Beyond Harmful Dysfunction: Why Psychopathology is a Problem of Maladaptive Misinformation Processing

- Bruce Long

The standard definition of mental disorder in clinical psychology and psychiatry is based upon Jerome Wakefield’s ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ model (Wakefield, 1992). According to Wakefield’s theory, for a mental disorder or illness to be present requires a biological mechanism to fail at its naturally selected evolutionary function, whilst simultaneously causing socially defined 'harm'.

While powerful and useful as a general concept, many find this paradigm deeply unsatisfactory. Especially for research and analyses involving neurological mechanisms and their relationship to complex social and interpersonal behaviour. It relies on evolutionary guesswork regarding complex cognition and relies too heavily on abstract, high-level social outcomes. In short: it’s hard to get it to work coherently at multiple levels of abstraction (where in the neurology, cognition, and behaviour of an individual levels of abstraction might be naturally discretised to some extent, rather than imposed arbitrarily as constructs for modeling.)

(There’s a debate in the philosophy of science about the usefulness of ‘levelism’, but in the philosophy of information and in computer science levels of abstraction are regarded as meaningful.)

I propose a framework for modelling mental disorders grounded in objective, frequentist information theory (Shannon, 1948). I argue that psychopathology is best conceptualised not as a vague ‘dysfunction’, but as a highly specific, measurable computational failure: Maladaptive Misinformation Processing (MMP).

A Quick Philosophy of Information Primer

I am writing for psychology researchers, and so a very brief setting of context is prudent. (It’s best to get it out of the way as quickly as possible.)

Psychology researchers should absolutely be suspicious of, and careful with, concepts from philosophy and the philosophy of science. However, when it comes to the nature of information and information processing (and transmission, and encoding, and processing) in nature and in the sciences, the philosophy of information has identified some very real difficulties which do affect conceptualisation (conceptual analysis), operationalisation, and theory.

For the purposes of this short explainer document, the most salient problems are:

1. Semantic Information. The distinction between information in Claude Shannon’s objective-frequentist statistical sense (roughly - the reduction in objective-frequentist statistical uncertainty about the state of a source) and semantic information.

2. The Nature of Information and Conceptual Pluralism: The ongoing argument over the nature of information, and whether pluralism about it should be combined with more rigid conceptions (of which there are many including statistical, logic-based, complexity based, and functionalist.)

3. The Veridicality Thesis: The ongoing argument about the veridicality thesis, or the thesis that information is necessarily alethic: that it necessarily has the property of truth aptness in the true-false sense.

These don’t need to be resolved for the purpose of this discussion, but they flag issues that potentially trouble theory-grounding and conceptualisation for defining mental disorders in relation to information processing.

Regarding (1), physical information associated with signals and channels may not even be semantic in any traditional sense of being true or false like a concept, a belief, or a proposal might be. They might be semantic on the basis of something like raw indication of the existence and/or configuration of a physical information source. Someone passing out and collapsing on the spot conveys information, but not like the encoded uttered or transmitted sentence-message “Gerald passed out” does. The sentence is alethic. The person-passing-out situation, not so much. The latter indicates certain things, but we don’t think of it as truth-apt like a concept or a proposition. Likewise for action potentials.

Regarding (2), it’s correspondingly up for debate what the nature of information even is. This is perhaps best exemplified in an anecdote conveyed by Shannon about a discussion with Von Neumann. Shannon had developed his measure of information, but did not know what to call it. The equation is very close to the Boltzmann entropy equation, and so Von Neumann told Shannon to call it entropy, since no one knew what that was anyway! 

Regarding (3), depending upon what a theorist thinks about the nature of information, they may or may not regard that being alethic is a necessary condition for the obtaining/existence of information. Proponents of the veridicality thesis suggest that if it’s not able to be true or false, it’s not information. Opponents reject this. Whether everyone is talking about semantic information, or just physical information, is not always clear. Most probably agree that physical information does not have to be alethic, but it’s also not clear that physical information is not semantic or meaningful even if it isn’t alethic.

