmetry [BibTeX]	1989		book
BibTeX: @book{van-fraassen-laws-1989, author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.}, title = {Laws and symmetry}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1989} }
Ratti, E.	Levels of abstraction, emergentism and artificial life [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence Vol. 27(1), pp. 51-61	article
Abstract: I diagnose the current debate between epistemological and ontological emergentism as a Kantian antinomy, which has reasonable but irreconcilable thesis and antithesis. Kantian antinomies have recently returned to contemporary philosophy in part through the work of Luciano Floridi, and the method of levels of abstraction. I use a thought experiment concerning a computer simulation to show how to resolve the epistemological/ontological antinomy about emergence. I also use emergentism and simulations in artificial life to illuminate both levels of abstraction and theoretical challenge for building intelligent agents.; I diagnose the current debate between epistemological and ontological emergentism as a Kantian antinomy, which has reasonable but irreconcilable thesis and antithesis. Kantian antinomies have recently returned to contemporary philosophy in part through the work of Luciano Floridi, and the method of levels of abstraction. I use a thought experiment concerning a computer simulation to show how to resolve the epistemological/ontological antinomy about emergence. I also use emergentism and simulations in artificial life to illuminate both levels of abstraction and theoretical challenge for building intelligent agents.; I diagnose the current debate between epistemological and ontological emergentism as a Kantian antinomy, which has reasonable but irreconcilable thesis and antithesis. Kantian antinomies have recently returned to contemporary philosophy in part through the work of Luciano Floridi, and the method of levels of abstraction. I use a thought experiment concerning a computer simulation to show how to resolve the epistemological/ontological antinomy about emergence. I also use emergentism and simulations in artificial life to illuminate both levels of abstraction and theoretical challenge for building intelligent agents.;
BibTeX: @article{ratti-levels-2015, author = {Ratti, Emanuele}, title = {Levels of abstraction, emergentism and artificial life}, journal = {Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence}, year = {2015}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, pages = {51--61} }
Owens, D.	Levels of Explanation [BibTeX]	1989	Mind Vol. 98(389), pp. 59-79	article
BibTeX: @article{owens-levels-1989, author = {Owens, David}, title = {Levels of Explanation}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1989}, volume = {98}, number = {389}, pages = {59--79} }
Hobbes, T.	Leviathan [BibTeX]	2015		book
BibTeX: @book{hobbes-leviathan-2015, author = {Hobbes, Thomas}, title = {Leviathan}, publisher = {Xist Publishing}, year = {2015} }
Chaitin, G.	Life as evolving software [BibTeX]	2012		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{chaitin-life-2012, author = {Chaitin, Gregory}, title = {Life as evolving software}, year = {2012} }
Aharonov, Y., Botero, A. and Scully, M.	Locality or Non-Locality in Quantum Mechanics: Hidden Variables without "Spooky Action-at-a-Distance" [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2001	Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung - Section A Journal of Physical Sciences Vol. 56(1-2), pp. 5-15	article
Abstract: The folklore notion of the "Non-Locality of Quantum Mechanics" is examined from the point of view of hidden-variables theories according to Belinfante's classification in his Survey of Hidden Variables Theories. It is here shown that in the case of EPR, there exist hidden variables theories that successfully reproduce quantum-mechanical predictions, but which are explicitly local. Since such theories do not fall into Belinfante's classification, we propose an expanded classification which includes similar theories, which we term as theories of the "third" kind. Causal implications of such theories are explored.
BibTeX: @article{aharonov-locality-2001, author = {Aharonov, Yakir and Botero, Alonso and Scully, Marlan}, title = {Locality or Non-Locality in Quantum Mechanics: Hidden Variables without "Spooky Action-at-a-Distance"}, journal = {Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung - Section A Journal of Physical Sciences}, year = {2001}, volume = {56}, number = {1-2}, pages = {5--15} }
Devlin, K.J.	Logic and information [BibTeX]	1991		book
BibTeX: @book{devlin-logic-1991, author = {Devlin, Keith J.}, title = {Logic and information}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991} }
Gurevich, Y. and Neeman, I.	Logic of infons: The propositional case [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) Vol. 12(2), pp. 1-28	article
Abstract: Infons are statements viewed as containers of information (rather then representations of truth values). The logic of infons turns out to be a conservative extension of logic known as constructive or intuitionistic. Distributed Knowledge Authorization Language uses additional unary connectives " p said" and " p implied" where p ranges over principals. Here we investigate infon logic and a narrow but useful primal fragment of it. In both cases, we develop model theory and analyze the derivability problem: Does the given query follow from the given hypotheses? Our more involved technical results are on primal infon logic. We construct an algorithm for the multiple derivability problem: Which of the given queries follow from the given hypotheses? Given a bound on the quotation depth of the hypotheses, the algorithm runs in linear time. We quickly discuss the significance of this result for access control.; Infons are statements viewed as containers of information (rather then representations of truth values). The logic of infons turns out to be a conservative extension of logic known as constructive or intuitionistic. Distributed Knowledge Authorization Language uses additional unary connectives "p said" and "p implied" where p ranges over principals. Here we investigate infon logic and a narrow but useful primal fragment of it. In both cases, we develop model theory and analyze the derivability problem: Does the given query follow from the given hypotheses? Our more involved technical results are on primal infon logic. We construct an algorithm for the multiple derivability problem: Which of the given queries follow from the given hypotheses? Given a bound on the quotation depth of the hypotheses, the algorithm runs in linear time. We quickly discuss the significance of this result for access control.
BibTeX: @article{gurevich-logic-2011, author = {Gurevich, Yuri and Neeman, Itay}, title = {Logic of infons: The propositional case}, journal = {ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)}, year = {2011}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {1--28} }
Hensen, B., Bernien, H., Dréau, A.E., Reiserer, A., Kalb, N., Blok, M.S., Ruitenberg, J., Vermeulen, R.F.L., Schouten, R.N., Abellán, C., Amaya, W., Pruneri, V., Mitchell, M.W., Markham, M., Twitchen, D.J., Elkouss, D., Wehner, S., Taminiau, T.H. and Hanson, R.	Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres [BibTeX]	2015	Nature	article
BibTeX: @article{hensen-loophole-free-2015, author = {Hensen, B. and Bernien, H. and Dréau, A. E. and Reiserer, A. and Kalb, N. and Blok, M. S. and Ruitenberg, J. and Vermeulen, R. F. L. and Schouten, R. N. and Abellán, C. and Amaya, W. and Pruneri, V. and Mitchell, M. W. and Markham, M. and Twitchen, D. J. and Elkouss, D. and Wehner, S. and Taminiau, T. H. and Hanson, R.}, title = {Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres}, journal = {Nature}, year = {2015} }
Azzouni, J.	Losing My Marbles [BibTeX]	1988	Hollins Critic Vol. 25(3), pp. 19	article
BibTeX: @article{azzouni-losing-1988, author = {Azzouni, Jodi}, title = {Losing My Marbles}, journal = {Hollins Critic}, year = {1988}, volume = {25}, number = {3}, pages = {19} }
Browning, G.K.	Lyotard and the end of grand narratives [BibTeX]	2000		book
BibTeX: @book{browning-lyotard-2000, author = {Browning, Gary K.}, title = {Lyotard and the end of grand narratives}, publisher = {University of Wales Press}, year = {2000} }
Williams, J.	Lyotard: towards a postmodern philosophy [BibTeX]	1998		book
BibTeX: @book{williams-lyotard:-1998, author = {Williams, James}, title = {Lyotard: towards a postmodern philosophy}, publisher = {Polity Press}, year = {1998} }
Lebowitz, J.L.	Macroscopic laws, microscopic dynamics, time's arrow and Boltzmann's entropy [BibTeX]	1993	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications Vol. 194(1), pp. 1-27	article
BibTeX: @article{lebowitz-macroscopic-1993, author = {Lebowitz, Joel L.}, title = {Macroscopic laws, microscopic dynamics, time's arrow and Boltzmann's entropy}, journal = {Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications}, year = {1993}, volume = {194}, number = {1}, pages = {1--27} }
Colyvan, M. and Hajek, A.	Making Ado Without Expectations [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	MIND Vol. 125(499), pp. 829-857	article
Abstract: This paper is a response to Paul Bartha's 'Making Do Without Expectations'. We provide an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two notable extensions of standard decision theory: relative expectation theory (RET) and Paul Bartha's relative utility theory (RUT). These extensions are designed to provide intuitive answers to some well-known problems in decision theory involving gaps in expectations. We argue that both RET and RUT go some way towards providing solutions to the problems in question but neither extension solves all the relevant problems.
BibTeX: @article{colyvan-making-2016, author = {Colyvan, M. and Hajek, A.}, title = {Making Ado Without Expectations}, journal = {MIND}, year = {2016}, volume = {125}, number = {499}, pages = {829--857} }
Votsis, I.	Making contact with observations [BibTeX]	2010		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{votsis-making-2010, author = {Votsis, Ioannis}, title = {Making contact with observations}, year = {2010} }
Kim, J.	Making Sense of Emergence [BibTeX]	1999	Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 95(1/2), pp. 3-36	article
BibTeX: @article{kim-making-1999, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Making Sense of Emergence}, journal = {Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition}, year = {1999}, volume = {95}, number = {1/2}, pages = {3--36} }
Pigliucci, M. and Kaplan, J.	Making sense of evolution: the conceptual foundations of evolutionary biology [BibTeX]	2006		book
BibTeX: @book{pigliucci-making-2006, author = {Pigliucci, Massimo and Kaplan, Jonathan}, title = {Making sense of evolution: the conceptual foundations of evolutionary biology}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {2006} }
Woodward, J.	Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003		book
Abstract: This book develops a manipulationist theory of causation and explanation: causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. The resulting theory is a species of counterfactual theory that (I claim) avoids the difficulties and counterexamples that have infected alternative accounts of causation and explanation, from the Deductive-Nomological model onwards. One of the key concepts in this theory is the notion of an intervention, which is an idealization of the notion of an experimental manipulation that is stripped of its anthropocentric elements. This notion is used to provide a characterization of causal relationships that is non-reductive but also not viciously circular. Relationships that correctly tell us how the value of one variable Y would change under interventions on a second variable Y are invariant. The notion of an invariant relationship is more helpful than the notion of a law of nature (the notion on which philosophers have traditionally relied) in understanding how explanation and causal attribution work in the special sciences.;Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defences, objections, and replies into a convincing defence of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyse causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.;
BibTeX: @book{woodward-making-2003, author = {Woodward, James}, title = {Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2003} }
Young, J.J.	Making up users [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2006	Accounting, Organizations and Society Vol. 31(6), pp. 579-600	article
Abstract: Within recent years, financial statement users have been accorded great significance by accounting standard-setters. In the US, the conceptual framework maintains that a primary purpose of financial statements is to provide information useful to investors and creditors in making their economic decisions. Contemporary accounting textbooks unproblematically posit this purpose for accounting. Yet, this emphasis is quite recent and occurred despite limited knowledge about the information needs and decision processes of actual users of financial statements. This paper unpacks the taken-for-grantedness of the primacy of financial statement users in standard-setting and considers their use as a category to justify and denigrate particular accounting disclosures and practices. It traces how particular ideas about financial statement users and their connection to accounting standard setting have been constructed in various documents and reports including the conceptual framework and accounting standards. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Within recent years, financial statement users have been accorded great significance by accounting standard-setters. In the United States, the conceptual framework maintains that a primary purpose of financial statements is to provide information useful to investors and creditors in making their economic decisions. Contemporary accounting textbooks unproblematically posit this purpose for accounting. Yet, this emphasis is quite recent and occurred despite limited knowledge about the information needs and decision processes of actual users of financial statements. This paper unpacks the taken-for-grantedness of the primacy of financial statement users in standard-setting and considers their use as a category to justify and denigrate particular accounting disclosures and practices. It traces how particular ideas about financial statement users and their connection to accounting standard setting have been constructed in various documents and reports including the conceptual framework and accounting standards. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.;Within recent years, financial statement users have been accorded great significance by accounting standard-setters. In the United States, the conceptual framework maintains that a primary purpose of financial statements is to provide information useful to investors and creditors in making their economic decisions. Contemporary accounting textbooks unproblematically posit this purpose for accounting. Yet, this emphasis is quite recent and occurred despite limited knowledge about the information needs and decision processes of actual users of financial statements. This paper unpacks the taken-for-grantedness of the primacy of financial statement users in standard-setting and considers their use as a category to justify and denigrate particular accounting disclosures and practices. It traces how particular ideas about financial statement users and their connection to accounting standard setting have been constructed in various documents and reports including the conceptual framework and accounting standards. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.;Within recent years, financial statement users have been accorded great significance by accounting standard-setters. In the United States, the conceptual framework maintains that a primary purpose of financial statements is to provide information useful to investors and creditors in making their economic decisions. Contemporary accounting textbooks unproblematically posit this purpose for accounting. Yet, this emphasis is quite recent and occurred despite limited knowledge about the information needs and decision processes of actual users of financial statements. This paper unpacks the taken-for-grantedness of the primacy of financial statement users in standard-setting and considers their use as a category to justify and denigrate particular accounting disclosures and practices. It traces how particular ideas about financial statement users and their connection to accounting standard setting have been constructed in various documents and reports including the conceptual framework and accounting standards.;
BibTeX: @article{young-making-2006, author = {Young, Joni J.}, title = {Making up users}, journal = {Accounting, Organizations and Society}, year = {2006}, volume = {31}, number = {6}, pages = {579--600} }
Stapel, K. and Schneider, K.	Managing knowledge on communication and information flow in global software projects [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Expert Systems Vol. 31(3), pp. 234-252	article
Abstract: Communication is a key success factor of distributed software projects. Poor communication has been identified as a main obstacle to successful collaboration. Global projects are especially endangered by information gaps between collaborating sites. Different communication styles, technical equipment, and missing awareness of each other can cause severe problems. Knowledge about actual and desired channels, paths, and modes of communication is required for improving communication in a globally distributed project. However, many project participants know little about communication and information flow in their projects. In this contribution, we focus on knowledge about communication and information flow. It is acquired by modelling on-going and desired flows of information, including documented and non-documented channels of information flow. We analyzed a distributed software project from the information flow perspective. Based on the findings, we developed specific techniques to improve information flow in distributed software development according to the FLOW Method. In a second distributed project, we evaluated one of the techniques. We found the FLOW mapping technique to be suitable for effectively spreading knowledge about communication and information flow in global software projects.
BibTeX: @article{stapel-managing-2012, author = {Stapel, Kai and Schneider, Kurt}, title = {Managing knowledge on communication and information flow in global software projects}, journal = {Expert Systems}, year = {2012}, volume = {31}, number = {3}, pages = {234--252} }
Saunders, S.	Many worlds?: Everett, quantum theory, and reality [BibTeX]	2010		book
BibTeX: @book{saunders-many-2010, author = {Saunders, Simon}, title = {Many worlds?: Everett, quantum theory, and reality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2010} }
Chen, J. and ebrary , I.	Mao's China and the cold war [BibTeX]	2001		book
