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Wednesday 8 November 2017

Dialectic and conversation is still the best way to stimulate ideas in philosophy: Information is a proportional truthmaker

I recently increased my participation in academia.edu. I found an interesting looking paper by Gustavo Cevolani of IMT Lucca:

(https://www.academia.edu/31575986/Strongly_Semantic_Information_as_Information_About_the_Truth)

Being that semantic information is a topic close to my heart, I was surprised that I had missed it being that it was published in the same year as my own article about semantic information (second entry in list at bottom.) In that paper, I proposed that information should be regarded as alethically neutral, and as a proportional truthmaker for representations that encode it.




Here's my full reply to Gustavo, for readability:

Hi Gustavo,
I am marking at the moment, and so I will not be able to finish your paper until the end of the week.

Having not had a chance to finish your paper, and based upon your reply, I adduce that your concept of informative falsehoods is supported by my view that information is a proportional truthmaker (the proportion of truthfulness/misleadingness is in the truthbearing encoded representation of the truthmaking information).

According to my thesis, independently of what approach one uses to quantify, discretise, or measure information: there will be varying amounts of truthmaking information available as a truthmaker to encode into a truthbearing representation (on non-standard non-dialethic grounds.) To consitute any proportion of an informative falsehood, it would have to be encoded into a representation that is a truthbearer, but in such as way as the representation is proportionally false. In other words: as long as the falsehood is constituted of an encoded (partly wrong or wrongly encoded) representation of the information, not the information itself, then such could be more or less misleading, in proportion to representing more or less information by faulty encoding. I take it that the encoded representation of the information has to be proportionally (more or less) false to support this outcome/analysis. 
Best Wishes, 
Bruce


Here are some related papers from the search results in my University library page:
1. Cover Image Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information
by Floridi, Luciano
Minds and Machines, 05/2004, Volume 14, Issue 2
This paper outlines a quantitative theory of strongly semantic information (TSSI) based on truth-values rather than probability distributi...
2. Cover Image Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral
by Long, Bruce Raymond
Synthese, 09/2014, Volume 191, Issue 14
In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or no...
3. Cover Image Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data?
by Floridi, Luciano
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 03/2005, Volume 70, Issue 2
There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revis...
4. Cover Image Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth
by Luciano Floridi
Erkenntnis (1975-), 03/2011, Volume 74, Issue 2
Semantic information is usually supposed to satisfy the veridicality thesis: p qualifies as semantic information only if p is true. Howeve...
5. Cover Image On Quantifying Semantic Information
by D’Alfonso, Simon
Information, 01/2011, Volume 2, Issue 4
  The purpose of this paper is to look at some existing methods of semantic information quantification and suggest some alternatives. It b...
6. Cover Image Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information
by Floridi, Luciano
The Philosophy of Information, 01/2011
The chapter applies and further supports the conclusion reached in chapter five by presenting a quantitative theory of strongly semantic i...