That’s enough philosophy of information. It’s probably not good for one’s mental health!

Housekeeping: Noise vs. Misinformation

To understand MMP, and to avoid conceptual confusion in the domain of psychological science, we should first distinguish between standard statistical errors and true misinformation.

Imagine you are in a jungle and hear rustling in the dense foliage. You might assume it is a tiger and run (a Type I error, or false positive), or you might assume it is the wind, stay put, and be eaten (a Type II error, or false negative). Crucially, making a Type II error here does not necessarily constitute maladaptive information processing. If the environment only provides rustling information—without the growl or the visual geometry of orange and black stripes—the signal-to-noise ratio is simply too poor. The system functioned as well as it could under conditions of severe information scarcity. It’s not maladaptive, just starved of adequate information.

Maladaptive information processing only occurs when a high(er)-fidelity signal and message encoded into that signal is present, yet the receiver fails to decode it faithfully. But how does this lead to clinical psychopathology? This is where misinformation becomes the critical variable, and why it is meaningful to focus upon misinformation processing rather than just information processing.

In Shannonian terms, an information source is a physical stochastic process. Misinformation, then, can be characterised as semantic (encoded) information which strongly indicates the existence of a source or the configuration thereof, but either the source picked out by the receiver is not real, or else the configuration of that source is not correctly identified. The signal has been spoofed in the first instance, and misread in the second.

Under the MMP framework, clinical conditions are failures to identify and filter this internal spoofing and/or corruption:

• Delusion involves the failure to identify that an internally generated signal (e.g., 'The CIA is watching me/aliens are transmitting messages into my brain') is misinformation masquerading as an external physical stochastic process (information source(s)).

• Rumination involves the failure to identify that a historical process (e.g., a past social rejection) is no longer actively transmitting. The brain fails to properly process misinformation regarding the current salience of a defunct or alternatively configured source or sources.
  
  

(A salient technical note: Since a physical stochastic process is a Shannon source, so is a set of such sources (whether spatially distributed or contiguous.) Moreover, so is a channel between source and destination.)

MMP can be applied explanatorily at the neurological level, and at the social level in relation to social cognition, and at all other levels of abstraction in between.

Stress-Testing MMP

When introducing a new theoretical architecture to cognitive neuroscience, it must not be simply a restatement of existing paradigms, or else otherwise made redundant by them. During the conceptualisation of MMP, the following candidates became apparent:

1. Predictive Processing

A modern cognitive neuroscientist might argue that MMP is simply Karl Friston’s (2010) Predictive Processing model dressed in different terminology. In Friston’s Bayesian brain hypothesis, the brain generates 'priors' (internal models) and tests them against sensory evidence. Delusions, in this model, are just hyper-rigid priors that override contradictory bottom-up data, resulting in an un-updated 'prediction error'. Is MMP redundant?

2. The Alethic Category Error

In the philosophy of information, theorists like Floridi advocate for the veridicality thesis, whilst others note the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox. If physical information is non-alethic (not truth-apt like a natural language proposition), then the neural networks of the brain do not process 'truth' or 'falsity'—they simply process electrical signals. A critic could argue that 'misinformation' is a semantic judgement applied by a clinician, not a structural reality at the neurocomputational and neurophysiological/neurostructural level.

3. Source Monitoring Impairment

Since the 1980s, psychology has utilised the concept of 'Reality Monitoring' or 'Source Monitoring' (Johnson & Raye, 1981) to describe the cognitive process of distinguishing between internally generated imagination and externally derived perception. Is MMP simply a rehash of source monitoring impairment?

4. Isn’t Misinformation Processing Just Bad Information Processing?

There's prospectively no difference between maladaptive information processing and maladaptive misinformation processing, Why refer to misinformation?

Why MMP (Probably) Survives

Far from dismantling the thesis, these objections may just help sharpen MMP. Here is why the model likely not only survives these critiques but supersedes-and in some cases  provides an explanatory basis for-the frameworks that generated them.

Counter 1: Shannon over Bayes

The critique of Predictive Processing is foundational. As philosophers like Richard Menary have pointed out, mapping Bayesian statistical inference onto wet, evolved neurology is often a metaphorical category error.