BibTeX: @book{chen-maos-2001, author = {Chen, Jian and ebrary, Inc}, title = {Mao's China and the cold war}, publisher = {University of North Carolina Press}, year = {2001} }
Nakorchevsky, A. and Yates, J.R.	Mass Spectrometry [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Comprehensive Biophysics, pp. 341 - 375	incollection	URL
Abstract: This chapter discusses the application of mass spectrometry to functional and structural characterization of proteins. Mass spectrometry techniques commonly applied to both the functional proteomics (identity and expression level of the proteins) and the structural characterization of proteins (post-translational modifications, tertiary structure and stability, subunit composition, and molecular shape) are discussed. The chapter reviews the current and historical methodologies for these applications, provides an in-depth description of the instrumentation requirements, and highlights some of examples of the techniques used. Overall, the chapter reviews biophysical, biochemical, analytical, and biological aspects of the structural and functional protein mass spectrometry.
BibTeX: @incollection{nakorchevsky-mass-2012, author = {Nakorchevsky, A. and Yates, J. R.}, title = {Mass Spectrometry}, booktitle = {Comprehensive Biophysics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2012}, pages = {341 -- 375}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123749208001211} }
Arendt, W. and Schleich, W.	Mathematical analysis of evolution, information, and complexity [BibTeX]	2009		book
BibTeX: @book{arendt-mathematical-2009, author = {Arendt, Wolfgang and Schleich, Wolfgang}, title = {Mathematical analysis of evolution, information, and complexity}, publisher = {Wiley-VCH}, year = {2009} }
Baker, A.	Mathematical Explanation in Science [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2009	The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 60(3), pp. 611-633	article
Abstract: Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects. Introduction: Mathematical Explanation Indispensability and Explanation Is the Mathematics Indispensable to the Explanation? 3.1 Object-level arbitrariness 3.2 Concept-level arbitrariness 3.3 Theory-level arbitrariness Is the Explanandum 'Purely Physical'? Is the Mathematics Explanatory in Its Own Right? Does Inference to the Best Explanation Apply to Mathematics? 6.1 Leng's first argument 6.2 Leng's second argument 6.3 Leng's third argument Conclusions; Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{baker-mathematical-2009, author = {Baker, Alan}, title = {Mathematical Explanation in Science}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2009}, volume = {60}, number = {3}, pages = {611--633} }
Shapiro, S.	Mathematical structuralism [BibTeX]	1996	Philosophia Mathematica Vol. 4(2), pp. 81	article
BibTeX: @article{shapiro-mathematical-1996, author = {Shapiro, Stewart}, title = {Mathematical structuralism}, journal = {Philosophia Mathematica}, year = {1996}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {81} }
Shapiro, S.	Mathematical Structuralism [BibTeX]	2010	Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy	misc
BibTeX: @misc{shapiro-mathematical-2010, author = {Shapiro, Stewart}, title = {Mathematical Structuralism}, journal = {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2010} }
Shapiro, S.	Mathematical Structuralism [BibTeX]	2010		book
BibTeX: @book{shapiro-mathematical-2010-1, author = {Shapiro, Stewart}, title = {Mathematical Structuralism}, year = {2010} }
Sober, E.	Mathematics and Indispensability [BibTeX]	1993	The Philosophical Review Vol. 102(1), pp. 35-57	article
BibTeX: @article{sober-mathematics-1993, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {Mathematics and Indispensability}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, pages = {35--57} }
Leng, M.	Mathematics and reality [BibTeX]	2010		book
BibTeX: @book{leng-mathematics-2010, author = {Leng, Mary}, title = {Mathematics and reality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2010} }
Resnik, M.D.	Mathematics as a science of patterns [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1997		book
Abstract: Mathematics is regarded as our most developed science, and yet philosophical troubles surface as soon as we inquire about its subject matter partly because mathematics itself says nothing about the metaphysical nature of its objects. Taking mathematics at face value seems to favour the Platonist view according to which mathematics concerns causally inert objects existing outside space-time, but this view seems to preclude any account of how we acquire mathematical knowledge without using some mysterious intellectual intuition. In this book, I defend a version of mathematical realism, motivated by the indispensability of mathematics in science, according to which (1) mathematical objects exist independently of us and our constructions, (2) much of contemporary mathematics is true, and (3) mathematical truths obtain independently of our beliefs, theories, and proofs.The ontological component of my realism is a form of structuralism according to which mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures, or patterns, and like geometric points, their identities are fixed only through their relationships to each other. Structuralism is also part of my epistemology in that material objects ‘fit’ simple patterns, and in doing so, they ‘fill’ the positions of simple mathematical structures. We may perceive the arrangements of objects but we cannot perceive their positions i.e. the abstract, non-spatiotemporal mathematical objects, and the problem then consists in explaining how we can form beliefs about them.Answering this question introduces a central notion of my epistemology, that of a posit: by representing and designing patterned objects our ancestors posited geometric objects as sui generis and started describing them by describing the patterns in which they are positions. Since positing mathematical objects, like positing new scientific entities, is an activity similar to making up a story, one might wonder how such an activity can lead to mathematical knowledge and truth, but I believe that our ancestors were justified in introducing mathematical objects and we are justified in retaining them, by pragmatic and global considerations: mathematics has proved immensely fruitful for science, technology, and practical life, and doing without it is now virtually impossible.This account of justification introduces a further problem: if our justification for believing in mathematical truths is global and pragmatic, then it might turn out that one is not justified in accepting a mathematical claim unless it is accepted by science, and this is clearly at odds with the practice of mathematics where we hardly ever invoke such global considerations in order to justify a mathematical claim. In mathematics, we usually employ a local conception of evidence made up mainly of a priori proofs. However, arguing from the perspective of a Quinean epistemic holism, I claim that this feature of the practice should not make us conclude that mathematics is an a priori science, disconnected evidentially from both observation and natural science, for observation is relevant to mathematics, and technological and scientific success forms a vital part of our justification for believing in the truth of mathematics.
BibTeX: @book{resnik-mathematics-1997, author = {Resnik, Michael D.}, title = {Mathematics as a science of patterns}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1997} }
Resnik, M.D.	Mathematics as a Science of Patterns [BibTeX]	2000		book
BibTeX: @book{resnik-mathematics-2000, author = {Resnik, Michael D.}, title = {Mathematics as a Science of Patterns}, publisher = {Oxford University Press, Incorporated}, year = {2000} }
Baker, A.	Mathematics, Indispensability and Scientific Progress [BibTeX]	2001	Erkenntnis (1975-) Vol. 55(1), pp. 85-116	article
BibTeX: @article{baker-mathematics-2001, author = {Baker, Alan}, title = {Mathematics, Indispensability and Scientific Progress}, journal = {Erkenntnis (1975-)}, year = {2001}, volume = {55}, number = {1}, pages = {85--116} }
Putnam, H.	Mathematics, matter, and method [BibTeX]	1979	Vol. 1.	book
BibTeX: @book{putnam-mathematics-1979, author = {Putnam, Hilary}, title = {Mathematics, matter, and method}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1979}, volume = {1.}, edition = {2nd} }
Erickson, G.J. and Smith, C.R.	Maximum-entropy and Bayesian methods in science and engineering [BibTeX]	1988		inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{erickson-maximum-entropy-1988, author = {Erickson, Gary J. and Smith, C. R.}, title = {Maximum-entropy and Bayesian methods in science and engineering}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1988} }
Bub, J.	Maxwell's Demon and the Thermodynamics of Computation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2001	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 32(4), pp. 569 - 579	article	DOI URL
Abstract: It is generally accepted, following Landauer and Bennett, that the process of measurement involves no minimum entropy cost, but the erasure of information in resetting the memory register of a computer to zero requires dissipating heat into the environment. This thesis has been challenged recently in a two-part article by Earman and Norton. I review some relevant observations in the thermodynamics of computation and argue that Earman and Norton are mistaken: there is in principle no entropy cost to the acquisition of information, but the destruction of information does involve an irreducible entropy cost.
BibTeX: @article{bub-maxwells-2001, author = {Bub, Jeffrey}, title = {Maxwell's Demon and the Thermodynamics of Computation}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2001}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, pages = {569 -- 579}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219801000235}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S1355-2198(01)00023-5} }
Grice, H.P.	Meaning [BibTeX]	1957	The Philosophical Review Vol. 66(3), pp. 377-388	article
BibTeX: @article{grice-meaning-1957, author = {Grice, H. P.}, title = {Meaning}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {1957}, volume = {66}, number = {3}, pages = {377--388} }
Grice, H.P.	Meaning [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1996		incollection
Abstract: Against causal theories of meaning offered by such philosophers as C. L. Stephenson (1944), meaning is defined here as a situation in which A intends to induce by x a belief in an audience, & intends his or her utterance to be recognized as such. Thus, both intention & recognition are integral aspects of meaning. This definition is illustrated with examples of imperatives & quasi-imperatives, & correlates of the main argument are elucidated. Against the objection that the terms "intention" & "recognition" are vaguely defined, it is argued that these may be defined, as in nonlinguistic cases, by the context of the utterance. D. M. Smith
BibTeX: @incollection{grice-meaning-1996, author = {Grice, H. P.}, title = {Meaning}, year = {1996} }
Rovelli, C.	Meaning = Information + Evolution [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016		article
Abstract: Notions like meaning, signal, intentionality, are difficult to relate to a physical word. I study a purely physical definition of "meaningful information", from which these notions can be derived. It is inspired by a model recently illustrated by Kolchinsky and Wolpert, and improves on Dretske classic work on the relation between knowledge and information. I discuss what makes a physical process into a "signal".
BibTeX: @article{rovelli-meaning-2016, author = {Rovelli, Carlo}, title = {Meaning = Information + Evolution}, year = {2016} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Meaning, Models and Selection: A Review of Philosophical Naturalism [BibTeX]	1996	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 56(3), pp. 673-678	article
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-meaning-1996, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Meaning, Models and Selection: A Review of Philosophical Naturalism}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56}, number = {3}, pages = {673--678} }
Wolski, J.	Measure of Amount of Information and Its Meaning [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	FILOZOFIA NAUKI Vol. 18(3), pp. 105-105	article
Abstract: Jacek Wolski, Measure of Amount of Information and Its Meaning There are five different conceptions of information which have been created in last sixty years. Each of them diversely define notion of information. The aim of this article is to prove that these five conceptions represents two separate trends. Every introduced conception of information is qualified either to quantitative trend, which is supported on rating of amount of information, or to semantic trend, which describe meaning of information. These trends are exclusive.
BibTeX: @article{wolski-measure-2010, author = {Wolski, J.}, title = {Measure of Amount of Information and Its Meaning}, journal = {FILOZOFIA NAUKI}, year = {2010}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, pages = {105--105} }
Cadney, J. and Linden, N.	Measurement entropy in generalized nonsignalling theory cannot detect bipartite nonlocality [BibTeX]	2012	Phys. Rev. A Vol. 86(5), pp. 052103	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{cadney-measurement-2012, author = {Cadney, Josh and Linden, Noah}, title = {Measurement entropy in generalized nonsignalling theory cannot detect bipartite nonlocality}, journal = {Phys. Rev. A}, year = {2012}, volume = {86}, number = {5}, pages = {052103}, url = {http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.86.052103}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.86.052103} }
Tal, E.	Measurement in Science [BibTeX]	2015	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	incollection	URL
BibTeX: @incollection{tal-measurement-2015, author = {Tal, Eran}, title = {Measurement in Science}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2015}, edition = {Summer 2015}, url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/measurement-science/} }
Wu Zhaoqi, Zhu Chuanxi and Zhang Xiaozhi	Measurement interpretation and information measures in general probabilistic theory [BibTeX]	2013	Open Physics Vol. 11(3), pp. 317	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{wu-zhaoqi-measurement-2013, author = {Wu Zhaoqi and Zhu Chuanxi and Zhang Xiaozhi}, title = {Measurement interpretation and information measures in general probabilistic theory}, journal = {Open Physics}, year = {2013}, volume = {11}, number = {3}, pages = {317}, url = {//www.degruyter.com/view/j/phys.2013.11.issue-3/s11534-012-0169-x/s11534-012-0169-x.xml}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.2478/s11534-012-0169-x} }
Tononi, G. and Sporns, O.	Measuring information integration [BibTeX]	2003	BMC Neurosci Vol. 4	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{tononi-measuring-2003, author = {Tononi, G. and Sporns, O.}, title = {Measuring information integration}, journal = {BMC Neurosci}, year = {2003}, volume = {4}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-4-31}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-4-31} }
Schneider, T.D.	Measuring Molecular Information [BibTeX]	1999	Journal of Theoretical Biology Vol. 201(1), pp. 87-92	article
BibTeX: @article{schneider-measuring-1999, author = {Schneider, Thomas D.}, title = {Measuring Molecular Information}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, year = {1999}, volume = {201}, number = {1}, pages = {87--92} }
Glennan, S.	Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 81(2), pp. 362-381	article
Abstract: Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties-Kim's functional model of reduction-and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation.;Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher‐level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher‐level properties—Kim’s functional model of reduction—and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher‐level properties and causation.;
BibTeX: @article{glennan-mechanisms-2010, author = {Glennan, Stuart}, title = {Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2010}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {362--381} }
Fraser, D.	Meinard Kuhlmann, Holger Lyre and Andrew Wayne, Editors, Ontological aspects of quantum field theory, World Scientific Publishing, London (2002) ISBN 981-238-182-1 (376 pp., US $98, £ 73) [BibTeX]	2004	Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 35(4), pp. 721-723	article	URL
BibTeX: @article{fraser-meinard-2004, author = {Fraser, D.}, title = {Meinard Kuhlmann, Holger Lyre and Andrew Wayne, Editors, Ontological aspects of quantum field theory, World Scientific Publishing, London (2002) ISBN 981-238-182-1 (376 pp., US $98, £ 73)}, journal = {Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2004}, volume = {35}, number = {4}, pages = {721--723}, url = {https://books.google.com.au/books?id=-brUCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA234&lpg=PA234&dq=Dieks+field+theory&source=bl&ots=aaQY-RqCna&sig=Bko7G7bZi0YQtr3RI7cOzu4JPj4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiCkfW-vtrSAhWEXrwKHaEzD6AQ6AEINDAE#v=onepage&q=Dieks%20field%20theory&f=false} }
Frigg, R.	Meinard Kuhlmann, Holger Lyre, and Andrew Wayne (eds.),Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory. Singapore: World Scientific (2002), 376 pp., $98.00 (cloth) [BibTeX]	2005	Philosophy of Science Vol. 72(3), pp. 511-514	article
BibTeX: @article{frigg-meinard-2005, author = {Frigg, Roman}, title = {Meinard Kuhlmann, Holger Lyre, and Andrew Wayne (eds.),Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory. Singapore: World Scientific (2002), 376 pp., $98.00 (cloth)}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2005}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, pages = {511--514} }
Cournia, Z., Allen, T.W., Andricioaei, I., Antonny, B., Baum, D., Brannigan, G., Buchete, N.-V., Deckman, J.T., Delemotte, L., del Val, C., Friedman, R., Gkeka, P., Hege, H.-C., Hénin, J., Kasimova, M.A., Kolocouris, A., Klein, M.L., Khalid, S., Lemieux, M.J., Lindow, N., Roy, M., Selent, J., Tarek, M., Tofoleanu, F., Vanni, S., Urban, S., Wales, D.J., Smith, J.C. and Bondar, A.-N.	Membrane Protein Structure, Function, and Dynamics: a Perspective from Experiments and Theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	The Journal of membrane biology Vol. 248(4), pp. 611-640	article
