The NZAP Conference, and Lesser Known and Rising Stars of The Philosophy of Information...

NZAP 2018

I recently attended, and enjoyed speaking at, the NZAP conference at Victoria University of Wellington in wonderful Wellington, New Zealand.

The organisers of the event did a stellar job:

Aside from somehow managing to be sick for the first two days, sleeping 10 hours a day, I had a great experience there. I met Dr Doug Campbell of Canterbury University in Christchurch, who presented a talk on the shortcomings of Frank Jackson's conception of physicalism, and showed how to reconcile it with the Chalmers-Papineau 'totalist' conception to arrive at a superior restatement of the latter. I am currently reviewing the paper for his talk and preparing a similar paper of my own based upon an informational restatement of Jackson's conception as presented in my PhD thesis last year.

I was also pleased to again run into Dr Martin Leckey and Professor John Bigelow, who presented a very interesting notation for hierarchical categorical ontology, which I have adduced is apt to be used for my own virtual-concrete information source ontology:

I am looking forward to completing a joint project with Dr Leckey.

Philosophers of Information in Ascension

I also had the pleasure of meeting the first of three very talented lesser known and/or upcoming philosophers of information whose work I would like to introduce:

Dr Anton Sukhoverkhov

Anton is interested in biosemiotics and Natural Signs and The Origins of Language. I have joined Dr Sukhoverkhov in contributing to a joint working group paper on different perspectives on the nature of information. He specialises also in ontology of memory and the role of non-genetic inheritance in biological and social evolution.

Dr Sukhoverkhov is particularly interested in the nature of information in natural phenomena and what makes such information semantic. He is currently situated at Macquarie University on a six month fellowship coming off the back of a Fullbright Scholarship to the US.

Sukhoverkhov Bibliography

Sukhoverkhov, Anton. 2010. “Memory, Sign Systems, and Self-Reproductive Processes.” Biological Theory 5 (2): 161–66.
———. 2012. “Natural Signs and the Origin of Language.” Biosemiotics 5 (2): 153–59.
Sukhoverkhov, Anton V., and Carol A. Fowler. 2015. “Why Language Evolution Needs Memory: Systems and Ecological Approaches.” Biosemiotics 8 (1): 47–65.

See more here.

Dr Simon D'Alfonso

My co-author on a current working paper about social mindreading, the small network model and the extended mind, Simon has produced an important logical analysis of Fred Dretske's classically derived and adapted conception of information flow. Dretske's model involves an adaptation of the classical Shannonian model of The Mathematical Theory of Communication that is designed to facilitate a proposal for a reliabilist epistemology based upon a naturalised conception of information. Dretske's adaptation involves singling out the information measure - according to the Shannonian probabilistic conception - of the information content of a single signal. It removes the averaging over sequences of symbols and messages that is necessary in Shannon's system and for Shannon's averaging measure of entropy of a sequence.

In particular the analysis reveals the problematic nature of Dretske's 'k' factor: or the 'knowledge' that the receiver has about the possible states of the source or the possibilities at the source. It's this factor that I have variously identified as being what makes Dretske's otherwise naturalised objectivist conception of information into a subjectivist conception. However, it does so when Dretske deploys the initial objective conception from the perspective of a receiver in order to develop a conception of semantic information.

D'Alfonso identifies that the 'k' factor complicates the proposal of a logic of objective information flow by disrupting minimal algebraic properties required for such to be useful: complementarity for example.

D'Alfonso Bibliography

D’Alfonso, Simon. 2011. “On Quantifying Semantic Information.” Information 2 (4): 61–101.
———. 2014. “The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.” Minds and Machines 24 (3): 307–25.
———. 2016. “Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.” Synthese 193 (7): 2013–2034.

Professor Wu Kun

Professor Wu Kun warrants mention because he is perhaps the only Chinese interdisciplinary and comparative philosopher working in the field of the philosophy of information who has been doing so since the 1980s. In fact I am writing a commentary and paper in support of and response to a number of the professor's views.

Professor Wu Kun Bibliography

Kun, Wu, and Joseph E. Brenner. 2015. “An Informational Ontology and Epistemology of Cognition.” Foundations of Science 20 (3): 249–279.

My New Tilt at Floridi's ISR ontology is on the way (I love Floridi's work...). Proofs done!