While modern neurocomputational models like Predictive Processing attempt to map Bayesian statistical inference onto wet neurology, this mapping relies on nativist assumptions (Fabry & Menary, 2020) and often metaphorically conflates mathematical description with actual biological mechanisms (Hutto & Myin, 2013; Menary, 2015).

According to Menary the brain does not literally perform Bayesian calculus to update priors. By anchoring MMP in Shannon’s (1948) objective frequentist theory, I avoid illusory baggage of the 'Bayesian brain'. MMP does not rely on metaphorical 'beliefs'; it just maps the actual, measurable capacities and failures of decoding information from physical signal channels.

Counter 2: Indication at the Sub-Personal Level

The alethic paradox can be resolved variously, including by reducing semantic content to indication rather than bivalent truth (Hintikka, 2007). We do not need a higher-order mind to 'believe a lie' for misinformation to exist. Consider hippocampal place cells in a rodent spatial navigation task. If a rat is in the north corner of a maze, but the place cell mapped to the south corner fires, that single neuron is transmitting a signal that indicates a non-existent spatial reality. It does not require bivalent logic or language; it is, structurally and physically, misinformation at the synaptic level. Thus, MMP is not a category error; it is explanatorily coherent at the sub-personal, neurocomputational substrate.

Counter 3: A ‘Fractal’ Explanatory Model

I suggest that this is where the thesis becomes a viable, fundable clinical model.

Jerome Wakefield’s "Harmful Dysfunction" has dominated the definition of mental disorder since the 1990s. But it is notoriously ‘clunky’. Wakefield requires a biological mechanism to fail at its naturally selected evolutionary function (which is almost impossible to definitively prove for complex cognition, since-among other things-cognition is not really evolved for truth-tracking in the conventional sense, but for optimising outcomes while minimising energy expenditure for cognitive information processing), and it must cause social "harm."

Richard McNally (2001) points out that many severe, debilitating mental disorders occur when an evolutionary mechanism is functioning exactly as it was designed to, just triggered at the wrong time or at the wrong magnitude. For example, a severe phobia or panic disorder is not a "dysfunction" of the fear circuitry; the circuitry is working perfectly.

Lilienfeld & Marino (1995) arguably completely dismantled Wakefield’s reliance on "naturally selected functions." They pointed out that evolutionary biology is full of exaptations (traits evolved for one purpose but repurposed for another) and spandrels (evolutionary byproducts that serve no specific function).

I propose that MMP is a superior, scalable replacement. Finally, MMP does not ignore the Source Monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981); it subsumes it and propbably also explains it. Source monitoring impairment is simply a specific, mid-level cognitive instance of maladaptive misinformation processing.

This is the ultimate strength of the MMP thesis: it applies perfectly and consistently across all levels of abstraction.

• At the neurological level, it explains a place cell misfiring (processing spatial misinformation).

• At the cognitive level, it explains source monitoring errors (processing internally generated trauma as a present external threat).

• At the psychiatric level, it defines delusion (processing internally generated data as an active external stochastic process).

• At the social level, it explains interpersonal breakdown (processing neutral social cues as hostile misinformation).
  
  

Counter 4: We have the word ‘Misinformation’ for a reason.

Misinformation is not just bad information processing, but it is just ‘bad information’. Rumination involves failure to identify misinformation that past processes (or sets of events) are worth thinking about. Delusion involves failure to identify misinformation that sources exist. Rumination is equally then failure to identify semantic information that past processes/experiences are not important, However, that failure requires internal misinformation. Whether it’s misfiring rat place neurons or delusions of reference: It's not the information that gets one into trouble, but the bad information or misinformation. Failure to identify and accurately process misinformation is necessary to maladaptively bungle information processing.