Abstract: Membrane proteins mediate processes that are fundamental for the flourishing of biological cells. Membrane-embedded transporters move ions and larger solutes across membranes; receptors mediate communication between the cell and its environment and membrane-embedded enzymes catalyze chemical reactions. Understanding these mechanisms of action requires knowledge of how the proteins couple to their fluid, hydrated lipid membrane environment. We present here current studies in computational and experimental membrane protein biophysics, and show how they address outstanding challenges in understanding the complex environmental effects on the structure, function, and dynamics of membrane proteins.; Membrane proteins mediate processes that are fundamental for the flourishing of biological cells. Membrane-embedded transporters move ions and larger solutes across membranes; receptors mediate communication between the cell and its environment and membrane-embedded enzymes catalyze chemical reactions. Understanding these mechanisms of action requires knowledge of how the proteins couple to their fluid, hydrated lipid membrane environment. We present here current studies in computational and experimental membrane protein biophysics, and show how they address outstanding challenges in understanding the complex environmental effects on the structure, function, and dynamics of membrane proteins.; Membrane proteins mediate processes that are fundamental for the flourishing of biological cells. Membrane-embedded transporters move ions and larger solutes across membranes; receptors mediate communication between the cell and its environment and membrane-embedded enzymes catalyze chemical reactions. Understanding these mechanisms of action requires knowledge of how the proteins couple to their fluid, hydrated lipid membrane environment. We present here current studies in computational and experimental membrane protein biophysics, and show how they address outstanding challenges in understanding the complex environmental effects on the structure, function, and dynamics of membrane proteins.
BibTeX: @article{cournia-membrane-2015, author = {Cournia, Zoe and Allen, Toby W. and Andricioaei, Ioan and Antonny, Bruno and Baum, Daniel and Brannigan, Grace and Buchete, Nicolae-Viorel and Deckman, Jason T. and Delemotte, Lucie and del Val, Coral and Friedman, Ran and Gkeka, Paraskevi and Hege, Hans-Christian and Hénin, Jérôme and Kasimova, Marina A. and Kolocouris, Antonios and Klein, Michael L. and Khalid, Syma and Lemieux, M. J. and Lindow, Norbert and Roy, Mahua and Selent, Jana and Tarek, Mounir and Tofoleanu, Florentina and Vanni, Stefano and Urban, Sinisa and Wales, David J. and Smith, Jeremy C. and Bondar, Ana-Nicoleta}, title = {Membrane Protein Structure, Function, and Dynamics: a Perspective from Experiments and Theory}, journal = {The Journal of membrane biology}, year = {2015}, volume = {248}, number = {4}, pages = {611--640} }
Dunlop, C.E.M.	Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2004	Philosophical Psychology Vol. 17(1), pp. 77-94	article
Abstract: In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor.; In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor.;
BibTeX: @article{dunlop-mentalese-2004, author = {Dunlop, Charles E. M.}, title = {Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2004}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {77--94} }
Sterelny, K.	Mentalese; Intentionality [BibTeX]	1989	Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. 98(392), pp. 623	article
BibTeX: @article{sterelny-mentalese;-1989, author = {Sterelny, Kim}, title = {Mentalese; Intentionality}, journal = {Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy}, year = {1989}, volume = {98}, number = {392}, pages = {623} }
Chalmers, D.J., Manley, D. and Wasserman, R.	Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology [BibTeX]	2009		inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{chalmers-metametaphysics:-2009, author = {Chalmers, David J. and Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan}, title = {Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {2009} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Metaphysics and the philosophical imagination [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Philosophical Studies Vol. 160(1), pp. 97-113	article
Abstract: Methods and goals in philosophy are discussed by first describing an ideal, and then looking at how the ideal might be approached. David Lewis's work in metaphysics is critically examined and compared to analogous work by Mackie and Carnap. Some large-scale philosophical systematic work, especially in metaphysics, is best treated as model-building, in a sense of that term that draws on the philosophy of science. Models are constructed in a way that involves deliberate simplification, or other imaginative modification of reality, in order to make relationships visible or problems tractable.; Issue Title: Special Issue: Metaphysics and Science Methods and goals in philosophy are discussed by first describing an ideal, and then looking at how the ideal might be approached. David Lewis's work in metaphysics is critically examined and compared to analogous work by Mackie and Carnap. Some large-scale philosophical systematic work, especially in metaphysics, is best treated as model-building, in a sense of that term that draws on the philosophy of science. Models are constructed in a way that involves deliberate simplification, or other imaginative modification of reality, in order to make relationships visible or problems tractable.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; Methods and goals in philosophy are discussed by first describing an ideal, and then looking at how the ideal might be approached. David Lewis’s work in metaphysics is critically examined and compared to analogous work by Mackie and Carnap. Some large-scale philosophical systematic work, especially in metaphysics, is best treated as model-building, in a sense of that term that draws on the philosophy of science. Models are constructed in a way that involves deliberate simplification, or other imaginative modification of reality, in order to make relationships visible or problems tractable.
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-metaphysics-2012, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Metaphysics and the philosophical imagination}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2012}, volume = {160}, number = {1}, pages = {97--113} }
Bachmann, T.	Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind [BibTeX]	2000		book	URL
BibTeX: @book{bachmann-microgenetic-2000, author = {Bachmann, T.}, title = {Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind}, publisher = {John Benjamins Pub. Co}, year = {2000}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/aicr.25} }
Kusch, M.	Microscopes and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Bas van Fraassen’s Recent Work [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Journal for General Philosophy of Science Vol. 46(1), pp. 167-182	article
Abstract: Bas van Fraassen’s recent book Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (2008) modifies and refines the “constructive empiricism” of The Scientific Image (1980) in a number of ways. This paper investigates the changes concerning one of the most controversial aspects of the overall position, that is, van Fraassen’s agnosticism concerning the veridicality of microscopic observation. The paper tries to make plausible that the new formulation of this agnosticism is an advance over the older rendering. The central part of this investigation is an attempt to answer Marc Alspector-Kelly’s 2004-criticism of an early (2001) version of van Fraassen’s new position. Alspector-Kelly’s contribution it is to date the most extensive attack on van Fraassen’s twenty-first-century work on the topic of microscopic observation. One of the central ideas emerging from the present discussion is a link between the debate over the veridicality of microscopic observation and the issue of the theory-ladenness of experience.
BibTeX: @article{kusch-microscopes-2015, author = {Kusch, Martin}, title = {Microscopes and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience in Bas van Fraassen’s Recent Work}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, year = {2015}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {167--182} }
Stapp, H.	Minds and values in the quantum universe [BibTeX]	2010	Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, pp. 104-120	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{stapp-minds-2010, author = {Stapp, Henry}, title = {Minds and values in the quantum universe}, booktitle = {Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2010}, pages = {104--120}, note = {DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511778759.006} }
Poppel, E. and Artin, T.	Mindworks : time and conscious experience [BibTeX]	1988		book
BibTeX: @book{poppel-mindworks-1988, author = {Poppel, E. and Artin, T.}, title = {Mindworks : time and conscious experience}, publisher = {Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc}, year = {1988} }
Sagawa, T. and Ueda, M.	Minimal energy cost for thermodynamic information processing: measurement and information erasure [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2009	Physical review letters Vol. 102(25), pp. 250602	article
Abstract: The fundamental lower bounds on the thermodynamic energy cost of measurement and information erasure are determined. The lower bound on the erasure validates Landauer's principle for a symmetric memory; for other cases, the bound indicates the breakdown of the principle. Our results constitute the second law of "information thermodynamics," in which information content and thermodynamic variables are treated on an equal footing.
BibTeX: @article{sagawa-minimal-2009, author = {Sagawa, Takahiro and Ueda, Masahito}, title = {Minimal energy cost for thermodynamic information processing: measurement and information erasure}, journal = {Physical review letters}, year = {2009}, volume = {102}, number = {25}, pages = {250602} }
Dretske, F.I.	Minimal rationality [BibTeX]	2012		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{dretske-minimal-2012, author = {Dretske, Fred I.}, title = {Minimal rationality}, year = {2012} }
Wallace, C.S. and Dowe, D.L.	Minimum Message Length and Kolmogorov Complexity [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1999	The Computer Journal Vol. 42(4), pp. 270-283	article
Abstract: The notion of algorithmic complexity was developed by Kolmogorov (1965) and Chaitin (1966) independently of one another and of Solomonoff's notion (1964) of algorithmic probability. Given a Turing machine T, the (prefix) algorithmic complexity of a string S is the length of the shortest input to T which would cause T to output S and stop. The Solomonoff probability of S given T is the probability that a random binary string of 0s and 1s will result in T producing an output having S as a prefix. We attempt to establish a parallel between a restricted (two-part) version of the Kolmogorov model and the minimum message length approach to statistical inference and machine learning of Wallace and Boulton (1968), in which an 'explanation' of a data string is modelled as a two-part message, the first part stating a general hypothesis about the data and the second encoding details of the data not implied by the hypothesis. Solomonoff's model is tailored to prediction rather than inference in that it considers not just the most likely explanation, but it also gives weights to all explanations depending upon their posterior probability. However, as the amount of data increases, we typically expect the most likely explanation to have a dominant weighting in the prediction.; The notion of algorithmic complexity was developed by Kolmogorov (1965) and Chaitin (1966) independently of one another and of Solomonoff's notion (1964) of algorithmic probability. Given a Turing machine T, the (prefix) algorithmic complexity of a string S is the length of the shortest input to T which would cause T to output S and stop. The Solomonoff probability of S given T is the probability that a random binary string of 0s and 1s will result in T producing an output having S as a prefix. We attempt to establish a parallel between a restricted (two-part) version of the Kolmogorov model and the minimum message length approach to statistical inference and machine learning of Wallace and Boulton (1968), in which an 'explanation' of a data string is modelled as a two-part message, the first part stating a general hypothesis about the data and the second encoding details of the data not implied by the hypothesis. Solomonoff's model is tailored to prediction rather than inference in that it considers not just the most likely explanation, but it also gives weights to all explanations depending upon their posterior probability. However, as the amount of data increases, we typically expect the most likely explanation to have a dominant weighting in the prediction.;
BibTeX: @article{wallace-minimum-1999, author = {Wallace, C. S. and Dowe, D. L.}, title = {Minimum Message Length and Kolmogorov Complexity}, journal = {The Computer Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {42}, number = {4}, pages = {270--283} }
Worrall, J.	Miracles and models: why reports of the death of structural realism may be exaggerated [BibTeX]	2007	Philosophy(61), pp. 125	article
BibTeX: @article{worrall-miracles-2007, author = {Worrall, John}, title = {Miracles and models: why reports of the death of structural realism may be exaggerated}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {2007}, number = {61}, pages = {125} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	Misinformation [BibTeX]	1989	Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 19(4), pp. 533-550	article
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-misinformation-1989, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Misinformation}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1989}, volume = {19}, number = {4}, pages = {533--550} }
Wilson, M.	Mixed-Level Explanation [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Philosophy of Science Vol. 77(5), pp. 933-946	article
Abstract: Explanations in physics commonly appeal to data drawn from different length or time scales, as when a "top-down" macroscopic constraint such as rigidity is used to evade the complexities one would confront in attempting to model the situation in a purely "bottom-up" fashion. Such techniques commonly embody rather complex shifts in explanatory strategy. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Explanations in physics commonly appeal to data drawn from different length or time scales, as when a “top-down” macroscopic constraint such as rigidity is used to evade the complexities one would confront in attempting to model the situation in a purely “bottom-up” fashion. Such techniques commonly embody rather complex shifts in explanatory strategy.;Explanations in physics commonly appeal to data drawn from different length or time scales, as when a “top-down” macroscopic constraint such as rigidity is used to evade the complexities one would confront in attempting to model the situation in a purely “bottom-up” fashion. Such techniques commonly embody rather complex shifts in explanatory strategy.;
BibTeX: @article{wilson-mixed-level-2010, author = {Wilson, Mark}, title = {Mixed-Level Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, volume = {77}, number = {5}, pages = {933--946} }
Grünwald, P.	Model Selection Based on Minimum Description Length [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	Journal of mathematical psychology Vol. 44(1), pp. 133-152	article
Abstract: We introduce the minimum description length (MDL) principle. a general principle for inductive inference based on the idea that regularities (laws) underlying data can always be used to compress data. We introduce the fundamental concept of MDL, called the stochastic complexity, and we show how it can be used for model selection. We briefly compare MDL-based model selection to other approaches and we informally explain why we may expect MDL to give good results in practical applications. (C) 2000 Academic Press.; We introduce the minimum description length (MDL) principle, a general principle for inductive inference based on the idea that regularities (laws) underlying data can always be used to compress data. We introduce the fundamental concept of MDL, called the stochastic complexity, and we show how it can be used for model selection. We briefly compare MDL-based model selection to other approaches and we informally explain why we may expect MDL to give good results in practical applications. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.
BibTeX: @article{grunwald-model-2000, author = {Grünwald, P.}, title = {Model Selection Based on Minimum Description Length}, journal = {Journal of mathematical psychology}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {133--152} }
Fraassen, V. and Bas, C.	Modeling and Measurement: The Criterion of Empirical Grounding [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Philosophy of Science Vol. 79(5), pp. 773-784	article
Abstract: A scientific theory offers models for the phenomena in its domain; these models involve theoretical quantities, and a model's structure is the set of relations it imposes on these quantities. A fundamental demand in scientific practice is for those quantities to be clearly and feasibly related to measurement. This demand for empirical grounding can be articulated by displaying the theory-dependent criteria for a procedure to count as a measurement and for identifying the quantity it measures. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];A scientific theory offers models for the phenomena in its domain; these models involve theoretical quantities, and a model’s structure is the set of relations it imposes on these quantities. A fundamental demand in scientific practice is for those quantities to be clearly and feasibly related to measurement. This demand for empirical grounding can be articulated by displaying the theory-dependent criteria for a procedure to count as a measurement and for identifying the quantity it measures.;A scientific theory offers models for the phenomena in its domain; these models involve theoretical quantities, and a model's structure is the set of relations it imposes on these quantities. A fundamental demand in scientific practice is for those quantities to be clearly and feasibly related to measurement. This demand for empirical grounding can be articulated by displaying the theory-dependent criteria for a procedure to count as a measurement and for identifying the quantity it measures.;
BibTeX: @article{van-fraassen-modeling-2012, author = {Van Fraassen, Bas C.}, title = {Modeling and Measurement: The Criterion of Empirical Grounding}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2012}, volume = {79}, number = {5}, pages = {773--784} }
Devlin, K.	Modeling real reasoning [BibTeX]	2009	Vol. 5363, pp. 234-252	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{devlin-modeling-2009, author = {Devlin, Keith}, title = {Modeling real reasoning}, year = {2009}, volume = {5363}, pages = {234--252} }
Wimsatt, W.C.	Models and experiments? An exploration: Review of Michael Weisberg’s Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford, 2013 [BibTeX]	2015	Biology & Philosophy Vol. 30(2), pp. 293-298	article
BibTeX: @article{wimsatt-models-2015, author = {Wimsatt, William C.}, title = {Models and experiments? An exploration: Review of Michael Weisberg’s Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, Oxford, 2013}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, year = {2015}, volume = {30}, number = {2}, pages = {293--298} }