I love Luciano Floridi's work. He has done more for the philosophy of information than any other philosopher. I disagree with his Kantian Transcendentalist stance about the nature of information (which is not an uncommon position), and in this forthcoming paper I say why I think it is still essentially a digital ontology of a different kind than that which Floridi himself rejects. It's not 'It from Bit' per Wheeler's lexical-instrumental orientated approach (whereby science asks binary yes no questions of the material universe via experimentation and instrumental theory.)

It matters that ISR is still a digital (based upon binary-discretised physical representations of binary values of relations or options-differences) ontology of a different kind because the binary component is what is supposed to be supplanted by the alternatively conceived informational component in informational structural realism. Another striking hint at the problem can be found in the fact that the concept of a minimal binary de re (and in re) difference which forms the basis of information in informational structural realism also forms the basis of the concept of data in Floridi's Strongly Semantic Theory of Information. Look at the treatment this gets when Floridi develops the theory of truth associated with the semantic theory of information (keep Wheeler's concept of 'It From Bit' in mind):

My Proofs Done!

It From Bit Bibliography

Aguirre, Anthony, Brendan Foster, and Zeeya Merali. 2015. It From Bit or Bit From It?: On Physics and Information. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 

Barbour, Julian. 2015. “Bit from It.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 197–211. Springer.

Cristinel Stoica, Ovidiu. 2015. “The Tao of It and Bit.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 51–64. Springer.

D’Ariano, Giacomo Mauro. 2015. “It from Qubit.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 25–35. Springer.

Leifer, MS. 2015. “‘It from Bit’ and the Quantum Probability Rule.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 5–23. Springer.

McHarris, Wm C. 2015. “It from Bit from It from Bit... Nature and Nonlinear Logic.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 225–234. Springer.

Planat, Michel. 2014. “It from Qubit: How to Draw Quantum Contextuality.” Information 5 (2): 209–18.

Rovelli, Carlo. 2015. “Relative Information at the Foundation of Physics.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 79–86. Springer.

Shikano, Yutaka. 2015. “These from Bits.” In It From Bit or Bit From It?, 113–118. Springer.

Floridi Bibliography

Adams, Fred, and João A. de Moraes. 2016. “Is There a Philosophy of Information?” Topoi 35 (1): 161–171.

Adriaans, Pieter. 2010. “A Critical Analysis of Floridi’s Theory of Semantic Information.” Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 1–16.

Allo, Patrick. 2010. Putting Information First: Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of Information. Malden, MA; Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 

———. 2011. “The Logic of ‘being Informed’ Revisited and Revised.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 153 (3): 417–434.

Baumgaertner, Bert, and Luciano Floridi. 2016. “Introduction: The Philosophy of Information.” Topoi 35 (1): 157–159.

Beni, Majid D. 2016. “Epistemic Informational Structural Realism.” Minds and Machines 26 (4): 323–339.

Berto, F., and J. Tagliabue. 2014. “The World Is Either Digital or Analogue.” Synthese 191 (3): 481–497.

Black, Elizabeth, Luciano Floridi, and Allan Third. 2010. “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Nature and Scope of Information.” Synthese 175 (S1): 1–3.

Bringsjord, Selmer. 2015. “The Symbol Grounding Problem . Remains Unsolved.” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (1): 63–72.

Bueno, Otávio. 2010. “Structuralism and Information.” Metaphilosophy 41 (3): 365–379.

Bynum, Terrell W. 2014. “On the Possibility of Quantum Informational Structural Realism.” Minds and Machines 24 (1): 123–139.

Caticha, Ariel. 2014. “Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism.” Minds and Machines 24 (1): 37–70.

Chen, Min, and Luciano Floridi. 2013. “An Analysis of Information Visualisation.” Synthese 190 (16): 3421–38.

D’Agostino, Marcello, and Luciano Floridi. 2009. “The Enduring Scandal of Deduction: Is Propositional Logic Really Uninformative?” 167 (2): 271–315.

D’Alfonso, Simon. 2011. “On Quantifying Semantic Information.” Information 2 (4): 61–101.

Ferguson, Thomas M. 2015. “Two Paradoxes of Semantic Information.” Synthese 192 (11): 3719–3730.

Floridi, Luciano. 1999. Philosophy and Computing: An Introduction. New York; London: Routledge.

———. 2003a. “From Data to Semantic Information.” Entropy 5 (2): 125–45.

———. 2003b. “Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information.” Minds and Machines 13 (4): 459–469.

———. 2004a. “Afterword LIS as Applied Philosophy of Information: A Reappraisal.” Library Trends 52 (3): 658–67.

———. 2004b. “Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information.” Metaphilosophy 35 (4): 554–582.