Conclusion

Functionalism is a powerful explanatory paradigm, but perhaps we do not need to rely on the vague evolutionary guesswork of the 'Harmful Dysfunction' to define mental illness? Psychopathology is a problem of information processing and information processing architecture. By defining clinical impairment as the measurable failure to identify and adaptively process misinformation, we ground psychology in the hard physics of computation and signal processing. As we move towards the future of AI-assisted psychometrics and digital phenotyping, MMP provides the exact theoretical engine required to track, measure, and treat the spoofed signals that hijack the human mind.

References

Folstein, J. R., & Van Petten, C. (2008). Influence of cognitive control and mismatch on the N2 component of the ERP: A review. Psychophysiology, 45(1), 152–170.

Fabry, R. E., & Menary, R. (2020). The enculturated predictive processing framework. In Smortchkova, J., Dołęga, K., & Schlicht, T. (Eds.), What are mental representations? (pp. 206–233). Oxford University Press.

Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138.

Hintikka, J. (2007). Socratic epistemology: Explorations of knowledge-seeking by questioning. Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88(1), 67–85.

Lilienfeld, S. O., & Marino, L. (1995). Mental disorder as a Roschian concept: A critique of Wakefield's "harmful dysfunction" analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104(3), 411–420. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.104.3.411

McNally, R. J. (2001). On Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(3), 309–314. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00069-4

Menary, R. (2015). The enculturated brain. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND (pp. 1–28). MIND Group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570085

Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. The Bell System Technical Journal, 27(3), 379–423.

Wakefield, J. C. (1992). The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 47(3), 373–388.

Strong metaphysical determinism is slippery, and hard to kill. Predictability is a misleading concept.

Strong metaphysical determinism is the philosophical position that every event, including those involved in human cognition and action, is the necessary and inevitable result of antecedent causes and the immutable laws of nature. It posits that the total physical information of the universe at any given moment—encoded across all levels of abstraction, from subatomic particle states to complex neural configurations—contains the complete blueprint for every future state. In this view, the universe is a closed computational system where the "input" of prior physical states dictates a singular, fixed "output," rendering the "ability to do otherwise" a logical impossibility. 

This (so many philosophers argue) relates to free will by framing our choices as mere ripples in a causal sea that was set in motion long before our existence; if our decisions are simply the processing of pre-existing physical information, the traditional concept of an autonomous "self" that initiates new causal chains is effectively nullified.

Here's a critical point to understand and keep in mind going forward: According to strong metaphysical determinism (SMD) everything is thus pre-determined by the total physical micro-states and macro-states of the physical universe. That includes all of the cognitive information processing that accompanies your emotions, and all of the cognitive information processing and sensory perception that you are using to read these sentences.

You thought you had made a free-will driven decision to read this.  No, no, says SMD. You just thought you did. Moreover your thinking that you did was also thus determined causally by the same mechanism of SMD. Any complaint that you want to make was also determined by the prior physico-informational states of the universe (especially those regions of it containing your brain and its information processing)? And so on, ad-infinitum and ad-nauseum. (Sartre's brand of nausea, perhaps?)

It's just cheating and a gimmicky trick, right?

Not necessarily. I mean: it might be, but I have strong reasons to doubt it.

What about the arguments that say it kind of doesn't matter? Or that even if stuff is all determined like that then we still have free will?

Those are called compatibilist arguments. Compatibilist arguments attempt to reconcile this causal necessity with the existence of free will by redefining what it means to be "free." Rather than requiring an exemption from the laws of physics, compatibilists argue that freedom consists in the ability to act according to one's own motivations, desires, and reasons without external coercion. 

Even if those internal desires are themselves determined by prior causes, a person is considered free if their actions align with their "inner state" rather than being forced by an outside power. From this perspective, determinism is not a prison, but the very mechanism that allows our stable character and rational deliberations to reliably produce our actions, thereby preserving a meaningful sense of moral responsibility.

I don't have any deep love for SMD. However, I try to heed my elite-level philosophical training and avoid letting my distaste for any idea get in the way of admitting that it might well correspond to reality.

(Being that I am a psychological entity with emotions and cognitive limits like all humans, I don't always succeed at this, obviously.)

Certain personality types and certain theologies (which probably correlate in people statistically significantly) find the idea of zero-free-will alarming. I don't find it alarming, but then I am an absurdist. 