Scharnhorst, A., Börner, K. and Besselaar, P.v.d.	Models of science dynamics: encounters between complexity theory and information sciences [BibTeX]	2012		book
BibTeX: @book{scharnhorst-models-2012, author = {Scharnhorst, Andrea and Börner, Katy and Besselaar, Peter v. d.}, title = {Models of science dynamics: encounters between complexity theory and information sciences}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2012} }
Esfeld, M. and Lam, V.	Moderate Structural Realism about Space-Time [BibTeX]	2008	Synthese Vol. 160(1), pp. 27-46	article
BibTeX: @article{esfeld-moderate-2008, author = {Esfeld, Michael and Lam, Vincent}, title = {Moderate Structural Realism about Space-Time}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2008}, volume = {160}, number = {1}, pages = {27--46} }
Anderson, E. and Gatignon, H.	Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction Cost Analysis and Propositions [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1986	Journal of International Business Studies Vol. 17(3), pp. 1-26	article
Abstract: When a firm seeks to perform a business function outside its domestic market, it must first choose the best ”mode of entry” into the foreign market. Entry modes differ greatly in advantages and drawbacks. Because the trade-offs involved are difficult to evaluate, a transaction cost framework is proposed for investigating the entry mode decision. The theory is specifically concerned with maximizing long-term efficiency. The framework provides a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions. It also provides propositions about interactions that resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date. The feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant is illustrated. It is concluded that the most appropriate entry mode is a function of the trade-off between control and the cost of resource commitment.;A framework for companies to use in choosing the best institutional arrangement for foreign operations.;A “frontier issue” in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets. The objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision. This framework provides 1) a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions, 2) propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date. Specifically, the paper:Illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant;Proposes that the most appropriate (i.e., most efficient) entry mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitmentadvances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long-term efficiency.The entry mode literature is reviewed in the context of these propositions, and guidelines are derived for choosing the appropriate mode of entry, given certain characteristics of the firm, the product, and the environment.© 1986 JIBS. Journal of International Business Studies (1986) 17, 1–26;A "frontier issue" in international marketing is the appropriate choice of entry mode in foreign markets. The objective of this paper is to offer a transaction cost framework for investigating the entry mode decision. This framework provides 1) a theoretical basis for systematically interrelating the literature into propositions, 2) propositions about interactions which resolve the apparently contradictory arguments advanced to date. Specifically, the paper: bullet illustrates the feasibility of clustering 17 entry modes into the degree of control the mode provides the entrant; bullet proposes that the most appropriate (i.e., most efficient) entry-mode is a function of the tradeoff between control and the cost of resource commitment bullet advances testable propositions delimiting the circumstances under which each mode maximizes long-term efficiency. The entry mode literature is reviewed in the context of these propositions, and guidelines are derived for choosing the appropriate mode of entry, given certain characteristics of the firm, the product, and the environment.;
BibTeX: @article{anderson-modes-1986, author = {Anderson, Erin and Gatignon, Hubert}, title = {Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction Cost Analysis and Propositions}, journal = {Journal of International Business Studies}, year = {1986}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {1--26} }
Sankararamakrishnan, R. and Weinstein, H.	Molecular Dynamics Simulations Predict a Tilted Orientation for the Helical Region of Dynorphin A(1–17) in Dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine Bilayers [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	Biophysical journal Vol. 79(5), pp. 2331-2344	article
Abstract: The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilayer in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane. Parallel simulations were carried out from two starting structures, systems A and B, that differ by 4 A in the vertical positioning of the peptide helix. The complex consisted of approximately 26,400 atoms (dynorphin + 86 lipids + approximately 5300 waters). After textgreater2 ns of simulation, which included textgreater1 ns of equilibration, the orientation of the helical segment of DynA had undergone a transition from parallel to tilted with respect to the bilayer normal in both the A and B systems. When the helix axis achieved a approximately 50 degrees angle with the bilayer normal, it remained stable for the next 1 ns of simulation. The two simulations with different starting points converged to the same final structure, with the helix inserted in the bilayer throughout the simulations. Analysis shows that the tilted orientation adopted by the N-terminal helix is due to specific interactions of residues in the DynA sequence with phospholipid headgroups, water, and the hydrocarbon chains. Key elements are the "snorkel model"-type interactions of arginine side chains, the stabilization of the N-terminal hydrophobic sequence in the lipid environment, and the specific interactions of the first residue, Tyr. Water penetration within the bilayer is facilitated by the immersed DynA, but it is not uniform around the surface of the helix. Many water molecules surround the arginine side chains, while water penetration near the helical surface formed by hydrophobic residues is negligible. A mechanism of receptor interaction is proposed for DynA, involving the tilted orientation observed from these simulations of the peptide in the lipid bilayer.; The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilaver in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane.; The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilaver in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane.; The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilayer in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane. Parallel simulations were carried out from two starting structures, systems A and B, that differ by 4 A in the vertical positioning of the peptide helix. The complex consisted of approximately 26,400 atoms (dynorphin + 86 lipids + approximately 5300 waters). After textgreater2 ns of simulation, which included textgreater1 ns of equilibration, the orientation of the helical segment of DynA had undergone a transition from parallel to tilted with respect to the bilayer normal in both the A and B systems. When the helix axis achieved a approximately 50 degrees angle with the bilayer normal, it remained stable for the next 1 ns of simulation. The two simulations with different starting points converged to the same final structure, with the helix inserted in the bilayer throughout the simulations. Analysis shows that the tilted orientation adopted by the N-terminal helix is due to specific interactions of residues in the DynA sequence with phospholipid headgroups, water, and the hydrocarbon chains. Key elements are the "snorkel model"-type interactions of arginine side chains, the stabilization of the N-terminal hydrophobic sequence in the lipid environment, and the specific interactions of the first residue, Tyr. Water penetration within the bilayer is facilitated by the immersed DynA, but it is not uniform around the surface of the helix. Many water molecules surround the arginine side chains, while water penetration near the helical surface formed by hydrophobic residues is negligible. A mechanism of receptor interaction is proposed for DynA, involving the tilted orientation observed from these simulations of the peptide in the lipid bilayer.; The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilayer in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane. Parallel simulations were carried out from two starting structures, systems A and B, that differ by 4 Angstrom in the vertical positioning of the peptide helix. The complex consisted of similar to 26,400 atoms (dynorphin + 86 lipids + similar to 5300 waters). After textgreater2 ns of simulation, which included textgreater1 ns of equilibration, the orientation of the helical segment of DynA had undergone a transition from parallel to tilted with respect to the bilayer normal in both the A and B systems. When the helix axis achieved a similar to 50 degrees angle with the bilayer normal, it remained stable for the next textgreater1 ns of simulation. The two simulations with different starting points converged to the same final structure, with the helix inserted in the bilayer throughout the simulations. Analysis shows that the tilted orientation adopted by the N-terminal helix is due to specific interactions of residues in the DynA sequence with phospholipid headgroups, water, and the hydrocarbon chains. Key elements are the "snorkel model"-type interactions of arginine side chains, the stabilization of the N-terminal hydrophobic sequence in the lipid environment, and the specific interactions of the first residue, Tyr. Water penetration within the bilayer is facilitated by the immersed DynA, but it is not uniform around the surface of the helix. Many water molecules surround the arginine side chains, while water penetration near the helical surface formed by hydrophobic residues is negligible. A mechanism of receptor interaction is proposed for DynA, involving the tilted orientation observed from these simulations of the peptide in the lipid bilayer.; The structural properties of the endogenous opioid peptide dynorphin A(1-17) (DynA), a potential analgesic, were studied with molecular dynamics simulations in dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine bilayers. Starting with the known NMR structure of the peptide in dodecylphosphocholine micelles, the N-terminal helical segment of DynA (encompassing residues 1-10) was initially inserted in the bilayer in a perpendicular orientation with respect to the membrane plane. Parallel simulations were carried out from two starting structures, systems A and B, that differ by 4A in the vertical positioning of the peptide helix. The complex consisted of [approximately equal to]26,400 atoms (dynorphin+86 lipids+[approximately equal to]5300 waters). After textgreater2ns of simulation, which included textgreater1ns of equilibration, the orientation of the helical segment of DynA had undergone a transition from parallel to tilted with respect to the bilayer normal in both the A and B systems. When the helix axis achieved a [approximately equal to]50[degrees] angle with the bilayer normal, it remained stable for the next 1ns of simulation. The two simulations with different starting points converged to the same final structure, with the helix inserted in the bilayer throughout the simulations. Analysis shows that the tilted orientation adopted by the N-terminal helix is due to specific interactions of residues in the DynA sequence with phospholipid headgroups, water, and the hydrocarbon chains. Key elements are the "snorkel model"-type interactions of arginine side chains, the stabilization of the N-terminal hydrophobic sequence in the lipid environment, and the specific interactions of the first residue, Tyr. Water penetration within the bilayer is facilitated by the immersed DynA, but it is not uniform around the surface of the helix. Many water molecules surround the arginine side chains, while water penetration near the helical surface formed by hydrophobic residues is negligible. A mechanism of receptor interaction is proposed for DynA, involving the tilted orientation observed from these simulations of the peptide in the lipid bilayer.
BibTeX: @article{sankararamakrishnan-molecular-2000, author = {Sankararamakrishnan, Ramasubbu and Weinstein, Harel}, title = {Molecular Dynamics Simulations Predict a Tilted Orientation for the Helical Region of Dynorphin A(1–17) in Dimyristoylphosphatidylcholine Bilayers}, journal = {Biophysical journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {79}, number = {5}, pages = {2331--2344} }
Rothman, J.E. and Schekman, R.	Molecular Mechanism of Protein Folding in the Cell [BibTeX]	2011	Cell Vol. 146(6), pp. 851-854	article
BibTeX: @article{rothman-molecular-2011, author = {Rothman, James E and Schekman, Randy}, title = {Molecular Mechanism of Protein Folding in the Cell}, journal = {Cell}, year = {2011}, volume = {146}, number = {6}, pages = {851--854} }
Fagarasanu, A., Mast, F.D., Knoblach, B. and Rachubinski, R.A.	Molecular mechanisms of organelle inheritance: lessons from peroxisomes in yeast [BibTeX]	2010	Vol. 11(9), pp. 644-654	article
BibTeX: @article{fagarasanu-molecular-2010, author = {Fagarasanu, Andrei and Mast, Fred D. and Knoblach, Barbara and Rachubinski, Richard A.}, title = {Molecular mechanisms of organelle inheritance: lessons from peroxisomes in yeast}, year = {2010}, volume = {11}, number = {9}, pages = {644--654} }
Sarkar, S.	Molecular models of life: philosophical papers on molecular biology [BibTeX]	2005		book
BibTeX: @book{sarkar-molecular-2005, author = {Sarkar, Sahotra}, title = {Molecular models of life: philosophical papers on molecular biology}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2005} }
Ji, S.	Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications [BibTeX]	2012		book
BibTeX: @book{ji-molecular-2012, author = {Ji, Sungchul}, title = {Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications}, publisher = {Springer New York}, year = {2012} }
Frieden, B.R. and Petri, M.	Motion-dependent levels of order in a relativistic universe [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics Vol. 86(3), pp. 032102	article
Abstract: Consider a generally closed system of continuous three-space coordinates x with a differentiable amplitude function ψ(x). What is its level of order R? Define R by the property that it decreases (or stays constant) after the system is coarse grained. Then R turns out to obey R=8(-1)L(2)I,where quantity I=4∫dx[nabla]ψ()·[nabla]ψ is the classical Fisher information in the system and L is the longest chord that can connect two points on the system surface. In general, order R is (i) unitless, and (ii) invariant to uniform stretch or compression of the system. On this basis, the order R in the Universe was previously found to be invariant in time despite its Hubble expansion, and with value R=26.0×10(60) for flat space. By comparison, here we model the Universe as a string-based "holostar," with amplitude function ψ(x)[proportionality]1/r over radial interval r=(r(0),r(H)). Here r(0) is of order the Planck length and r(H) is the radial extension of the holostar, estimated as the known value of the Hubble radius. Curvature of space and relative motion of the observer must now be taken into account. It results that a stationary observer observes a level of order R=(8/9)(r(H)/r(0))(3/2)=0.42×10(90); while for a free-falling observer R=2(-1)(r(H)/r(0))(2)=0.85×10(120). Both order values greatly exceed the above flat-space value. Interestingly, they are purely geometric measures, depending solely upon ratio r(H)/r(0). Remarkably, the free-fall value 10(120) of R approximates the negentropy of a universe modeled as discrete. This might mean that the Universe contains about equal amounts of continuous and discrete structure.; Consider a generally closed system of continuous three-space coordinates x with a differentiable amplitude function psi(x). What is its level of order R? Define R by the property that it decreases (or stays constant) after the system is coarse grained. Then R turns out to obey R = 8(-1)L(2)I, where quantity I = 4 integral dx del psicenter dot del psi is the classical Fisher information in the system and L is the longest chord that can connect two points on the system surface. In general, order R is (i) unitless, and (ii) invariant to uniform stretch or compression of the system. On this basis, the order R in the Universe was previously found to be invariant in time despite its Hubble expansion, and with value R = 26.0 x 10(60) for flat space. By comparison, here we model the Universe as a string-based "holostar," with amplitude function psi(x) proportional to 1/r over radial interval r = (r(0), r(H)). Here r(0) is of order the Planck length and r(H) is the radial extension of the holostar, estimated as the known value of the Hubble radius. Curvature of space and relative motion of the observer must now be taken into account. It results that a stationary observer observes a level of order R = (8/9)(r(H)/r(0))(3/2) = 0.42 x 10(90); while for a free-falling observer R = 2(-1)(r(H)/r(0))(2) = 0.85 x 10(120). Both order values greatly exceed the above flat-space value. Interestingly, they are purely geometric measures, depending solely upon ratio r(H)/r(0). Remarkably, the free-fall value similar to 10(120) of R approximates the negentropy of a universe modeled as discrete. This might mean that the Universe contains about equal amounts of continuous and discrete structure.
BibTeX: @article{frieden-motion-dependent-2012, author = {Frieden, B. R. and Petri, Michael}, title = {Motion-dependent levels of order in a relativistic universe}, journal = {Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics}, year = {2012}, volume = {86}, number = {3}, pages = {032102} }
Kim, M.	Motivations for engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting [BibTeX]	2009	School: Stockholm University	phdthesis	URL
BibTeX: @phdthesis{kim-motivations-2009, author = {Kim, Miji}, title = {Motivations for engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting}, school = {Stockholm University}, year = {2009}, url = {http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:525164/fulltext02} }
Aberg, J., Shtarkov, Y.M. and Smeets, B.J.M.	Multialphabet coding with separate alphabet description [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1997	, pp. 56-65	inproceedings
Abstract: For lossless universal source coding of memoryless sequences with an a priori unknown alphabet size (multialphabet coding), the alphabet of the sequence must be described as well as the sequence itself. Usually an efficient description of the alphabet can be made only by taking into account some additional information. We show that these descriptions can be separated in such a way that the encoding of the actual sequence can be performed independently of the alphabet description, and present sequential coding methods for such sequences. Such methods have applications in coding methods where the alphabet description is made available sequentially, such as PPM.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{aberg-multialphabet-1997, author = {Aberg, J. and Shtarkov, Yu M. and Smeets, B. J. M.}, title = {Multialphabet coding with separate alphabet description}, year = {1997}, pages = {56--65} }