———. 2004c. “Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information.” Minds and Machines 14 (2): 197–221.

———. 2004d. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

———. 2005a. “Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 351–70.

———. 2005b. Semantic Conceptions of Information. Stanfrod Univeristy CSLI.

———. 2008a. “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism.” Synthese 161 (2): 219–53.

———. 2008b. “Artificial Intelligence’s New Frontier: Artificial Companions and the Fourth Revolution.” Metaphilosophy 39 (4–5): 651–655.

———. 2008c. “The Method of Levels of Abstraction.” Minds and Machines 18 (3): 303–29.

———. 2008d. “Trends in the Philosophy of Information.” In , 113–131.

———. 2009a. “A Distributed Model of Truth for Semantic Information.” In . 

———. 2009b. “Against Digital Ontology.” Synthese 168 (1): 151–78.

———. 2009c. “Philosophical Conceptions of Information.” In Formal Theories of Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information, 5363:13–53.

———. 2009d. “The Information Society and Its Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue on ‘The Philosophy of Information, Its Nature, and Future Developments.’” The Information Society 25 (3): 153–158.

———. 2010a. “How to Account for Information.” In , 1–15.

———. 2010b. Information: A Very Short Introduction. Vol. 225. Oxford;New York; Oxford University Press.

———. 2010c. “Information, Possible Worlds and the Cooptation of Scepticism.” Synthese 175 (S1): 63–88.

———. 2010d. “The Philosophy of Information as a Conceptual Framework,” 1–29.

———. 2011a. “Children of the Fourth Revolution.” Philosophy & Technology 24 (3): 227–232.

———. 2011b. “Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth.” Erkenntnis (1975-) 74 (2): 147–175.

———. 2011c. “The Informational Nature of Personal Identity.” Minds and Machines 21 (4): 549–566.

———. 2011d. The Philosophy of Information. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2011e. “The Philosophy of Information: Ten Years Later.” In , 153–170.

———. 2012a. “Semantic Information and the Network Theory of Account.” Synthese 184 (3): 431–454.

———. 2012b. “Turing’s Three Philosophical Lessons and the Philosophy of Information.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 370 (1971): 3536–42.

———. 2013a. “Information Quality.” Philosophy & Technology 26 (1): 1–6.

———. 2013b. “Things.” Philosophy & Technology 26 (4): 349–52.

———. 2014a. “Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.” Synthese 191 (6): 1037–1050.

———. 2014b. The Ethics of Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2014c. “The Latent Nature of Global Information Warfare” 27 (3): 317–319.

———. 2017. “The Logic of Design as a Conceptual Logic of Information.” Minds and Machines 27 (3): 495–519.

Floridi, Luciano, and Mariarosaria Taddeo. 2005. “Solving the Symbol Grounding Problem: A Critical Review of Fifteen Years of Research.” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 17 (4): 419–445.

Floridi, Luciano, Mariarosaria Taddeo, and Matteo Turilli. 2009. “Turing’s Imitation Game: Still an Impossible Challenge for All Machines and Some Judges––An Evaluation of the 2008 Loebner Contest” 19 (1): 145–150.

Fyffe, R. 2015. “The Value of Information: Normativity, Epistemology, and LIS in Luciano Floridi.” PORTAL-LIBRARIES AND THE ACADEMY 15 (2): 267–286.

Ganascia, Jean-Gabriel. 2015. “Abstraction of Levels of Abstraction.” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (1): 23–35.

Greco, Gian M., Gianluca Paronitti, Matteo Turilli, and Luciano Floridi. 2005a. “How to Do Philosophy Informationally.” In , 3782:623–634.

———. 2005b. “The Philosophy of Information a Methodological Point of View.” CEUR Workshop Proceedings 130.

Long, Bruce R. 2014. “Information Is Intrinsically Semantic but Alethically Neutral.” Synthese 191 (14): 3447–67.

Ratti, Emanuele. 2015. “Levels of Abstraction, Emergentism and Artificial Life.” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (1): 51–61.

Sdrolia, Chryssa, and J. M. Bishop. 2014. “Rethinking Construction: On Luciano Floridi’s ‘Against Digital Ontology.’” Minds and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science 24 (1): 89.

Taddeo, Mariarosaria, and Luciano Floridi. 2007. “A Praxical Solution of the Symbol Grounding Problem.” Minds and Machines 17 (4): 369–389.

Van Leeuwen, Jan. 2014. “On Floridi’s Method of Levels of Abstraction.” Minds and Machines 24 (1): 5.