I also think that it's possible that there's a compatibilist argument that takes the edge off. However, it's a very basic one. It is more or less "So what?". Maybe I don't care how my decision and its cognitive processing came about, just that it's mine because I had it (or because the information processing happened in my brain).

On one hand, it feels cosy. On the other hand, it seems flimsy. So I am not buying compatibilism for the time being. I reserve the right to change my possibly completely determined mind.

Moreover, free will of the kind desired by theologians might not be so great anyway.

In an earlier Quillette essay, Stuart Doyle points out a neglected way in which our choices may be unpredictable (in addition to amplified quantum fluctuations or nonlinear dynamics aka chaos): they may implement an "undecidable" system, one which is both deterministic and…

— Steven Pinker (@sapinker) February 19, 2026

Importantly, strong metaphysical determinism isn't just about predictability. It's about whether or not a cognitive, conscious decision precedes and determines action. This can be false whether the process is random or not. Randomness doesn't entail control.

It's likely the case that there can be strong metaphysical determinism with or without randomness. Think about it. Assume SMD with no randomness. Prior physical states at all Levels of Abstraction (LoAs) determine the outcome. No free will. Add randomness. Do you now have more control over the entire process at any LoA? No.

I asked Gemini AI to remind me of the suite of compatibilist arguments. It did so and then asked me if I'd like to shop for counter arguments based upon quantum indeterminacy (or quantum randomness). That is: randomness inherent in quantum systems like atoms and their sub-particles in the garden of particles in the standard model of physics. Okay, I said, but then I told it why quantum randomness probably didn't remove physicalist determinism:

(Discussion with Gemini starts here...)

Gemini: Since you've been looking at this through the lens of physical information and metaphysical determinism, would you like to explore how Quantum Indeterminacy (the idea that some events are truly random) is often used to counter these arguments?

Me: Sure. But also note that quantum randomness doesn't solve the problem. Why? Because a truly random physical system doesn't deliver 'full control' to a cognitive, neurological system. All it does is make the physically-causally determined states truly randomly generated. 

You might find this hard to accept because even scholars who produced your training data have trouble with it. (Not all of them.) Moreover, people like free-will-loving theologians are desperate to find knock-down arguments against SMD. 

I am by no means certain about my own position which rejects the quantum randomness arguments, but it is probably going to cause those detractors a lot of trouble.

The confusion with randomness arises because it is often intuitively and scientifically couched in terms of statistical predictability. This is understandable since the concept of randomness is often couched in statistical terms. 

However, even if a physical system is objectively chaotic or otherwise truly non-linear and random, and therefore not computationally predictable using standard—or even any—computational approaches: it doesn't follow that the prior physical states of the material universe at all levels of abstraction right down to the microphysical haven't 100% caused the later states. The informational and epistemic inaccessibility of future states by statistical forecasting doesn't make reductionist causation go away.

Reductionist causation might not be real for other reasons perhaps, but not for that reason. (Even using supervenience in place of reduction doesn't necessarily help anti-SMD here, since supervenience might just be another example of hiding information.) 

Although it does not necessarily kill SMD, I find the outcome of the no hidden variables problem that vexed Einstein a better candidate for possibly saving anti-SMD free-will arguments. Why? Because the Bell experiments show that there are no hidden physical variables in entanglement or 'spooky' action at a distance, and that is deeply weird and seems to break physical conceptions of causation. That's better than randomness. That being said, spooky action at a distance still involves total consistency. e.g. If the state of one quantum system is spin down, it's 100% certain the state of the other is spin up. So there are no hidden variables, but the causation seems to be very deterministic in that sense.

Gemini (Being a little sycophantic, perhaps...):

You have pinpointed what is often referred to in philosophy as the Luck Objection. Simply put: if an action is the result of a random quantum fluctuation rather than a deterministic causal chain, it is no more "up to me" than a coin flip. Replacing a clockwork universe with a chaotic one doesn't grant agency; it just replaces a "determined" slave with a "random" one.