Sasai, M. and Itoh, K.	Multidimensional theory of protein folding [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2009	Journal of Chemical Physics Vol. 130(14), pp. 145104-145104-21	article
Abstract: Theory of multidimensional representation of free energy surface of protein folding is developed by adopting structural order parameters of multiple regions in protein as multiple coordinates. Various scenarios of folding are classified in terms of cooperativity within individual regions and interactions among multiple regions and thus obtained classification is used to analyze the folding process of several example proteins. Ribosomal protein S6, src-SH3 domain, CheY, barnase, and BBL domain are analyzed with the two-dimensional representation by using a structure-based Hamiltonian model. The extension to the higher dimensional representation leads to the finer description of the folding process. Barnase, NtrC, and an ankyrin repeat protein are examined with the three-dimensional representation. The multidimensional representation allows us to directly address questions on folding pathways, intermediates, and transition states.; Theory of multidimensional representation of free energy surface of protein folding is developed by adopting structural order parameters of multiple regions in protein as multiple coordinates. Various scenarios of folding are classified in terms of cooperativity within individual regions and interactions among multiple regions and thus obtained classification is used to analyze the folding process of several example proteins. Ribosomal protein S6, src-SH3 domain, CheY, barnase, and BBL domain are analyzed with the two-dimensional representation by using a structure-based Hamiltonian model. The extension to the higher dimensional representation leads to the finer description of the folding process. Barnase, NtrC, and an ankyrin repeat protein are examined with the three-dimensional representation. The multidimensional representation allows us to directly address questions on folding pathways, intermediates, and transition states.; Theory of multidimensional representation of free energy surface of protein folding is developed by adopting structural order parameters of multiple regions in protein as multiple coordinates. Various scenarios of folding are classified in terms of cooperativity within individual regions and interactions among multiple regions and thus obtained classification is used to analyze the folding process of several example proteins. Ribosomal protein S6, src-SH3 domain, CheY, barnase, and BBL domain are analyzed with the two-dimensional representation by using a structure-based Hamiltonian model. The extension to the higher dimensional representation leads to the finer description of the folding process. Barnase, NtrC, and an ankyrin repeat protein are examined with the three-dimensional representation. The multidimensional representation allows us to directly address questions on folding pathways, intermediates, and transition states.
BibTeX: @article{sasai-multidimensional-2009, author = {Sasai, Masaki and Itoh, Kazuhito}, title = {Multidimensional theory of protein folding}, journal = {Journal of Chemical Physics}, year = {2009}, volume = {130}, number = {14}, pages = {145104--145104--21} }
Devin, M.	Musings on Firewalls and the Information Paradox [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Galaxies Vol. 2(2), pp. 189-198	article
Abstract: The past year has seen an explosion of new and old ideas about black hole physics. Prior to the firewall paper, the dominant picture was the thermofield model apparently implied by anti-de Sitter conformal field theory duality. While some seek a narrow responce to Almheiri, Marolf, Polchinski, and Sully (AMPS) , there are a number of competing models. One problem in the field is the ambiguity of the competing proposals. Some are equivalent while others incompatible. This paper will attempt to define and classify a few models representative of the current discussions.
BibTeX: @article{devin-musings-2014, author = {Devin, Michael}, title = {Musings on Firewalls and the Information Paradox}, journal = {Galaxies}, year = {2014}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {189--198} }
Papineau, D.	Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist? [BibTeX]	2010		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{papineau-must-2010, author = {Papineau, David}, title = {Must a Physicalist be a Microphysicalist?}, year = {2010} }
Jylkkä, J.	Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	Erkenntnis Vol. 78(3), pp. 647-663	article
Abstract: The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.;The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers' variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.; The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmersâ[euro](TM) variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{jylkka-natural-2013, author = {Jylkkä, Jussi}, title = {Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, year = {2013}, volume = {78}, number = {3}, pages = {647--663} }
Kraemer, D.M.	Natural probabilistic information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Synthese Vol. 192(9), pp. 2901-2919	article
Abstract: Natural information refers to the information carried by natural signs such as that smoke is thought to carry natural information about fire. A number of influential philosophers have argued that natural information can also be utilized in a theory of mental content. The most widely discussed account of natural information (due to Dretske, in Knowledge and the flow of information, 1981/1999) holds that it results from an extremely strong relation between sign and signified (i.e. a conditional probability of 1). Critics have responded that it is doubtful that there are many strong relations of this sort in the natural world due to variability between signs and signified. In light of this observation, a promising suggestion is that much of the interesting natural information carried by natural signs is really information with a probabilistic content. However, Dretske’s theory cannot account for this information because it would require implausible second order objective probabilities. Given the most plausible understanding of the probabilities involved here, I argue that it is only sequences of traditional natural signs (not individual signs) that carry this probabilistic information. Several implications of this idea will be explored.;Natural information refers to the information carried by natural signs such as that smoke is thought to carry natural information about fire. A number of influential philosophers have argued that natural information can also be utilized in a theory of mental content. The most widely discussed account of natural information (due to Dretske, in Knowledge and the flow of information, 1981/1999) holds that it results from an extremely strong relation between sign and signified (i.e. a conditional probability of 1). Critics have responded that it is doubtful that there are many strong relations of this sort in the natural world due to variability between signs and signified. In light of this observation, a promising suggestion is that much of the interesting natural information carried by natural signs is really information with a probabilistic content. However, Dretske's theory cannot account for this information because it would require implausible second order objective probabilities. Given the most plausible understanding of the probabilities involved here, I argue that it is only sequences of traditional natural signs (not individual signs) that carry this probabilistic information. Several implications of this idea will be explored.; Issue Title: Special Section on The Roles of Experience in A Priori Knowledge, edited by Magdalena Balcerak Jackson Natural information refers to the information carried by natural signs such as that smoke is thought to carry natural information about fire. A number of influential philosophers have argued that natural information can also be utilized in a theory of mental content. The most widely discussed account of natural information (due to Dretske, in Knowledge and the flow of information, 1981/1999 ) holds that it results from an extremely strong relation between sign and signified (i.e. a conditional probability of 1). Critics have responded that it is doubtful that there are many strong relations of this sort in the natural world due to variability between signs and signified. In light of this observation, a promising suggestion is that much of the interesting natural information carried by natural signs is really information with a probabilistic content. However, Dretske's theory cannot account for this information because it would require implausible second order objective probabilities. Given the most plausible understanding of the probabilities involved here, I argue that it is only sequences of traditional natural signs (not individual signs) that carry this probabilistic information. Several implications of this idea will be explored.;
BibTeX: @article{kraemer-natural-2015, author = {Kraemer, Daniel M.}, title = {Natural probabilistic information}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2015}, volume = {192}, number = {9}, pages = {2901--2919} }
Boudry, M. and Vlerick, M.	Natural Selection Does Care about Truth [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 28(1), pp. 65-77	article	DOI URL
Abstract: True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the common-sense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth: it cares only about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws in Plantinga's latest formulation of his argument: a failure to appreciate adaptive path dependency, an incoherent conception of content ascription, and a conflation of common-sense and scientific beliefs, which we diagnose as the ‘foundationalist fallacy’. More fundamentally, Plantinga's reductive formalism with respect to the issue of cognitive reliability is inadequate to deal with relevant empirical details.
BibTeX: @article{boudry-natural-2014, author = {Boudry, Maarten and Vlerick, Michael}, title = {Natural Selection Does Care about Truth}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2014}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {65--77}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.915651}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2014.915651} }
Millikan, R.G.	Natural signs [BibTeX]	2012	Vol. 7318, pp. 496-506	inproceedings
BibTeX: @inproceedings{millikan-natural-2012, author = {Millikan, Ruth G.}, title = {Natural signs}, year = {2012}, volume = {7318}, pages = {496--506} }
Northcott, R.	Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Philosophical Studies Vol. 150(1), pp. 1-20	article
Abstract: A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.;A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.;
BibTeX: @article{northcott-natural-born-2010, author = {Northcott, Robert}, title = {Natural-born determinists: a new defense of causation as probability-raising}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2010}, volume = {150}, number = {1}, pages = {1--20} }
Maddy, P.	Naturalism in mathematics [BibTeX]	1997		book
BibTeX: @book{maddy-naturalism-1997, author = {Maddy, Penelope}, title = {Naturalism in mathematics}, publisher = {Clarendon}, year = {1997} }
De Caro, M. and Macarthur, D.	Naturalism in question [BibTeX]	2004		book
BibTeX: @book{de-caro-naturalism-2004, author = {De Caro, Mario and Macarthur, David}, title = {Naturalism in question}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {2004} }
Dretske, F.I.	Naturalizing the mind [BibTeX]	1995	Vol. 1994.	book
BibTeX: @book{dretske-naturalizing-1995, author = {Dretske, Fred I.}, title = {Naturalizing the mind}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1995}, volume = {1994.} }
Mill, J.S.	Nature ; the Utility of religion ; and Theism [BibTeX]	1904		book
BibTeX: @book{mill-nature-1904, author = {Mill, John S.}, title = {Nature ; the Utility of religion ; and Theism}, publisher = {Watts}, year = {1904} }
Broadie, S. and Press, O.U.	Nature, change, and agency in Aristotle's Physics: a philosophical study [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1982		book
Abstract: This book examines Aristotle's concept of natural substance and its implications for change, process, agency, teleology, mathematical continuity, and eternal motion. It illustrates the conceptual power of Aristotle's metaphysics of nature, along with its scientific limitations and internal tensions.
BibTeX: @book{broadie-nature-1982, author = {Broadie, Sarah and Press, Oxford University}, title = {Nature, change, and agency in Aristotle's Physics: a philosophical study}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1982} }
Friedman, M.	Neo-Kantianism, Scientific Realism, and Modern Physics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013		incollection
Abstract: Kant’s original philosophical project took Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics as synthetic a priori sciences fixed for all time. Developments in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century science made this view untenable, but a number of neo-Kantian philosophers responded by relativizing the conception of a priori principles to the historical development of mathematics and physics after Kant. Friedman’s conception of a dynamics of reason follows this tradition. Mark Wilson has addressed many of these same post-Kantian developments on behalf of a sophisticated version of scientific realism inspired by the earlier work of Hilary Putnam, and Wilson has expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘ersatz’ conceptions of scientific objectivity characteristic of neo-Kantianism. This chapter argues that Wilson’s and Friedman’s approaches can be seen as complementary rather than incompatible, responding to different but equally important aspects of the historical development of modern physics from Newton to the early twentieth century.
BibTeX: @incollection{friedman-neo-kantianism-2013, author = {Friedman, Michael}, title = {Neo-Kantianism, Scientific Realism, and Modern Physics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2013} }
Peres, A.	Neumark's theorem and quantum inseparability [BibTeX]	1990	Foundations of Physics Vol. 20(12), pp. 1441-1453	article
BibTeX: @article{peres-neumarks-1990, author = {Peres, Asher}, title = {Neumark's theorem and quantum inseparability}, journal = {Foundations of Physics}, year = {1990}, volume = {20}, number = {12}, pages = {1441--1453} }
Rees, G., Kreiman, G. and Koch, C.	Neural correlates of consciousness in humans [BibTeX]	2002	Nat Rev Neurosci Vol. 3	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{rees-neural-2002, author = {Rees, G. and Kreiman, G. and Koch, C.}, title = {Neural correlates of consciousness in humans}, journal = {Nat Rev Neurosci}, year = {2002}, volume = {3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn783}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn783} }
Lumer, E.D., Edelman, G.M. and Tononi, G.	Neural dynamics in a model of the thalamocortical system.1. Layers, loops and the emergence of fast synchronous rhythms [BibTeX]	1997	Cerebral Cortex Vol. 7	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{lumer-neural-1997-1, author = {Lumer, E. D. and Edelman, G. M. and Tononi, G.}, title = {Neural dynamics in a model of the thalamocortical system.1. Layers, loops and the emergence of fast synchronous rhythms}, journal = {Cerebral Cortex}, year = {1997}, volume = {7}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.3.207}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.3.207} }
Lumer, E.D., Edelman, G.M. and Tononi, G.	Neural dynamics in a model of the thalamocortical system.2. The role of neural synchrony tested through perturbations of spike timing [BibTeX]	1997	Cerebral Cortex Vol. 7	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{lumer-neural-1997, author = {Lumer, E. D. and Edelman, G. M. and Tononi, G.}, title = {Neural dynamics in a model of the thalamocortical system.2. The role of neural synchrony tested through perturbations of spike timing}, journal = {Cerebral Cortex}, year = {1997}, volume = {7}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.3.228}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/7.3.228} }
Vuilleumier, P., Sagiv, N., Hazeltine, E., Poldrack, R.A., Swick, D., Rafal, R.D. and Gabrieli, J.D.	Neural fate of seen and unseen faces in visuospatial neglect: a combined event-related functional MRI and event-related potential study [BibTeX]	2001	Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Vol. 98	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{vuilleumier-neural-2001, author = {Vuilleumier, P. and Sagiv, N. and Hazeltine, E. and Poldrack, R. A. and Swick, D. and Rafal, R. D. and Gabrieli, J. D.}, title = {Neural fate of seen and unseen faces in visuospatial neglect: a combined event-related functional MRI and event-related potential study}, journal = {Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A}, year = {2001}, volume = {98}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.051436898}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.051436898} }
Shea, N.	Neural Signaling of Probabilistic Vectors [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Philosophy of Science Vol. 81(5), pp. 902-913	article
Abstract: Recent work combining cognitive neuroscience with computational modeling suggests that distributed patterns of neural firing may represent probability distributions. This article asks, what makes it the case that distributed patterns of firing, as well as carrying information about (correlating with) probability distributions over worldly parameters, represent such distributions? In examples of probabilistic population coding, it is the way information is used in downstream processing so as to lead to successful behavior. In these cases content depends on factors beyond bare information, contra Brian Skyrms’s view that representational content can be fully characterized in information-theoretic terms.; Recent work combining cognitive neuroscience with computational modeling suggests that distributed patterns of neural firing may represent probability distributions. This article asks, what makes it the case that distributed patterns of firing, as well as carrying information about (correlating with) probability distributions over worldly parameters, represent such distributions? In examples of probabilistic population coding, it is the way information is used in downstream processing so as to lead to successful behavior. In these cases content depends on factors beyond bare information, contra Brian Skyrms's view that representational content can be fully characterized in information-theoretic terms.; Recent work combining cognitive neuroscience with computational modeling suggests that distributed patterns of neural firing may represent probability distributions. This article asks, what makes it the case that distributed patterns of firing, as well as carrying information about (correlating with) probability distributions over worldly parameters, represent such distributions? In examples of probabilistic population coding, it is the way information is used in downstream processing so as to lead to successful behavior. In these cases content depends on factors beyond bare information, contra Brian Skyrms’s view that representational content can be fully characterized in information-theoretic terms.; Recent work combining cognitive neuroscience with computational modeling suggests that distributed patterns of neural firing may represent probability distributions. This article asks, what makes it the case that distributed patterns of firing, as well as carrying information about (correlating with) probability distributions over worldly parameters, represent such distributions? In examples of probabilistic population coding, it is the way information is used in downstream processing so as to lead to successful behavior. In these cases content depends on factors beyond bare information, contra Brian Skyrms's view that representational content can be fully characterized in information-theoretic terms.