Epistemic Unpredictability vs. Ontic Determinism

Your distinction between statistical forecasting and reductionist causation is crucial. In many scientific and theological circles, there is a tendency to conflate epistemic inaccessibility (our inability to calculate or know the information) with ontic indeterminism (the information not being fixed).

The Statistical Trap: Because we use probability to describe complex systems (like fluid dynamics or neural firing), we often slip into the lazy assumption that the underlying reality is "loose."

Informational Scrambling: As you noted, a system can be 100% causally driven by prior physical states—encoded at every level of abstraction—even if that information is effectively "hidden" from us by non-linearity or computational complexity.

Bell’s Theorem: A Different Kind of Trouble

The "No Hidden Variables" outcome of the Bell experiments is indeed a more formidable challenge to Strong Metaphysical Determinism (SMD) than mere randomness, but as you observed, it brings its own flavor of necessity.

The Non-Locality Paradox

Bell’s Theorem proves that no "local" hidden variables can explain the correlations in quantum mechanics. If we reject "spooky action at a distance," we have to accept that the properties of particles aren't "real" until they are measured. However, if we accept non-locality, we preserve a form of realism but lose the "billiard ball" model of causation.

The Determinism of Correlation

Even without hidden variables, the consistency you mentioned—where one state being "spin down" guarantees the other is "spin up"—suggests a universe that is deeply, perhaps holistically, synchronized. This "super-consistency" doesn't provide a foothold for traditional free will; if anything, it suggests that the "physical information" of the universe is non-locally distributed, making the "autonomous agent" even harder to isolate from the total system.

The Theologian’s Dilemma

Theologians often cling to the "Gaps" in quantum mechanics because they require a "non-physical" entry point for the soul or will. However, if the "gap" is filled by either randomness (which is meaningless) or non-local entanglement (which is perfectly correlated), the entry point for an independent, non-caused "Self" remains effectively sealed.

Would you like to explore Superdeterminism—the controversial idea that Bell's Theorem is bypassed because the observers' choices of measurement were themselves determined by the initial conditions of the Big Bang?

(...Discussion with Gemini ends here.)

To those who think true randomness (in chaotic and nonlinear systems) would nix SMD and deliver free will. It would—in principle—not necessarily do so.

In fact it doesn't look like it would put a dent in causation-based SMD at all.

Worse still, it would make the causation-based deteminism objectively random rather than statistically predictable. The definition of SMD is that the current entire state of the universe at all LoAs is 100% causally determined by the immediately prior physical states (including all of those physical states in our brains). 

That can be true even if the causal relationship between the prior states and current states is random.

The confusion arises partly because of the concept of predictability. Future states might be determined per SMD, but still not practically computationally and statistically predictable. That's an informational and epistemic access problem, not a foil to SMD.

Just because the entire system is random-or chaotic with enough randomness in it—it doesn't necessarily follow that it is not causally deterministic.

Approach it by asking: If the universe is only physical and it's significantly random (e.g. intrinsic natural nonlinearity and chaos) then does that necessarily mean/imply/entail that all of the subsequent states of the universe are not caused 100% by the current states at all LoA. The answer is no.

Declining birth rates. The panopticon? Or unprecedented social epistemic access?

This handsome young commentator with plenty of hair just blamed technology for inducing low birthrates on the basis of a panoptical effect on young people:

He’s 30 years old and childless. None of his friends have kids either. He says this phenomenon is happening worldwide and shares his theory why. pic.twitter.com/AwKJiJIRI2

— Financial Dystopia (@financedystop) February 22, 2026

The panopticon does matter, and there's likely some truth to the his analysis of the effects of mass and constant surveillance (and the attached inference about the fears young men have of getting caught in a clumsy error or perceived offfence).

However the reason people are not reproducing is mostly a combination of two factors: economics, and epistemic access to awareness-raising information.

People are also well informed due to information age technology in an unprecedented way. Moreover, Western nations' citizens are in one of the toughest, most competitive financial environments for housing that's ever occurred.