BibTeX: @article{shea-neural-2014, author = {Shea, Nicholas}, title = {Neural Signaling of Probabilistic Vectors}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2014}, volume = {81}, number = {5}, pages = {902--913} }
Reines, F. and Kropp, W.R.	Neutrinos and other matters: the selected works of Frederick Reines [BibTeX]	1991		book
BibTeX: @book{reines-neutrinos-1991, author = {Reines, Frederick and Kropp, William R.}, title = {Neutrinos and other matters: the selected works of Frederick Reines}, publisher = {World Scientific}, year = {1991} }
Anonymous	New Directions in the Philosophy of Science [BibTeX]	2014	Vol. 5	book
BibTeX: @book{anonymous-new-2014, author = {Anonymous}, title = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, year = {2014}, volume = {5} }
Lewis, D.	New work for a theory of universals [BibTeX]	1983	Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 61(4), pp. 343-377	article
BibTeX: @article{lewis-new-1983, author = {Lewis, David}, title = {New work for a theory of universals}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1983}, volume = {61}, number = {4}, pages = {343--377} }
Stoltenberg, H. and Albrecht, A.	No firewalls or information problem for black holes entangled with large systems [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Physical Review D - Particles, Fields, Gravitation and Cosmology Vol. 91(2)	article
Abstract: We discuss how under certain conditions the black hole information puzzle and the (related) arguments that firewalls are a typical feature of black holes can break down. We first review the arguments of Almheiri, Marolf, Polchinski and Sully favoring firewalls, focusing on entanglements in a simple toy model for a black hole and the Hawking radiation. By introducing a large and inaccessible system entangled with the black hole (representing perhaps a de Sitter stretched horizon or inaccessible part of a landscape), we show complementarity can be restored and firewalls can be avoided throughout the black hole's evolution. Under these conditions black holes do not have an "information problem." We point out flaws in some of our earlier arguments that such entanglement might be generically present in some cosmological scenarios and call out certain ways our picture may still be realized.
BibTeX: @article{stoltenberg-no-2015, author = {Stoltenberg, Henry and Albrecht, Andreas}, title = {No firewalls or information problem for black holes entangled with large systems}, journal = {Physical Review D - Particles, Fields, Gravitation and Cosmology}, year = {2015}, volume = {91}, number = {2} }
Cowling, S.	No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 95(2), pp. 246-260	article
Abstract: Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure - i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure - i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure.;Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend E leaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non‐logical properties. I then present an E leatic argument for mereological anti‐realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending E leaticism and mereological anti‐realism, I argue that mereological anti‐realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure.;Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure - i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure.;
BibTeX: @article{cowling-no-2014, author = {Cowling, Sam}, title = {No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2014}, volume = {95}, number = {2}, pages = {246--260} }
Wilson, J.M.	No Work for a Theory of Grounding [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Inquiry Vol. 57(5), pp. 535-579	article
Abstract: It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation – 'Grounding' – is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold 'in virtue of”, be (constitutively) 'metaphysically dependent on', or be 'nothing over and above' some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence – for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on – which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.;It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation- 'Grounding'-is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold 'in virtue of”, be (constitutively) 'metaphysically dependent on', or be 'nothing over and above' some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence-for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on-which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.; It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation – 'Grounding' – is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold 'in virtue of”, be (constitutively) 'metaphysically dependent on', or be 'nothing over and above' some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work (better than merely modal notions, in particular) in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether Grounded goings-on exist, whether they are reducible to or rather distinct from Grounding goings-on, whether they are efficacious, and so on; but in the absence of answers to such basic questions, we are not in position to assess the associated claim or theses concerning metaphysical dependence. There is no avoiding appeal to the specific metaphysical relations typically at issue in investigations into dependence – for example, type or token identity, functional realization, classical mereological parthood, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, the determinable/determinate relation, and so on – which are capable of answering these questions. But, I argue, once the specific relations are on the scene, there is no need for Grounding.;
BibTeX: @article{wilson-no-2014, author = {Wilson, Jessica M.}, title = {No Work for a Theory of Grounding}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {2014}, volume = {57}, number = {5}, pages = {535--579} }
Réfrégier, P.	Noise theory and application to physics: from fluctuations to information [BibTeX]	2004		book
BibTeX: @book{refregier-noise-2004, author = {Réfrégier, Philippe}, title = {Noise theory and application to physics: from fluctuations to information}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2004} }
Jarzynski, C.	Nonequilibrium Equality for Free Energy Differences [BibTeX]	1997	Physical Review Letters Vol. 78(14), pp. 2690-2693	article
BibTeX: @article{jarzynski-nonequilibrium-1997, author = {Jarzynski, C.}, title = {Nonequilibrium Equality for Free Energy Differences}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {78}, number = {14}, pages = {2690--2693} }
Stam, C.J., Breakspear, M., van Cappellen van Walsum, A.M. and van Dijk, B.W.	Nonlinear synchronization in EEG and whole-head MEG recordings of healthy subjects [BibTeX]	2003	Hum Brain Mapp Vol. 19	article	DOI URL
BibTeX: @article{stam-nonlinear-2003, author = {Stam, C. J. and Breakspear, M. and van Cappellen van Walsum, A. M. and van Dijk, B. W.}, title = {Nonlinear synchronization in EEG and whole-head MEG recordings of healthy subjects}, journal = {Hum Brain Mapp}, year = {2003}, volume = {19}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hbm.10106}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.10106} }
Walleczek, J. and Grössing, G.	Nonlocal Quantum Information Transfer Without Superluminal Signalling and Communication [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2016	Foundations of Physics Vol. 46(9), pp. 1208-1228	article
Abstract: It is a frequent assumption that—via superluminal information transfers—superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a ‘no-go’ theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell’s theorem, we argue that Bell employed both interpretations, and that he finally adopted the operational position which is associated often with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie–Bohm theory. This position we refer to as “effective non-signalling”. By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as “axiomatic non-signalling”. In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between “axiomatic” and “effective” non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, whereby we distinguish between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems: (1) Non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) Non-signification-control (NSC) theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. Effective non-signalling prevents the instantaneous, i.e., superluminal, transfer of message-encoded information through the controlled use—by a sender-receiver pair —of informationally-correlated detection events, e.g., in EPR-type experiments. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet—at the same time—effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.;It is a frequent assumption that-via superluminal information transfers-superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a 'no-go' theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell's theorem, we argue that Bell employed both interpretations, and that he finally adopted the operational position which is associated often with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie-Bohm theory. This position we refer to as "effective non-signalling". By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as "axiomatic non-signalling". In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between "axiomatic" and "effective" non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon's mathematical theory of communication, whereby we distinguish between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems: (1) Non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) Non-signification-control (NSC) theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. Effective non-signalling prevents the instantaneous, i.e., superluminal, transfer of message-encoded information through the controlled use-by a sender-receiver pair -of informationally-correlated detection events, e.g., in EPR-type experiments. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet-at the same time-effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.;It is a frequent assumption that - via superluminal information transfers - superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a 'no-go' theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell's theorem, we argue that Bell employed both interpretations at different times. Bell finally pursued an explicitly operational position on non-signalling which is often associated with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie-Bohm theory. This position we refer to as "effective non-signalling". By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as "axiomatic non-signalling". In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between "axiomatic" and "effective" non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon's mathematical theory of communication. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems, which we call (1) non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) non-signification-control (NSC) theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet - at the same time - effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.;
BibTeX: @article{walleczek-nonlocal-2016, author = {Walleczek, Jan and Grössing, Gerhard}, title = {Nonlocal Quantum Information Transfer Without Superluminal Signalling and Communication}, journal = {Foundations of Physics}, year = {2016}, volume = {46}, number = {9}, pages = {1208--1228} }
Wallace, D. and Timpson, C.G.	Non-locality and Gauge Freedom in Deutsch and Hayden’s Formulation of Quantum Mechanics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2007	Foundations of Physics Vol. 37(7), pp. 1069-1073	article
Abstract: Deutsch and Hayden have proposed an alternative formulation of quantum mechanics which is completely local. We argue that their proposal must be understood as having a form of ‘gauge freedom’ according to which mathematically distinct states are physically equivalent. Once this gauge freedom is taken into account, their formulation is no longer local.
BibTeX: @article{wallace-non-locality-2007, author = {Wallace, David and Timpson, Christopher G.}, title = {Non-locality and Gauge Freedom in Deutsch and Hayden’s Formulation of Quantum Mechanics}, journal = {Foundations of Physics}, year = {2007}, volume = {37}, number = {7}, pages = {1069--1073} }
Timpson, C.G.	Nonlocality and Information Flow: The Approach of Deutsch and Hayden [BibTeX]	2005	Foundations of Physics Vol. 35(2), pp. 313-343	article
BibTeX: @article{timpson-nonlocality-2005, author = {Timpson, C. G.}, title = {Nonlocality and Information Flow: The Approach of Deutsch and Hayden}, journal = {Foundations of Physics}, year = {2005}, volume = {35}, number = {2}, pages = {313--343} }
Parikh, M. and Schaar, J.P.v.d.	Not one bit of de Sitter information [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2008	Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2008(09), pp. 041	article	URL
Abstract: We formulate the information paradox in de Sitter space in terms of the no-cloning principle of quantum mechanics. We show that energy conservation puts an upper bound on the maximum entropy available to any de Sitter observer. Combined with a general result on the average information in a quantum subsystem, this guarantees that an observer in de Sitter space cannot obtain even a single bit of information from the de Sitter horizon, thereby preventing any observable violations of the quantum no-cloning principle. The result supports the notion of observer complementarity.
BibTeX: @article{parikh-not-2008, author = {Parikh, Maulik and Schaar, Jan Pieter van der}, title = {Not one bit of de Sitter information}, journal = {Journal of High Energy Physics}, year = {2008}, volume = {2008}, number = {09}, pages = {041}, url = {http://stacks.iop.org/1126-6708/2008/i=09/a=041} }
Unruh, W.G.	Notes on black-hole evaporation [BibTeX]	1976	Physical Review D Vol. 14(4), pp. 870-892	article
BibTeX: @article{unruh-notes-1976, author = {Unruh, W. G.}, title = {Notes on black-hole evaporation}, journal = {Physical Review D}, year = {1976}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, pages = {870--892} }
Bennett, C.H.	Notes on Landauer's principle, reversible computation, and Maxwell's Demon [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2003	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Vol. 34(3), pp. 501 - 510	article	DOI URL
Abstract: Landauer's principle, often regarded as the basic principle of the thermodynamics of information processing, holds that any logically irreversible manipulation of information, such as the erasure of a bit or the merging of two computation paths, must be accompanied by a corresponding entropy increase in non-information-bearing degrees of freedom of the information-processing apparatus or its environment. Conversely, it is generally accepted that any logically reversible transformation of information can in principle be accomplished by an appropriate physical mechanism operating in a thermodynamically reversible fashion. These notions have sometimes been criticized either as being false, or as being trivial and obvious, and therefore unhelpful for purposes such as explaining why Maxwell's Demon cannot violate the second law of thermodynamics. Here I attempt to refute some of the arguments against Landauer's principle, while arguing that although in a sense it is indeed a straightforward consequence or restatement of the Second Law, it still has considerable pedagogic and explanatory power, especially in the context of other influential ideas in nineteenth and twentieth century physics. Similar arguments have been given by Jeffrey Bub (2002).
BibTeX: @article{bennett-notes-2003, author = {Bennett, Charles H.}, title = {Notes on Landauer's principle, reversible computation, and Maxwell's Demon}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, year = {2003}, volume = {34}, number = {3}, pages = {501 -- 510}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S135521980300039X}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/S1355-2198(03)00039-X} }
Mari, L.	Notes towards a qualitative analysis of information in measurement results [BibTeX]	1999	Measurement Vol. 25(3), pp. 183-192	article
BibTeX: @article{mari-notes-1999, author = {Mari, Luca}, title = {Notes towards a qualitative analysis of information in measurement results}, journal = {Measurement}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, number = {3}, pages = {183--192} }
Hogan, C.	Now Broadcasting in Planck Definition [BibTeX]	2015	It From Bit or Bit From It?, pp. 143-151	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{hogan-now-2015, author = {Hogan, Craig}, title = {Now Broadcasting in Planck Definition}, booktitle = {It From Bit or Bit From It?}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2015}, pages = {143--151} }
Wójtowicz, K.	Object realism versus mathematical structuralism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Semiotica Vol. 2012(188), pp. 157-169	article
Abstract: In this article, two possible standpoints concerning the nature of mathematical entities are discussed: object realism (according to which the identity of mathematical objects is determined by their intrinsic properties); and structuralism (according to which it is determined only by their relations to other mathematical objects). I discuss some motivations that underlie the structuralist view of mathematical entities, and indicate some philosophical drawbacks of this position. In particular, I argue, that these motivations and intuitions violate basic ontological intuitions concerning the notions of set and membership. I also claim that, from the point of view of mathematical structuralism, the main problem of object realism is the reference problem. On the other hand, from the point of view of object realism, mathematical structuralism has to accept very strong ontological assumptions (reifying classes of isomorphism). It is also not quite clear how the notion of identity is understood from the point of mathematical structuralism. Finally, I argue that the difference between mathematical structuralism and object realism is (at least partly) a matter of formulation.;In this article, two possible standpoints concerning the nature of mathematical entities are discussed: object realism (according to which the identity of mathematical objects is determined by their intrinsic properties); and structuralism (according to which it is determined only by their relations to other mathematical objects). I discuss some motivations that underlie the structuralist view of mathematical entities, and indicate some philosophical drawbacks of this position. In particular, I argue, that these motivations and intuitions violate basic ontological intuitions concerning the notions of set and membership. I also claim that, from the point of view of mathematical structuralism, the main problem of object realism is the reference problem. On the other hand, from the point of view of object realism, mathematical structuralism has to accept very strong ontological assumptions (reifying classes of isomorphism). It is also not quite clear how the notion of identity is understood from the point of mathematical structuralism. Finally, I argue that the difference between mathematical structuralism and object realism is (at least partly) a matter of formulation.;
BibTeX: @article{wojtowicz-object-2012, author = {Wójtowicz, Krzysztof}, title = {Object realism versus mathematical structuralism}, journal = {Semiotica}, year = {2012}, volume = {2012}, number = {188}, pages = {157--169} }
Popper Karl R., S.	Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach [BibTeX]	1986		book
BibTeX: @book{popper-objective-1986, author = {Popper, Karl R., Sir}, title = {Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1986}, edition = {Rev.} }
Wilson, A.	Objective Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2013	The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 64(4), pp. 709	article
Abstract: David Wallace has given a decision-theoretic argument for the Born Rule in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach promises to resolve some long-standing problems with probability in EQM, but it has faced plenty of resistance. One kind of objection (the "incoherence problem") charges that the requisite notion of decision-theoretic uncertainty is unavailable in the Everettian picture, so that the argument cannot gain any traction; another kind of objection grants the proof's applicability and targets the premises. In this article I propose some novel principles connecting the physics of EQM with the metaphysics of modality, and argue that in the resulting framework the incoherence problem does not arise. These principles also help to justify one of the most controversial premises of Wallace's argument, "branching indifference". Absent any a priori reason to align the metaphysics with the physics in some other way, the proposed principles can be adopted on grounds of theoretical utility. The upshot is that Everettians can, after all, make clear sense of objective probability. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; David Wallace has given a decision-theoretic argument for the Born Rule in the context of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach promises to resolve some long-standing problems with probability in EQM, but it has faced plenty of resistance. One kind of objection (the "incoherence problem") charges that the requisite notion of decision-theoretic uncertainty is unavailable in the Everettian picture, so that the argument cannot gain any traction; another kind of objection grants the proof's applicability and targets the premises. In this article I propose some novel principles connecting the physics of EQM with the metaphysics of modality, and argue that in the resulting framework the incoherence problem does not arise. These principles also help to justify one of the most controversial premises of Wallace's argument, "branching indifference". Absent any a priori reason to align the metaphysics with the physics in some other way, the proposed principles can be adopted on grounds of theoretical utility. The upshot is that Everettians can, after all, make clear sense of objective probability. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT];
BibTeX: @article{wilson-objective-2013, author = {Wilson, Alastair}, title = {Objective Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2013}, volume = {64}, number = {4}, pages = {709} }
Mercado-Reyes, A., Padilla-Longoria, P. and Arroyo-Santos, A.	Objects and processes: Two notions for understanding biological information [BibTeX]	2015	Journal of theoretical biology Vol. 380, pp. 115-122	article
BibTeX: @article{mercado-reyes-objects-2015, author = {Mercado-Reyes, Agustín and Padilla-Longoria, Pablo and Arroyo-Santos, Alfonso}, title = {Objects and processes: Two notions for understanding biological information}, journal = {Journal of theoretical biology}, year = {2015}, volume = {380}, pages = {115--122} }
KOSSO, P.	OBSERVABILITY AND OBSERVATION IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (EPISTEMOLOGY) [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1986		book
Abstract: The concept of observability of entities in physical science is typically analyzed in terms of the nature and significance of a dichotomy between observables and unobservables. In the present work, however, this categorization is resisted and observability is analyzed in a descriptive way in terms of the information which one can receive through interaction with objects in the world. The account of interaction and the transfer of information is done using applicable scientific theories. In this way, the question of observability of scientific entities is put to science itself. Several examples are presented which show how this interaction-information account of observability is done. It is demonstrated that observability has many dimensions which are, in general, orthogonal. The epistemic significance of these dimensions is explained. This study is intended primarily as a method for understanding problems of observability rather than as a solution to those problems. The important issue of scientific realism and its relation to observability, however, demand attention. Hence, the implication of the interaction-information account for realism, and the implication of realism for the interaction-information account of observability are discussed in the end.
BibTeX: @book{kosso-observability-1986, author = {KOSSO, PETER}, title = {OBSERVABILITY AND OBSERVATION IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (EPISTEMOLOGY)}, year = {1986} }
Hume, D.	Of the delicacy of taste and passion [BibTeX]	1990		book
BibTeX: @book{hume-delicacy-1990, author = {Hume, David}, title = {Of the delicacy of taste and passion}, publisher = {Alex Catalogue}, year = {1990} }
Martin, C.	On Continuous Symmetries and the Foundations of Modern Physics [BibTeX]	2003	Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, pp. 29-60	incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{martin-continuous-2003, author = {Martin, Christopher}, title = {On Continuous Symmetries and the Foundations of Modern Physics}, booktitle = {Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2003}, pages = {29--60} }
Demopoulos, W.	On extending "empiricism, semantics, and ontology" to the realism/instrumentalism controversy [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Journal of Philosophy Vol. 108(12), pp. 647-669	article
Abstract: The concept of a linguistic framework and the distinction between internal and external questions are the central ideas of Rudolf Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." It is not uncommon to encounter the suggestion that reflection on the theoretical and experimental investigations which led to the acceptance of the atomic hypothesis undermines Carnap's distinction between these two types of question and the utility of his notion of a linguistic framework. Demepoulos believes this is a mistake. There is a natural development of the distinction and the notion of framework choice with which it is paired that is perfectly capable of accommodating this case. He shows this by bringing out a subtlety that arises in the extension of the conceptual apparatus of ESO to the realism/instrumentalism controversy.
BibTeX: @article{demopoulos-extending-2011, author = {Demopoulos, William}, title = {On extending "empiricism, semantics, and ontology" to the realism/instrumentalism controversy}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2011}, volume = {108}, number = {12}, pages = {647--669} }
Van Leeuwen, J.	On Floridi's method of levels of abstraction [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Minds and Machines Vol. 24(1), pp. 5	article
Abstract: Abstraction is arguably one of the most important methods in modern science in analysing and understanding complex phenomena. In his book The Philosophy of Information, Floridi (The philosophy of information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) presents the method of levels of abstraction as the main method of the Philosophy of Information. His discussion of abstraction as a method seems inspired by the formal methods and frameworks of computer science, in which abstraction is operationalised extensively in programming languages and design methodologies. Is it really clear what we should understand by levels of abstraction? How should they be specified? We will argue that levels of abstraction should be augmented with annotations, in order to express semantic information for them and reconcile the method of level of abstraction (LoA's) with other approaches. We discuss the extended method when applied e.g. to the analysis of abstract machines. This will lead to an example in which the number of LoA's is unbounded. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
BibTeX: @article{van-leeuwen-floridis-2014, author = {Van Leeuwen, Jan}, title = {On Floridi's method of levels of abstraction}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2014}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {5} }
Millikan, R.G.	On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2010	Mind Vol. 119(473), pp. 43-81	article
Abstract: I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of 'basic' empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined 'intensions'. Nor do methods of application used by individual speakers constitute definitive reference-determining intensions for their idiolect terms or associated concepts. Conventional intensions of non-basic empirical terms ultimately rest on basic empirical concepts, so no empirical meaning is found merely 'in the head'. I discuss the nature of lexical definition, why empirical meanings cannot ultimately be modelled as functions from possible worlds to extensions, and traps into which armchair analysis of meaning can lead us. A coda explains how 'Swampman' examples, as used against teleosemantic theories of content, illustrate such traps. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]; I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of 'basic' empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined 'intensions'. Nor do methods of application used by individual speakers constitute definitive reference-determining intensions for their idiolect terms or associated concepts. Conventional intensions of non-basic empirical terms ultimately rest on basic empirical concepts, so no empirical meaning is found merely 'in the head'. I discuss the nature of lexical definition, why empirical meanings cannot ultimately be modelled as functions from possible worlds to extensions, and traps into which armchair analysis of meaning can lead us. A coda explains how 'Swampman' examples, as used against teleosemantic theories of content, illustrate such traps.; I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of 'basic' empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined 'intensions'. Nor do methods of application used by individual speakers constitute definitive reference-determining intensions for their idiolect terms or associated concepts. Conventional intensions of non-basic empirical terms ultimately rest on basic empirical concepts, so no empirical meaning is found merely 'in the head'. I discuss the nature of lexical definition, why empirical meanings cannot ultimately be modelled as functions from possible worlds to extensions, and traps into which armchair analysis of meaning can lead us. A coda explains how 'Swamprnan' examples, as used against teleosemantic theories of content, illustrate such traps.
BibTeX: @article{millikan-knowing-2010, author = {Millikan, Ruth G.}, title = {On Knowing the Meaning; With a Coda on Swampman}, journal = {Mind}, year = {2010}, volume = {119}, number = {473}, pages = {43--81} }
BibTeX: @article{dalfonso-quantifying-2011, author = {D’Alfonso, Simon}, title = {On Quantifying Semantic Information}, journal = {Information}, year = {2011}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {61--101} }
Brenner, J.E.	On Representation in Information Theory [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	Information Vol. 2(4), pp. 560-578	article
Abstract: Semiotics is widely applied in theories of information. Following the original triadic characterization of reality by Peirce, the linguistic processes involved in information—production, transmission, reception, and understanding—would all appear to be interpretable in terms of signs and their relations to their objects. Perhaps the most important of these relations is that of the representation-one, entity, standing for or representing some other. For example, an index—one of the three major kinds of signs—is said to represent something by being directly related to its object. My position, however, is that the concept of symbolic representations having such roles in information, as intermediaries, is fraught with the same difficulties as in representational theories of mind. I have proposed an extension of logic to complex real phenomena, including mind and information (Logic in Reality; LIR), most recently at the 4th International Conference on the Foundations of Information Science (Beijing, August, 2010). LIR provides explanations for the evolution of complex processes, including information, that do not require any entities other than the processes themselves. In this paper, I discuss the limitations of the standard relation of representation. I argue that more realistic pictures of informational systems can be provided by reference to information as an energetic process, following the categorial ontology of LIR. This approach enables naïve, anti-realist conceptions of anti-representationalism to be avoided, and enables an approach to both information and meaning in the same novel logical framework.
BibTeX: @article{brenner-representation-2011, author = {Brenner, Joseph E.}, title = {On Representation in Information Theory}, journal = {Information}, year = {2011}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {560--578} }
Kolmogorov, A.N.	On Tables of Random Numbers [BibTeX]	1963	Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A (1961-2002) Vol. 25(4), pp. 369-376	article
BibTeX: @article{kolmogorov-tables-1963, author = {Kolmogorov, A. N.}, title = {On Tables of Random Numbers}, journal = {Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A (1961-2002)}, year = {1963}, volume = {25}, number = {4}, pages = {369--376} }
Gunson, J.	On the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1967	Communications in Mathematical Physics Vol. 6(4), pp. 262-285	article	DOI URL
Abstract: We present a reformulation of the axiomatic basis of quantum mechanics with particular reference to the manner in which the usual algebraic structures arise from certain natural physical requirements. Care is taken to distinguish between features of physical significance and those introduced for mathematical convenience. Our conclusion is that the usual algebraic structures cannot be significantly generalised without conflicting with our current experimental picture of processes occurring at the quantum level.
BibTeX: @article{gunson-algebraic-1967, author = {Gunson, J.}, title = {On the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics}, journal = {Communications in Mathematical Physics}, year = {1967}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {262--285}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01646019}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01646019} }
Bacon, M.	On the Apparent Differences between Contemporary Pragmatists: Richard Rorty and the New Pragmatism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2012	Humanities Vol. 1(3), pp. 229-245	article
Abstract: Throughout its history pragmatism has been criticised for failing to account for the roles truth and objectivity play in our lives and inquiries. Pragmatists have long sought to guard against this objection, but recently some proponents have identified a form of pragmatism which they think is deficient in the manner identified by its critics. This has led them to claim that pragmatism should be understood as falling into two distinct varieties, and to argue for the superiority of the one over the other. In this paper I argue that behind the apparent differences between contemporary pragmatists lies greater agreement than is commonly thought. Taking Richard Rorty to represent what some find unattractive in their philosophy, I claim that there is little if any substantive difference between pragmatists about the concepts of truth and objectivity. Further, Rorty's work shows that it is misleading to distinguish pragmatists in terms of whether they highlight the constraints imposed by social practices or whether they seek to free us from such constraint; properly understood, freedom and constraint are a necessary condition of one another.;Throughout its history pragmatism has been criticised for failing to account for the roles truth and objectivity play in our lives and inquiries. Pragmatists have long sought to guard against this objection, but recently some proponents have identified a form of pragmatism which they think is deficient in the manner identified by its critics. This has led them to claim that pragmatism should be understood as falling into two distinct varieties, and to argue for the superiority of the one over the other. In this paper I argue that behind the apparent differences between contemporary pragmatists lies greater agreement than is commonly thought. Taking Richard Rorty to represent what some find unattractive in their philosophy, I claim that there is little if any substantive difference between pragmatists about the concepts of truth and objectivity. Further, Rorty’s work shows that it is misleading to distinguish pragmatists in terms of whether they highlight the constraints imposed by social practices or whether they seek to free us from such constraint; properly understood, freedom and constraint are a necessary condition of one another.;