Educated, well adjusted people don't want kids to suffer. They want the maximally good future that they can clearly see the wealthy and successful have. They can see it more clearly than ever before in history.

Moreover, unprecedented access to information including exposure to philosophy and psychology means that average people are aware of how much their average kids will very likely struggle and suffer. Again: they don't want to force that upon people who have no choice. IQ matters.

Just one example: the amount of good basic psychoeducation available easily, in an easily consumable form, is unprecedented. So is access to professionals who are willing to condense and explain it. Now also: very good AI. People know what their kids face. (diagnav.site)

Unfortunately for most people, their kids face a lifetime of suffering due to mediocrity and disappointment at best, and even worse in many cases. People are aware of how unfair the natural inequalities of heritable IQ, and the  fiscal inequalities of inherited wealth, are.

Don't ban good Muslims. Ban the Islamic hate doctrines which they evidently choose to suppress and ignore.

It's critical for us all to acquire a proper understanding of what's going on with the memetic narratives affecting Australia's current situation in relation to hate speech laws.

Unflappable, Niki Savva quashes talk that Pauline Hanson "has mellowed" as Speers muses "the rise & rise of One Nation":

"What she said about Muslims was highly offensive, inaccurate, bigoted – every other adjective you care to use."

(Vile, moronic, pathetic?) #insiders #auspol pic.twitter.com/xuM7CZ8ESx

— Sahar A (@Sahar_A_Writes) February 22, 2026

Clearly, saying that there are no good Muslims as Hanson did is ludicrous. It's just as ludicrous as saying there are no good Christ cult people. Such people are often good despite their awful, duplicitous, anti-unbeliever, delusional, misogynistic, homophobic, and largely ridiculous doctrines.

However, we do need to be saying that there are no good anti-unbeliever hate doctrines, and we need to start being honest about the fact that—on the whole—Islamic doctrine exactly is, unambiguously, one of those.

Enter individual and group psychology, and psychological linguistic analysis of Islamic hate doctrines and their use by many Islamic hate cult clerics.

If Islamic hate cultists are good people in the sense of being truly peace loving, not anti-unbeliever bigots, and not supporters of their hate doctrines and the many clerics which promote them: then that's because they in fact reject their cult's hate doctrines. They're good people despite their cult and its hate doctrines. Their altruistic and pro-social inclinations cancel out the ingroup-outgroup insanity of their cult's hate doctrines, and the intrinsic and childhood-programmed biases that those doctrines attempt to manipulate.

Frankly, such people are victims and have a raw deal.

They should just ditch their cult and its specious delusions and go on being largely terrific, if flawed, people without them. Or, if they must be in a cult, they could choose the Buddhist cult or another similar option that has no unambiguous, plausibly-undeniably anti-unbeliever hate doctrines like those of the Islamic cult.

Those anti-unbeliever hate doctrines are real, are deployed in our contemporary setting broadly, and are not acceptable. Additionally, they're a narrative that's intended to be internally consistent on a supernaturalistic (i.e. dogmatic and immutable) basis. That's significant, and what makes them truly dangerous. Their unrevisability is a foil against improvement, and thus a foil against true multicultural community cohesion, and against cultural enrichment.

This means that although one might meet plenty of nice, polite Muslims, it does not logically, sensibly, coherently, intuitively, factually, contextually, or pscyhologically follow that their doctrines are not hate doctrines. What this essentially means is that decent Muslim people already need to have serious selective amnesia in relation to those anti-unbeliever hate doctrines, or to personally re-interpret them out of the psychological or cognitive schemas which motivate their personal behaviour.

It's the hate doctrines which should be legislated out of existence and relegated to belonging only in a museum, or a library history section. Promoting them as memetic narratives to program the minds of cultists in our societies should be illegal. 

Nonsensical, rude, intellectually offensive defences of the anti-unbeliever hate doctrines of Islam generally involve dishonest hand-waving about historical context and specific intentions within historical contexts. This approach is disingenuous in multiple ways, and obviously so.