BibTeX: @article{bacon-apparent-2012, author = {Bacon, Michael}, title = {On the Apparent Differences between Contemporary Pragmatists: Richard Rorty and the New Pragmatism}, journal = {Humanities}, year = {2012}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, pages = {229--245} }
Szilard, L.	On the decrease of entropy in a thermodynamic system by the intervention of intelligent beings [BibTeX]	1964	Vol. 9(4), pp. 301-310	article
BibTeX: @article{szilard-decrease-1964, author = {Szilard, L.}, title = {On the decrease of entropy in a thermodynamic system by the intervention of intelligent beings}, year = {1964}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {301--310} }
Aronson, J.L.	On the Grammar of 'Cause' [BibTeX]	1971	Synthese Vol. 22(3/4), pp. 414-430	article
BibTeX: @article{aronson-grammar-1971, author = {Aronson, Jerrold L.}, title = {On the Grammar of 'Cause'}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, number = {3/4}, pages = {414--430} }
Rackovsky, S. and Scheraga, H.A.	On the information content of protein sequences [BibTeX]	2011	Journal of biomolecular structure & dynamics Vol. 28(4), pp. 593-594	article
BibTeX: @article{rackovsky-information-2011, author = {Rackovsky, S. and Scheraga, H. A.}, title = {On the information content of protein sequences}, journal = {Journal of biomolecular structure & dynamics}, year = {2011}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, pages = {593--594} }
Kolmogorov, A.N.	On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Logic [BibTeX]	1932	Mathematische Zeitschrift Vol. 35, pp. 58-65	article	URL
BibTeX: @article{kolmogorov-interpretation-1932, author = {Kolmogorov, A. N.}, title = {On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Logic}, journal = {Mathematische Zeitschrift}, year = {1932}, volume = {35}, pages = {58--65}, url = {http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/jmckinna/kolmogorov-1932.pdf} }
Stephens, P.H.G.	On the nature of "nature": the real meanings and significance of John Stuart mill's misunderstood essay [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2015	Environmental Ethics Vol. 37(3), pp. 359	article
Abstract: John Stuart Mill is known as the first canonical Western philosopher to espouse a stationary state of economic growth, and as such he can be seen as an important totemic figure for reformist strategies in environmental ethics. However, his reputation among environmental thinkers has been rendered more ambiguous in recent years by increased attention to his essay "Nature." The "Nature" essay has been much used lately by critics to oppose claims (1) that independent nature may properly be seen as important in any way as an ethical guide or inspiration, and (2) that Mill's philosophy may feasibly be viewed as pro-environmentalist. This use of Mill's essay is mistaken, and has undermined appreciation of the potential significance of Mill's thought for environmental philosophy. When examining the most detailed of the critical treatments of the essay, reading "Nature" as an anti-environmentalist text badly distorts the essay's meaning by ripping it from the context of Mill's intentions as well as from the very specific and significant historical circumstances and biographical conditions of its production. Attending properly to these factors shows that the essay is unrepresentative of Mill's general position and rather philosophically weaker than its reputation. Reading the text as a definitive statement of Mill's supposed anti-naturalism is thus mistaken and fails to recognize different modes and significances in "following nature," some of which Mill supported. The "Nature" essay is an aberrant outlier in the Mill canon, and one which should no longer be allowed to undermine Mill's strong and important environmentalist credentials.
BibTeX: @article{stephens-nature-2015, author = {Stephens, Piers H. G.}, title = {On the nature of "nature": the real meanings and significance of John Stuart mill's misunderstood essay}, journal = {Environmental Ethics}, year = {2015}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, pages = {359} }
Werndl, C.	On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	European Journal for Philosophy of Science Vol. 1(2), pp. 193-225	article
Abstract: This paper presents and philosophically assesses three types of results on the observational equivalence of continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. The first results establish observational equivalence to abstract mathematical descriptions. The second results are stronger because they show observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. Here I also discuss Kolmogorov’s contribution. For the third results I introduce two new meanings of ‘observational equivalence at every observation level’. Then I show the even stronger result of observational equivalence at every (and not just some) observation level between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. These results imply the following. Suppose one wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best modeled as deterministic or indeterministic. Then one cannot appeal to differences in the probability distributions of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science to argue that one of the descriptions is preferable because there is no such difference. Finally, I criticise the extant claims of philosophers and mathematicians on observational equivalence.; This paper presents and philosophically assesses three types of results on the observational equivalence of continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. The first results establish observational equivalence to abstract mathematical descriptions. The second results are stronger because they show observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. Here I also discuss Kolmogorov's contribution. For the third results I introduce two new meanings of observational equivalence at every observation level'. Then I show the even stronger result of observational equivalence at every (and not just some) observation level between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. These results imply the following. Suppose one wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best modeled as deterministic or indeterministic. Then one cannot appeal to differences in the probability distributions of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science to argue that one of the descriptions is preferable because there is no such difference. Finally, I criticise the extant claims of philosophers and mathematicians on observational equivalence.
BibTeX: @article{werndl-observational-2011, author = {Werndl, Charlotte}, title = {On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2011}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {193--225} }
Verlinde, E.	On the origin of gravity and the laws of Newton [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2011	The Journal of High Energy Physics Vol. 2011(4), pp. 1-27	article
Abstract: Starting from first principles and general assumptions we present a heuristic argument that shows that Newton's law of gravitation naturally arises in a theory in which space emerges through a holographic scenario. Gravity is identified with an entropic force caused by changes in the information associated with the positions of material bodies. A relativistic generalization of the presented arguments directly leads to the Einstein equations. When space is emergent even Newton's law of inertia needs to be explained. The equivalence principle auggests that it is actually the law of inertia whose origin is entropic.; Starting from first principles and general assumptions we present a heuristic argument that shows that Newton’s law of gravitation naturally arises in a theory in which space emerges through a holographic scenario. Gravity is identified with an entropic force caused by changes in the information associated with the positions of material bodies. A relativistic generalization of the presented arguments directly leads to the Einstein equations. When space is emergent even Newton’s law of inertia needs to be explained. The equivalence principle auggests that it is actually the law of inertia whose origin is entropic.; Starting from first principles and general assumptions we present a heuristic argument that shows that Newton’s law of gravitation naturally arises in a theory in which space emerges through a holographic scenario. Gravity is identified with an entropic force caused by changes in the information associated with the positions of material bodies. A relativistic generalization of the presented arguments directly leads to the Einstein equations. When space is emergent even Newton’s law of inertia needs to be explained. The equivalence principle auggests that it is actually the law of inertia whose origin is entropic.
BibTeX: @article{verlinde-origin-2011, author = {Verlinde, E.}, title = {On the origin of gravity and the laws of Newton}, journal = {The Journal of High Energy Physics}, year = {2011}, volume = {2011}, number = {4}, pages = {1--27} }
Wolf, Y.I. and Koonin, E.V.	On the origin of the translation system and the genetic code in the RNA world by means of natural selection, exaptation, and subfunctionalization [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2007	Biology Direct Vol. 2(1), pp. 1-25	article	DOI URL
Abstract: The origin of the translation system is, arguably, the central and the hardest problem in the study of the origin of life, and one of the hardest in all evolutionary biology. The problem has a clear catch-22 aspect: high translation fidelity hardly can be achieved without a complex, highly evolved set of RNAs and proteins but an elaborate protein machinery could not evolve without an accurate translation system. The origin of the genetic code and whether it evolved on the basis of a stereochemical correspondence between amino acids and their cognate codons (or anticodons), through selectional optimization of the code vocabulary, as a “frozen accident” or via a combination of all these routes is another wide open problem despite extensive theoretical and experimental studies. Here we combine the results of comparative genomics of translation system components, data on interaction of amino acids with their cognate codons and anticodons, and data on catalytic activities of ribozymes to develop conceptual models for the origins of the translation system and the genetic code.
BibTeX: @article{wolf-origin-2007, author = {Wolf, Yuri I. and Koonin, Eugene V.}, title = {On the origin of the translation system and the genetic code in the RNA world by means of natural selection, exaptation, and subfunctionalization}, journal = {Biology Direct}, year = {2007}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {1--25}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1745-6150-2-14}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1186/1745-6150-2-14} }
Lewis, D.K.	On the plurality of worlds [BibTeX]	1986		book
BibTeX: @book{lewis-plurality-1986, author = {Lewis, David K.}, title = {On the plurality of worlds}, publisher = {B. Blackwell}, year = {1986} }
Bynum, T.W.	On the Possibility of Quantum Informational Structural Realism [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2014	Minds and Machines Vol. 24(1), pp. 123-139	article
Abstract: In The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi presents an ontological theory of Being qua Being, which he calls "Informational Structural Realism", a theory which applies, he says, to every possible world. He identifies primordial information ("dedomena") as the foundation of any structure in any possible world. The present essay examines Floridi's defense of that theory, as well as his refutation of "Digital Ontology" (which some people might confuse with his own). Then, using Floridi's ontology as a starting point, the present essay adds quantum features to dedomena, yielding an ontological theory for our own universe, Quantum Informational Structural Realism, which provides a metaphysical interpretation of key quantum phenomena, and diminishes the "weirdness" or "spookiness" of quantum mechanics.; In The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi presents an ontological theory of Being qua Being, which he calls "Informational Structural Realism", a theory which applies, he says, to every possible world. He identifies primordial information ("dedomena") as the foundation of any structure in any possible world. The present essay examines Floridi's defense of that theory, as well as his refutation of "Digital Ontology" (which some people might confuse with his own). Then, using Floridi's ontology as a starting point, the present essay adds quantum features to dedomena, yielding an ontological theory for our own universe, Quantum Informational Structural Realism, which provides a metaphysical interpretation of key quantum phenomena, and diminishes the "weirdness" or "spookiness" of quantum mechanics.; In The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi presents an ontological theory of Being qua Being, which he calls “Informational Structural Realism”, a theory which applies, he says, to every possible world. He identifies primordial information (“dedomena”) as the foundation of any structure in any possible world. The present essay examines Floridi’s defense of that theory, as well as his refutation of “Digital Ontology” (which some people might confuse with his own). Then, using Floridi’s ontology as a starting point, the present essay adds quantum features to dedomena, yielding an ontological theory for our own universe, Quantum Informational Structural Realism, which provides a metaphysical interpretation of key quantum phenomena, and diminishes the “weirdness” or “spookiness” of quantum mechanics.
BibTeX: @article{bynum-possibility-2014, author = {Bynum, Terrell W.}, title = {On the Possibility of Quantum Informational Structural Realism}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2014}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {123--139} }
Bell, J.S.	On the problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics [BibTeX]	1966	Reviews of Modern Physics Vol. 38(3), pp. 447-452	article
BibTeX: @article{bell-problem-1966, author = {Bell, John S.}, title = {On the problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics}, journal = {Reviews of Modern Physics}, year = {1966}, volume = {38}, number = {3}, pages = {447--452} }
Chakravartty, A.	On the Prospects of Naturalized Metaphysics [BibTeX]	2013		incollection
BibTeX: @incollection{chakravartty-prospects-2013, author = {Chakravartty, Anjan}, title = {On the Prospects of Naturalized Metaphysics}, year = {2013} }
Plastino, A., Plastino, A.R. and Miller, H.G.	On the relationship between the Fisher-Frieden-Soffer arrow of time, and the behaviour of the Boltzmann and Kullback entropies [BibTeX]	1997	Physics Letters A Vol. 235(2), pp. 129-134	article
BibTeX: @article{plastino-relationship-1997, author = {Plastino, A. and Plastino, A. R. and Miller, H. G.}, title = {On the relationship between the Fisher-Frieden-Soffer arrow of time, and the behaviour of the Boltzmann and Kullback entropies}, journal = {Physics Letters A}, year = {1997}, volume = {235}, number = {2}, pages = {129--134} }
Uhlmann, A.	On the Shannon entropy and related functionals on convex sets [Abstract] [BibTeX]	1970	Reports on Mathematical Physics Vol. 1(2), pp. 147 - 159	article	DOI URL
Abstract: We give the definition of functionals r(K,x) and r(K,S,x) defined on convex sets K without or with respect to locally convex topology with the help of a strongly convex function r(p) on a unit interval. If r = —p ln p we refer r(K,x) to be the Shannon entropy of x relative to the convex set K. In the case of the convex set Zn of density matrices this definition gives the usual Shannon–Gibbs entropy and yields a new defining inequality for the entropy which is independent of the representation of the algebra of n×n-matrices.
BibTeX: @article{uhlmann-shannon-1970, author = {Uhlmann, A.}, title = {On the Shannon entropy and related functionals on convex sets}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Physics}, year = {1970}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {147 -- 159}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0034487770900091}, doi = {http://doi.org/10.1016/0034-4877(70)90009-1} }
Rousseau, J.-J. and Cress, D.A.	On the social contract [BibTeX]	1987		book
BibTeX: @book{rousseau-social-1987, author = {Rousseau, Jean-Jacques and Cress, Donald A.}, title = {On the social contract}, publisher = {Hackett Pub. Co}, year = {1987} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	On the Theoretical Role of "Genetic Coding" [Abstract] [BibTeX]	2000	Philosophy of Science Vol. 67(1), pp. 26-44	article
Abstract: The role played by the concept of genetic coding in biology is discussed. I argue that this concept makes a real contribution to solving a specific problem in cell biology.; The role played by the concept of genetic coding in biology is discussed. I argue that this concept makes a real contribution to solving a specific problem in cell biology. But attempts to make the idea of genetic coding do theoretical work elsewhere in biology, and in philosophy of biology, are probably mistaken. In particular, the concept of genetic coding should not be used (as it often is) to express a distinction between the traits of whole organisms that are coded for in the genes and the traits that are not.; The role played by the concept of genetic coding in biology is discussed. I argue that this concept makes a real contribution to solving a specific problem in cell biology. But attempts to make the idea of genetic coding do theoretical work elsewhere in biology, and in philosophy of biology, are probably mistaken. In particular, the concept of genetic coding should not be used (as it often is) to express a distinction between the traits of whole organisms that are coded for in the genes and the traits that are not.
BibTeX: @article{godfrey-smith-theoretical-2000, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {On the Theoretical Role of "Genetic Coding"}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, number = {1}, pages = {26--44} }

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British Journal for the History of Philosophy

POPULAR PHILOSOPHY DIGESTS

Daily Nous

Philosophy Now

PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY

Biology & Philosophy

Acta Biotheoretica

PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

Foundations of Physics

PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

Philosophia Mathematica Open Access

Philosophia Mathematica Current Issue

Philosophia Mathematica Advance Access

Annals of Mathematics and Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS

Economics & Philosophy

COGNITIVE SCIENCE

Cognitive Science

Neuroscience of Consciousness Current Issue

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Phenomenology and Mind

Philosophical Psychology

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A