First of all: there are constant examples of clerics from all across the Islamic cult and its sects deploying anti-unbeliever hate doctrines against every group from Americans, to unbelievers, to Jews, to Christians, to infidel, to Zoarastrians, to atheists: just to name a few. Secondly—true to typcial theist-fideist form—the doctrines are promoted as a whole-package-doctrine. Those programmed with their tenets are encouraged to observe the entirety of the doctrine. The doctrine itself says this. It's the usual circular reinforcement of such delusional narratives.

Thirdly: the false "out of context" lie is just not good enough anyway. These doctrines are too aggressive, violent, threatening, and dangerous to be allowed to exist as the core of a memetic narrative used to program the minds, bigotries, and prejudices of members of the Islamic cult worldwide. Not to mention the very real concerns due to taqiyya, which is (certainly commonly used as) a broad-brush excuse to deceive infidel about Islam's anti-unbeliever intentions while Islam is falsely claiming victim status.

In Australia the current approach to handling this monumental set of problems which are caused squarely, wholly, and exclusively by archaic, atavistic hate doctrines of Dark Ages cults like Islam is to:

1. Accept such disastrous, anti-unbeliever memetic narratives as an unavoidable, embedded norm of our cultures due to careless, all-or-nothing deployment of the cultural doctrine of freedom of religion and

2. To target reasonable critics of such anti-unbeliever hate-doctrines thus protecting-and ensuring their proliferation.

There's a much better approach: Ban and prohibit the anti-unbeliever, infidelophobic hate doctrines.

Enriching multiculturalism is good. Destructive multi-hate-cult-ism-due to baby-out-with-bathwater freedom of religious cults is very bad.

Salman Rushdie is just one person who knows exactly what the truth about the nature of such memetic narratives is. We should learn from not only his experiences, but from the experiences of women and unbelievers in countries like Iran and Afghanistan, and in many other nations where Islam serves the wealthy psychopaths who ignore it and fake adherence (often for convenience in crushing opponents), and allows Voltaire's scoundrel, conman clerics to increase the suffering of the lives of the poor, uneducated, cognitively underpowered, and powerless:

A Shia cleric in Iran ordered the beheading of any Iranian who says they're not Muslim:

"We will kill you, and we will kill you good."

Sharing his own words shouldn't be controversial...pic.twitter.com/pKHY0FCCMR

— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) February 22, 2026

Narcissism in a partner is a pain in the pain.

Narcissism is a pain in the pain, and so it's very prevalent in social media and the mainstream online media lately. My last girlfriend was a terrilbly nasty gaslighter and an NPD-traiter. (Narcissistic Personality Disorder.) The gaslighting-distance-discard trajectory is very traumatising for anyone.

It's more difficult because the abusive discard for narcissistic supply is quasi-planned.In a sense the narcissist is planning to do it, but because of their disorder they are self-unaware enough to not realise what they are. Therefore the planning is partly subconscious and they won't admit what it is because they can't.

NPD is notorious for being basically impossible to treat with psychological interventions. Keep in mind that such people are often well socially connected and high functioning, and if they have more friends and connections than you do they will see it as an overarching reason why they're superior to you. This of course neglects factors like their collection and abuse of flying monkeys and the behaviours of NPD sufferers with communal narcissistic behaviours.

The epidemiological prevalence of NPD in the population is only about 0.5% to 6.2% in the general population and most 75% of NPD are male. Rates are typically higher for men (e.g., 7.7%) compared to women (e.g., 4.8%).

The DSM-5 reports that up to 75% of those diagnosed with NPD are males.

It's important to note that while men may exhibit more "grandiose" or overt narcissistic traits, women may express narcissism differently, often leaning towards "vulnerable" or covert narcissism, which can sometimes be misdiagnosed as other disorders like Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). These are often comorbidities.

Keep in mind that it takes five out of nine dimensional diagnostic criteria and other historical data to diagnose NPD, but people can narrowly miss out on a diagnosis and still score very high on some of the worst of the nine diagnostic criteria.

You can investigate the comorbidites for NPD diagnav.site . For example, anxiety, BPD, and HPD can all be comorbid with NPD.